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Remarks at the Nova University Forum
Alan Dershowitz*
Thank you so much. It's really a pleasure to be down here in warm
climates. I have really enjoyed having met so many of you before and
look forward to meeting many of you afterwards and look forward to
the questions which I, find contentious and stimulating. I met last night
with some people from the Law School and the University and I find
this place to be a real miracle. The fact that a new university and a
new law school, relatively new at least, could have been established
during these trying times of budgetary constraint is a real credit to
President Fischler, Dean Abrams, and Vice-President Goldstein and I
really want to wish them continued good luck.
While watching the news this morning with the first anniversary of
the invasion in the Middle East, thinking about the current events and
about the world in terms of how it's changed in the last year, particu-
larly the destruction of the Soviet Union, I was reminded of a visit I
made to the Soviet Union back in 1974, on behalf of dissidents, talking
about hopeless causes in those days, people like Natan Scharansky and
Edith Udell. I remember meeting with Edith Udell who was then going
to jail the next morning for the terrible crime of simply wanting to join
her family in Israel and having protested about that. I met her in front
of St. Basil at five o'clock in the morning in order to avoid detection by
the KGB. I expected to meet a forlorn and distraught woman who was
facing the inevitability of imprisonment and instead I found a bouncy
and vivacious woman waiting to confront the Soviet legal system. I re-
member she said, "Before we begin our serious discussion, Professor,
tell me a joke or a story that Americans tell which reflects life in
America." So I thought a moment and I said, alright, and I told her
the story of poor Mr. Schwartz who got sick one day in Boston and was
taken to the Massachusetts General Hospital, the fanciest pavilion ...
where only presidents and actors go. And he was there for two or three
* Professor of Law, Harvard University Law School. LL.B., Yale Law School,
1962; B.A., Brooklyn College, 1959. Professor Dershowitz is the well-known constitu-
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days, getting great care. Finally he insisted that he wanted to go to the
smaller little hospital down the road, the Beth Israel Hospital. It wasn't
as good as Massachusetts General. So he goes to the Beth Israel Hospi-
tal and the young intern there, who was a little jealous that he wasn't
an intern at Massachusetts General said, "Mr. Schwartz, I see you'd
agree with us here that the medical care in Massachusetts General is
not what it's cracked up to be." And Schwartz said, "no, the medical
care was fantastic. I can't complain." He said, "it must be the nurses".
"No, the nurses were wonderful. I can't complain" "Was it the X-ray
technicians?" "No, the X-rays were excellent. I can't complain." "It
must have been the food there, all the watercress salad they gave you."
"No, the food was very good. I can't complain." He said, "then why
did you switch to our hospital.?" And Schwartz said, "simple, here I
can complain!"
And I said that was the essence of being an American. Here we
can complain. In fact, not only can we, but we must. It's part of our
obligation as a democracy. Indeed, there is even a constitutional
amendment about it; the right to petition government for the redress of
grievances. That's a fancy word for complaint.
So, today, in the spirit of the First Amendment, I am going to
complain a little bit. I am going to exercise my right to complain. I
want to complain about the fact that, as we see emerging nations
throughout the world, particularly in Eastern Europe, expecting and
demanding more freedom and more rights and more liberties, that we
in this country seem to be neglecting our rights. We seem to be taking
them for granted; we seem to be regarding them often as inconve-
niences. We are impatient about these rights, particularly the rights of
minorities. These rights excite us at a time when we are beginning our
celebration of the two-hundredth anniversary of the Bill of Rights, an
unusual document we talk about as constitutional amendments. They
are really not constitutional amendments. The first ten amendments to
our Constitution are part and body of the Constitution. The Constitu-
tion itself, which is a document not of rights but of power, would never
have been enacted had it not been for a promise that there was going to
be a Bill of Rights to restrain the power of the central government.
People like Thomas Jefferson, who said in 1787, "were it left to me to
decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or
newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to
prefer the latter." Thomas Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton and others
told us we didn't have to choose. We can have both newspaper and
government. We could have both freedom of speech and the power of
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the government to defend us in case of war.
The irony, and one repeated I think throughout American history,
is that it was generally the citizens themselves who have sought to con-
strain our rights in the interests of safety, security and convenience.
Sometimes the interests were even less compelling: xenophobia, bigotry,
intolerance. The greatest crisis of constitutional democracy occurs
when the majority demands that minority rights be abridged. The con-
flicts between the power of the many and the rights of the few raise the
most profound questions about our theory of government.
You know, it's interesting, when you have government by the mi-
nority, as you had in communist countries, and as you have in most
countries throughout the world today, such as in the Middle East and
Asia, then rights are often majority rights. In South Africa, the rights
are the rights of the majority who try to participate in government. But
when you have a real democracy, such as the one that we have in this
country, then rights tend to be the rights of minorities. Power is the
power of the majority. How does a democracy justify its Bill of Rights
which allow minorities to overrule the majority? Every time one of our
first ten amendments to the Constitution or any of the other provisions,
the 14th, 13th, 15th amendments are also part of the structure of our
government before the Civil War and the close of the war amendments
were really part of the peace treaty that resolved the conflict between
North and South, between slavery and freedom; every time the Consti-
tution is invoked to strike down legislatively-enacted statutes that con-
strain a popularly-elected official, we have made an uneasy compromise
with democracy. In that sense our Bill of Rights is somewhat analogous
to the Ten Commandments or other constraints upon majority will
within a religion.
I am reminded of the good news, bad news story when Moses
came back from Sinai bearing the Commandments and then he said,
"Ladies and Gentlemen, the good news is I got him down to ten. But
the bad news is that he still kept the prohibition against adultery."
Well, that might not have been so popular in those days but, nonethe-
less, it is one of the Commandments.
Now, religious society and secular society, of course, are different.
Throughout our two hundred year span as a constitutional democracy,
many efforts, theoretical, jurisprudential have been made to justify the
constraints on majority action. Though no single accepted rationale has
ever emerged as the definitive one, the general consensus has been that
our experiment with restraining the powers of the majority have
worked tolerably well. The greatest threats to our liberties have always
19921 1011
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come from tangent majorities, impatient about the rights of minorities.
I always remember comedian Yakov Smirnoff, who came from the So-
viet Union, saying, "The day I got my citizenship and stood at the
Statue of Liberty this great feeling overcame me and I started to ask
myself, what can we do to keep these damned immigrants out!" There
is a sense, when you become a majority, how would you feel about the
threats of minorities.
From the very beginning of our history, Thomas Jefferson, Adams,
and Hamilton were willing to tolerate limitations on our freedom. The
Alien and Seditious Acts were virtually contemporaneous with our
First Congress. And what did it do? It undercut the First Amendment
quite dramatically. The trial of Aaron Burr for sedition virtually came
at the time of the beginning of our constitutional rights. Thank God we
had a Chief Justice in place, John Marshall, who presided over that
trial and defined treason so narrowly and specifically that we were able
to live within the constraints of the First Amendment. Slavery in this
country! Thurgood Marshall has pointed out, that the Constitution
started out describing slavery and defining African-Americans as three-
fifths of a person. It's not the kind of a Constitution that could have
endured forever but for the amendment process. Nativism, the persecu-
tion of immigrants, segregation, racism, anti-Japanese hysteria at the
beginning of the Second World War, the detention of 100,000 people of
American descent because of their racial background, and the hysteria
over McCarthyism. Last night I was privileged to read a brilliant law
review article, really a book, written by Professor Marc Rohr of your
faculty here, entitled "Communists and the First Amendment: The
Shaping of Freedom of Advocacy in the Cold War Years", which tell
us the terrible story of how we almost lost our First Amendment in our
quest to end communism both here and abroad and the great victory of
both the First Amendment and our fight against tyranny and commu-
nism. We didn't need to sacrifice the First Amendment to destroy com-
munism. Communism self-destructed because of its absence of a First
Amendment, because of the absence of a way of expressing oneself
under totalitarian regimes. And I think we have a great deal to be
proud of as to how we eventually allowed communism to defeat itself,
without allowing it to become tyranny in this country and to repress
our own Bill of Rights.
Of course our Bill of Rights has provided far less than perfect pro-
tection against the excesses of tangent majorities. But it has continued
and contributed, and continues to contribute to the prevention of popu-
lar tyranny. The First Amendment certainly has occasionally imposed
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unnecessarily restrictive checks on majority power. Surely during the
New Deal the way in which the courts used the first ten amendments
and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution to prevent social
welfare legislature from being enacted, shows one excess. Many Ameri-
cans believes that the Warren Court went too far in protecting the
rights of criminals in relation to the interests of the victims. Reasonable
people could have different views on that one and my view is not in
accordance with that popular conception but nonetheless I understand
the opposing points of view.
But this balance is very much a part of a dynamic system of gov-
ernment which eschews too much concentration of power. American
sovereignty! You know, it's interesting, when Tocqueville came to
America, 150 years ago, he came looking for where sovereignty led. He
was use to Britain where you can find sovereignty in either the King or
in the Parliament, or in France where you can find sovereignty in the
president. He came to the United States and he thought he would find
sovereignty in the president and they said, no, the president isn't really
sovereign. The legislature isn't really sovereign. The judiciary isn't re-
ally sovereign. And he went back in a state of confusion because he was
looking in the wrong place. Sovereignty in America is not located
within a particular branch of government. It is located within a process
of government; the process of checks and balances; the process of sepa-
ration of power. It's very hard to see a process in a day. You can't take
a snapshot of a process. You can only take a videotape of a process.
But Tocqueville wasn't.here long enough to see the process in opera-
tion. But our concept of checks and balances, and our process of sepa-
ration of powers are an extremely subtle and well-functioning form of
sovereignty. But beyond that abstract concept is a common sense dis-
trust of untrammeled authority, born out of the very histories and ex-
periences which combined to create the very diverse American
character.
We are a nation of minorities. We are a nation of dissidents, of
immigrants, of risk-takers, of skeptics, of pariahs, of experimenters,
and of naysayers. We are distrustful and ornery mavericks. We are a
tyrant's nightmare and an anarchist's dream. Our slogans, anachronis-
tic as they may seem, tell us something profound about our sense of
individualism. Don't tread on me! Give me liberty or give me death!
Show me! Question authority! Yesterday's quaint slogans have often
become today's rude bumper stickers, T-shirt logos or wall graffiti. But
whatever the medium, the American message has been similar for over
two centuries. We need breathing room. We will not submit to regi-
19921 1013
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss3/18
Nova Law Review
mentation. We demand our liberties.
Against this historical landscape, the Bill of Rights can be viewed
as an insurance policy protecting against tyranny. As with all insurance
policies, payment of the annual premium is no fun at all. You get noth-
ing material in return, at least not right away. We pay a heavy pre-
mium every time a guilty criminal is freed in the name of the Fourth
Amendment; every time a pornographer or a racist is permitted to in-
still their hate in the name of the First Amendment; every time a girl is
allowed to make a "wrong choice" in the interests of freedom of choice;
every time an indigent seminary student is denied governmental tuition
payments for his or her religious education that would violate the Es-
tablishment Clause.
But as with any insurance policy, we pay these premiums in ex-
change for partial protection against disasters that are specifically un-
predictable and generally inevitable. No insurance policy can prevent
death or disability but it can ease their ravages. Sometimes a good in-
surance policy even reduces the risk by requiring those who control to
take precautions as conditions to reducing premium payments. Like-
wise, the Bill of Rights by itself cannot prevent oppression. I think it
was Learned Hand who said, "If there is oppression in the souls and
hearts of the American people, no Bill of Rights can ever keep it from
coming to fruition. And if there is liberty in the hearts and souls of the
American people, no Bill of Rights may be necessary." As to the latter,
I think he was wrong, with all due respect. The Bill of Rights is neces-
sary. It slows down the passions. It makes us think long term. It makes
us understand that there are minority rights to be balanced against ma-
jority rights. It sends an important message to those who would seek
power through dubious means. We Americans take our rights seriously
and you ignore that message at considerable political risk. The down-
falls of Richard Nixon, Joseph McCarthy, Eichmann are great testa-
ments to the American allergy to traffic in constitutional rights. During
the past two hundred years, we have paid many constitutional premi-
ums and accumulated much equity in our collective insurance policy.
What you have here is not merely a term policy; it is a whole life policy
and an investment in our future as a free country.
There are those today who would turn our Constitution into a nar-
row, authoritarian tool for advancement of particularistic philosophies,
doctrines and even religions. Evangelist Pat Robertson has called the
Constitution a "Christian document" and has promised to "rescue us
from non-Christian judges who have been misconstruing it in a secular
manner." Presidential Candidate Pat Buchanan has made similar
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points, though he has added the cosmetic of calling it a "Judeo-Chris-
tian document" hoping perhaps to make it more acceptable to Jews as
well as Christians. It won't work. The Constitution is not a document
for some, even for the majority. It is a document for all. It is a docu-
ment for the increasing number of non-Christians or non-Jews who are
coming to this country, and who are making this country the most di-
verse and heterogeneous experiment in the history of humankind. Some
politicians view the Bill of Rights as an encumbrance to their political
programs which should be interpreted grudgingly to somehow reflect an
original intent, an intent they claim to know. But if there was any orig-
inal intent in the minds of the Framers, it was general and broad to
create an enduring charter of liberty capable of responding to changing
conditions.
I remember having a debate recently with Chief Justice Rehn-
quist. Chief Justice Rehnquist, I think, doesn't like me because the
New York Times asked me a couple of years ago what did I think of
the fact that more Americans knew the name of Judge Wapner than
the name Justice Rehnquist. And I said I was not surprised, Wapner
was a better judge. But in the course of my debate with Chief Justice
Rehnquist about judicial intent, I told a story that comes from the Tal-
mud. The Talmud is that great, old Jewish document which is akin to
the United States Reports. It simply reflects all the cases, stories and
controversies that occurred during several millennia of Jewish litiga-
tion. The story that I wanted to tell was the story of the great Rabbi
Eliezer, who was engaged in an acrimonious dispute with some other
rabbis in the seminary about the meaning of a particularly arcane pro-
vision in the Bible. Eliezer was so certain that he was correct in his
interpretation of the Bible that -he brought forward every imaginable
argument. But the other rabbis did not accept his interpretation. Fi-
nally, in excess frustration, he invoked the original intent of the Author
of the Bible, God Himself. Eliezer implored, "if the Halakah, the au-
thoritative meaning of the Law, agrees with me, let it be proved from
Heaven." Whereupon a booming heavenly Voice cried out to the
others, "Why do you dispute with Rabbi Eliezer, seeing that the Hala-
kah, the Jewish law, agrees with him?" Pretty authoritative evidence,
that the original author would say it. But another of the rabbis, Joshua,
rose up and rebuked God for interfering in this very human dispute.
"Thou hast long since written the Torah and we pay no attention to a
heavenly voice." The message was clear: God's children were telling
their Father it is our job, as the rabbis, to interpret and give meaning
to the Torah that you gave us so many years ago. You gave us a docu-
19921 1015
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ment to interpret and a methodology for interpreting it. Now, please,
leave us to do our job. According to the tradition, God laughed, agreed,
and said to the angels, "My children have defeated Me in argument."
Well, if no single person, divine or otherwise, can tell us what the au-
thoritative meaning of the Bible is, certainly the idea of looking for
divine intervention to explain to us general phrases in the Constitution
is always going to be an exercise in futility. I can just imagine Jeffer-
son, Hamilton and Madison in constitutional heaven today, looking at
Justice Rehnquist, Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia looking and poring
over the test of the constitutional amendments saying, "They must
have meant this!" And Hamilton, Jefferson and Madison saying "We
just never thought of those models! It never occurred to us how to deal
with wire tapping! It never occurred to us how to deal with current
problems that are facing the American people. Please use your own
common sense, use your own experience, use your own points of view
subjected to widespread debate. But come, please, to your own
conclusions."
I worry very much about the insensitivity that so many have today
towards civil liberties. You know, if you ask people in America, are you
are a civil libertarian? They all say, oh, yes, sure, we agree with civil
liberties. Do you agree with the First Amendment? Oh, sure, we agree
with the First Amendment. Do you believe in the Bill of Rights? Sure,
we believe in the Bill of Rights. But then when you ask them more
particularistic questions, it turns out that for most Americans, civil lib-
erties and the Bill of Rights mean rights for us; rights when we think
our interests are disturbed. They have so little understanding about the
concepts of rights for others. I think about Patrick Buchanan who
never, ever supports the rights of people charged with crimes. He is
always in favor of a law and order approach. He always believes in the
rights of victims. But he's upset when it comes to Nazi war criminals.
Pat Buchanan has never found a Nazi war criminal that he couldn't
support. In fact, Allen Ryan, head of the Justice Department's Special
Investigation Office recently said, "Many people are asking why is Pat
Buchanan so in love with Nazi war criminals?" You have to ask your-
self that question, what is it about Nazi war criminals that would at-
tract the attention of a Pat Buchanan who generally doesn't support
the rights of any criminal defense.
Or, to switch from right to left, look at William Kunstler, who
said, "I defend only people who I love." I'll never forget the time when
he asked me to defend him, having been charged with contempt of
court in the Chicago Seven case, I said, "Bill, I'll defend you but I
1016 [Vol. 16
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don't love you." And he then threw his arms around me and kissed me
and said, "It's good enough that I love you, Alan." Well, Bill doesn't
love me anymore, even though he won his case, because I have been
very critical of his selective use of the Bill of Rights.
But take an issue that certainly attracted the attention of so many
people down here for so long a period of time. How many radical femi-
nists do we know that believe in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution
except when it comes to the rights of people charged with rape where
they would suspend constitutional rights. Catherine MacKinnon said
recently in an article in the New York Times, that we ought to change
the burden of proof on rapes from beyond a reasonable doubt to a sim-
ple by a preponderance of the evidence, as a kind of an affirmative
action program towards the rights of women. Or right to lifers, who
have discovered within the Constitution, a right to protest or a new
right, a right to life, but who don't support or have any sympathy for
the right to choice. Or many of my Jewish friends who believe in free-
dom of' speech but who were on the side of the city of Skokie when it
tried to ban Nazis from marching through the city of Skokie, finding
within the Bill of Rights an exception where it suited their own particu-
lar convenience or ideology. How many African-Americans do we know
who believe in freedom of speech except when it comes to the right of a
white diplomat from South Africa to speak at a university campus.
How many gays do we know who support the right of freedom of ex-
pression for gays but would ban homophobic speech. How often we see
with the political-correctness doctrines today on campus; a selective in-
vocation of rights when it serves the interests of the left but not the
interests of the right. How many times do we hear from those who are
wealthy that the most important right in the Constitution is the right to
preserve property; that the right of liberty certainly can be compro-
mised in the interest of property. How many poor people or advocates
for the poor see in the Constitution only a welfare right but not a right
of property. How many of those who are religious read only the first
part of the First Amendment talking about free exercise, and neglect
the Establishment Clause. And how many who are irreligious see in the
First Amendment only the Establishment Clause, without looking at
the opposite side of the coin, the right to practice one's religion freely.
I want to spend the last few minutes of my talk on one particular
right that nobody ever advocates. That is, the rights of criminal defend-
ants. A job that I have taken over the past twenty-five or thirty years.
It's a very thankless right because virtually all of the other rights I
have spoken about have advocates. There are people who vote and who
19921 1017
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defend the rights of the religion, the rights of life, the rights of property
and others. But when it comes to defending the rights of people
charged with crimes, you don't win elections on a platform of saying "I
am for the criminal". I have often wondered, in Florida, the only state
I know of where people run for the office of public defender, what's the
program, what's the platform? "I am going to be the best public de-
fender in Broward County! I am going to free more guilty people than
my predecessor! I am going to invoke more constitutional rights! You
are going to see a higher rate of recidivism under me than under any of
my predecessor!" You run that way or you run by saying, "Vote for
me. I won't fight that hard. I'll put one arm behind my back and I'll
protect all of you. You should put me in as public defender." That's
how you run for public defender because advocating the rights of crimi-
nal defendants is so unpopular. It's no surprise that you don't see any
Nobel prizes for those who defend the rights of criminal defendants.
Nor would you ever see a president of the United States get up and
make the following speech. "I am now going to appoint as the new
justice to the Supreme Court a man or a woman who has devoted her
life or his life to defending pornographers, rapists, murderers. That's
what we need on the Supreme Court. Someone who will speak up for
the rights of thieves, disenfranchised elements of our society." You
know, you ask yourself, how did he ever get on the United States Su-
preme Court. Name me justices who have ever stood up for the rights
of criminal defendants and I will tell you a one word answer, accident,
total accident. When you think of the great justices who have sup-
ported the rights of criminal defendants over time, who have they
been? Earl Warren, appointed as governor of California, former dis-
trict attorney, former attorney general, tough "law and order" type and
he gets on the Supreme Court and suddenly he is in favor of the rights
of criminal defendants. William Brennan, never had any reputation as
an advocate for the rights of defendants. He had been a justice in the
New Jersey Supreme Court where most of his cases had to do with
sewage and other phenomena in New Jersey. Suddenly he gets on the
United States Supreme Court and is freed from the constraints of polit-
ics and he becomes a beacon on the rights of criminal defendants. The
only justice in history ever appointed to the Supreme Court who has
had a record and a reputation for defending the rights of criminal de-
fendants was Thurgood Marshall and who was appointed, I think,
largely and importantly, because for two hundred years we have not
had an African-American on the United States Supreme Court. The
next African-American appointed to the Supreme Court surely was not
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one who supported the rights of criminal defendants, perhaps except if
they vere charged with harassment. We'll wait and see how those cases
turn out. But the rights of criminal defendants certainly have been a
benchmark of how we define our constitutional system and yet we see
people appointed to the Court for all kinds of other reasons but not
because of their defense of the rights of criminal defendants.
lit's a hard job. Some of you probably are criminal defense lawyers
or at least are friends of criminal defense lawyers. We've all had the
same experience. When we defend somebody who is popular everybody
loves you. "Oh, you are doing a great job." You know, when I speak in
the financial community, people come over and pat me on the back and
say "we really appreciate that you are representing Michael Milken.
We think he is unjustly accused of a crime." Or when I represent a
Doctor Spock people from the radical community say "oh you are do-
ing a terrific job. You know, we really like the fact that you are repre-
senting somebody charged with that particular . . . ." Or if I represent
somebody who, as mentioned before, was accused of pornography, a
Harry Reems in the latest film made right down here twenty or twenty-
five years ago, the people from that industry find you to be something
of a hero. But everybody disagrees with most of the people we re-
present most of the time. My bellwether is always my mother and my
mother finds most of my clients thoroughly disagreeable. She happens
to like Leona Helmsley. But it's rare to find any criminal defense law-
yer who can continue to represent defendants who will give them any
kind of popularity contests. A great lawyer from Florida, Roy Black,
when involved in the defense of William Kennedy Smith, made as
many enemies as he made friends. The New York Times op-ed piece
recently called him sexist for using words like hysterical to describe the
complaining witness. I thought it was a poor choice of words myself.
Others regard him as a great hero and a great lawyer. I think the one
thing you can say about many lawyers, particularly a lawyer like Black
is that he was thoroughly professional. He did a very, very good job.
He played by the rules. He did what a defense attorney is supposed to
do.
You know the famous old story of the defense lawyer who cabled
his client, "justice has prevailed." His client cabled back,,"appeal im-
mediately!" We are not necessarily in the justice business. That is, the
American system of criminal justice is based on a very interesting the-
ory. It's a theory that we achieve justice not by everybody in the system
trying directly to reach justice but by everybody in the system trying to
achieve what's best for them. It's almost like the way capitalism works
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in a free market economy. In a free market economy, every single par-
ticipant in the economy does not have his or her particular goal, to
achieve a kind of economic equilibrium. We hope that the invisible
hand of Adam Smith would bring about some kind of economic revolu-
tion and everybody fights for his own piece of the pie. Our adversary
system of criminal justice, which is entirely compatible with the capi-
talist system of economy, the free market systems, works in somewhat
the same way. If everybody works hard and if everybody is on an equal
plane, the William Kennedy Smith case revealed, I think, how actions
sometimes in equal level plane deal with participants, and if everybody
has a roughly equal access to resources, and roughly equal access to
excellent counsel, the system in the end will work.
What does it mean, "the system in the end will work?" Does it
mean the truth will always come out? No. Because truth is only one,
and perhaps the most important goal of the system but only one impor-
tant goal of the system. The system's goal is fair process. The system's
goal is achieving as many of the equities that the system is capable of
achieving. Justice is a summation of all the other virtues that our sys-
tem is capable of achieving. It's a very hard system to justify. It's a
very hard system to explain. The hardest question I'm asked all the
time, as I said, not only by my mother. I am asked by my children. I
am asked by my students. I am sure at some form or another I will be
asked by you, is how can I sleep at night defending people I know to be
guilty. And I do know that some of my clients are guilty. How do I
know that they are guilty? They told me. Why did they tell me? Be-
cause I promised that if they told me I wouldn't tell you. And if they
told me, I would never use that against them. It's a very important part
of the system that I encouraged them to tell me the whole truth. That
way, if they want to lie on the stand, I can try to talk them out of it. If
they want to do something that's improper, I can try to persuade them
that most of the time it's not in their best interests to do it. Unfortu-
nately, sometimes it may be in their best interests to violate ethical and
legal rules and then a lawyer really has a very difficult job. So the role
of the defense lawyer is part to understand, it's part to explain, it's part
of the system and a process which generally produces good results but
at a very high cost. And so I invoke the insurance policy analogy, even
in talking about why I defend guilty clients.
I defend guilty clients, first of all, because there aren't that many
innocent ones around, and let's talk about that for just a minute. Isn't
that a wonderful thing to say about the American system of justice.
The vast majority of people who are charged with crimes in this coun-
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try are guilty and thank God for that! Would we want to live in a
country where the vast majority of people charged with crimes are in-
nocent. That might be Iraq, it might be China, it might be the former
Soviet Union but it's not America. One of the reasons why the vast
majority of people charged with crimes are, in fact, guilty is because
we criminal defense lawyers are prepared to fight the government, as
they find to charge somebody with a crime, whether or not the person
charged is guilty or innocent. We keep the government honest. We
make sure that we can never get to a situation where the government
can say, a ha!, this time I'll cross the line and charge somebody who is
innocent because the lawyer will not be vigorous, the lawyer will not
defend, the lawyer will not use all the resources available to her or him,
so that the ability to challenge the government at every turn is a big
difference between the rights in the United States and the rights in
totalitarian countries. In this country we have the most fundamental
right of all, the right to be wrong, the right to make a mistake. The
right to be wrong if you are a journalist, to make an honest mistake,
that's what the New York Times' Mr. Sullivan gave us. The right to
defend somebody who is guilty, the right not only to defend when the
person is innocent.
In the Soviet Union there is. a rule, or there used to be a rule, I
don't know whether it exists under the new Russian government consti-
tution, that you could, not get up in court and defend somebody who
you knew to be guilty. Socialist democracy demanded that if you knew
the person to be guilty you had to plead ,that person guilty. Well, how
do you determine whether or not you knew somebody to be guilty?
Well, very simple. If the person was eventually found guilty and you
defended him on the ground that he was innocent, you were presump-
tively in violation of the law. And that presumes, of course, that the
system would never make a mistake. We know our system is imperfect.
We know that it makes mistakes.
I started out with a story that came from the Soviet Union. Let
me end with a story that takes place many years ago in China. The
story is about a Chinese farmer who calls in his family one day and
says, "We had a terrible family tragedy. Somebody has pushed the
family outhouse into the Yangtze River. Now, children, tell me which
one of you did it." Nobody says a word. And finally the father said,
"maybe this will loosen your tongues. Let me tell you a story about a
faraway place called America and a young boy who is called in by his
father. And his father said, 'somebody chopped down my cherry tree.
Who was it who chopped down my cherry tree?' And this young man
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said, 'Daddy, I cannot tell a lie. It was I who chopped down your
cherry tree.' And the father embraced him and hugged him and kissed
him and this young man, George Washington, became the president of
the United States. Now, does anybody want to tell me who pushed the
outhouse into the Yangtze River?" The youngest boy comes forward
and says, "Daddy, I cannot tell a lie. It was I who pushed the outhouse
into the Yangtze River." Whereupon the father slapped him and beat
him and pushed him. And the young man said, "But George Washing-
ton's father loved George Washington when George Washington
chopped down his father's cherry tree." The father replied, "His father
was not sitting in the cherry tree!"
I tell the story to illustrate the principle that justice can not be
done by those who represent solely the clients that are perceived vic-
tims of rights. Most of us find it easier to identify with the father in the
outhouse because so many of us are pushed around these days, so many
of our own rights are interests are being violated. But justice, I believe,
must be done from a somewhat loftier perch. Thank you very much.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The now-defunct Soviet Union and the term "police state" have
been synonymous for many years, at least from the Stalinist era until,
possibly, the Gorbachev era. Yet for those Westerners to whom the
concepts were indistinguishable, the "police" generally signified the se-
cret police, that is, the KGB. The Soviet Union had another police
force, one more comparable to that known by Americans and other
Westerners.
This "non-secret" police force, in the Soviet Union and now in the
Commonwealth of Independent States, is called the militia. Although
its role in the USSR criminal justice system has, in Western popular
culture, been a distant second to that of the KGB, it has recently begun
to come into its own. The militia and its personnel have played a part
in recent years in most forms of Western media, including film, televi-
sion, and literature.
In this article, the treatment of the Soviet militia in these different
media are explored. After an introduction surveying the nature and
role of the Soviet police in the years leading up to and following the
abortive August 1991 coup and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the
article will consider the expanding role of the militia in fiction, more
specifically, in the genre of detective novels. It will focus on two series
of mysteries, the Inspector Rostnikov police procedurals of Stuart M.
Kaminsky, and the two novels by Martin Cruz Smith, Gorky Park and
its sequel, Polar Star.
The depiction of the Soviet police in modern film will be addressed
next. Two recent movies, Red Heat and Gorky Park, the film based on
the Martin Cruz Smith novel, will be discussed in this context.
The third medium to be considered is television. Its portrayal of
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the Soviet police in two recent television programs, Cops and 48 Hours,
will be compared with each other and with the treatment accorded the
militia in other media.
Finally, the article will address the role of the militia in political
cases. In that context, the manner in which Western media have por-
trayed the Soviet police, and in turn the Soviet criminal justice system,
will be considered in light of the nature of the Soviet rule of law in
reality.
I1. THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IN THE SOVIET CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. Recent Changes in the Soviet Union
This article was begun before the West became so responsive to, if
not so freshly aware of, the profound changes rocking the Soviet Union.
Perestroika and glasnost were still newsworthy, but had already moved
from illuminating the front pages of the daily news to constituting the
daily fare of the consumers of breakfast television. Everyone knew, if
not the translations of these words, at least their symbolic representa-
tion of the opening of the Soviet Union.
By the time this article was completed, the Soviet Union no longer
existed, and Mikhail Gorbachev had been supplanted by Boris Yeltsin,
then President of the Russian Federation, and now President of the
largest of the Commonwealth's Independent States.
The author of this article briefly questioned whether this topic any
longer held any significance: First, if the reformed Soviet Union was no
longer a "police state," was any Western impression of the Soviet po-
lice in the United States hopelessly outdated? The question was an-
swered for this author by Natan Sharansky, in his July 1989 Introduc-
tion to the Vintage Edition of his 1988 autobiography Fear No Evil:
[I]n the Soviet Union, everything has changed-and nothing
has changed .... On the one hand, the number of political pris-
oners has declined sharply. The number of emigrants is quickly
growing, and virtually every day the Soviet press uncovers new ar-
eas of history, ideology, and politics that can now be criticized.
And for the first time since 1917, Soviet elections sometimes pro-
vide a real opportunity for voters to choose from among a number
of candidates.
On the other hand, there are harsh new decrees and regula-
tions. The dictatorship of the Party, the only party, remains im-
movable, and the centralization of power in the hands of a single
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individual continues to grow.'
Second, of course, even more changes followed this July, 1989 as-
sessment. Along with the reconstitution of the USSR as the CIS came
striking changes in the role of the Communist Party,2 one factor con-
sidered to be primary in the nature of the rule of law in the CIS. But
Sharansky himself seemed aware of the rapid pace with which these
changes could be expected: "The more liberal the times, the more his-
tory is changed."3 This author nonetheless became convinced that the
role of the police in a police state, as examined in Western popular
culture, remains a viable topic.
Initially, it should be recognized that the role of the Soviet police
during the abortive August 1991 coup was not that of a neutral by-
stander. The Chief of Police, that is, the head of the Ministry of the
Interior, Boris Pugo, was one of the architects, or at least frontmen, of
the coup." Thus, as one commentator notes, the failure of the coup was
that much more astonishing in light of the fact that "the men who led
the coup had everything going for them: the armed forces, the KGB,
the Party, the police." 5
As will be discussed, the Soviet police shared its authority with,
and operated subject to control by, the Committee for State Security
(KGB) and the procuracy, the latter functioning as a cross between a
prosecutor and an ombudsman. But in the pre-coup months during
which Gorbachev turned away from reform and toward the right, the
police found themselves with an additional partner in the "fight against
crime": the military.
President Gorbachev gave his approval to a joint order . . . an-
nouncing that . . . city streets throughout the country would be
jointly patrolled by the police and the military, both carrying as-
I. NATAN SHARANSKY, FEAR NO EVIL xi (1989).
2. "During the past two years ... several new laws curtail [party] interference
with the courts. One of the laws makes it a crime to pressure a judge to influence the
outcome of a case." A.B.A. J., July 1990, at 32. This latter practice is known as "tele-
phone justice, the contacting of judges by party officials concerned about the outcome
of a particular case. This . . . problem has become so acute that a standard joke is that
there are three kinds of law in the USSR: criminal, civil, and telephone." Juris, Sum-
mer 1990, at 17 (footnote omitted).
3. SHARANSKY, supra note 1, at xii.
4. See, e.g., VLADIMIR POZNER, EYEWITNESS: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF THE
UNRAVELING OF THE SOVIET UNION 22 (Random House 1992).
5. Id. at 214.
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sault weapons and, where and when necessary, backed up by ar-
mored vehicles. This measure, [the Soviet people] were told, should
be understood as a special effort on the part of the law-and-order
forces to combat crime in the streets.'
Along with the promise and limited realization of widespread re-
form came widespread crime.
People became less secure, not more so. Crime suddenly shot sky
high, reaching a level unheard of before in the Soviet Union. Mug-
gings became common, along with a host of other violent crimes.
People began to fear the evening streets, steel doors became the
craze as citizens looked for ways to protect their homes from mur-
derous thieves.7
Indeed, in a poll taken in January 1991, "the desire for less democracy
and more law and order had increased by a startling 19 percent," from
twenty percent in November 1990 to thirty-nine percent in January
1991.
During 1990, the KGB was working to consolidate its power and
undermine Gorbachev. In October of that year, the KGB head Vladi-
mir Kryuchkov announced great success against organized crime.
"Having thus demonstrated the KGB's efficiency as the nation's top
crime fighter, Kryuchkov made his move: To successfully combat or-
ganize crime, he said, the KGB must legally be charged with that duty.
Laws had to be passed specifying the concrete status of the KGB and
the police."9
In the months leading up to the coup, the KGB had a great stake
in fostering the impression that the Soviet system was in grave jeop-
ardy. '[T]he idea of danger was very much part of the siege mentality,
which had . . .been carefully nurtured by the KGB: The greater the
threat to the system and its leaders, the more the KGB was
necessary.""
Under Gorbachev, it was hoped that with the diminished role of
the KGB would come a strengthening of the rule of law in the Soviet
Union. But even after the elimination of Article VI of the Soviet Con-
6. Id. at 165.
7. d. at 126.
8. Id. at 171.
9. POZNER, supra note 4, at I11.
10. Id. at 118.
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stitution, which enshrined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as
the country's leading force, the Party continued to hold sway over every
aspect of Soviet life. "Departization," or diminution of the Party's in-
fluence," was not so easily achieved: "[A]s long as the Party continued
to have a presence in the workplace, in the armed forces, in the police
and the KGB, in short, everywhere, Article VI continued to exist, if not
in letter, then certainly in spirit.""
While the role of the police in the republics of the CIS is still too
new to be definitively gauged, there are several key elements to be
noted. First is the evolving role of the KGB in Russian life, including
crime control. In an article describing the soaring human rights com-
plaints being filed in Russia, it was noted that people have more faith
in voicing their complaints because "the KGB is clearly no longer as
repressive as it once was."' 3 At one juncture, Russian President "[Bo-
ris] Yeltsin ordered the merger of the KGB and Interior Ministry into
a security organization that many feared would crack down on critics
of his harsh economic reforms."' 4 The measure was struck down by
Russia's Supreme Court, but a KGB representative,
predicted that another powerful security agency will have to be cre-
ated to strengthen the government's hand. "Society is too unstable.
There are processes raging, nationalism, crime, unrest . . . ." [The
KGB spokesman] dismissed concerns of repression and said the re-
formed KGB is not the old, oppressive KGB. "We have unbuttoned
our shirts to let people see us," he said. "We cannot do wrong now
because people are watching.""5
But it is premature at best to expect overwhelming reform on the part
of the KGB. "The old KGB and the new KGB are the same people
under different bosses,"16 according to a Russian journalist.
Second, the dissolution of the Soviet Union has seen an increase in
crime,7 nationalism,"8 and- anti-Semitism.' 9 It remains to be seen how
11. Id. at 209.
12. Id.
13. Juan 0. Tamayo, In Russia, Freedoms Spur Rights Complaints, MIAMI




17. Juan 0. Tamayo, Crime Flourishes Alongside Freedom In Russia's Cities,
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 22, 1992, at Al.
18. David Hancock, Russian Jew Finds U.S. No Refuge, MIAMI HERALD, Jan.
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the police are used to control and contain the rising crime and, in par-
ticular, hate crime, and whether the result will be an increase in repres-
sive measures to the detriment of the rule of law.
B. Nature and Origin of the Soviet Militia
By way of background to the media treatment of the militia, a
short introduction to the nature of the police20 in the Soviet Union pre-
dissolution is helpful. As stated above, what we as Westerners think of
as the police was called the militia in the USSR.
In the Soviet Union (as in most other East European countries) the
police [was] called "militia," a name which goes back to the times
when a popular militia was formed to replace the police of the
ancien r4gime. In the language of Soviet newspapers "police" [had]
a distinctly unfriendly ring and [was] used only with reference to
bourgeois police. 1
The militia operated under the jurisdiction and authority of the
Ministry of the Interior.12 The Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union es-
tablished the parameter of the police's authority in a 1973 decree,
"[oin the basic duties and rights of the Soviet militia in protecting pub-
11, 1992, at Al; see also James Carney, Russia Yeltsin's Enemies: Communists, Ul-
tra-Nationalists, Rival Reformers and Disgruntled Soldiers Are All Breathing Down
the President's Neck, TIME, March 9, 1992, at 32-34; Ken Gluck, Dissatisfied Rus-
sians Turning To Nationalism, MIAMI HERALD,' March 2, 1992, at Al l.
19. Hancock, supra note 18, at A1; Gluck, supra note 18, at A 1l.
20.
[TIhere may be said to be two police forces in the Soviet Union: the state
security police, or KGB; and the "ordinary" police, or militia. There is also
a third type of Soviet police function, the so-called People's Patrols
(Druzhiny), or auxiliary police. In their present form the People's Patrols
have existed since 1958, and are empowered by the 1960 R.S.F.S.R. Stat-
ute to perform, inter alia, the following tasks: maintain public order; com-
bat petty crime (a responsibility shared with the ordinary police, courts
and Procuracy); enforce traffic regulations; and combat the neglect of
children.
H.J. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R., AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET LAW 286-87
(1976).
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lic order and fighting crime. '23
The decree consists of ten articles, and is considered the "most
general All-Union enactment concerning the Soviet police."2"
Article six of the decree establishes the duties of the militia, re-
lated to "either the maintenance of public order or the fight against
crime."" In sixteen points,2 6 the duties are listed, including the follow-
ing "public order" categories: "traffic control, measures against public
drunkenness, implementation of the internal passport system,control of
arms, explosives, etc., providing strongarm assistance to other govern-
mental agencies (where required) and, generally, aid to the population
and the authorities in cases of natural disasters." 27 The points also list
the militia's responsibilities for crime control, including "measures to
prevent crime, arresting suspects, criminal investigation, . . . [and] va-
rious practical activities in the execution of criminal penalties and ad-
ministrative supervision of released prisoners, former recidivists
"28
Militia authority for administrative supervision was governed by
the Regulations on Administrative Supervision by Militia Organs, 29
which established three categories of people subject to administrative
police supervision,
persons who have been recognized as "especially dangerous recidi-
vists"; persons who have served a sentence for a serious crime and
who have not shown that they have bettered themselves during
their sentence; and persons who, after having served a sentence for
a serious crime, frequently violate public order and have not
heeded a previous police warning.3°
Under this jurisdiction, the militia has broad authority to impose re-
strictions on persons falling within any one of these three categories,
including the power to "place such persons under house arrest, limit
their freedom to travel outside the . . . city, forbid their presence in
specific places, or require them to report once or several times a month
23. Id. at 739.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at 739.
27. Id. at 739-40.
28. Id. at 740.
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at the police station." 3' The penalty for disobeying such militia order is
an administrative fine imposed by the people's judge. 2
The decree provided for police responsibilities, authority and
rights. The powers of the militia, as set forth in Article seven, included
"checking passports, entering buildings and houses, ordering people to
appear at the police office, imposing fines, photographing and finger-
printing suspects, arresting or detaining suspects of drunks, taking
measures to ensure the safety of traffic, and requisitioning means of
transport." The police were also entitled, in limited specified circum-
stances, to carry and make use of firearms. 3
The organization of the police was based on a 1962 decree of the
USSR Council of Ministers, entitled "Regulations on the Soviet Mili,-
tia."3 ' The internal organization of the police was structured "along
military lines; police discipline is regulated by disciplinary police regu-
lations issued by the governments of the Union republics. 33
At the top of the organizational pyramid is the Chief Department
of the Militia within the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. There
are militia departments within the republican ministries of internal
affairs (except the RSFSR); at lower levels the police constitute[d]
by far the most important branch of the internal affairs depart-
ments; the head of the latter department and the police chief are
one and the same person ....
The internal organization of the police consisted of the following
sections: regular, or uniformed section; the criminal investigation sec-
tion; the section for the "struggle against theft of socialist property";
the section in charge of internal passport; the motor vehicle section;
sections for training and administration; and a section for prosecution
and preliminary investigation.3 7
C. Role of the Militia in Criminal Investigations




34. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at 521.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 522.
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investigations. Soviet criminal procedure codes drew a distinction be-
tween those crimes which are serious enough to warrant a formal "pre-
liminary investigation," and those minor offenses investigated by mere
"inquiry." 38 In general, the less serious offenses were investigated by
the militia. However,
[elven in instances in which a preliminary investigation is to be
conducted, the police normally perform[ed] certain initial investi-
gatory actions before transferring the case to an investigator (e.g.,
formal commencement of a criminal case, search and seizure, de-
tention and interrogation of a suspect, and interrogation of wit-
nesses). This is also called an inquiry.39
The major difference between the two types of investigations was the
greater extent of due process protections afforded the more serious
crimes-those commenced by preliminary investigation rather than
inquiry. 0
The primary responsibility for most criminal investigations lay
with the designated "investigator." '41 This investigator supervised the
section for criminal investigation within the Office of the Procuracy.
This is contrasted with those crimes which are not so designated in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, and which therefore become the responsi-
bility of the militia.
The section for prosecution and preliminary investigation is con-
cerned with those aspects of the police functions which involve the
police directly as a part in criminal proceedings, i.e. either as a
"reporting" agency ...or as "investigator . . .," in those cases
where the preliminary investigation is not conducted by investiga-
tors from the Prokuratura [procurator] or the State Security.42
Thus, the preliminary investigation will be commenced by an investiga-
tor in the procurator's office, based on information from the militia.
"The investigator may perform investigatory acts himself or may dele-
gate them to other agencies, typically the police."4 3
Throughout the course of his investigation, the investigator com-
38. Id. at 190.
39. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at 191.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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piles a dossier which details the progress of his investigation."4 "The
dossier, which often includes several hundred pages, is then made avail-
able to the prosecution, defense, other parties and the court before trial
''45
After the conclusion of the preliminary investigation, the dossier is
submitted to the office of the procurator, along with, when warranted, a
"conclusion to indict." The ultimate decision to prosecute then rests
wholly within the province of the procurator. 6
A Soviet defense attorney, in her 1982 book, Final Judgment, de-
scribes the division of labor in a criminal investigation as follows:
[A] lengthy preliminary investigation [preceding trial was]
conducted by bodies that are organizationally independent of the
courts. These are the procuracy, the police, the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, and-in cases that fall within the competence of the secur-
ity services-the KGB. Police work of course include[d] both
preventing crime and making inquiries to identify suspects once a
crime has been committed.
Soviet police, like all police forces, [ran] a network of under-
cover agents and maintain ed] covert observation of known male-
factors and the criminal underworld in general. The main work in
unraveling crime, however, [was] done by officials of the investiga-
tory departments of the procuracy, the Ministry of Internal Af-
fairs, and the KGB. They can initiate or discontinue investigations,
and they ha[d] complete authority to conduct all necessary
investigations.47
Another commentator describes the police powers as falling into
two categories,
criminal procedural powers and others. Police powers in criminal
procedure are enumerated in arts. 89-101 and 117-124 of the
RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure. The most important is the
power to arrest . . . .Outside the sphere of criminal procedure the
police [were] given a number of powers by a variety of enactments
such as the power to arrest in specific instances, to impose on-the-
44. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at 527.
45. Id.
46. rd.
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spot fines, to commandeer means of transport, etc."'
Thus, in what we normally think of as police work, the militia
operated either together with or subordinate to two bodies: the
procuracy, whose investigators conduct preliminary investigations in
the more serious offenses, and the KGB in what are considered political
crimes. The militia may function. as part of the procuracy (for the more
serious crimes) or independently of the procuracy (for the more minor
crimes). In reality, however, the militia are always subordinate to the
office of the procurator.
While this might seem to minimize 'the role of the militia to a
great extent, this does not suggest a cavalier disregard for the political
pedigree of those who would serve in the militia. "Recruiting for the
police force is done with special care to ensure political reliability and
candidates are screened by Party . . . bodies." 4 As Kaminsky's series
of novels suggests, - the odd candidate of questionable "political relia-
bility" nonetheless might manage to slip through the nets.
Adherence to the dictates of the police, which, as discussed-in the
context of the television documentaries on the Soviet police, seems to
be an area needing improvement, is controlled by,
a system of sanctions against the persons who disobey the. police
instructions or obstruct the performance of such duties. Resisting a
police officer . . . in the execution of.his duties in connection with
the maintenance of public order entails the penalties provided by
art. 191-1 of the RSFSR Criminal Code.51
The provisions of the Criminal Code which protect the life of police
officers extend to allow for the death penalty for an attempt on an of-
ficer's life, "the only provision in the RSFSR Criminal Code with a
mandatory capital sentence."52
48. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at 522.
49. Id.
50. See infra notes 81-108 and accompanying text.
51. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note:21, at 522; Art. 191-1 UK RSFSR.
52. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at 522-23. But see FLA. B. NEws, November
15, 1989, at 17 (Soviet attorney Anna Meschanskaya, interning with the Palm Beach
County, Florida Public Defender's Office, stating that in the USSR, "there are some 47
articles in our criminal codes which have the death penalty . . .").
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D. Role of the Procuracy in Police Supervision
In a sense, the entire Soviet criminal justice system functioned at
least nominally under the auspices of the Procuracy, or Prokuratura s
The Procuracy, or Prokuratura, [was] one of the Soviet system's 4
branches of government. It [was] a state orgari fulfilling the consti-
tutional function of supervising exact compliance with the laws of
the Soviet Union. As opposed to all other state organizations,
which are in principle organized on the basis of double subordina-
tion . . ., the Prokuratura [was) organised on a clearly centralist
basis and its subordination is hierarchical from the bottom upwards
54
The Prokuratura had its origins in the Union republics as early as
May 28, 1922,"' and all subordinate procuracies of, for example, the
Union republics and autonomous republics were within the jurisdiction
and supervision of the Procuracy of the Soviet Union." After the office
was used during the Stalin regime "to blindly execut[e] the instructions
of the security forces [KGB]," regulations were issued fortifying the
role of' socialist legality in the operations of the Procuracy, and mini-
mizing the potential for abuse of power. 7
In many cases, though, the role of procurator as neutral
ombudsman, or guardian of the legal system, may be illusory. Accord-
ing to one account by a woman working on behalf of Soviet political
prisoners in the 1970s: "The Soviet legal system has an unique element,
the procurator's office, which is theoretically supposed to see that the
laws are correctly applied and that justice is administered. In reality,
however, the procurator's office is part of the penal apparatus itself,
thus rendering the prisoner defenseless and without rights." '58
The Procuracy was led by the Procurator General of the Soviet
Union, appointed for a five year59 term-by the Supreme Soviet. He ap-
53. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at 545. But see infra text at subsection lIE.
54. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at 545.
55. But see ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 293 (4th ed. 1980) (the procuracy
was "conceived by Czar Peter the Great in 1722 and revived by Lenin after a five-year
lapse in 1922.").
56. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at 546.
57. id.
58. IDA NUDEL, A HAND IN THE DARKNESS; THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A
REFUSENIK 41 (1990) (emphasis in original).
59. KONST. SSSR art. 167; see ABRAHAM, supra note 55, at 293 (Procurator
.19921 1035
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pointed Union republic procurators for five year terms, who in turn ap-
pointed lesser procurators for their own five-year terms.6" Procurators
generally possessed higher legal education, and the powers of the Proc-
urator General included an ability to initiate legislation and seek legal
interpretation by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.61
The responsibilities of the procuracy for supervising the militia in-
cluded supervision of arrests, searches, seizures, and procedures relat-
ing to internal passports (identity certificates). The procuracy also had
jurisdiction over any citizen complaints relating to actions of the mili-
tia. 2 As discussed above, investigators in the Office of the Procurator
conducted the preliminary investigations of more serious crimes, while
the militia operate subordinately to-and under certain circumstances,
separately from-the office of the procurator in conducting inquiries of
more minor offenses.
E. Role of the KGB in the Criminal Justice System6"
The Committee for State Security, or KGB,64 was, along with the
procuracy and the militia, assigned the responsibility for criminal in-
vestigation, and supervision of criminal investigations otherwise as-
signed the procuracy and militia in cases affecting state security.65
Most descriptions of the KGB duties in Soviet sources contain the
following elements: the protection of the security of the state; the
fight against spies, saboteurs, traitors and foreign agents; the fight
against political crimes (crimes against the state); the protection of
General is appointed for a five-year term). But see infra note 161 and accompanying
text (discussion on seven-year term for Procurator General); see also ENCYCLOPEDIA,
supra note 21, at 546.
60. ABRAHAM, supra note 55, at 293.
6 I. Id.
62. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at 548.
63. For more extensive discussion of the role of the KGB in political cases, see
infra notes 139-63 and accompanying text.
64. The original secret police was the Cheka, established in 1917, and was suc-
ceeded in 1922 by the GPU, or State Political Administration. The NKVD (People's
Commisar of International Affairs) took over in 1934. In 1946, the NKVD became the
MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs), and the KGB assumed the responsibility over
national security. BENET. READERS ENCYCLOPEDIA 179 (3rd ed. 1987).
65. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at 600-01.
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the border of the USSR; [and] the protection of state secrets
66
The KGB was given authority by virtue of its police duty for
"some investigative functions in criminal procedure."67 In certain cases
with security aspects, which extended to smuggling, mass demonstra-
tions, and illegal entry into or exit from the USSR, KGB investigators
actually conducted the investigation themselves, rather than supervising
militia or procuracy investigators. Determining which cases involve se-
curity aspects, however, is a subject given to much exposition in both
fictional and nonfictional treatments of the Soviet criminal justice
system.68
F. Police and the Criminal Code
The role of the primary bodies of criminal investigation in the So-
viet Union-the procuracy, the militia and the KGB 6 -was governed
by Codes of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure implementing the
"Fundamentals of Criminal Procedure of the USSR and the Union Re-
publics," and the Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR
and the Union Republics," along with the 1977 Brezhnev Constitu-
tion.7 0 The Criminal Codes and Codes of Criminal Procedure in exis-
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See infra notes 139-63 and accompanying text (discussion on reforms regard-
ing political crimes).
69. UPK RSFSR, art. 3 (delegating the "Duty of Initiating Criminal Cases and
Detecting Crimes" to the court, procurator, investigator, and agency of inquiry); see
also UPK RSFSR, art. 20 (the role of the Procuracy); UPK RSFSR, art. 29 (role of
the militia).
70.
In reaction to "the indefiniteness encouraged by Stalin and his heirs" the
19513 fundamental principles of criminal law were designed to usher in a
more clearly defined concept of social danger. [T]he Fundamentals had to
be followed by detailed criminal codes in each of the republics before the
full sweep of the reform could be determined, and this occurred only in
1960 and thereafter. Since the state and military crimes were still defined
solely by the federal government, the codes of the republics merely incor-
porated in their entirety the 1958 statutes on those subjects, but the speci-
fications of other offenses and the penalties to be applied were left to the
local leaders, guided as usual, by the Communist Party members among
them who saw to the preservation of considerable but not complete uni-
formity. Within two years after adoption of the Fundamentals, criminal
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tence in the Gorbachev presidency dated back to the Khrushchev era,
and for the most part reflect a reformist jurisprudence following the
Stalinist period of repression.71
Moreover, before dissolution the Soviet Union was struggling with
proposed reforms 72 in their criminal justice system, chiefly relating to
due process protections in the area of criminal procedure.7 3 One com-
mentator notes that "[tihe academic reformers in Moscow now seek to
introduce the 'principle of adversarialness' into the new codes to be
adopted in the next year or two."17
Many of the proposed changes were aimed at reducing the likeli-
hood of bureaucratic interference, or "telephone justice," in the crimi-
nal justice system.7 5 Previously, judicial decisions under. party-ap-
policies veered again towards the more severe. As campaigns were con-
ducted to eradicate various types of crime, amendments to the Criminal
Code were introduced to increase flexibility by offering a wider range of.
punishment.
J.M. HAZARD, W.E. BUTLER & P.B. MAGGS, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM: THE LAW IN
THE 1980's 149 (Parker School of Foreign & Comparative Law Columbia University
1984).
71. G. Fletcher, In Gorbachev's Courts, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, May 18, 1989.
72.
Laws also have been adopted extending greater rights to criminal defend-
ants, offering protection against bureaucratic abuse, and establishing free-
dom of the press and the right to assembly. But, as of late August, no final
action had been taken on legislation for the right to freedom of religion, to
form political groups and to emigrate.
S.B. Goldberg, A More Perfect Union Part I.- A Lawyer in Moscow, A.B.A. J., Oct.
1990, at 62.
In March, the party finally capitulated to a constitutional amendment of
Article VI of the Soviet Constitution, eliminating the party's monopoly on
the country's leadership. Some months earlier, Gorbachev appointed a
group of scholars, party officials and legislators to write a new constitution.
The hope is that, unlike its three predecessors, the new constitution will
prescribe actual rights and powers rather than simply state policy. No one,
however, expects to see a new constitution anytime soon.
Id. Gorbachev has become a firm advocate of the concept of a "law-based state," les-
sening the power of the bureaucracy., Id. at 60.
73. "Subjects of reform include the role of defense attorneys [and] the number
of acquittals ..... Justice Soviet Style, JURIS, Summer 1990, at 17 [hereinafter
Justice].
74. Justice, supra note 73, at 16.
75. "In 1989 several laws were passed to strengthen the judiciary and address
party interference, or telephone justice-when a call from a party official decides a
case." Id. at 60.
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pointed judges were viewed as too susceptible to this type of
interference.76 Chief among the proposed changes was a measure that
would increase the power of defense attorneys by accelerating their en-
try into a case. "Under the current code, a Soviet lawyer is permitted
to see his or her' client only at the end of the preliminary
investigation."77
Under the proposed change, defense counsel would have access to
their clients before the preliminary investigation is concluded. Com-
mentators seemed to agree both on the likelihood of this change being
effected, and on the extent to which this change would benefit the So-
viet criminal justice system.7
Other proposed reforms included abolishing the death penalty and
increasing the number and authority of "lay assessors," juror-like civil-
ian participants in trial decision-making. 79
111. PORTRAYAL OF SOVIET POLICE IN AMERICAN POPULAR
CULTURE
The purpose of this article is to survey, in an admittedly anecdotal
manner, the Western opinion of Soviet police. In order to achieve this
purpose, this article addresses the treatment accorded Soviet police in
American popular culture. Three media are considered: fiction, televi-
sion, and film.
With regard to fiction, this article discusses primarily two series of
novels: first, the series of Soviet police procedurals by Stuart M. Ka-
minsky and second, the two novels by Martin Cruz Smith, Gorky Park
and its sequel, Polar Star.
The television shows discussed in this article are two programs de-
voted to the Soviet police. The first was an episode of the Fox Net-
work's show "Cops." To date, it has aired twice, once in 1989 and once
in 1990. The other program on the Soviet police was an episode of the
76. U.S. Justice Opens Eyes of Soviets, MIAMi HERALD, April 8, 1990, at 13.
The problem "has become so acute that a standard joke is that there are three types of
law in the USSR: criminal, civil, and' telephone." Justice, supra note 73, at 17.
77. Justice, supra note 73, at 17.
78. E.g., Slobogin, The Soviet Legal System, FLA. B., July/August 1989, at 3 1;
see also Osakwe, Modern Soviet Criminal Procedure: A Critical Analysis. 57 TUL. L.
REV. 439 (1983) (referring to the current climate of resistance to criminal justice
reform).
79. Slobogin, supra note 78, at 32; see also Osakwe, supra note 78, at 590 (re-
ferring to other suggested areas needing reform).
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CBS series, "48 Hours," taking place in two cities in the Soviet Union.
Finally, the third category is the Soviet police in the movies. In
this category, the article discusses both the feature-length film of Mar-
tin Cruz Smith's novel, Gorky Park, and the somewhat lighter Arnold
Schwartzeneger vehicle, Red Heat.
The approach or goal of this article is twofold: first, to contrast the
differing styles of presentations regarding Soviet police and second, to
assess the extent of accuracy in American representation of Soviet po-
lice. With regard to the former, it demonstrates how the varying genres
of American culture differ in their depiction of Soviet police more by
the viewpoint of the author or artist than by the nature of the genre.
The "parallax," therefore, is generated by the idiosyncratic style of
Stuart Kaminsky, for example, as opposed to Martin Cruz Smith,
rather than by the choice of television, for example, over fiction.
With regard to the second goal, the article at two intervals consid-
ers the issue of accuracy: first, by assessing the works of the media
against the backdrop presented in the section preceding this analysis
and second, by considering the media portrayals in the context of polit-
ical investigations.
A. Soviet Police in American Detective Fiction
1. Introduction
Several recent works of Western fiction have taken one of the most
fecund genres of modern popular culture, the mystery, or more specifi-
cally, the detective novel, 80 and transplanted the characters to the So-
viet Union. It is the purpose of this article to analyze some of these
novels, and evaluate the significance and influence of the Soviet setting
in these works and on the genre itself. The article focuses primarily on
the seven Inspector Porfiry Rostnikov police procedurals by Stuart M.
Kaminsky,8 and on Martin Cruz Smith's Gorky Park and Polar Star.
80. This article has, where possible, skirted the realm of another mystery fiction
terrain, that of Soviet spy novels penned by Western as well as Eastern authors, and
focuses instead solely on fiction about police investigation rather than espionage adven-
tures. The distinction was not always possible to maintain. Letter from Carol Brener to
the author (July, 1990) (owner of New York, New York mystery bookstore, Murder
Ink.).
81. STUART M. KAMINSKY, THE MAN WHO WALKED LIKE A BEAR (1990); STU-
ART M. KAMINSKY, A COLD RED SUNRISE (1988); STUART M. KAMINSKY, A FINE RED
RAIN (1987); STUART M. KAMINSKY. RED CHAMELEON (1985); STUART M. KAMINSKY,
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2. The Inspector Rostnikov Series
Over the last ten years, Stuart M. Kaminsky has written seven
novels in the series of Soviet police procedurals featuring Inspector
Porfiry Rostnikov. In chronological order, they are: Death of a Dissi-
dent (1981); Black Knight in Red Square (1984); Red Chameleon
(1985); A Fine Red Rain (1987); A Cold Red Sunrise (1988); The
Man Who Walked Like A Bear (1990) (hereinafter "Bear"); and
Rostnikov's Vacation (1991).
a. Kaminsky's Characters
Like most police procedurals, Bear takes up several cases on the
plates of the Soviet militia detectives featured in the series, Inspector
Porfiry Rostnikov and his two assistants, Emil Karpo (alias "The Vam-
pire") and Sasha Tkach. Kaminsky offers the following description of
his chief protagonist, Inspector Rostnikov:
Porfiry Petrovich Rostnikov was, with good reason, known to his
colleagues as the Washtub. There was nothing imposing about the
fifty-seven-year-old man with one good leg and one very bad one,
but Rostnikov had his passions-his books, his wife and son, his
job, his weights.82
The younger of Rostnikov's two assistants is Sasha Tkach:
Sasha was usually successful with reluctant witnesses. He was
handsome if a bit thin and looked much younger than his twenty-
nine years. His hair fell over his eyes, and he had an engaging
habit of throwing his head back to clear his vision. He also had a
rather large space between his upper teeth, which seemed to bring
out the maternal response in most women ..
Witnesses might be disposed to confess to Rostnikov's other associ-
ate, Emil Karpo, but for quite different reasons, having more to do with
terror than with maternal instincts:
Karpo was over six feet tall, lean, with dark, thinning hair and pale
BLACK KNIGHT IN RED SQUARE (1984); STUART M. KAMINSKY, DEATH OF A Dissi-
DENT (198 1).
82. STUART M. KAMINSKY, THE MAN WHO WALKED LIKE A BEAR 7 (1990).
83. hd. at 26.
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skin that contrasted with the black suit he wore. He looked corpse-
like, and his dark eyes were cold and unblinking. When he spoke,
his voice was an emotionless monotone . . . . [T]wenty years of
fanatical pursuit of enemies of the state had earned him the nick-
name of the Vampire among his colleagues. The name seemed par-
ticularly appropriate when a peculiar look crept into Karpo's eyes,
and at those moments even those who had worked with him for
years avoided him.84
Some insight into what these novels tell us about western percep-
tions of the Soviet police is afforded by comparing the Rostnikov books
with a series of American police procedurals. There is repeated indica-
tion that Stuart Kaminsky patterns his work to a large extent on the
paradigmatic police procedurals by Ed McBain, the so-called "87th
Precinct" novels. Kaminsky makes frequent references 5 to these
novels; Inspector Rostnikov is a self-styled fan of the pseudonymous
McBain's detective fiction.
In his right hand, Rostnikov held a paperback copy in English of
Ed McBain's The Mugger. He had read the book five years earlier
and about four years before that. It was time to reread [sic] it
... . Rostnikov read: "For as the old maid remarked upon kissing
the cow, it's all a matter of taste." He had read the line before but
for the first time he thought he understood the joke and he smiled
slightly, appreciatively. Americans were most peculiar. Ed McBain
was peculiar, including in his police novels pictures of fingerprints,
maps, reports, even photographs. Delightful but peculiar.88
It is reasonable to infer from such references, as well as from the
nature of the Rostnikov books, that these allusions are not gratuitous.
One is then led to wonder what is the significance of setting a police
procedural in such an unlikely location. Given that the police proce-
dural is one of the most formulaic, not to say rigid, among the detective
genre, it is likely that the reader is being consciously steered toward
comparing the two examples-one set in a fictitious Eastern metropolis,
and one in an all too identifiable Moscow.
Kaminsky is not a newcomer to detective fiction or to inventive
locales. His outstanding serio-comic mysteries featuring private investi-
84. Id. at 29-30.
85. See, e.g., STUART M. KAMINSKY RED CHAMELEON 13 (1985).
86. STUART M. KAMINSKY. A COLD RED SUNRISE 8-9 (1988).
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gator Toby Peters are set in the Hollywood of the 1930s and '40s, and
mix fictitious characters with real personalities from the era, ranging
from the, actors playing munchkins in the 1939 film 8" "The Wizard of
Oz"'88 to Eleanor Roosevelt89 to Albert Einstein ° and, most recently, to
maestro Leopold Stokowski. 91 Each of the books in the series appears
meticulously researched, accurately (or at least, to this layperson, cred-
ibly) depicting Los Angeles in the pre-war, and then World War II
years.
In some ways, Peters and Rostnikov resemble each other. Physi-
cally, at least, neither cuts an imposing figure. Rostnikov, a.k.a. "The
Washtub," is described as "a short, squat man in his fifties with a non-
descript Moscow face."'92 Toby Peters, too, is in his fifties, his nose bro-
ken too many times (usually by his older brother, Leo), his body pum-
meled by too many battles and too many bullets.
Still, the Toby Peters books could not, by any stretch of imagina-
tion or critical hindsight, be classified as political or ideological; the
only evident philosophy is Peters' insouciant equanimity toward his
rather feckless, almost accidental ability to wrest victory from a series
of missteps that could only charitably be characterized as an
investigation.
Inspector Porfiry Rostnikov bears a passing resemblance to Peters,
n6 Tobias Pevsner, only in the fatalism both characters share. Inability
or unwillingness to "get with the program" is, in Peters, a former po-
lice officer, comic companion to his iconoclastic, out-of-step hapless-
ness. In Rostnikov, where "the program" is not Soviet criminal law but
political, usually KGB, directive, this divergence from convention is
deadly serious, and both cause and symptom of his disagreement and
disfavor with the Soviet government.
The System, in Toby Peters' books, may be said to be represented
by Peters" estranged brother, police lieutenant Leo Pevsner. Although
Peters frequently, humorously, is subject to physical violence at his
brother's hands because of Peters' sarcastic, provoking attitude, the
penalty for straying is far more dangerous for Rostnikov and his fam-
87. Kaminsky's "day job" is as a professor and chair of the Division of Film at
Northwestern University where he teaches film history, criticism, and production.
88. STUART M. KAMINSKY. MURDER ON THE YELLOW BRICK ROAD (1977).
89.' STUART M. KAMINSKY, THE FALA FACTOR (1984).
90. STUART M. KAMINSKY, SMART MOVES (1986)..
91. STUART M. KAMINSKY. POOR BUTTERFLY (1990).
92. STUART M. KAMINSKY, A COLD RED SUNRISE 8 (1988).
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ily. It has proven capable of resulting in his ostracism, the threat of
exile to Siberia, and his son's military assignment to Afghanistan.
The degree of levity in tone is not the most notable distinction
between the two series, though it is consistent with what most sets the
two apart. In the Toby Peters' books, Peters' chief antagonists are the
objects of his criminal investigations, the assorted miscreants whom he
has been charged with identifying or capturing. His only obstacles are
his own ignorance or faulty methodology, although a hard-of-hearing
landlady and a lethal dentist friend, the latter with whom he shares
office space, are occasional impediments to his success. His brother is
more irascible than intractable, and Leo's partner, Phil, often serves to
pave the way to cooperation between Toby and the police.
For Rostnikov, the perpetrators of the various crimes which he is
charged with investigating are often the least of his worries. Much in
the books is concerned with Rostnikov's machinations and maneuver-
ings aimed at eluding or bypassing his superiors. If Rostnikov occasion-
ally acquires a political agenda, along with his assigned role of investi-
gator, it is motivated by a stalwart compulsion to survive and to protect
his family.
Rostnikov would never be more than a chief inspector in the MVD,
a position higher than might be expected of him considering his
inability to control his tongue, his frequent impetuousness, and his
politically hazardous Jewish wife-a wife who had no interest at all
in either religion or politics. Fortunately, Rostnikov had an ambi-
tion; he was politically uninterested. His job was to catch criminals
and occasionally punish them at the moment of capture. Usually,
however, the game-and he saw it as a game-ended when he
caught the criminals and turned them over to the procurator's of-
fice for justice. It didn't matter to Rostnikov whether the law was
reasonable or not. The criminals knew the law and knew when they
were violating it."
Rostnikov is never seen as a cavalier subversive, one who, at odds
with the regime, thwarts them for the sheer literary sake of endearing
himself to Western audiences or, as with some Western pop icons of
recent decades, to thumb his nose at authority. A disrupting presence,
Rostnikov battles the entrenched government representatives because
they threaten him or his family, not because he is an ideologically-mo-
tivated counterculture renegade. Porfiry is an apparently uncompli-
93. STUART M. KAMINSKY, BLACK KNIGHT IN RED SQUARE 18 (1984).
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cated man, much like Toby Peters, but where his superior officers, ei-
ther in the police department or in the KGB, play a complicated game,
Rostnikov has the moral stamina and intellectual capacity to rival their
own byzantine inventiveness. Unlike the Western police or politicians in
some other works of modern popular culture, the government, for
Rostnikov, is not represented by foolish, ineffectual theorists, to be con-
trasted by the street-smart, all-knowing pragmatic detective.
Rostnikov's encounters are with antagonists of equal intellect and in-
sight; -their agenda may be antonymous to his own, but neither
Rostnikov nor his readers would make the mistake of underestimating
their abilities or the threat posed by the same.
These encounters, almost always verbal exchanges across an office
desk, yield brilliant dialogues of shading and nuance, in which the par-
ticipants seem to be speaking in code, and as much is decided by the
superior official's decision as to whether or when Rostnikov is permitted
to be seated, as it is by what either speaker actually says.
Toby Peters, he of the ready wisecrack and equally ready six-
shooter, allowed his rebellion to flower by challenging the police de-
partment and, ultimately, by resigning from it. Rostnikov's challenges
are perforce more stilted and subtle. He can no more patently disagree
with his superiors than he can resign from his job.
The closest Rostnikov came to complete disassociation was his
scheme to give life to the dreams of his Jewish wife, Sarah, of emigrat-
ing from the Soviet Union. When this fell through, Rostnikov was left
only with his careful, deliberate determination of doing his job and
safeguarding his family. His wife and their son, Joseph, are almost al-
ways at risk, whether it be the vague threat of action being taken be-
cause of Sarah's religion, or the actualized threat of a reassignment of
Joseph to Afghanistan. It is this more than any physical danger to
Porfiry Rostnikov that lends the novels their air of intrigue, fear, para-
noia, and dramatic tension.
Subsequent to the beginning of the series, Rostnikov has suffered
professional disgrace and personal sorrow, the latter occasioned by fear
over Joseph's transfer to the front, and the former by his demotion
from the office of the Procurator General to the less prestigious MVD.
Rostnikov had recently been transferred "on temporary but open-
ended duty" to the MVD, the police, uniformed and nonuniformed,
who directed traffic, faced the public, and were the front line of
defense against crime and for the maintenance of order. It had
been a demotion, the result of Rostnikov's frequent clashes with the
• . . KGB. Before the demotion, Rostnikov had been a senior in-
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spector in the office of the Procurator General in Moscow ....
Too often, Rostnikov's path had crossed into the territory of the
KGB which is responsible for all political investigations and secur-
ity. The KGB, however, could label anything from drunkenness to
robbery as political. 4
Or, as Kaminsky relates elsewhere: "It wasn't that Rostnikov was
a troublemaker. Far from it. It was simply a matter of the KGB's be-
ing involved in so much that it was difficult to avoid them." '95 His de-
motion meant, in part, that on one case he was lumbered with a repre-
sentative of the procuracy supervising his investigation.96
The characters in Ed McBain's paradigmatic 87th Precinct novels
have, throughout the decades, matured and developed into three-di-
mensional individuals with problems and pleasures which occasionally
form an unrelated backdrop to the crimes under investigation by the
officers of the precinct. To that extent, the characters have become fa-
miliar companions to the series' readers, who eagerly await the next
installment of what may feel like a romantic serial, to learn whether
Detective Bert Kling's romance with Detective Eileen Burke has met a
fate similar to that of all of Kling's historically disastrous romantic en-
tanglements,97 or whether Detective Steve Carella and his deaf-mute
wife, Teddy, are still blissfully happy.
More often, however, these personal triumphs and tragedies are
skillfully interwoven in McBain's plots. The Kling-Burke relationship,
for example, is at risk because of a case in which Detective Burke"
suffered a traumatizing rape while acting as a decoy to catch a rapist
in the area. Even where these personal aspects of a police officer's life,
depicted in the books, are extraneous to the criminal investigations of
the precinct, they are pertinent simply by virtue of their irrelevance;
that is, they are reflective of the difficulty of living a normal, civilian
life in a police officer's "off-duty hours."
The quotation marks parallel the point McBain seems to be mak-
94. STUART M. KAMINSKY, A COLD RED SUNRISE 18 (1988).
95. STUART M. KAMINSKY, A FINE RED RAIN 3 (1987).
96. STUART M. KAMINSKY, A COLD RED SUNRISE 24 (1988).
97. See Ed McBain's 87th Precinct novel, Ice, for a description of how Detective
Bert Kling lost his first love, Claire, in a fatal bookstore shooting, and later his wife,
Augusta, to another man. ED MCBAIN, ICE 101-05 (1983).
98. McBain enjoyed an inside joke in Ice where Burke makes passing reference
to Raquel Welch, who portrayed a female police officer temporarily assigned to the
87th Precinct in the Burt Reynolds movie, "Fuzz". Id.
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ing, though it cannot necessarily be inferred that it is anything so
heavy-handed as the "message" of the books: For police officers in the
real-life world McBain seems to be depicting, there is nothing as clear-
cut as "off-duty." This generates the dysfunctional relationships in the
lives of the detectives, and the way their personal lives seem so inextri-
cably entwined with their professional world.
• This theme is replicated resoundingly in the Porfiry Rostnikov po-
lice procedurals. Nowhere is it sounded as palpably as in the life of
Rostnikov himself, where every move in his cat-and-mouse game with
his superiors ripples in his would-be personal, that is to say family, life.
Rostnikov's two associates in the police department, Sasha Tkach
and Emil Karpo, are unlike Rostnikov in that they ,represent two ex-
tremes: Tkach is the naive innocent, bright though occasionally ineffec-..
tual; young enough in age and appearance to have been used to imper-
sonate a student, he has a wife and infant who form the focus of his
life, even to the extent of his occasionally trying to include his wife in
his work.
I For Sasha, there is no political subtext, no intrigue,, no sinister an-
tagonists for him to outmaneuver. It might be-said, however, that he
enjoys this blissful ignorance only because, and to the extent that,
Rostnikov, his superior number,. serves as a buffer between Sasha and
the political elements at work.
Emil Karpo, nicknamed "The Vampire," is at the other end of the
spectrum. He is a gaunt and frightening personality, wholly and discon-
certingly devoted to his police work. That devotion is unsettling to the
more balanced Rostnikov; where Rostnikov, in self-defense perhaps,
must occasionally keep his work on his mind even when at home,
Karpo goes home each day to work. on his professional journal, in
which he keeps records of all his cases. Karpo's belief in the system
which he represents is absolute; he is humorless, obsessed, strong, de-
voutly loyal and fearless, as in this scene:
"And you .like your work," said Rostnikov.
"I am satisfied that within the parameters of our system and the
reality of human fallibility I perform a worthwhile societal function,"
Karpo said.99
Rostnikov's skepticism is equally baffling to Karpo:
Though he had been much decorated and had nearly lost both his
life and'leg in the war against the Axis, Rostnikov had never, since
99. STUART M. KAMINSKY, THE MAN WHO WALKED LIKE A BEAR 59.(1990).
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Karpo had known him, displayed the slightest revolutionary zeal or
interest in politics. And yet Rostnikov was known to be the most
effective and relentless criminal investigator in Moscow. It was a
constant puzzle for Karpo but one he tried not to address. To even
consider it was a distraction from his duty.'00
Sasha's eagerness and youthful innocence may be his prime assets,
Rostnikov's his agile intellect, but for Karpo it is his stubborn, even
obstinate fealty to Communist ideals. Sasha never ponders the state's
corruption-he is too busy coping with his struggling new family-and
Rostnikov battles it daily for his integrity and survival, but it is for
Karpo the bane of his existence.
Emil Karpo was a police inspector. He had his duty, and his duty
was clear, as clear as the law. If others evaded the law, moved
around it, teased its corners, corrupted it, it would not deter him
from his duty. Compassion would lead to destruction. The law was
all there was, the law and the State, which created the law. There
was no morality, only law.'
Where Karpo is aware on a certain level of the weaknesses in the
system, Sasha seems to deal with it only in the inconveniences of food
and housing shortages. It is not communism Karpo abhors but the cur-
rent inability to implement it with the perfection its principles merit.' 2
Sasha, on the other hand, seems perpetually troubled by a vague sense
of uneasiness or occasional depression, which the books lightly suggest
may be inspired by the current malaise in the system, or frustration by
the limitations imposed by political considerations.
b. The Role of Police Procedurals in Humanizing Police
Two of the chief themes which characterize and typify police
procedurals are the accurate replication of the routine procedure em-
ployed by police officers and, as natural corollary, the boredom, even
tedium, of that daily procedure. In that respect, police procedurals, as
"slice of life" dramas may be seen as stark contrasts to the "lone wolf'
private investigator type of mystery, in which the hero is all that one
expects of a hero in current pop culture, large part rebellious antihero,
100. Id. at 60.
101. Id. at 117; see also id. at 165.
102. Id. at 232 (suggesting a new crisis of faith).
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isolated, inventive, quirky, creative, and romantically attractive.
In police procedurals, the "heroes" are seen as prosaic, plebeian
working stiffs, working within the system, for whom their job is just a
paycheck, who solve cases slowly and stolidly, dependent on their part-
ners and their opposite numbers within different branches of the local
and other law enforcement networks. Their lives are exciting only when
they err in following procedure, and when they are in danger, it is not
perceived by the reader as the thrilling escapades of an adventurous
romantic hero, but rather as the terrifying risk of what is normally a
mind-numbingly boring job. The reader is not meant to enjoy a vicari-
ous adventure, because they can too closely identify with the middle-
class prole punching the clock, who stumbles into a deadly hazard.
Where McBain's chronicles of the 87th Precinct are lauded for
their verisimilitude, in Kaminsky's police procedurals the average
reader is at a loss to gauge the accuracy and realism in which the
American author depicts the Soviet police system. The plodding steps
which Rostnikov and his associates follow to solve their cases seem le-
gitimately routine, but we are only now, and only slowly, gaining some
familiarity with the reality which Kaminsky is attempting to portray.
Like the detectives at the 87th Precinct, Rostnikov and his men are
perceived as heroic only in the sense that, because they are not glamor-
ous men of daring, their achievements and triumphs are the stuff of the
virtuous but unexceptional common man, and all the more impressive
for that.
Western perception of the so-called Soviet "police state" is that
there prevails a presumed state of paranoia among the citizens against
the government and, by implication, its representatives. If forced to ar-
ticulate the source of the terror, most Westerners would probably name
the KG3, seen as the enforcers of repressive government's arbitrary
"system" of law.
Enlightened, or given one's perspective, naive jurists and layper-
sons in the East and West alike might point in rebuttal to the existence
of a Western-style Soviet Constitution, penal code, court system, and
system of legal representation, which seemed to incorporate an almost
recognizable guarantee of due process. All these elements, as they were
revealed to Westerners, seemed to disprove or at least contradict the
suspicions.
The Rostnikov books provide a credible compromise viewpoint
tending to suggest that the reality is somewhere in between: There was
a repressive, capricious, authoritarian, official presence, and there was a
familiarly mundane set of rules and implementers or watchdogs of
19921 1049
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those rules, the KGB and the police, respectively. Both coexisted, un-
comfortably, not side by side so much as one shadowing and haunting
the other. Rostnikov, more than his two subordinates, epitomizes the
haunted police department.
Police procedurals are most effective to the extent that they are
successful in personalizing while demystifying the police. Kaminsky
achieves this in his Rostnikov books as well as McBain does with his
87th Precinct series, though it is a far more extraordinary accomplish-
ment for Kaminsky. Some westerners are predisposed to discredit the
essential humanity of their local police, but the inherent bias toward,
and even fear of, police officers in a communist country runs far
deeper. Their police are seen here as being indistinguishable from the
political system, charged with enforcing not a criminal justice system
for their protection but a repressive political regime.
Where local police are scorned in the West, it is because they are
perceived as implementing an essentially just system in an unjust way.
Police in a communist state are deprecated by Westerners because the
criminal justice system is viewed as intrinsically flawed, or corrupt.
What the Rostnikov books manage to do is to shed light on the distinc-
tion between Soviet law and Soviet politics; there is a line between po-
lice and state in the so-called police state. Kaminsky is not so notice-
ably ingenuous, or disingenuous, as to suggest that the two systems
-criminal justice and political-do not impact on each other to the
citizens' detriment, but the books manage to reveal a line between what
is to most Westerners a blurred bifurcation.
In humanizing the members of a police department, authors of po-
lice procedurals manage a precarious balance in making the officers:
likeable characters, in some way sufficiently ingratiating that the read-
ers will cheer for them, care about them, identify with them, but not
idolize them as unbelievably flawless; sufficiently amiable that the read-
ers will enjoy following them about their daily business, but not happy
or shallow enough for the reader to gloss over their tedious, depressing,
and unremittingly unrewarding work; and part of a team that generally
gets results without meshing smoothly, where its members are not in-
terchangeable but neither are they so independent or indispensable that
they would be better off working outside.
That last ingredient is what distinguishes the denizen of police
procedurals from his fictional cousin, the "lone wolf" private investiga-
tor, who is idiosyncratic enough to function chiefly if not solely outside
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any official system."' 3 The characters in police procedurals must be
seen as poignantly human, flawed individuals, much as we see our-
selves, placed in tense and involving, but not unbelievable or sensa-
tional, life-threatening situations, and prevailing by tapping astonishing
resources of heroism within themselves.
In a very real sense, the genre is able to provide its readers with a
point of reference for their local police systems. The system thereby is
given a face and a name, or several faces and names; never mind that
those names and faces are fictitious. Police procedurals succeed only to
the extent that they are credible simulations of real life. The characters
must seem, feel and sound real for the plot to have any meaning. Un-
like most other "thrillers," police procedurals are not devoured because
they provide a fantasy adventure life for their readers; they are instead
valued because they recreate a different type of tedium, because, with
apologies to Hannah Arendt, they depict the "banality of evil."
Readers of police procedurals will then substitute the 87th Pre-
cinct's Steve Carella or Meyer Meyer for the phrase "police officer,"
and see three dimensions, shades of grey, substance and texture where
once they would only have seen a one-dimension, essentially inhuman
cog in the System. Some readers can even go further and substitute
these fleshed-out fictitious human beings for "police department," de-
termining that, arguably, there is no system other than, or greater
than, the sum of the individuals comprising that system.
The Soviet police procedurals of Stuart Kaminsky have two addi-
tional obstacles toward achieving a similar goal: First, the political sys-
tem imposes a layer of danger and deception on the functioning of
these individuals; however admirable and approachable the officers' in-
stincts and intentions, the KGB is only too likely to thwart these, po-
tentially distancing the would-be do-gooder police from their citizens
and readers. Second, the daily life of an Eastern-bloc country is so
alien and hidden from us that an author is hard-pressed to achieve the
sense of intimacy and routine.
Kaminsky scales both hurdles admirably. He injects the same de-
gree of detail and hamishness into the lives of his Soviet police officers
that he does with Toby Peters' Hollywood existence half a century ago,
whether by describing Toby's subsistence on Depression-era private in-
vestigator's fees by eating cold cereal for dinner, or grimly recounting
Sasha Tkach's queuing for bare essentials on endless, perhaps pointless
103. But see infra notes 109-19 (discussing Martin Cruz Smith's policeman who
functions, notwithstanding his employment, in just such an antiheroic role).
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lines. Kaminsky thereby manages to make the reader feel the charac-
ters' hunger, pain, fear, frustration-and rare exhilaration-so palpa-
bly that we can experience the enmity of the KGB as a threat external
to the Soviet police officers, than that as linked to, or aligned with, the
police. The Soviet police are identified with as victimized or terrorized
by the KGB; the KGB is enemy to the police as to the citizen, and the
reader is enabled to identify with the police as with the citizens.
To this end, Kaminsky uses the KGB to provide a large measure
of the dramatic tension, even overshadowing the villainy of the
criminals being sought and investigated. While the KGB remains an
intimidating, powerful adversary, the police become the reader's heroes
rather than the puppets of the antagonists or persecutors. Onge Kamin-
sky has convinced us, to our colossal astonishment, that the Soviet po-
lice are human beings as well as police officers, it is a small leap of
faith to reach the understanding that human beings doing ordinary jobs
are the same the world over.
c. Rostnikov's Police and Perestroika
Kaminsky's later Rostnikov novels make frequent references to the
recent changes in the Soviet Union. "Yes, things had changed recently.
People talked of . . .democratization, but those things could change
back again with a bullet, a quiet coup."1 4 Kaminsky paints the general
public as frustrated with the economic problems resulting from per-
estroika,106 including new crimes, as described by Rostnikov's supervi-
sor in the militia:
Criminals are preying on newly formed cooperative businesses.
Street fighting among rival gangs of youths has reached murderous
levels right in our city. Some people have claimed that General
Secretary Gorbachev's political and social reforms, which have re-
laxed state controls, are to blame for this grave new crime wave. 106
But along with the negative changes came hopeful new signs of
impending reforms in the Soviet criminal justice system: In a conversa-
tion with Rostnikov, his supervisor, known as "The Wolfhound," a man
with largely ceremonial duties unlike the work Rostnikov was permit-
104. STUART M. KAMINSKY, THE MAN WHO WALKED LIKE A BEAR 20-21
(1990).
105. Id. at 32, 34, 88.
106. Id. at 44.
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ted to perform as part of the procuracy, 10° has the following to say
about the reforms:
I am permitted an investigative staff, your staff, consisting of per-
sonnel who are not wanted in other departments but, for reasons I
cannot always fathom, are too valuable simply to dismiss. We are
permitted to function, investigate as long as we remain harmless,
unthreatening to other investigative bodies . . . . My political fu-
ture is suddenly very promising, Porfiry Petrovich. If I-we---do
not stumble. If the reforms continue, we may emerge with more
than a ceremonial image .... 108
By the end of Bear, Rostnikov has again wrested a measure of
triumph from his superiors and his two chief professional antago-
nists-the KGB and the criminals he is investigating. To say he has
thwarted the criminals or the KGB would overstate the case.
3. Martin Cruz Smith's Arkady Renko Novels
a. Renko as an Existential Hero
Martin Cruz Smith has written two novels featuring Arkady
Renko, a once-and-future Chief Inspector with the Procurator's Office.
Where Porfiry Rostnikov is middle aged, with a bad leg and the de-
scriptive sobriquet of "The Washtub," Arkady Renko is young and
handsome, slightly disheveled but nonetheless a dashing romantic fig-
ure, a loner betrayed by his wife.
Martin Cruz Smith's Arkady Renko series, while nominally police
procedurals in that its central figure is a police officer, treat that figure
as sympathetic as he exists in a state of alienation from the militia. He
is sympathetic, therefore, only insofar as he is estranged from his offi-
cial status; by the sequel to Gorky Park, Arkady Renko's estrangement
is complete: He is "exiled" aboard the eponymous freighter, Polar Star.
It is this characteristic which distinguishes Smith's books from
novels both about Soviet police and American police; that is, Kamin-
sky's procedurals bear greater resemblance to McBain's 87th Precinct
novels than to Smith's two books, despite their settings. Smith's work
falls rather within the subgenre of "lone wolf" detective novels, the
Chandleresque antihero popularized in cinema by Humphrey Bogart.
4
107. Id. at 27, 41.
108. Id. at 154.
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While Smith's and Kaminsky's books both reflect extensive re-
search, and take pains to familiarize the reader with their unusual set-
ting, Smith's seem to use that setting as exotic backdrop for a tale of
alienation and disaffection from authority. Kaminsky, on the other
hand, treats the role of the Soviet militia almost as a character in itself.
Renko, even more than Rostnikov, serves as existential hero, alien-
ated as Soviet policeman because he is forced to operate without rules,
like any private detective functioning outside the law, or more techni-
cally, within a set of illogical, unreasonable, arbitrary or corrupted
rules. Like a private detective "wannabe," Arkady is forced to devise
his own moral code because of that set of illogical or corrupted rules
that comprise his job.
"Even Pribluda [Renko's KGB nemesis] should know that Gorky
Park was for recreation, not education . . . .The lesson was cold, too
old, pointless. It wasn't justice as Arkady had come to expect and
detest." 109
"Arkady had few illusions about his work. He was senior homicide
investigator, a specialist in murder in a country that had little well-
organized crime and no talent for finesse." 110
In three years as a deputy investigator and two years as chief in-
vestigator, [Renko]'d encountered fewer than five homicides that
rose above childlike stupidity, or following which the murderer
hadn't presented himself or herself to the militia drunkenly boast-
ful or rueful. The Russian murderer had great faith in the inevita-
bility of his capture, all he wanted was his moment onstage. Rus-
sians won wars because they threw themselves before tanks, which
was not the right mentality for a master criminal."'
On one level it is Renko's alienated nature that enables him to find
a solution to the riddles posed to him: in Gorky Park, three literally
faceless bodies are found in the park; in Polar Star, the body of a
young woman is caught in one of the ship's fishing nets.
However, Renko's disaffection .does not provide him with anything
like a way out of his maze. His sense of alienation quite literally ren-
ders him dysfunctional as a police officer. "Under the guise of pretense,
without his will, a real investigation was taking shape. 11 2 Indeed, he
109. MARTIN CRUZ SMITH, GORKY PARK 37-38 (1986).
110. Id. at 10.
11. Id. at 26-27.
112. Id. at 70.
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will be robbed of his position because of who he is, what he does.:
In Gorky Park, he was given a case on which he did not want to,
work, and in which he felt himself a pawn. It is a perfect symbol of his
sense of weightlessness and lack of control. "[R]enko felt strangely
light--light of [his wife], light of home, slipping out of an orbit that
had been his life, falling away from gravity."11 By recognizing his own
sense of powerlessness, Renko is both empowered and impotent:
There remained one more intriguing possibility: that the investiga-
tor himself had discovered-by accident, the way a manpasses a
mirror and suddenly notices he is unshaven, his overcoat worn at
the collar-how shabby his work was. Or worse, how pointless.
Was he a chief investigator or a processor of the dead, an adjunct
of the morgue, his paperwork the bureaucratic substitute for last
rites? A small point that, and merely indicative of socialist reality(after all, only Lenin Lives!)." 4
In the sequel; Polar Star, this sense of lifelessness and powerless-
ness will be reaffirmed. As the sequel opens, Arkady Renko has suf-
fered a far more decisive fall from grace than Porfiry Rostnikov's mere
demotion. Because of his unorthodox actions in Gorky Park, or because
of his nature, Arkady was dismissed from the procurator's office for
lack of political reliability, for what he flippantly refers to as "doing
my job."
Renko is told by the political officer; i.e., KGB representative, on
the epony mous Soviet factory ship on which he now labors, "You have
no home, no place to go.""' 5 Thus Polar Star retains Renko's sense of
rootlessness, of rulelessness. Confused' as to the changed nature of his
relationship with Major, now Colonel, Pribluda of the KGB, Renko ru-
minates: "It was as if everyone traveled the world in the dark, never
knowing where he was going, blindly following a road that twisted, rose
and fell, The hand that pushed you down one day helped you up the
next. The only straight road was . . . what?""'
There is, though, in Polar Star, the promise of hope, of redemp-
tion for Arkady.
[I]sn't this what Arkady did, hide? First in the deep faraway of the
113. Id. at 92.
114. Id.
115. MARTIN CRUZ SMITH, POLAR STAR 25 (1989).
116. MARTIN CRUZ SMITH, GORKY PARK 102 (1986).
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psycho ward. Then, after Pribluda revived him, in Siberia and on
the ship, carrying on inert and semidead . . .? Now, asleep in his
narrow bunk, he asked himself, Wouldn't it be good to be alive
again? [The murder victim] had swum back. Maybe he could,
too.
1 7
This promise may be attributed to Soviet political changes. Com-
rade Hess is a "fleet engineer" on the Polar Star. 18 The term, Renko
determines, is a euphemism for naval intelligence; Hess is responsible
for turning the tide against the KGB and in favor of Arkady in the
murder investigation, "There is more than one mission," Hess tells the
KGB officer. At that remark, "There was a pause," Smith reflects, "as
if the entire ship had veered in a new direction." 1 9 The book ends, too,
with a sense of optimism:
"You know, on the radio they're starting to refer to you as Investi-
gator Renko, whatever that suggests."
"It could mean anything," Arkady said."
"True."
In Gorky Park, however, Renko has a great deal to say about the
conflict between militia and KGB, as personified by himself and Major
Pribluda.
The major might . . .start with a little joke, establishing a fresh,
more amiable relationship, perhaps describing their current misun-
derstanding as purely institutional. After all, the KGB was main-
tained out of fear. Without enemies, outside or within, real or
imagined, the whole KGB apparatus was pointless. The roles of the
militia and the prosecutor's office, on the other hand, were to
demonstrate that all was well. 120
b. Comparisons between the Renko and Rostnikov Series
Martin Cruz Smith uses the KGB in Gorky Park and Polar Star
as antagonists, much as a corrupt or simply hostile police department
in the "lone wolf' detective novels set in the United States. In the Ka-
minsky books, however, it is the byzantine nature of the Soviet police,
as it relates to the Soviet state, represented by militia superiors and the
117. Id. at 105-06 (emphasis in original).
118. Id. at 87
119. Id. at 89.
120. Id. at 91.
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KGB, that lends Rostnikov's employment its special poignancy.
A character like Emil Karpo could not exist in the United States,
nor would he fit neatly into a Smith list of dramatis personae. One
similarly gets the impression that Rostnikov would not have become the
person he is without the treacherous path he has learned to tread in the
Soviet militia. Only Sasha Tkach, almost a Bert Kling clone, could slip
into an Ed McBain novel, but he is too complex a character for one to
imagine him as one of Arkady Renko's colleagues. In Gorky Park, as
in most of the lone wolf subgenre, the protagonist is sympathetic be-
cause he is alone; often he achieves this solitude and alienation through
the plot device of a murdered partner. Indeed, Renko loses his only
helpful associate, Pasha Pavlovich, early in Gorky Park, perhaps to
achieve just this effect.
Renko bears the trappings of existential angst befitting a late 20th
Century antihero, but the doom and gloom seem more romantic trap-
pings de rigueur in the classic lone wolf detective fiction than the politi-
cal, Kafkaesque fatalism or hopelessness with which Kaminsky man-
ages, seemingly effortlessly, to imbue his series. The humor in
existential anxiety has always lain just beneath-sometimes even
on-the surface of great existential literature from Waiting for Godot
to Metamorphosis. From two men waiting for an entire play for some-
one who never arrives, someone who may never exist, to a man who
turns into a giant insect: The difference between the two lies in the
difference between reality and fantasy. Maybe the truest humor derives
not from injecting unbelievable twists into real life situations, but from
lampooning what we are made to see in the irrational nature of reality
as we know it and live it every day.
Kaminsky's Rostnikov series is the perfect vehicle for just such a
goal, for two reasons: first, because cops are known to see more "real-
ity" in one week than most of us can expect to encounter in our entire
lives. Maybe they see reality at its ugliest, but in some ways they also
get to see, and experience, reality, or life, at its fullest, and at its most
impressive-heroism and camaraderie at its finest. Second, by setting
his series in the Soviet Union, even if he had no political agenda, Ka-
minsky had an opportunity to present life, or reality, at its most absurd.
Not unreal-somewhere between Kafka and the Twilight Zone,
maybe--but eminently believable.
It must be remembered that credibility is the sine qua non of the
authentic police procedural. Kaminsky manages to blend what we don't
know about the Soviet Union-a place traditionally shrouded in mys-
tery, illuminated only by images of a system in which due process as
19921 1057
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we know it is twisted beyond recognition by an oppressive legal "or-
der." It is a place we fear both because of what we know, and because
of what we don't know. Kaminsky grounds his books in the requisite
prosaic routine while not compromising-in fact, heightening-that
'fear.
The more we learn, the more terrified we become, and this is only
the background of the books, almost but not quite separate and apart
from the murder that is colorably the plot of the novels. We grow more
frightened because the system is a way of life from which the he-
roes-the cops-will never be free. This is the classic stuff of existen-
tialism as much as of police procedurals: The system is never sub-
verted, but is rather used to triumph over the wrongdoer.
Occasionally a cop in the 87th'Precinct might stray from the
straight and narrow, might even bend the rules, but the system itself
isn't portrayed as malevolent. At worst, slow or awkward, ironically
misused, but not inherently malign. Rostnikov and his colleagues tri-
umph despite the system-not by extricating themselves from it (that
would be akin to extricating oneself from reality)-but by learning to
adapt to the absurdity and thereby exploit it.
Porfiry Rostnikov plays the system better than his superiors
(though we always get the uneasy feeling that his is only a temporary
victory, holding the enemy at bay for a fleeting triumph); Sasha ignores
it with the naivete of ignorance and the purity of youth; the Vampire
survives because in his devotedly single-minded tunnel-vision, he credits
the system with the genuineness and nobility of his own set of rules.
Karpo would never believe us if we told him he was thinking for him-
self. He blindly perceives that he is serving the system, but in truth he
is investing it with his own sense of justice.
Does the doublespeak of that system genuinely contain the values
that Karpo serves? We take our cue from Rostnikov,.the most enlight-
ened of the trio, who shows us that even with the somewhat more
evolved and still loyal party members in the police, the system (reality,
from an unpolitical view, or the USSR, from a political reading) is
absurd and dysfunctional. Not unreal, but all the more frightening be-
cause it is real. And, or at least until recently, because it bore indica-
tions of permanence.
Police function hampered by the weight of hopelessness and de-
spair-the more intelligent, or aware or evolved or sensitive the person-
ality, the greater the despair. In the Smith books, as well as in the
Rostnikov series, a reader used to this sadness/frustration is left to
wonder only if it is the existential angst standard in detective novels in
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the classic mode, or borne of a more political ennui.
Kaminsky's series, like most police procedurals, is something of an
ensemble piece, affording the reader more than one character to study
and compare. With Smith's lone wolf or "cowboy" hero/antihero, we
are left to question whether his sensibilities epitomize the author's ideal
or his opinion as to the audience's ideal (i.e., highly aware, intelligent,
sensitive to life's irony, bitterness, hopelessness, injustice, etc.)
'Where hopelessness is a result not just of bureaucracy's muddle of
red tape, but a political agenda, it is potentially that much more essen-
tial than the protagonist despair. But should he allow that despair to
render him compliant, or wholly dysfunctional, the reader's sympathies
are likely to pall.
Professional rivalries, bickering and infighting take on a life-or-
death seriousness: In the Kafkaesque-or Orwellian-world where a
wrong word to the wrong person could cost not just one's professional
standing but one's freedom or even one's life, ruffling a colleague's
feathers is risk-taking of almost self-destructive proportions.
Here again, Arkady, the more Chandleresque antihero, is dramati-
cally required to sabotage his career, while Rostnikov is able, in a less
glamorous, more plebeian fashion, to maintain the balance of power,
occasionally stumbling and losing ground, but forfeiting a battle in or-
der to return another day to fight again. If he is the less romantic of
the two men, Rostnikov is closer to the mold of Western police proce-
dural protagonist, more credible or convincing because his victories and
defeats are almost always minor, and almost always temporary.
Surviving the occasional risks of their jobs and catching the
wrongdoers whose crimes form the plot of these novels may not seem
minor in theory, but these accomplishments are smaller in scope than
are usually featured in novels. Renko's battles are fought against a
backdrop of good and evil; Rostnikov is harassed and beleaguered,
threatened and endangered, but his triumphs are more subtle, sounded
in a cryptic dialogue or political double-entendres, in which even the
conversants may not know for days who got the better of whom. Ka-
minsky occasionally supplies the obligatory chase or showdown, but the
real dramatic tension lies in what is said, and not said, rather than in
what is done. It provides a far more subtle and enduring gratification of
an intellectual and visceral nature.
B. The Militia in Western Films
Martin Cruz Smith's novel, Gorky Park, was made into a film in
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1983 by Orion Pictures, starring William Hurt as Chief Investigator
Arkady Renko, and also featuring Lee Marvin, Brian Dennehy, and
Joanna Pakula.12 1 The film is only sporadically faithful to Smith's
plot, 22 but entirely consistent with his mood and characters.
William Hurt affected a jarringly inconstant English accent, per-
haps to distinguish his character from the other American actors por-
traying Americans, and to align himself with the British actors portray-
ing Russians. Aside from that distracting note, Hurt admirably
captures the iconoclastic melancholy of Smith's Renko.
The movie neglects the complex relationship of Renko and
Pribluda so well treated in Smith's novel, but otherwise is faithful to
the competitive nature of procuracy, 12 militia and KGB. When Renko
first begins his investigation, and demands of Pribluda a reason for the
latter's presence on the scene, Pribluda explains that "the KGB decides
what interests KGB."
The character of Renko in Dennis Potter's screenplay and Hurt's
interpretation is true to the character in the novel. Renko is openly
rebellious, disaffected, a man who has something to prove and nothing
to lose: the archetypal "private eye." His hostility toward everyone but
his trusted colleague Pasha is palpable. He is combative with the
pathologist, with witnesses, and most significantly, with the KGB. This
antagonism is a luxury Porfiry Rostnikov cannot afford, or will not al-
low himself.
Renko is compared with his father, the war hero General Renko, a
man considered neat and tidy, as contrasted with Renko's patent di-
sheveled lifestyle. The prosecutor cautions Renko: "Your father was
just as insolent, but he could afford to be. He was good at his job." '24
The film's Renko is almost a man without a sense of self, a man
able to solve the case by assuming the identity, however fleetingly, with
the initially anonymous victims, and then with the killer. Without be-
ing as firmly grounded (not to say earthbound) as, for example, Inspec-
tor Porfiry Rostnikov, Renko is able to be changed by the investigation
121. The film was produced by Gene Kirkwood and Howard W. Koch, Jr., and
directed by Michael Apted with a screenplay by Dennis Potter based on Smith's book.
122. The character of KGB officer Major Pribluda dies in the movie but not in
the book, in which the two men ultimately gain respect and something like friendship
for each other. Also, the movie omits Renko's trip to New York.
123. Here, as in the novel, the procurator is called a "prosecutor," and in the
novel, the Procurator General, the "Prosecutor General."
124. Major Pribluda will later acknowledge to Renko that the prosecutor erred
in underestimating Arkady's abilities.
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in a way Rostnikov never is. Rostnikov has nothing to prove and a
great deal to lose. Smith's novel accentuates the point by giving Renko
a wife and having him forfeit that wife.
Renko, the true existential hero, is aware of the tragic, hopeless
nature of his reality, and therein lies his despair. When asked by a
friend what he is "up to," Arkady replies, "Saving a life."
"Whose?" he is asked.
"Mine," he responds. "I'm on a case that reeks of KGB
involvement."
Renko is only too aware of his being "set up," but he suspects the
wrong man. "Lies are not freedom," Renko tells lrina, the woman he
comes to love, and it is his existential self-honesty, or his inability to
avoid confronting the truth, that is his downfall and his salvation.
The film adds a particularly pointed observation of the nature of
Soviet justice when Arkady tells a forensic expert of the need to inves-
tigate, notwithstanding the danger in his society of knowing the truth:
"Too many people in our society . . . disappear . . . into the chasm
• . . between what is said and what is done." Lies are not freedom, but
truth is a little like death, a point made more explicitly in Polar Star.
From the sublime to the ridiculous, the credibility of Western
films' portrayal of the Soviet police took a downward turn in the 1988
movie, Red Heat.25 The movie, part mismatched buddy film, part fish-
out-of-water caper, starred Arnold Schwartzeneger as militia Captain
Ivan Danko, paired with James Belushi as the Chicago police depart-
ment's Detective Sergeant Art .Ridzik. The two are teamed to locate an
escaped Soviet criminal in Chicago.
The film began with a comic book opening, a fight scene complete
with kung-fu-type heightened sound effects for the punches landed. The
opening credits featured equally discouraging bastardized cyrillic let-
tering (e.g., the backwards "R", which is pronounced "ya" in Russian,
stood instead for the English letter "R").
This was not an auspicious beginning if credibility and. accuracy
were chief values. The film itself, while not unentertaining, did not im-
prove with time. Captain Danko was a humorless, forbidding figure, at
least in the first hour or so of the film, but less because of his uniform
than because of Danko's stoic personality-and the physical presence
of the actor portraying the Soviet officer. Indeed, bearing out the im-
125. A Carolco-Lone Wolf-Oak film, directed by Walter Hill, produced by Wal-
ter Hill and Gordon Carroll, with a screenplay by Harry Kleiner, Walter Hill and Troy
Kennedy Martin from a story by Walter Hill.
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pression that the humorlessness was not a function of his nationality or
profession was the fact that other Soviet militiamen, e.g., Danko's Rus-
sian partner, felt comfortable telling jokes.
Schwartzeneger's character's motivation was prime "lone wolf'
material, avenging the death of his partner. The entire film, however,
seemed calculated to inject every Western stereotype of Soviet society:
Danko criticized pornography on the hotel television as "capitalism"
(the correct phrase should've been "capitalist decadence," but the point
was made). Danko was also portrayed as a brilliant chess player; while
this might be imagined a fleeting reference to the mental fencing prev-
alent in Kaminsky's novels, it turns out instead to be no more than the
use of another Russian stereotype.
Danko is asked by Peter Boyle's character, a police commander
and Ridzik's supervisor, "How do you Soviets deal with all the tension
and stress?" The answer, predictably, is "Wodka." Even though Danko
appears to develop a sense of humor as the film progresses, it seems to
be attributable to his contact with Belushi rather than an inherent
character trait we are only beginning to glimpse.
Nor are the KGB omitted in the parade of Soviet stereotypes.
Captain Danko, as he works with Belushi, manages to "hold out" on
the KGB's representative, who is described in pointed euphemism as a
"liaison officer" from Washington, D.C. The political commentary
continues:
Danko: "Chinese had way [of dealing with criminals]. Take all
drug dealers, line them up, shoot them in back of head."
Ridzik (regretfully): "Nah, never work here. Fucking politicians
would never go for it."
Danko: "Shoot them first."
Schwartzeneger's character is not, however, without compassion.
At one point in the film, he shoots out a door lock to let a relatively
innocent young woman escape. Nor is Belushi, the representative of the
American police, idealized. Ridzik is argumentative, foul-mouthed, big-
oted and overly emotional, in sum, "a good cop, and a total expert at
fucking up." He describes a group of blacks as a "basketball team," a
racist stereotype. Yet it is Belushi's character who is seen as "teaching
[Danko] a sense of humor."
In sum, while mildly entertaining, Red Heat may be considered a
worthwhile entry in the category of Western media's depiction of So-
viet police only until one recalls the far superior treatment given the
topic by Gorky Park.
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C. The Soviet Police in American Television
Two recent television programs purport to document a slice of So-
viet life in portraying their police at work. The first of the two is an
episode of the Fox network program, Cops. It was first televised in July
1989, and rebroadcast early this year.
The episode, "Cops in Russia," was taped over sixteen days in
Moscow and Leningrad by an American-Soviet film-crew, reportedly
"for the first time in history, thanks to glasnost." The program began
its coverage with the Soviet Militia Training Academy, showing police
recruits at jogging, morning exercises, martial arts class, combat course
and dress inspection. The training appears rigorous, as might be ex-
pected of any police academy, but the scene ends with an unattributed
voice-over claiming that, '.'In my personal opinion, only a real man can
be a cop."
The program returns after commercial break with a Leningrad
morning May Day celebration. The voice-over describes the wide-
spread Soviet alcohol problem, exacerbated on holidays when people
are inclined to celebrate. "The problem of alcoholism in this country is
a very great social problem; and the task of the militia is to help the
people get rid of this social evil," the speaker notes in Russian-accented
voice.
We are next taken to a drunk-tank in the Central District of Le-
ningrad, where we see a young man being removed from restraints in a
chair used specifically for that purpose. The man is obviously debili-
tated and subdued, and when removed from the chair, is unable to
stand on his own. As he is returned to the holding room, the voice-over
dutifully reports that the other inmates are claiming that the young
man had been beaten before placed in the restraining chair. A few mo-
ments later, we see another man, drunk and boisterous, being placed in
a similar chair.
The closest the program gets to political commentary comes after
a street patrol in the same Central District. A woman, victimized by
burglary of the savings she had intended to use to buy a new mattress,
complains of life in the Soviet Union: "All the world . . . knows that
the Soviet people have only all these achievements and they have
no . . . they have nothing in their shops and they can buy nothing,
practically."
The program follows the police ifi a shopping district investigation
of sales fraud, and to the Nevsky District to apprehend a black
marketeer. We are shown a glimpse of the police station, where sus-
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pects are detained, its central dispatch, where emergency information is
collected. The station appears much like any other metropolitan police
station.
A surprising view of the Soviet mindset is provided when the mili-
tia raid a suspected drug house. The police have to break down the
door, and when they question the man inside as to why he declined to
open the door for them, his reply is that he was not obligated to open
the door inasmuch as he is entitled to his privacy. This writer expected
the suspect's next protest to be, "This is a free country, isn't it?"
As it happens, the son of the man arrested in that house helped
the militia locate narcotics in a wardrobe. The boy, apparently ten or
eleven years old, told the police that he had telephoned the police sev-
eral times to report his father, but that no investigating officers ever
appeared.
The program then follows the officers to a crackdown on motorcy-
cle gangs, where gang members, who refused to pull over for the police,
were forced by the police to a checkpoint (where the police check citi-
zens' internal passports). When asked why the gang members would
not pull over, they replied, "'Cause they felt like it, and the police are
full of crap."126
This typifies the rather singular lack of fear or intimidation of the
militia. Later, when a pair of "lovebirds, maybe" in a parked car are
questioned by the police during a rooftop surveillance of suspicious
cars, the two in the car shut and lock their doors and drive away, with
two police officers attempting to jump onto the roof of the car. The
suspects are soon apprehended, however, and when one of the officers
demanded the girl turn over the keys to her car, she proclaims, "I
won't, you have no right." The officer replies that he certainly does
have a right, and that citizens must produce their papers for the police.
The girl is noticeably underwhelmed, although the officer returns her
keys only to allow her to drive herself and the officer to the police
station.
While the "Cops" episode offers no explicit commentary or narra-
tive, in allowing the events to speak for themselves, it makes a point
quite eloquently. What we see seems strikingly familiar, but not famil-
iar in that it is what one expected to see: It is familiar in the sense that
it parallels what Americans see in their own streets and see on the
streets of other cities on other episodes of "Cops."
126. Courtesy of the translator/narrator.
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The second of the two television programs on Soviet police is a
June 1990 episode of the CBS news show 48 Hours entitled "Moscow
Vice", featuring a visit to the Soviet Union by members of the San
Jos& Police Department. The visit included a trip to Moscow, where the
American police officers reported that it was not the heavy-handed po-
lice state they imagined.
The Soviet police had a different perspective on changes in their
country. "Fear of the policeman is gone,''17 one militia officer reported
rather mournfully, notwithstanding the existence of the internal pass-
port system, i.e., the remnant of the police state. Another officer com-
mented that the "police state is in a state of disrepair." This is entirely
consistent with the rather brazen attitude of citizens toward the militia
witnessed in the "Cops in Russia" episode.
According to the Soviets interviewed on 48 Hours, there is concern
that the internal changes will bring increasing crime, leading in turn to
a backlash and renewed repression. 28 One officer reported that the
shortage of housing left "no room for reason." This viewer was re-
minded of Inspector Rostnikov's colleague, the young Sasha Tkach,
struggling to rid his cramped household of his mother.
The only other political commentary in 48 Hours touched on the
operations of the Organized Crime Unit. A Soviet policeman noted
that the Unit can now focus on local extortionists or protection racke-
teers functioning in cooperatives; those criminals prey on legitimate
businesses, but more lately also on black marketeers who are taking up
the slack when state-run liquor stores fold.
It is noteworthy that both of the two television programs limited
their coverage of Soviet police to nonpolitical crimes. In that sense,
viewers were exposed only to the types of police activity paralleling that
of American police. To what extent this accurately reflects the Soviet
criminal justice system is discussed below, in the context of the activity
of Soviet police in both political and nonpolitical cases.
127. However, a satirical cartoon from the Soviet magazine Krokodil depicts a
woman reassuring a man about the shadowy figures approaching their window: "Relax,
it's not the police, it's just burglars." SOVIET HUMOR (1990) (by the editors of
Krokodil magazine).
128. 48 Hours (CBS television broadcast of June, 1990).
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IV. ACCURACY OF WESTERN MEDIA'S PORTRAYAL OF MILITIA
A. The Apologists' Controversy
One final area of discussion which should be briefly considered is
the treatment accorded the Soviet criminal justice system in another
form: the area of both primary and secondary legal authority. A battle
was waged in legal periodicals as to the reliability of the portrait of the
Soviet legal system in texts and treatises written by Westerners, who
may be said to have brought the Soviet legal system to the Western
scholar.
It has been questioned whether those scholars who have been re-
sponsible for most if not all of Westerners' knowledge of the Soviet
system have painted an inaccurately rosy picture. The question tends to
hinge on the difference between the law on the books of the Soviet legal
system and the law as practiced in the Soviet Union.
A chronic problem for scholarship about any legal culture is
the question of how the "law on the books"-the official, published
sources of law-correspond to the "law in practice," the way life is
actually governed . . . . Law in practice is undoubtedly closer to
law on the books in a society like that of the United States [than in
developing countries], which traditionally has a high public level of
legal consciousness and a press that is free to expose deviations
from the letter of the law. Even in America, of course, the congru-
ence is less than complete.
Distinguishing the law on the books from the law in practice is
especially difficult-yet indispensable-in considering a society like
that of the USSR, where propaganda is a pervasive part of daily
life. State and Communist Party agencies supervise the dissemina-
tion of information and ideas in the Soviet Union, including official
legal materials, and ensure that what is disseminated reflects well
on the State and the Party. To be sure, propaganda and the publi-
cation of lies are scarcely unique to Communist statecraft, but
propaganda is peculiarly prominent in the folkways of the Commu-
nist movement and its institutions. In the Soviet Union, moreover,
there is little internal check on the propaganda output, because
the government has a monopoly of the means of communication
and prohibits independent publication. A healthy measure of skep-
ticism, therefore, is surely appropriate toward whatever is pub-
lished under such a regime, including official legal materials. 29
129. Marnion Schwarzschild, Variations on an Enigma: Law in Practice and
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The difference between the law on the books and the law in prac-
tice in the Soviet Union seemed to come down to one prime factor: the
Communist Party as embodied by the enforcement or vigilance of the
KGB. "Perhaps the most difficult difference [between American and
Soviet legality] for the American to grasp is the role of the Communist
Party in legal affairs."' 130 Professor John Hazard,"' the author of those
words, reviewing Dina Kaminskaya's book, Final Judgment, notes that
some similarities exist between the American and Soviet regard for the
rule of law:
Every American lawyer knows that social and political pressures
are brought to bear on the administration of justice under some
circumstances in the United States . . . . Political machines in the
United States may dominate the process of selection of judges.and
district attorneys, but they have no propaganda apparatus at their
disposal as does the Soviet security police, the K.G.B. Most signifi-
cantly, American political machines are always subject to an oppo-
sition party, weak though it may sometimes be, and the press is not
controlled. 132
Professor Hazard describes "three basic points of contrast" be-
tween the American and Soviet systems: the increased role of political
authorities; the heightened considerations of state security, "and, most
importantly, the unique presence of the Communist party color[ing]
the entire legal system.' 33
Also, "the Soviet judiciary, while nominally independent, actually
adhere[d] to governmental and Party directives on penal policy, a fact
not startling in light of the control that the Party has over the selection
of judges.""3 "
That same author added, in "defense" of the Soviet system:
Law on the Books in the USSR, 99 HARV. L. REV. 685, 686 (1986) (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).
130. John N. Hazard, An Insider's View of the Soviet Legal System, 84 COLUM.
L. REv. 271 (1984).
131. "The mainstream of Anglo-American scholarship about Soviet Law is fairly
represented by Professor John Hazard . . . [and] by professor William Butler."
Schwarzschild, supra note 129, at 687 (the author apparently did not intend the re-
mark as a compliment).
132. Hazard, supra note 130, at 271-72.
133. Id. at 271.
134. Dina Kaminskaya, My Life as a Soviet Defense Attorney, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 902, 903 (1984).
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[A]lthough one might reasonably argue that criminal procedures in
most western countries . . are substantially fairer because of their
greater protections for the defendant, such a claim necessarily as-
sumes that conviction of the innocent is a greater evil than absolu-
tion of the guilty. Most in the West probably agree that it is, but
the fact that Soviet jurisprudence may take the opposite view need
not ineluctably lead to the moral condemnation of Soviet society.18 5
The author does, however, condemn the Soviet Union for the "system-
atic suppression of political dissent."' 6 Although the commentator ac-
knowledges the existence of political abuse in Western countries, in-
cluding the United States, he points out that the Soviet Union, given its
repression of free expression, was far more successful at it than any of
its Western counterparts. 3 '
As Professor Hazard points out, even Soviet attorney Kamin-
skaya's book does not depict the Soviet legal system "as a farce."
Rather, "she draws a line between the trials for common crimes and
those for political opposition."' 3 8 Professor Hazard goes on to charac-
terize this distinction as bringing the Soviet leadership in line with the
Tsars, "who, like all Emperors, feared for the safety of their regimes
and of their persons, and reserved for themselves the prerogative of rul-
ing by decree when they spied a political crisis."' 39
Chris Steele Perkins, a London-based photojournalist, was allowed
virtually unprecedented access to the inside workings of the police and
prisons in the Soviet Union. Perkins explains why he believes he was
given such access: "[B]ecause it suited the Soviets; it gave them a
chance to confirm a manifestation of glasnost, and no doubt it was in-
tended to dispel the image powerfully etched in the western mind of the
gulag and a relentless, ever-present KGB."
But Perkins admits he "did not see anything of the KGB [or] po-
litical prisoners,""' and he remains skeptical if optimistic about what
he has been shown: "Of course, I hadn't seen it all. People must still
rely on the evidence of dissidents and others for details of the worst of
the Soviet penal system. But why was I allowed to see any of it? Per-
135. Id. at 903.
136. Id. at 904.
137. Id. at 904-05.
138. Hazard, supra note 130, at 272.
139. Id.
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haps because glasnost is a reality. The Soviet system may truly be
reforming. "I42
To determine whether that sanguine view is accurate, it is neces-
sary to turn to the sources Perkins himself acknowledges to be the au-
thorities: political dissidents.
B. The Role of the Soviet Police in Political Crimes
In keeping with the caveat raised in the preceding section, it is
now incumbent on the author to sound a cautionary note to the analysis
of media's treatment of the Soviet police. It would be disingenuous to
discuss, at any length, the role of the Soviet Union's police without
addressing the role of the militia-and indeed, that of the entire Soviet
criminal justice system-in political cases.
In this context, it behooves us to consider the rule of law itself in
the Soviet system. How much of what was discussed above, with regard
to the checks and balances and due process, is in effect a true picture of
the Soviet criminal justice system? In other words, how much of what
was on the books was in the streets and in the courts of the Soviet
Union? 4"
As indicated above, this is not a new question. Academic and scho-
lastic battles have been waged over alleged apologists for the Soviet
legal system, scholars who, in bringing knowledge of the Soviet legal
system to the West, have been charged with bringing over only a mis-
leading glimpse of Soviet law in theory, rather than accurate insight
into what is Soviet law in practice. On one point most scholars seem to
agree: Soviet law in practice approached Soviet law in theory in most
areas 4" but one. That one exception, that potentially abrogates the
1,42. Id. at 15.
143. The legally trained Gorbachev is seen as being instrumental in efforts to
institutionalize the rule of law in the Soviet Union, a process in-line with that of "de-
mocratization." S.B. Goldberg, A More Perfect Union Part I A Lawyer in Moscow,
A.B.A. J., Oct. 1990, at 60.
144.
[Tihe legal system and machinery of justice in the Soviet Union-which in
its outward structure and functioning was derived largely from the French
system-grinds in an entirely different manner when it deals with an ordi-
nary transgression, that is, not one involving the state as a politico-eco-
nomic institution per-se. In the former case, adjudication will be effected
by the tribunals involved in roughly the same manner known throughout
the world; but in the latter, law becomes the political organ of state power,
the instrument of the class that constitutes the regime of the land, a mere
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rule, is the political case, the so-called "crimes against the state." In
this area of the law, the Soviet criminal justice system failed miserably.
This point of view is reflected not only in the words of the system's
victims, e.g., Natan Sharansky's autobiography Fear No Evil, but also
in the works of some of its accused apologists and even its practitioners.
It is in this sphere that one has to consider the gap between Soviet
law on the books and in practice, and to wonder whether the cause of
that gap is the perhaps diminishing but formerly preeminent role of the
KGB, or something more elusive, something attributable to the Soviet
Union as a "police state." Whether the ebbing dominance of the Com-
munist Party,14 5 leading to a changing role of the KGB to focus on
foreign crimes rather than domestic, will bring the ideal of Soviet crim-
inal justice, as codified, closer to the reality of criminal justice as prac-
ticed in all cases in the Commonwealth, is something still to be
determined. 14 6
Perhaps one of the most striking aspects of the Soviet criminal
justice system for an American is what seems to be a curious admix-
ture of due process and lawlessness, for lack of a better word, in its
application. While the latter term only approximates the meaning in-
tended, it serves better than "arbitrariness" or "capriciousness."
For one gets no impression of anything arbitrary or haphazard in
the experiences documented by Natan Sharansky in his autobiographi-
cal Fear No Evil. A Westerner indoctrinated in the idea, not to say
mythology, of the "evil empire" is hard pressed to fathom the depths of
the byzantine mechanism of Soviet criminal justice. One expects, and
indeed feels gratified by, reports of psychological abuse. It is the docu-
mentation of the orderly procedures implementing the Soviet criminal
code that strike a Westerner as aberrant or inconsistent.
It is in this context that I feel compelled to highlight, however
briefly, the bifurcation of the Soviet criminal justice system. The opera-
tions of the Soviet police prosaically, if artfully and gracefully, depicted
by Kaminsky, and more sharply (though with no less melancholia) by
Martin Cruz Smith, focus on crimes other than treason or espionage.
For those two crimes, as Sharansky describes, it is the KGB rather
adjunct of state power in pursuit of conformity within Soviet society.
ABRAHAM, supra note 55, at 287.
145. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (discussing reforms relating
to "telephone justice").
146. Mikhail Gorbachev was a law school classmate of Dina Kaminskaya. See
generally KAMINSKAYA, FINAL JUDGEMENT (1985).
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than the investigating prosecutor (or procurator, as the position is
called in the Soviet Union) who calls the shots.
Yet even in this somber context, in which the KGB rather than the
militia serves the police function of investigation and arrest, a West-
erner is still surprised by the combination of the dominance of the rule
of law and the more Kafkaesque chess game 47 of psychological mind
games, or investigation by calculated and manipulative interrogation.
In other words, there were still procedures to be followed in the
Soviet system of criminal justice, procedures paralleling and even in
some instances exceeding the Western concept of due process.' 48 It
would be disingenuous, however, to overestimate the force and effect of
these mechanisms as they apply to the crimes of espionage and treason.
It is nonetheless noteworthy to a Westerner, or more specifically to an
American, when the rules bearing an eccentric resemblance to our own
system of civil rights and due process rear their collectively incongru-
ous head amidst an Orwellian setting of double-talk and double-
dealing.
There has been some word of changes in the area of political
crimes in the latter years of the Soviet Union. George P. Fletcher, a
Beekman Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, noted the follow-
ing upon his return from a month-long study of the Soviet legal system:
Soviet criminal justice is evolving, but some trends are apparent.
Before Gorbachev, the bureaucracy relied heavily on the crimes of
possessing anti-Soviet literature and parasitism as techniques for
dissent. Anyone who had a Hebrew grammar at home or a copy of
Solzhenitsyn in his pocket might land in a prison camp for at least
three years. Refuseniks who were fired and could not find substi-
tute employment were prosecuted as parasites. These measures
have virtually disappeared, and I was told that the number of po-
litical prisoners has dwindled.
149
But for the accuracy of this assessment, perhaps we should let the
words of two recent political prisoners speak for themselves: First, Lev
Timofeyev, a Soviet economist and author imprisoned from 1985 to
1987 for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda":
147. Both Kaminsky's and Sharansky's books use the game of chess as a meta-
phor for ideological conflict.
148. 48 Hours (CBS television broadcast of June, 1990 airing California police
officer's views on due process).
149. Fletcher, supra note 140, at 11.
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When a Soviet zek, or prisoner, has a little free time (which
rarely happens), he loves to try to figure out how many of us there
are-all the prisoners, labor camp inmates, exiles, etc., throughout
the USSR .. . [AIccording to these estimates, it appears that
there are at least 10 million of us. The majority of the prisoners
were arrested "for violating the internal passport regimen . . ." or
for "economic crimes . . . ." There are separate labor camps for
political prisoners, the majority of whom are writers, journalists
and other critics of the regime ....
[When I was in prison], I did not experience hatred toward
the jailers and camp officials, nor do I experience hatred now to-
ward those who searched me and kept me under guard; who seized
my notes; who forced me into cells and workshops; who clanged
shut the bolts and locked me behind heavy doors. I was tormented
when they deprived me of warm clothing and did not let me sleep;
when they confiscated my letters and did not permit me to see my
wife and children.
But now, when I write about them, I feel a deep loathing. Be-
cause they are all still at their jobs, alive and well. They are an
enormous army, with complete power over millions of prisoners. Is
it so easy to speak of changes in my country? How will those
changes ever happen for us?150
Also, Natan Sharansky, released after nine years in a Soviet
prison, speaks eloquently about his encounter with the Soviet criminal
justice system: "At some level," Sharansky notes, "every Soviet citizen
lives in fear of the consequences of his actions, for he knows there is no
presumption of innocence on the part of the KGB. That is what makes
interrogations so sinister." 15 1 Thus, references in the novels discussed
above and in the television documentaries to the lack of fear and intim-
idation among the Soviet people for the militia do not take into account
the terror held for the KGB.
Sharansky speaks, too, about the difference between the treatment
he received as a political dissident and that of suspects and prisoners in
nonpolitical cases, as when Sharansky discusses his last cell mate in
Lefortovo, a nonpolitical swindler: "He was unfamiliar with the KGB,
and viewed them with respect and fear. But he also had a highly devel-
oped curiosity, and listened eagerly as I told him about my own exper-
iences with the KGB, both before and after my arrest."
150. Id. at 13.
151. NATAN SHARANSKY, FEAR No EvIL 35 (1989).
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Lefortovo [an investigative prison where Sharansky was held]
is no police station: officially, fists aren't permitted here, and they
don't yell at you. True, they can torture you with the cold and
hunger of the punishment cell, but even there they address you for-
mally ....
Years later, in a prison camp, I learned that I had been one of
the lucky ones. As they led me down the deathly silent corridors of
Lefortovo, I had no idea that next to the freight elevator was a
room lined with rubber. If "state interests" demanded it, and if the
KGB was certain that Western public opinion had no interest in
their victim, they would bring him here, where the beatings were
carried out by the very same officers who addressed me so politely
152
To a reader of Kaminsky's novels, who has thus been exposed to
the KGB's mental "chess matches," Sharansky's description of KGB
interrogations seem familiar:
Where they had once used force, the KGB now preferred to engage
you in long conversations, which often lasted the whole day ....
The point of these incessant interrogations was twofold: first, to
create an aura of legitimacy to mask what was still a legal farce,
and, second, to induce you to reveal as much information as possi-
ble, even if it was already known to the investigators. 153
Most pointedly, however, Sharansky details his experience with
the difference between law on the books and law for political dissidents.
For example, when Natan Sharansky and friends were arrested, prior
to his ultimate arrest: "It soon became clear that these were preventive
arrests, although such arrangements are against the law in the Soviet
Union and are never admitted to.'
1 54
The KGB directly informed Sharansky of the results he would in-
cur by failing to follow the KGB program and accept their proffered
defense counsel: "Although the KGB doesn't participate in the trial,
the court certainly takes us into consideration. I'm telling you clearly;





153. Id. at 36.
154. Id. at 85.
155. NATAN SHARANSKY, FEAR No EvIL 171-72 (emphasis in original).
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I . . . knew very well that the KGB firmly controlled the
choice of lawyers admitted to 'their' cases. Only a lawyer with
KGB clearance was permitted to participate in political trials, al-
though the need for such clearance wasn't mentioned in any law.
Moreover, lawyers who went too far in the defense of their clients
had been known to lose their clearance.
Obviously, no serious lawyer would dare to defend my posi-
tion, as this would mean exposing the fabrications of the KGB. In-
stead, he would try to 'reestablish the truth' by trying to show that
the actions attributed to me were committed by other members of
our group, and that I was the unwitting victim of more experienced
Zionist provocateurs. 5 6
Finally, Sharansky describes the impact of international opinion
on the excesses of the KGB. When granted the liberties of exchanging
notes with his mother, Sharansky tells us, "I hoped it was because of
the international commotion over my case, and that the demand to per-
mit a lawyer of my choice to defend me was so strong that the KGB
was forced to show some signs of legality."' 7 Sharansky describes in
his book the period of anxious optimism in 1983, when the "zeks"
(prisoners) awaited the results of the Madrid conference, where it was
hoped Soviet concessions to Western opinion would result in improved
human rights protections for the prisoners. But the "fragmentary infor-
mation" that reached Sharansky and the other zeks seemed dismal
parallel to Helsinki's promised, but unrealized, guarantees. "Prison is
the most sensitive barometer of change, and in prison nothing had
changed."'58
Those words were written, or published, in 1988; Lev Timofeyev's
were published in 1989. In 1992, Westerners must still wonder: In pris-
ons in the Commonwealth, has anything changed? 59
156. Id. at 172
157. Id. at 174.
158. Id. at 364.
159.
One night in December 1988, in a hotel in the Russian city of Perm in
the Urals, I saw Gorbachev speaking on TV, from the United Nations. He
said that there were no longer any political prisoners in the Soviet Union.
But the next morning I visited Perm 35, a prison camp four hours by
car from Perm. The men named above were still in the camp, as were
other political prisoners.
Now almost all the old political prisoners are out; some new ones have
been taken from republics trying to break free of the Soviet Union. Most
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C. The Soviet Police in Soviet Detective Fiction
Edward Topol is a star in a relatively small constellation, that is,
the field of Soviet mystery writers with Western exposure. Topol, a So-
viet emigr6 now living in Ontario and Florida, adds to Soviet detective
fiction an element neglected in Kaminsky's books and treated from a
different perspective in Smith's: sex.
While Smith treats romance from the point of view of a male mili-
tia officer,. specifically, Arkady Renko, Topol's first-person narrator is a
female militia officer, policewoman Anna Kovina, militia lieutenant
and "CID Investigator."
To this author, the main virtue of Topol's body of work is the illu-
mination it casts upon the relationship between the militia and the
KGB, as perceived by a Soviet emigr6 writing in the voice of a
policewoman:
On the whole, relations between us in the militia and the KGB are
pretty complicated; there's rivalry. They think they're the elite, the
white bone and blue blood of national security; their pay and al-
lowances are way above ours. But we know who does the basic
everyday dirty work, looking after law and order in the country.
Especially in Siberia, . . ., where the government has mobilized
more than a million workers over the last few years . . . to develop
the gas fields and construct the Siberia-Western Europe gas pipe-
line. Along with them, naturally, came drifters and profiteers, pros-
titutes and other criminal elements from all over the country, every
one of them after a fast arctic ruble. Drunken brawls and knife
fights in restaurants and workingmen's hostels, murders over
women, fistfights in dance halls with fatal consequences, poaching
in the taiga, gang rapes, under the influence of liquor or not; add to
that narcotics, unreported syphilis, prostitution, speculation in furs
and fruit-that's the criminal dungheap we have to rake over day
after day. The lily-white hands of the KGB, of course, keep well
away. 160
of the former prisoners still fight Gorbachev-some from seats in the parlia-
ments of the departing republics.
Mikhail Kazachkov remains imprisoned. I think that he infuriated
somebody in the KGB by trying to talk to me from the windows of a "hos-
pital ward" where he and other militant prisoners were locked away during
my visit.
A.M. Rosenthal, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 17, 1990, at Ok 15, col. 3.
160. EDWARD ToPOL, RED SNOW 10 (1986) (emphasis in original).
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How accurate, then, were the pictures of the Soviet criminal jus-
tice system that were presented in Kaminsky's and Martin Cruz
Smith's novels? Were the documentaries of "Cops in Russia" and "48
Hours" truly nonfictional, and if accurate, did they present the full
story?
With rare exception,"' the research in the novels was impeccable,
the presentation accurate and verifiable. While Kaminsky's tone dif-
fered drastically from that in Gorky Park and Polar Star, both authors
successfully conveyed the conflict between the different bodies charged
with implementing the law of criminal investigation, that is, the
procuracy, the militia, and the KGB. Both series of novels also ad-
dressed, with admirable credibility and accuracy, the extent to which
the KGB itself determines its own jurisdiction.
This authority on the part of the KGB, for determining which
cases involving aspects of state security, is responsible for not only
much of the novels' dramatic tension but also for imbuing the reader
with a sense of the gap between "law on the books" and "law in real-
ity," the gap attributable to political crimes more than to any sinister
sensibilities in a so-called "police state." Far from exonerating the, So-
viet criminal justice system, the novels (and, to a lesser extent, the
films) vilify this discrepancy: the tough cases making bad law, in effect.
The fact that both "48 Hours" and "Cops in Russia" completely
sidestep the political cases, and, in turn, the role of the KGB in crimi-
nal investigations, renders them critically deficient. Unlike the meticu-
lously comprehensive fiction of both Kaminsky's series and Smith's two
Arkady Renko books, the television "documentaries" are therefore mis-
leading and distorted tunnel-vision portraits of the Soviet militia. Even
the somewhat melodramatic and even laughable portrayals in Red
Heat at least pay lip-service to the militia-KGB dichotomy, though
bordering on and, yes, crossing over into the realm of caricature.
Thus, in conclusion, the Western media of detective novels and
film manage to convey with impressive accuracy the nature and role of
the militia within the Soviet criminal justice system and the Soviet so-
161. A Cold Red Sunrise discusses the seven-year term of the Procurator Gen-
eral as "the longest term of any Soviet official." STUART M. KAMINSKY, A COLD RED
SUNRISE 17 (1988); see also, STUART M. KAMINSKY, A FINE RED RAIN 2 (1987). But
see STUART M. KAMINSKY, BLACK KNIGHT IN RED SQUARE 15 (1984) (where the
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ciety as a whole. Most notably, the works of Kaminsky and Smith ef-
fectively bridge the gap between pre- and post-glasnost and per-
estroika, and confront the extent to which these changes had and had
not brought comparable reforms in the criminal justice system.
Although the Rostnikov and Renko series inform the readers of
the role of the KGB in hamstringing the militia, they too stop short of
confronting directly the issue of the other gap, that between political
and nonpolitical cases. Both series come admirably close, in depicting
KGB control over what constitute political cases within KGB jurisdic-
tion, but neither has yet done more than acknowledge the existence of
the realm of the political dissident in the Soviet criminal justice
system.:"'
This author is hasty to add that this deficiency does not mitigate
the tremendous accomplishment of either series in portraying, with re-
markable verisimilitude, the nature of that system. Kaminsky's work in
particular has succeeded in capturing the complex relationships of the
governmental entities which administer criminal justice in the Soviet
Union, and this reader for one looks forward to a more comprehensive
treatment of the subject in his future entries in the Rostnikov series.
The question 'for west and east alike is what changes will be
wrought in the criminal justice system in the new Commonwealth. As
noted above, crime and nationalist fervor are both on the increase in
Russia, for example. There is concern that the need to control those
elements will lead to an erosion of the burgeoning reforms. There is
growing evidence that the desire for law and order, not to mention eco-
nomic salvation, may be empowering the "enemies" of reformists like
Boris Yeltsin, 113 the Communist Party, the military and the nationalist
extremists. While the dissolution has brought new hope and sanguine
improvement in east-west relations, some are skeptical:
Warnings of a coming dictatorship have been as common in Mos-
cow this winter as street-corner complaints about high prices.
Down through Russia's history, authoritarianism has been the rule,
reform and democracy the rare-and brief-exception. For that
reason alone, the odds seem to dictate that President Boris Yelt-
sin's efforts to install a new system will founder and the strong
hand will follow. Even Yeltsin has raised the specter. "I have faith
162. Kaminsky's Death of a Dissident (1981) does, however, focus on the mur-
der of a political dissident.
163. Carney, supra note 18, at 32.
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in our reforms . . . . But if they fail, I can already feel the breath
of the Redshirts and Brownshirts on our necks."'"
164. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Silence," the King of the Turtles barked back, "I'm king, and
you're only a turtle named Mack."1
The authority an employer exercises over an employee's continued
job security is substantial. As a result, this relationship implicitly rec-
ognizes "that not every act of insubordination or misconduct ethically
justifies an employer in firing [an] employee .. ". . ' When discharge
* LL.M., Georgetown University, 1991; J.D., Nova University Law Center,
1989.
1. Davis v. Williams, 598 F.2d 916, 917 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting SUESS, YERTLE
THE TURTLE AND OTHER STORIES (1950)).
2. Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 422 A.2d 611, 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (quot-
ing Resilient Floor & Decorative Covering Workers, Local Union 1179 v, Welco Mfg.
Co., 542 F.2d 1029, 1033 n.4 (8th Cir. 1976)); Note, Protecting Employees At Will
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does occur it is recognized to be an extreme industrial penalty since the
employee's job, benefits and reputation are at stake.3 To some commen-
tators, discharge is the equivalent of industrial capital punishment.
Yet, employees in the United States encounter dramatically dispa-
rate levels of protection against the risk of wrongful discharge. On one
hand, those covered by a collective bargaining agreement and those
employed by the federal, state and local governments enjoy substantial
protection and can only be discharged for "just cause."15 On the other
hand, those working for an indefinite or unspecified term of employ-
ment are considered to be employees at-will. Under this doctrine, either
party may terminate the employment relationship at any time or for
any reason. 6 The resulting inequity becomes readily apparent since the
rule permits an employer to discharge a long-term employee without
regard to the years of satisfactory performance or the substantial op-
portunities the employee may have foregone to remain in the em-
ployer's service.7 Thus, the common law "at-will" doctrine allows any
employee under no specific term of employment or statutory protection
to be discharged by his employer for good cause, bad cause, or for no
cause at all without concern for legal liability. Despite marked im-
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931
(1983). The condition of the modern employee has been described as follows:
We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for
our means of livelihood, and most of our people have become completely
dependent upon wages. If they lose their jobs they lose every resource,
except for the relief supplied by the various forms of social security. Such
dependence of the mass of the people upon others for all of their income is
something new in the world. For our generation, the substance of life is in
another man's hands.
Thomas G. Lemley, Note, Employment At Will: Missouri Recognizes the Public Pol-
icy Exception, 52 Mo. L. REV. 677 (1987) (quoting F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY
OF LABOR 9 (1951)) (emphasis in original).
3. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 616 (4th
ed. 1985).
4. Id.
5. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty
To Terminate Only In Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980). In the federal
sector, the employer agency must demonstrate some nexus between the conduct war-
ranting discharge and the efficiency of the service. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (1988).
6. Smith v. Piezo Tech. and Prof. Admin., 427 So. 2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1983);
Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327, 1328 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
7. See supra, note 5.
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provements in federal legislation protecting employee rights,8 workers
in Florida not covered by a collective bargaining agreement or individ-
ual employment contract enjoy only limited protections.9 Furthermore,
the Florida courts have significantly compounded the problem by con-
sistently refusing to extend additional protection for workers in the ab-
8. E.g., Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 7116 (1988) (protecting
federal employees from discharge for exercising rights under the title); Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e-2a (1988) (protecting employ-
ees from discriminatory discharges); National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 8(a), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988)(protecting employees while engaged in protected activity); Age
Discrimination Act of 1967, § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988) (prohibiting dismissal
of persons within the protected class); Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, §
I I(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1)(1988) (prohibiting discharge or discrimination against
any employee for filing a complaint under this chapter); Railway Labor Act of 1926, §
2 Fourth, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Fourth (1988)(prohibiting interference by employers for
protected activity).
9. FLA. STAT. § 40.271 (1991) (prohibiting discharge because of service on a
jury); FLA. STAT. § 61.1301(2)0)1 (1991) (prohibiting discharge against an employee
because of an income deduction order); FLA. STAT. § 104.081 (1991) (prohibiting dis-
charge for voting or not voting in any election); FLA. STAT. § 110.105(2) (1991)
(prohibiting discrimination in state employment based upon sex, age, race, religion,
national origin, political affiliation, marital status or handicap); FLA. STAT. §
112.042(1) (1991) (prohibiting discharge or discrimination by county or municipal em-
ployers on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, handicap, religious creed); The
Drug Free Workplace Act, FLA. STAT. § I12.0455(8)(p)-(t) (1991) (prohibiting em-
ployee discharge on the basis of prior medical history or who is voluntarily seeking
drug rehabilitative treatment); FLA. STAT. § 112.044(3)(a)l (1991) (prohibiting dis-
crimination in employment because of age); The Whistle-blower's Act of 1986, FLA.
STAT. § I 12.3187(4)(a) (199 1) (prohibiting discharge of an agency or independent con-
tractor for disclosing information pursuant to this section); The Police Officer's Bill of
Rights, FLA. STAT. § 112.532(5) (1991) (prohibiting discharge of a law enforcement
officer for exercising rights guaranteed under the statute); The Firefighter's Bill of
Rights, FLA. STAT. § 112.82(9) (1991) (prohibiting discharge of firefighter for exercise
of rights guaranteed under the statute); FLA. STAT. § 250.481 (1991) (prohibiting dis-
charge because of armed forces reserve obligations); FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (1991) (cre-
ating a statutory cause of action for wrongful discharge for employee's pursuit of a
workers' compensation claim); FLA. STAT. § 447.17(1) (1991) (action for discrimina-
tion based on membership in a labor union); FLA. STAT. § 447.501(1)(b) (1991)
(prohibiting certain employer unfair labor practices for public employees); FLA. STAT. §
448.07(2) (1991) (action for wage discrimination on the basis of sex); FLA. STAT. §
448.075 (1991) (prohibiting discharge or discrimination solely because individual has
sickle-cell trait); The Human Rights Act of 1977, FLA. STAT. § 760.10(l)(a) (1991)
(prohibiting discharge or discrimination in private employment on the race, color, reli-
gion, sex, national origin, age, handicap or marital status); FLA. STAT. § 760.50 (1991)
(prohibiting discharge or discrimination on the basis of or belief that the individual has
taken an HIV test or is infected with the HIV virus).
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sence of specific legislative enactments, even when the employer's ac-
tion can only be described as unconscionable.1" As justification for this
lack of intervention, the Florida courts assert that to overrule long-
standing Florida law would create uncertainty in present employer-em-
ployee relationships and would be contrary to one of the basic functions
of the law which is "to foster certainty in business relationships.""
Yet:
[I]n a civilized state where reciprocal legal rights and duties
abound the words "at will" can never mean "without limit or quali-
fication" . . . for in such a state the rights of each person are nec-
essarily and inherently limited by the rights of others and the inter-
ests of the public. An at will prerogative without limits could be
suffered only in an anarchy, and not there for long-it certainly
cannot be suffered in a society such as ours without weakening the
bond of counterbalancing rights and obligations that holds such so-
cieties together . . . .[T]here can be no right to terminate such
[an employment] contract for an unlawful reason or purpose that
contravenes public policy. A different interpretation would en-
courage and sanction lawlessness, which law by its very nature is
10. Bellamy v. Holcomb, 577 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (em-
ployee discharged after subpoena of employer's wage and hour records); Scott v. Es-
talella, 563 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (Florida statute protecting em-
ployees from discharge for jury service "in this state" did not apply to jury service in
federal courts in Florida); Jarvinen v. HCA Allied Clinical Lab., Inc., 552 So. 2d 241
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (subpoenaed employee terminated for testifying truth-
fully against employer); Ochab v. Morrison, Inc., 517 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) (no cause of action for fired employee who refused to serve intoxicated
patron, even though state statute prohibits serving habitual drunkards); Ponton v.
Scarfone, 468 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), petition for rev. denied, 478 So. 2d
54 (1985) (no common law cause of action based upon public policy under state or
federal sex discrimination laws when female's rejection of sexual advances is motiva-
tion underlying her termination from employment). Contra Newsday, Inc. v. Long Is-
land Typographical Union, No. 915, 915 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S.
Ct. 1314 (1991) (arbitrator's award properly vacated as violative of explicit, well-de-
fined and dominant public policy against sexual harassment). Accord DeMarco v. Pub-
lix Super Markets, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980) (no wrongful discharge action for
employee who was terminated for failure to withdraw daughter's injury suit); Hartley
v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (no cause of
action against employer for employee refusing to violate federal and state environmen-
tal statutes and regulations); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
11. Hartley, 476 So. 2d at 1329; Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d
266, 270 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983). The court's statement ignores the fact that the
courts can narrowly circumscribe a public policy exception to avoid uncertainty.
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designed to discourage and prevent.' 2
By refusing to modify an outmoded nineteenth century principle in
addressing twentieth century problems, the Florida judiciary perpetu-
ates the uncertainty that it seeks to avoid. This article examines the
underpinnings and development of the employment at-will doctrine as
it expanded in the United States and in Florida, and focuses on the
cases of Jarvinen v. HCA Allied Clinical Laboratories, 3 and Bellamy
v. Holcomb. 4 This article concludes that the Florida Supreme Court
should now recognize a narrow public policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine in light of the inequity of the Jarvinen and Bel-
lamy decisions and further examines how other courts approach this
issue, along with the theoretical basis for adopting such a policy. Fi-
nally, this article proposes specific statutory reforms for adoption by
the Florida Legislature.
II. EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL IN THE UNITED STATES
Commentators agree that the growth of the at-will doctrine can be
traced to several developments during the late nineteenth century. The
first factor involved the decline of the American courts in following the
traditional English rule of employment.' 5 While previously, the master
bore the customary responsibility for the servant's health and well-be-
12. J. Michael McGuinness, The Doctrine of Wrongful Discharge in North Car-
olina: The Confusing Path from Sides to Guy and the Need for Reform, 10 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 217 (1988) (quoting Sides v. Duke Hosp., 328 S.E.2d 818, 826 (N.C. Ct.
App.), rev. denied, 335 S.E.2d 13 (1985).
13. 552 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
14. 577 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
15. Amy D. Ronner, Comment, Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet: The Narrow
Public Policy Exception to the Terminable-At-Will Rule, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 565
(1984). The employment at will doctrine supplanted English employment law. The
Statute of Labourers provided that
no master can put away his servant during or at the end of his term of
employment and that apprentices could be dismissed only upon reasonable
cause. The statute influenced the English courts and the law of employ-
ment relations. The courts determined that when an employment contract
contained the mention of an annual salary, the employer implicitly agreed
to a one-year term of employment unless there was reasonable cause to
discharge.
Id. at 566-67 (citations omitted); see I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 1425 (1783). Consequently, the rule made it difficult for an employer to
dismiss an employee without breaching the contract and incurring liability.
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ing, the new employment theory supposed that by entering into a wage
bargain, workers assumed the risk of on-the-job injuries." The second
factor entailed the willingness of the courts to recast the traditional
employment relationship in terms of the emerging theory of contracts."a
Third, with the advent of the industrial revolution, the courts favored a
laissez-faire attitude concerning the employment relationship in order
to further economic growth."8 Fourth, the emergence of Horace Wood's
16. Note, supra note 5, at 1824-25.
As the nineteenth century progressed and society became more commer-
cial, the relationship between master and servant changed. The "law of
master and servant," being originally premised on a personal, often famil-
ial relationship under the category of domestic relations, was no longer
suitable for employment that was commercial and involved large number
of employees. With these changes in society, the application of the "set-
tled" [English rule] no longer produced judicious results.
See David P. Weiss, Note, Public Policy Limitations to the Employment At-Will Doc-
trine Since Geary v. United States Steel Corporation, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 1115, 1117
(1983) (citations omitted). Hence, the courts were no longer capable of dealing with
the new commercial employer-employee relationship. Consequently, the courts utilized
the new emerging theory of contracts to define the employment relationship.
17. Note, supra note 5, at 1824-25.
The principal consequence of this conceptual change was a drastic limita-
tion in the employer's duties to the employee . . . . According to this for-
malistic approach, if the parties had intended the employment relationship
to last for one year, they would have made that an express term of the
contract.
Id. This approach relies upon two predominant theories in the late nineteenth century.
First, "that manifestations of assent must be evidenced by definite, express terms if
promises are to be enforceable. Thus, an employer's absolute discretion to terminate
had to be presumed unless some definite duration was specified in the employment
contract." Id. at 1825. Secondly, there must be mutuality of contract. "Mutuality of
contract requires that both parties are bound or neither is bound to the contract. Sym-
metry is the crux of this definition of mutuality. Accordingly, terminable at-will em-
ployment contracts are valid because neither party is bound to the agreement." David
Peck, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment At-Will Rule: Illinois Creates
and Amorphous Tort, 59 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 247, 248 n.5 (1982). But several courts
and commentators have pointed out that the symmetry and logical appeal of the con-
tractual principle of mutuality of obligation has little or no legitimate economic justifi-
cation to at-will employment because it is based upon the false premise of relatively
equal bargaining power between employers and at-will employees. See Andre D. Bouf-
fard, Comment, Emerging Protection Against Retaliatory Discharge: A Public Policy
Exception To The Employment At-Will Doctrine In Maine, 38 ME. L. REV. 67, 70 n.7
(1986).
18. See Ronner, supra note 15, at 567.
The laissez-faire concept was based on the assumption that the individual
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1877 Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant, 9 provided the al-
ready receptive courts with an additional basis to adopt the at-will doc-
trine110 Recognized as a prolific treatise writer of his time, Wood's the-
ory stated that:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is
prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out
a. yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A
hiring at so much a day, week, month or year, no time being speci-
fied, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was
for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the
party may serve. It is competent for either party to show what the
mutual understanding of the parties was in reference to the matter;
but unless their understanding was mutual that the service was to
extend for a certain fixed and definite period, it is an indefinite
should have complete social freedom to contract not only in his personal
affairs, but also in his business relationships. The new rule was ushered in
by the industrial revolution and its companion notions of social freedom
and freedom of contract. Under this contractual approach to employment,
the parties were bound only by obligations clearly intended; the parties set
their own terms and any implied obligations became secondary to the em-
ployees' basic freedoms.
George R. Arrants, Jr., Note, Labor Law-Employment At Will-Public Policy Excep-
tions to the Employment At Will Doctrine, 53 TENN. L. REV. 199, 203 n.22 (1985).
19. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134
(1877). One author writes that Wood himself was an enigma. He apparently was a
practicing attorney in Albany, New York, but was not a member of the New York
State Bar Association. In addition to his master and servant treatise, he edited or au-
thored treatises on nuisances, torts and evidence, among others. See Jay M. Feinman,
The Development of The Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 n.68
(1976). 'The Albany Law Journal said:
Mr. Wood obtained an excellent reputation as a learned, accurate and
original author ....
To bring order, simplicity and symmetry out of [the conflicting
decisions on master and servant] was the work of a man of genius, and this
we have before us.
15 ALB. L.J. 378-79, May 12, 1877; Feinman, supra note 68.
20. See Ronner, supra note 15, at 568.
The employment relationship in the late nineteenth century was considered
to be strictly contractual in nature and the absence of expressed terms or a
written contract created the at will arrangement. [Thus, the] contract
based theory was a repudiation of the English rule which required just
cause for termination of at will employment.
Arrants, supra note 18, at 203 n.23.
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hiring and is determinable at the will of either party, and in this
respect there is no distinction between domestic and other
servants."
Wood's rule has been widely criticized as a misreading and distor-
tion of the law existing at the time. 2 A review of the authority relied
upon by Wood reveals four flaws with his "inflexible rule." First, it is
argued that Wood's treatment on the duration of service contracts
lacked comprehensiveness and concern for detail.2 3 Second, the four
American cases cited as authority for the at-will theory were in fact far
off the mark. 4 In actuality, two of the cases cited by Wood found job
21. WOOD, supra note 19, at 272 (citations omitted).
22. Feinman, The Development of The Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976); Joseph De Giuseppe, Jr., The Recognition of Public Policy
Exceptions To Employment-At-Will Rule: A Legislative Function?, I I FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 721, 724 n.6 (1983); Rodney A. Max, A New Tort in Alabama: Wrongful Em-
ployment Termination in Violation of Public Policy, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVoc. 39, 40
n.6 (1988); Laurie Schober Carnahan, Note, Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co.: An Analy-
sis of the Wisconsin Public Policy Exception to the Employment At Will Rule and a
Call For Legislative Action, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 689, 691 n.17 (1987); accord Gregory
L. Grow, Note, Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford. Arkansas Adopts the Public Policy
Exception to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 42 ARK. L. REv. 187, 190 n.26
(1989); Lemley, supra note 2, at 678 n.10; J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note,
Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341 (1974); Weiss,
supra note 16, at 18 n.23.
23. Feinman, supra note 22, at 126.
24. Id.; see Shapiro & Tune, supra note 22, at 341. The first case, DeBriar v.
Minturn, I Cal. 450 (1851), involved
the right of a discharged bartender to occupy a room in the tavern after he
had been notified to leave by the end of the month. Essentially an action
for unlawful ejection, the case touched only tangentially on the employ-
ment relationship. [The court] held only that the innkeeper had a right to
eject a person living in his house after proper notification.
Shapiro & Tune, supra note 22, at 342 n.54.
Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870), also contradicts
Wood's assertion. The court found that there was no error in allowing the
jury to determine the nature of the contract from written and oral commu-
nications, usages of the trade, the situation of the parties, the types of
employment and all other circumstances.
Shapiro & Tune, supra note 22, at 342 n.54.
In Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115 (1871), the court
found that indefinite duration by itself did not give the employer unfet-
tered discretion to dismiss an employee. A mining captain discharged at
the end of eight months was allowed to recover four additional months of
pay because he had been assured that employment would be stable. The
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security rights in the absence of explicit provisions on the length of
employment.2 5 Third, Wood's rule revolved around his incorrect asser-
tion that no American court had approved the English rule in recent
years. He continued that the employment at-will rule was inflexibly ap-
plied in the United States and that the English rule was only a yearly
hiring, making no mention of notice.2" Lastly, even though unsupported
by legal precedent, Wood failed to offer any policy grounds for the
adoption of this theory. 7 Feinman argues that it is possible to attribute
too much influence to Wood himself. 8 However, he acknowledges that
treatises were an important tool to the bar and bench in this period.2 9
Therefore, a modern, comprehensive treatise stating a clear rule of
practical application would inevitably attract a wide following and be
cited as authority." While Wood's treatise could not have alone caused
the change to employment at-will, the rule would not have developed as
quickly and uniformly as it did without it. 31 Despite the lack of analysis
and authority, by the beginning of the twentieth century Wood's rule
jury thought that hiring for a year could be reasonably inferred from the
facts.
Shapiro & Tune, supra note 22, at 342 n.54.
Finally, Wilder v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl. 462 (1869), rev'd on other
grounds, 80 U.S. 254 (1871), concerned a business contract between the
Army and private entrepreneurs for the transportation of goods; it had
nothing to do with general hirings as such. A business had an outdated
contract with an army quartermaster to transport goods across Minnesota
and, at a time when the quartermaster could obtain no other transporta-
tion, the company insisted on a new arrangement at a higher price. The
Supreme Court reversed a Court of Claims decision upholding the com-
pany's right to collect the additional price on grounds that the statute of
limitations on the claim had run.
Shapiro & Tune, supra note 22, at 342 n.54.
25. Feinman, supra note 22, at 126. Judge Meyer, in his dissenting opinion in
Murphy v. American Home Prod. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 95 (N.Y. 1983) (Meyer, J.,
dissenting), characterizes the New York court's adoption of.Wood's rule in Martin v.
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1895), as bizarre in light of Wood's concession
of a yearly hiring in England; the Court of Appeals adoption of the English Rule and
the fact that Wood's rule was not supported by any of the cases cited by him.
26. Feinman, supra note 22, at 126.
27. Id.
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became the primary doctrine governing employment duration.3 2 Those
courts adopting Wood's rule did so by simply citing to Wood's treatise
or the cases cited by him directly. 33
32. Shapiro & Tune, supra note 22, at 342.
33. Id. One commentator writes:
Although courts today often feel obliged to pay lip service to the legit-
imacy of the at will rule, legal scholars are increasingly likely to view the
rule as an anachronism. This conclusion follows from three sets of interre-
lated arguments, each suggesting that certain social, economic and institu-
tional conditions have change since 1877. First, economic power has be-
come increasingly concentrated in the hands of large, impersonal
employers. This not only endangers individual freedom by creating the po-
tential for employers to exploit employee vulnerability but also undermines
the traditional assumption that employees can negotiate the terms of their
employment contract using bargaining power equal to that of their em-
ployers. This does not conform to modern realities. At the time a job is
extended and accepted, little bargaining actually takes place, only the rare
employee can insist on negotiating terms of employment and the rest must
accept the terms and conditions of employment prevailing in the workplace
at the time of hire.
Second, the work force is no longer predominantly self employed and
as a result today's wage earner is often completely dependent on employ-
ment related income. This reveals the inadequacy of the contract principles
of freedom of choice and mutuality of rights. In this context, the em-
ployer's right to discharge employees at will becomes a right to impose
significant social, psychological and economic costs on employees without
providing justification. For the economically dependent employee who does
not feel free to quit, the right to withdraw from the employment contract
becomes a hollow right.
Third, employee expectations regarding employee rights generally and
job security specifically have changed during the course of this century.
Evidence of increasing employee dissatisfaction with the employment rela-
tionship and rising expectations regarding fair, nonarbitrary treatment is
revealed by opinion polls, surveys and a growing number of lawsuits. Em-
ployees now expect management to provide job related reasons when deci-
sions are made that affect their employment status. Evidence that norms of
workplace justice are changing is also reflected in arbitration decisions.
Arbitrators are increasingly insistent that procedural rules be observed and
increasingly reluctant to uphold employee discharges except as an option
of last resort. As a result it can no longer be suggested that employees, in
accepting a job offer, agree as part of the employment bargain that they
can be fired at will.
Fourth, contract principles are unsuited to modern institutional reali-
ties. Life in large scale organizations is characterized by a high degree of
interdependence. This requires cooperation among all of the organization's
members and a strong sense of commitment to the enterprise as well as
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An even more dramatic pronouncement of the at-will doctrine oc-
curred with the Supreme Court's decisions in Adair v. United States
3 4
and Coppage v. Kansas.3 5 Both cases gave the at-will doctrine constitu-
tional legitimacy. In those cases, the Supreme Court held that regula-
tion of the employment relationship violated the parties' freedom to
contract. These opinions represent the high water mark of the Court's
insistence on laissez-faire principles in the labor area, despite a growing
concern that freedom of contract was a cruel illusion because of the
extreme differences in bargaining power between employers and
employees.36
each other. Contract principles, premised on freedom of choice and limited
commitment, are ill suited for establishing the kind of employment rela-
tionship required by modern enterprises. Achieving harmony between legal
principles and institutional realities requires alternative principles of asso-
ciation premised on mutual obligation and increased commitment.
Tompkins, Legislating the Employment Relationship: Montana's Wrongful-Discharge
Law, 14 EMp. REL. L.J. 387 (1988) (citations omitted).
34. 208 U.S. 161 (1908). In this case, the Supreme Court invalidated a federal
statute making it a criminal offense for an interstate carrier to discharge an employee
simply because of the employee's membership in a labor organization. The high court
concluded that the statute invaded the parties personal liberty and interfered with the
right to contract. The Court wrote:
In the absence, however, of a valid contract between the parties controlling
their conduct towards each other and fixing a period of service, it cannot
be, we repeat, that an employer is under any legal obligation, against his
will, to retain an employee in his personal service any more than an em-
ployee can be compelled, against his will, to remain in the personal service
of another.
Id. at 175.
Adair was overruled in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941);
see Richard D. Himberger, Comment, Unjust Discharge: Why Nonunion Employees
Need a Just Cause Statute, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 135 (1989).
35. 236 U.S. 1 (1915). In Coppage, the Supreme Court invalidated a Kansas
statute that provided for a fine and imprisonment if an employer required an employee
to agree not to become or remain a member of any labor organization during the term
of employment. The Court then concluded that the employer's right to hire and fire at-
will was a property right protected by the Constitution.
Today, so called "yellow dog" contracts are specifically illegal under several stat-
utes. See, e.g., The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
36. Arrants, supra note 18, at 204; Himberger, supra note 34; Ronner, supra
note 15; see Note, Protecting Employees, supra note 2, at 1933; see also Note, Pro-
tecting At Will Employees, supra note 5, at 1982.
From a historical perspective, the Supreme Court's laissez-faire intervention and
its attempts at restraining Congressional power to regulate the economy eventually
culminated in a showdown between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the High
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III. THE RULE DEVELOPS IN FLORIDA
The Florida courts were slow to expressly adopt Wood's rule after
its first pronouncement in 1877. Yet, early Florida cases suggest that
the doctrine was evolving.
In Chipley v. Atkinson,37 the plaintiff sued the defendant in an
action for tortious interference with a business relationship. Kehoe and
Walker employed Chipley as a superintendent at a brick manufactur-
ing business.38 His employment agreement included a provision that he
would be employed for a long period of time and that he had a "pros-
pect and promise of obtaining an interest in the business."39 The com-
pany dismissed Chipley after Atkinson convinced Kehoe and Walker
that Chipley was a thief.40 Chipley then commenced an action against
Atkinson."' At trial, the court charged the jury as to terminable at-will
employment as part of the proof Chipley needed to show in order to
prevail against Atkinson.42 The jury found for Chipley and awarded
Court. Ravaged by the throes of an economic depression, the Roosevelt New Deal pro-
gram was shattered by a series of judicial defeats. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238 (1936) (striking down the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935); United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1933); see Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton Ry., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating
the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act of
1933).
In February, 1937, President Roosevelt wrote Congress calling for a reorganiza-
tion of the judicial branch or what has become known as the Roosevelt "Court Pack-
ing" plan. The plan proposed that for the appointment of additional judges to the fed-
eral bench for each judge over the age of seventy years who did not choose to retire. At
that time, six Justices on the Supreme Court had passed the voluntary retirement age.
The plan was rejected. However, within four years Roosevelt was able to replace all six
justices as a result of retirement. The new Court took essentially a hands off approach
on economic policy.
37. 1 So. 934 (Fla. 1887).
38. Id. at 935.
39. Id.
40. Id. Chipley never sued his former employers and named only Atkinson in the
action. The case makes no mention as to why Chipley chose not to sue the partners.
41. Id.
42. Chipley, I So. at 935. The court charged the jury that: "If you find that the
contract was not for a definite term, and there are no payments or other circumstances
to show that the hiring was from period to period, then it would be a hiring from day to
day, and terminable at the will of either party." Id. This instruction was not excepted
to by either party to the lawsuit. Nor is there any supporting authority found in the
case supporting this statement of the law.
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damages. The defendant filed exceptions to several of the jury charges.
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court granted a new trial. The court
reasoned that the term "long period of time" created a jury question as
to the actual term of employment which suggested that Chipley could
not be discharged except for cause.'" Consequently, the jury would
have to determine the actual length of employment since this factor
controlled whether Chipley could maintain his action against
Atkinson."
Shortly after the turn of the century, the supreme court again ad-
dressed the issue of at-will employment in Savannah, F. &. W. Rail-
way Co. v. Willett."' In that case, Willett made an application for em-
ployment to the defendant after being solicited to apply for a
conductor's position. "' The defendant informed Willett that he would
be employed if he reported for duty at once.' 7 Willett resigned from his
job and reported to a Savannah, F. & W. station at the company's
direction. 48 After receiving his route assignment, Willett left the com-
pany's Sanford station and travelled to Kissimmee."9 Upon arrival at
the Kissimmee station, Willett was instructed to return to Sanford. The
43. Id. at 941. The court wrote:
An agreement between the plaintiff and Kehoe & Walker for the continu-
ance of the employment for a long period of time cannot be ignored as a
feature of the case. This allegation means that the agreement entered into
by them entitled the plaintiff, either expressly or by implication, to em-
ployment not only for a period of time, but for a long period. It means that
a period of time was agreed upon by them; and whatever the period thus
agreed on was, whether limited by months or years or otherwise, is to be
proved. The language implies that there was at least some point of time in
the future, ascertainable from the terms of the agreement, up to which the
employment was to extend.
Id.
44. The term of employment was critical since Chipley alleged that he was dis-
charged during his term of employment. This could only be done for just cause. If
Chipley was an at-will employee with no definite term, then he could be discharged at
any time for any reason. Accordingly, his claim for malicious interference with a busi-
ness relationship could not be maintained against Atkinson if he could be discharged
for no reason at all.
45. 31 So. 246 (1901).
46. Id. Willett had been employed as a conductor for nineteen years and sought
a better paying job with the Savannah, F. & W. Railway.
47. Id. The facts indicate that Willett took the Savannah position in order to
improve himself.
48. Id. Upon responding, Willett was examined and then assigned to a route.
49. Id. Willett travelled aboard one of the Savannah's trains to the new station.
19921 1,091
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company subsequently informed Willett on his return that he would not
be employed unless he obtained a release or recommendation from his
previous employer. When he could not obtain the recommendation,
Willett was fired. 50 Willett sued the railroad. The case went to trial
resulting in a verdict for Willett and Savannah appealed.5 1
The supreme court reversed the verdict and judgment. The court
held that since Willett alleged no facts as to the duration of employ-
ment, the employment was at-will and terminable by either party. In
its analysis, the court cited several cases and Wood's rule.52 Each of the
cases cited by the court were reminiscent of Wood's misapplication of
the actual holdings and lack of analysis.5 3
50. Savannah, 31 So. at 246. The railway had not previously asked for this re-
lease or recommendation at the time it solicited Willett to work for them. Furthermore,
the company was aware that Willett was working for another railroad and that he took
the Savannah position in order to improve himself and for an increase in salary. The
evidence before the court showed that Willett had faithfully and diligently performed
his duties in the nineteen years that he had been a conductor. As a result of Savannah's
actions, Willett was unable to obtain employment for twelve months.
51. Id. at 247. Willett claimed $1500.00 in damages. The jury awarded $744.83.
Id. at 246-47.
52. Id. at 247.
53. Id. The court first cited to Blaisdell v. Lewis, 32 Me. 515 (1851). In that
case, Blaisdell sued alleging that Lewis failed to hire him as promised. There was no
time stipulated as to the duration of the service. Subsequently, Lewis never hired Blais-
dell and was sued for the amount of money that Blaisdell would have made had he
been hired. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The Maine Supreme Court re-
versed the verdict holding that because there was no fixed period of time of when Blais-
dell's employment was to begin, there was no contract. The court then wrote in dicta
that had Blaisdell gone to work, there was nothing to prevent Lewis from discharging
him on that day. The Maine Supreme Court never cited any other precedent in its
holding.
Today, the efficacy of the Blaisdell holding is dwindling with the Maine Supreme
Court's recent pronouncement in Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d
97 (Me. 1984). In that case, the court indicated that it would not rule out the possible
recognition of a public policy cause of action when the discharge contravenes some
strong public policy. See, Andre D. Bouffard, Comment, Emerging Protection Against
Retaliatory Discharge: A Public Policy Exception To The Employment At-Will Doc-
trine In Maine, 38 ME. L. REv. 67 (1986).
De Briar v. Minturn, I Cal. 450 (1851), the second case relied upon by the Florida
Supreme Court, and previously rejected as a misstatement, was blindly cited by the
court. The court then cited directly to Wood's treatise.
Commissioners v. Brown, 32 N.J.L. 504 (N.J. 1866), the third case cited by the
court, involved a suit of a contractor against the water commissioners of Jersey City,
New Jersey. Brown alleged that the commission refused to perform under a contract
hiring Brown to lay submerged pipe across the Hackensack river. The enabling state
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The court's next pronouncement of the employer-employee rela-
tionship occurred in Florida Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Hart.54
Hart alleged that he was elected secretary of the insurance company
for a definite period of time and had been fired.5 5 To support his allega-
tions, Hart testified at trial that no information was given him that the
position was temporary. 5 Hart proffered no evidence to support his al-
legations that he was elected secretary at a salary of $200.00 per
month until the next annual meeting. The court had little trouble con-
cluding that Hart's lack of evidence was fatal to his claim. 57
I In 1934, the supreme court decided the case of Knudsen v.
Green."8 Knudsen alleged that he had an oral agreement with the de-
statute authorized the water commission, to enter into contracts for the pipe project.
The statute set forth specific criteria concerning the particular manner in which con-
tracts were to be advertised for and made. The statute further mandated that the con-
tracts be in writing and that three copies were to be deposited with the controller of
Jersey City and one retained by the commissioners. The commissioners subsequently
passed a resolution authorizing that a contract be drawn up to utilize Brown as a pipe
laying contractor. However, prior to the actual contract being drawn, the commission-
ers rescinded the resolution. At trial a jury found for Brown and awarded damages. On
appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed. The court reasoned that the resolu-
tion was not a binding contract but only an authorization to begin negotiations for a
contract. Furthermore, the court held that until there was an actual offer and accept-
ance, then either party was at liberty to withdraw from the negotiations. Thus, the
court viewed the resolution only as a direction to the commission's engineer and attor-
ney to prepare a contract for the pipe work and to submit the agreement to the com-
mission for its approval before being executed. Finally, the court concluded that the
commission's failure to pass a resolution approving the agreement signified that they
did not consent to the agreement.
Shaw v. Woodbury Glass Works, 18 A. 696 (N.J. 1889), the final case cited by
the court, involved the hiring of a workman for a definite period of time. The court
concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove the agreement because neither the rate of
wages nor the location of work had been agreed upon. The court reasoned that no
agreement existed and that this was merely negotiations in contemplation of an
agreement.
54. 75 So. 528 (Fla. 1917).
55. 1d. at 529.
56. Id. at 532. This suggested that if Hart was not temporary, then he had a
definite term of employment.
57. Id. The court noted that Hart's failed to proffer any evidence through the
testimony of witnesses, the minutes of the board of directors or the charter or by-laws
of the company. The court was quick to note that if Hart had come forward with this
evidence, it would have supported his claim for wrongful discharge. Id. It seems clear
that this case stands not so much as an expansion of the employment at-will doctrine as
it does on how to prove a wrongful discharge case.
58. 156 So. 240 (Fla. 1934).
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fendant for employment as captain and master of a house boat. 59 The
duration of the alleged agreement was unspecified.60 After Knudsen re-
signed from his current employment, Green refused to employ him and
hired another person to serve as captain.6" The trial court found that
Green's actions entitled Knudsen to recover only $300.00 for the first
month's employment.62 The court reasoned that because the amount in
dispute was only $300.00, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dis-
missed the case.63
The supreme court reversed the circuit court and held that the
court did have jurisdiction. The court went on to resolve the dispute
and found that a contract existed but that it did not bind the parties
after the first month since the duration was indefinite. Accordingly, the
court held the relationship to be terminable at-will despite the fact that
the authority relied upon by the supreme court strongly militated
against a finding of at-will employment." ' In short, one case indicated
that no specific term of employment needed to be agreed upon in order
to establish a definite term if the custom of the trade implied a term of
employment. 65 The second case held that a jury could infer a yearly
59. Id. at 241. Knudsen was employed as a mate on a vessel of the Standard Oil
Company at the time of the hiring. He had a definite annual salary and benefits in the
form of a retirement and other bonuses.
60. Id.
61. Id. Green assured Knudsen that Knudsen would not regret leaving Standard
Oil. Moreover, Green offered Knudsen a monthly salary of $300.00. Knudsen, relo-
cated to Miami based upon those representations in October, 1930, and remained there
until April, 1931 when Green repudiated the agreement. Thereafter, Knudsen at-
tempted to obtain his former position at Standard Oil but was refused reemployment.
62. Id. Knudson alleged that his damages were $15,000.00. Knudsen based this
amount on the monies he lost as a result of terminating his employment with Standard.
Once the trial court found that the damages were only $300.00, it dismissed the case
without further action.
63. Knudsen, 156 So. at 242.
64. Id. Interestingly, the court never cited to any of its earlier decisions in
Chipley or Savannah, F & W Ry., as support for this proposition. Rather, the court
relied upon another series of cases from other jurisdictions as precedent. Most of the
interpretations given by the supreme court were in fact strained and ignored other per-
tinent discussions in the cases.
65. In Odom v. Bush, 53 S.E. 1013 (Ga. 1906), the court interpreted a Georgia
statute that provided that a hiring of indefinite duration could be terminated at the will
of either party. Yet, the court wrote that: "Where a contract of hiring is made with
reference to a general custom or business usage, which enters into and becomes a part
of the agreement, the contract is not, of course, indefinite as to its duration the custom
and usage fixes the term of the engagement." Id. at 1016.
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hiring even if there was no specific evidence to support that inference. 66
The third case involved an employee who remained willing and able to
perform his service contract and who was entitled to recover that por-
tion of his unpaid salary.67 The last case pertained to an expressed pro-
vision of an employment contract which evidenced a definite term of
employment.6 8 However, the contract could be terminated so long as a
The court's statement certainly suggests a definite term of employment need not
be explicitly agreed upon by the parties if the plaintiff can show by evidence that the
custom or trade implies a certain term of employment which would become part of the
employment contract. Even more significant, is the fact that the Georgia court ac-
knowledged that wages payable for a stipulated period raised a presumption that the
hiring was for that period. As a result, even if no term of employment was stated a
definite term employment could still exist. On the other hand, if the proof indicates
that the contract was for a longer term, the mere reservation of wages for a lesser
period would not control. In other words, a plaintiff could be paid on a monthly basis
but still have a contract for a year if the evidence supported this conclusion. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court seemed to ignore this portion of the opinion in reaching its conclu-
sion. Under this analysis, if Knudsen proVed that the industry standard of $300.00 per
month implied a longer term of employment, he would have been successful in his
claim. At the very minimum, if the Florida Supreme Court -followed through with the
Odom rationale, the remand should have also allowed Knudsen to plead and prove the
claim, if possible.
66. Clark v. Ryan, II So. 22 (Ala. 1892). Similarly, the court's reliance on
Clark is misplaced. In that case, the Alabama Supreme Court relied upon Wood's
treatise to state the employment at-will doctrine. See supra note 19. The court, how-
ever, approved the trial court's jury instruction that read if the jury did not believe that
Ryan's employment was for a month, then a reasonable construction was that it was
for a year. It seems clear that this holding is contrary to a finding of at-will employ-
ment. Recently, the Alabama Supreme Court recognized a limited exception to the at-
will doctrine. For a discussion of the employment at-will doctrine in Alabama, see
James W. Lampkin 11, Comment, Employment At Will: The Time has Come For
Alabama To Embrace. Public Policy As An Exception To The Rule Of Employment
At Will, 19 CUMB. L. REV. 372 (1989).
67. Cleveland v. Towle, 106 So. 60 (Ala. 1925). In Cleveland, the plaintiff sued
after being, fired. A jury found for the plaintiff and the Alabama Court of Appeals
reversed the verdict. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
held that where an employee has a contract for services to be performed and was dis-
charged without fault on his part, he is entitled to recover his salary if he remains
ready to perform.
68. Derry v. Board of Educ., 61 N.W. 61 (Mich. 1894). In Derry, the plaintiff
signed an agreement with the school board to teach for the following school year. The
contract provided an express clause that allowed the school board to discharge the
plaintiff upon one weeks written notice. When the board exercised that option, plaintiff
sued. In a brief opinion, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the dismissal based upon
the clear express contractual language of the agreement. Accordingly, this holding did
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week's notice was given.69
Twenty one years later, the supreme court firmly cemented the at-
will doctrine in Florida jurisprudence in Wynne v. Ludman Corp.70
Wynne's complaint alleged a definite term employment contract. It fur-
ther alleged that Wynne's employment had been held over for an addi-
tional year under the prior terms. At trial, Wynne candidly testified
that his employment was not for a definite time and that he could be
terminated at any time.71 Thus, his testimony did not support the alle-
gations of his complaint and in fact proved the appellee's allegations.'
The court, relying on its decisions in Savannah, F. & W. Railway Co.'"
and Knudsen'7" reiterated its holdings in order to uphold the
termination.75
IV. THE GROWTH OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
Faced with a growing number of unconscionable discharges, sev-
eral courts began to create exceptions to the employment at-will doc-
trine. One of the recognized exceptions is the discharge in violation of
public policy. Under this doctrine, the courts allow recovery in tort for
employees who are fired for refusing to violate a clear mandate of pub-
lic policy. 76 The problem with this precept lies in the fact that its devel-
opment has been erratic and not always without contradictions." Even
those who support the doctrine agree that the "Achilles Heel" of excep-
tion is in determining what constitutes public policy.78 Still, several
not deal with an at-will situation but the interpretation of clear and unambiguous con-
tractual language.
69. Id.
70. 79 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1955).
71. Id. at 691.
72. Id.
73. 31 So. 246 (Fla. 1901).
74. 156 So. 240 (Fla. 1934).
75. The result in Wynne is not as troubling as the court's other holdings because
Wynne's complaint and testimony were completely contradictory.
76. See Giuseppe, supra note 22, at 754. Before applying the public policy excep-
tion most courts require that the plaintiff show more than a mere personal interest in
retaining their employment. The employer's actions must harm not only the plaintiff
but also society as a whole by circumventing a specific statutory pronouncement. Peck,
supra note 17, at 263.
77. See Weiss, supra note 22, at 1121.
78. See Giuseppe, supra note 22; McGuinness, supra note 12, at 232 (the thresh-
old question to be addressed in a wrongful discharge case premised upon public policy
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courts have been able to formulate a workable definition of public pol-
icy. Some courts hold that public policy may be found in legislation,
administrative rules, regulations or judicial decisions. 79 Other courts
find public policy within a professional code of ethics.80 Certainly, it is
beyond dispute that once a legislature enacts a statute prohibiting cer-
tain conduct, that conduct is against public policy.8
exception is whether or not a sufficient expression of public policy is alleged); Peck,
supra note 17, at 255 (many courts recognize rather ethereal public policies not to be
readily found in legislation, constitutions, or judicial opinions); Bouffard, supra note
53; Debra Greenberg, Note, Employment At Will: A Proposal To Adopt The Public
Policy Exception In Florida, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 614, 629 (1982) (court have long
recognized that public policy of one generation might not be the public policy of an-
other); Robert B. Gidding, Comment, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.: Is the
Public Policy Exception to the At Will Doctrine a Bad Omen for the Employment
Relatiom:hip?, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1187, 1193 (1981) ("not all sources express a
clear mandate of public policy . . . absent legislation, other sources claimed to be a
source of' public policy would be subject to case by case judicial determinations");
Grow, supra note 22, at 201 (supreme court neglected to determine the proper scope of
Arkansas's public policy exception); David J. Monz, Comment, Wrongful Discharge
Law In Connecticut. Time For A Workers' Bill Of Rights Through Enumerated
Prohibitions Legislation, 21 CONN. L. REV. 467, 477 (1989) (the degree to which pub-
lic policy overrides at-will employment rights generally varies depending on the policies
implicated); Comment, Employment At Will, supra note 63, at 380 (the concept of
public policy is vague and subject to dispute when applied).
Some courts encounter little problem in defining the scope of public policy. See,
e.g. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987)
(public policy must be well defined and dominant and is to be ascertained by reference
to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public
interest); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974) (discharge moti-
vated by bad faith or malice or based upon retaliation is not in the best interest of the
economic system or the public good); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d
505, 512 (N.J. 1980) (public policy may be found in legislation; administrative rules,
regulations or decisions and judicial decisions and in certain instances a professional
code of ethics).
Public: policy is also described as:
community common sense and common conscience, extended and applied
throughout the state to matters of public morals, health, safety, welfare
and the like; it is that general and well-settled public opinion relating to
man's plain, palpable duty to his fellowmen, having due regard to all cir-
cumstances of each particular relation and situation.
BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 1231 (6th ed. 1990).
79. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).
80. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980).
81. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985). The
Wagenseller court also noted that a majority of states have either recognized some
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While the full parameters of the doctrine are unclear, three defini-
tive types of cases have evolved. First, are those cases where the firings
were precipitated by the employee's refusal to obey directions of the
employer to commit a crime or act contrary to public policy, or where
the employee refused to give false testimony at a trial or administrative
hearing.8" The second area pertains to those cases involving whistle-
blowers or employees refusing to violate a code of ethics.". The last
form of public policy exception or expressed a willingness to consider it under appropri-
ate circumstances. The court concluded that while the interests of the economic system
will be served by allowing employers to terminate employees for good cause or no
cause, the interests of society will be served if employers are prevented from terminat-
ing employees for a cause that is morally wrong. Id. at 1031. Administrative rules and
regulations can also be said to reflect public policy since all have their genesis in the
statute's enabling statute absent any excess of delegated legislative authority.
82. Tritle v. Crown Airways, Inc., 928 F.2d 81 (4th Cir. 1991) (discharged for
reporting FAA safety violations); Jarvinen v. HCA Allied Clinical Lab., Inc., 552 So.
2d 241 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d
1327 (Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App. 1985); Ochab v. Morrison, Inc., 517 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (refusal to serve intoxicated patron in violation of state dram
law); Laws v. Aetna Fin. Co., 667 F. Supp. 342 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (refusal to "pack
loans" in violation of federal truth in lending law and state small loan regulation law);
Sides v. Duke Hosp., 325 S.E.2d 818, (N.C. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 335 S.E.2d 13
(1985) (refusal to commit perjury); DeRose v. Putnam Mgt. Co., 496 N.E.2d 428
(Mass. 1986) (refusing to testify falsely against fell ow employee.at -employer's de-
mand); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986),
affd, 408 N.W.2d 569 (1987) (refusing to violate Clean Air Act); Thompson v. St.
Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984) (en .banc) (fired for instituting account-
ing practices to insure compliance with federal corrupt practices anti-bribery statute);
Troy v. Interfinancial, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 872 (Wash. 1984) (false testimony in deposi-
tion in lawsuit of another against employer); Melchi v.. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 597
F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (discharge for reporting violationsto Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982) (em-
ployee discharged to prevent testimony before grand jury or any subsequent criminal
trial); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (refusal to violate
anti-trust laws and consent decree); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R., 265
N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (employee discharged for refusing to alter results
of tests on pollution control reports); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 568 P.2d 764
(Was. 1977) (en banc) (refusal to commit perjury); Petermann v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (refusal to commit perjury before state
legislature).
83. City of Miami v. Coil, 546 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (dis-
charge for reporting malfeasance, misfeasance and neglect of duty); Boyle v. Vista
Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (filing complaint with FDA
where employer violated lens testing regulations); Maus v. National Living Ctrs., Inc.,
633 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (reporting inadequate patient care and neglect
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area entails the employee's exercise of a statutory right.84 In all cases
in which plaintiffs prevailed, the courts recognized that the public's col-
lective good outweighed the employer's right to fire. For example, the
North Carolina courts recognized this premise when creating an excep-
tion to the at-will doctrine.
In Sides v. Duke Hospital,"5 the plaintiff was employed as a nurse
anesthetist for more than eleven years prior to her dismissal.86 While
on duty, Sides refused to follow a doctor's order to administer anesthet-
ics to a patient because she thought the drug would harm the patient.87
The doctor administered the drug and the patient suffered permanent
brain damage.88 The patient's estate filed suit alleging medical mal-
practice. 89 Sides was deposed in the malpractice case but before she
gave her deposition, several doctors at Duke and Duke's attorneys told
her not to testify about all she observed. Some of the doctors warned
her that she would be "in trouble" if she did so.90 Despite these warn-
of patients); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (Il. 1981)
(relying on general criminal statutes for proposition that public policy favors citizen
crime fighters); Martin v. Platt, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Geary v.
United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Penn. 1974) (employee complaint over defec-
tive casings).
84. Scott v. Otis Elevator, 572 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1991) (discharged for filing
workers' compensation claim); Hummer v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 573 So.
2d 135 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct App. 1991) (discharged for HIV treatment); Aszkenas v.
J.B. Robinson Jewelers, Inc., 560 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (fired for
serving on federal jury); Neidhart v. Pioneer Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 498 So. 2d 594
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (responding to jury summons); Blangy v. State, 481 So.
2d 940 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 492 So. 2d 1330 (1986) (discharge be-
cause of length of jury duty); Kilpatrick v. Delaware County Soc'y for Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals, 632 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (OSHA prohibits discharge of
employees in reprisal for exercising rights under the Act); Novosel v. Nationwide Ins.
Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (dismissal in violation of first amendment guarantee);
Mobley v. Southern Plasma Corp., 366 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (dis-
charge for collective bargaining activities); Montalvo v. Zamora, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401
(5th Dist Ct. App. 1970) (implied action under minimum wage statute).
85. 328 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 335 S.E.2d 13 (1985).
86. Id. at 820.
87. Id. at 821.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Sides, 328 S.E.2d at 821. Such a recommendation by counsel in Florida
would certainly violate the rules of professional conduct. See RULES REGULATING THE
FLORIDA BAR 4-3.4(a), which states that a lawyer shall not "[u]nlawfully obstruct an-
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ings, Sides testified "fully and truthfully" at the depositions and again
at trial.9  The trial resulted in an award of $1,750,000 for the patient."
Concerned that her testimony in the case might cause her difficulties in
her work with some of the doctors at Duke, Sides asked her supervisor
to inform her of any complaints about her work so that she could ad-
dress them.9 3 Thereafter, several doctors displayed hostility towards
Sides and refused to work with her.94 Within a short period of time,
Sides' supervisor informed Sides of her inadequate job performance,
but refused to give her any specific examples. Sides was told that her
performance would be monitored closely for the next three months.9'
Less than three weeks later, Sides was discharged. 9 Sides brought an
action for wrongful discharge and for wrongful interference with her
employment contract.97 The trial court dismissed the suit..
In a unanimous decision, the court of appeals reversed the dismis-
sal of the claims and held that Sides stated an action for relief under
both contract and tort theories.9 8 The court noted that there was a
strong public interest in preventing the obstruction of justice.99 As a
91. Sides, 328 S.E.2d at 821.
92. Id. The defendant doctor viewed Sides as the person who caused them to lose
the case.
93. Id. The chief nurse refused to do this.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Sides, 328 S.E.2d at 821-22.
97. Id. at 822.
98. Id. at 825-28.
99. Id. at 823-24. Speaking for a unanimous court, Judge Phillips wrote:
These offenses are an affront to the integrity of our judicial system, an
impediment to the constitutional mandate of the courts to administer jus-
tice fairly, and a violation of the right that all litigants in this State have
to have their cases tried upon honest evidence fully given. Indeed, as every
citizen of ordinary intelligence must surely know, under-our law before any
witness can testify in any civil or criminal case he must solemnly affirm or
swear that the evidence given by him "shall be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth." [W]e ...believe that to deny that an en-
forceable claim has been stated in this instance would be a grave disservice
to the public and the system of law that we are sworn to administer, no
principle of which requires that civil immunity be given to those who
would defile or corrupt it.
Id. (citations omitted). Section 90.605, Florida Statutes, requires that before testifying
a witness must take an oath or affirmation that he will testify truthfully. FLA. STAT. §
90.605 (1991). If a witness refuses to either swear or affirm that he will tell the truth,
he will not be allowed to testify. CHARLES W. EHRHARDT. FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 605.1
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result, the court concluded that no employer could deprive an at-will
employee of his livelihood without civil liability because he refuses to
testify untruthfully or incompletely in a court case. The court opined:
".If we are to have law, those who so act against the public interest
must be -held accountable for the harm inflicted thereby; to accord
them civil immunity would incongruously reward them for lawlessness
at the unjust expense of their victims." 100
Of equal importance was the action of the Texas Supreme Court
in Sabine.Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck.10' Hauck was discharged by his
employer for -refusing to pump the bilges of the employer's boat into
the water which would be a violation of federal law.102 He subsequently
sued his employer alleging wrongful discharge. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the employer and the court of appeals reversed
the judgment. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed.' 0 3 The supreme
court opined that in the intervening ninety seven years since the court
first recognized the at-will doctrine in. Texas, the employer-employee
relationship and changes in American society required that public pol-
icy, as expressed in the laws of Texas and the United States, required a
very narrow exception to the doctrine.'04 The court was sure to note
that the narrow exception covers only the discharge of an employee for
the sole reason that an employee refused to perform an illegal act. 1 5
The concurring justices applauded the decision, characterizing the at-
will doctrine as a "relic of industrial times, conjuring up visions of
sweat shops described by Charles Dickens," and concluded that the
doctrine "belongs in a museum, not in our law."' 06
(2d ed. 1984).
100. Sides, 328 S.E.2d at 826.
101. 687 &W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
102. Id. at 734-35. Hauck saw a sign stating that this practice was illegal. He
called the Coast Guard to confirm the illegality of the procedure. After receiving con-
firmation that the act was illegal, he refused to do what the employer ordered. He was
then fired. Id.; see Comment, Labor Law-Texas Employment At-Will-A State Position
On Public Policy Comes Into Sharper Focus. Vasquez v. Bannworths, 707 S. W2d 886
(1986), 12 1'. MARSHALL L. REV. 241 (1986).
103. Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 734-35.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 736.
106. Id.; Comment, supra note 102, at 249. Justice Kilgarlin then observed:
Our duty to update this doctrine is particularly urgent when the doctrine is
used as leverage to incite violations of our state and federal laws ....
Allowing an employer to require an employee to break a law or face termi-
nation cannot help but promote a thorough disrespect for the laws and
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V. OF CONTRACT OR TORT
Perhaps the most difficult problem facing the Florida Supreme
Court in dealing with an exception to the at-will employment doctrine
is whether to treat the exception as a breach of contract or as a tort.
Florida courts take a strict doctrinal approach to employer-employee
relations and couch their concern in terms of a reluctance to interfere
with the inherent right of the employer and employee to contract.""
This strict doctrinal approach and the courts' refusal to allow an action
under tort theory suggests that the Florida courts are more comfortable
in defining the employment relationship under traditional contract the-
ory. This may be the result of the courts' perception that contract the-
ory provides a bright line basis for defining the relationship. Thus, the
court simply looks to see if the relationship includes an exchange of
mutual promises, consideration and mutuality.10 8 If any one element is
missing, there is no relationship.10 9
legal institutions of our society . . . . The court admittedly carves out but
one exception to employment-at-will, . . . but our decision today in no way
precludes us from broadening the exception when warranted in a proper
case.
Id.
107. Hartley, 476 So. 2d at 1329. One commentator astutely observes: "It is as
though the turn of the century values concerning formalism, laissez-faire economics,
stare decisis and deference to legislatures . . . still predominate in the South." Susan
K. Datesman, Note, Sides v. Duke Hospital: A Public Policy Exception to the Em-
ployment-At-Will Rule, 64 N.C. L. REv. 840, 841 (1986).
108. For a good review of the doctrinal basis under contract theory and the ne-
cessity of change, see Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Dis-
charge: The Duty To Terminate Only In Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1824-28
(1980). One commentator suggests that contract theory could be properly applied to
the public policy at-will exception the same as if the employer attempted to enforce an
illegal condition in a term employment contract. If the court would find void as against
public policy a condition allowing abusive conduct in a contract term, that court should
not condone the abusive conduct simply because an at will contract is for an indefinite
period of time. Illegal conduct is illegal conduct. J. Wilson Parker, North Carolina
Employment Law After Coman: Reaffirming Basic Rights In The Workplace, 24
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 905, 931 (1989).
109. 1 believe that the true reasons for this strict doctrinal approach are set forth
in Justice Ryan's dissent in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
The deteriorating business climate in this State is a topic of substantial
interest. A general discussion of that subject is not appropriate to this dis-
sent. It must be acknowledged, however, that Illinois is not attracting a
great amount of new industry and business and that industries are leaving
97
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Tort theory, on the other hand, attempts to reconcile the poten-
tially conflicting sets of interests present in an at-will relationship.11
Courts analyzing the at-will doctrine as a tort, balance the employer's
interest in the ability to evaluate its workforce with a sufficient degree
of flexibility to discharge an unproductive employee against the em-
ployee's interest in freedom from discharge for exercising legal rights
or refusing to violate the law.' Once the courts are committed to pro-
tecting the employee's interest in the balance, the logical result is to
utilize a third interest, the public interest, in the promotion of state
public policy. 112 In the traditional form of contract based at-will em-
ployment, the Florida Supreme Court recognizes only one of these in-
terests, that of the employer's, by granting the employer the absolute
right to discharge an employee at-will for good cause, no cause or even
morally bad cause." 3
In contrast to Florida's strict doctrinal approach, contract based
exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine have evolved from the
obligations of the parties arising out of their relationship." 4 While
the State at a troublesome rate. I do not believe that this court should
further contribute to the declining business environment by creating a
vague concept of public policy which will permit an employer to discharge
an unwanted employee, one who could be completely disruptive of labor-
management relations through his police spying and citizen crime-fighting
activities, only at the risk of being 'sued in tort not only.for compensatory
damages, but also for punitive damages.
Id. at 885.
110. See Bouffard, supra note 53, at 78-79. The three interest are the employer's
interest, the employee's interest, and the public interest.
I11. Id.
112. 1d. The courts, therefore, use the public interest to resolve the conflict be-
tween the employer and the employee. The overall objective is to balance all three
interests without favoring one set of interests over another. Id.
113. Id.; accord Smith v. Piezo Tech. and Prof. Adminis., 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla.
1983); DeN~arco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1978), affid, 384 So. 2d 1253 (1980).
114. See Bouffard, supra note 53, at 80. In an insightful fashion, Gilmore argues
that over the past forty years, we have seen the effective dismantling of the formal
system of classical contract theory.
Speaking descriptively, we might say that what is happening is that con-
tract is being reabsorbed into the mainstream of tort. Until the general
theory of contract was hurriedly run up late in the nineteenth century, tort
had always been our residual category of civil liability. As the contract
rules dissolve, it is becoming so again. It should be pointed out that the
theory of tort into which contract is being reabsorbed is itself a much more
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Florida courts assess liability for breach of an expressed contract,11 5
they refuse to find liability for breach of a policy manual " ' or through
the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.1 1 7
expansive theory of liability than was the theory of tort from which con-
tract was artificially separated a hundred years ago.
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
115. Vienneau v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 548 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1989); Maines v. Davis, 491 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Grap-
pone v. City of Miami Beach, 495 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
116. Lurton v. Muldon Mtr. Co., 523 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(policy manual expressing dismissal only for just cause not enforceable). Contra Staggs
v. Blue Cross of Md., Inc., 486 A.2d 798 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 303 493
A.2d 349 (1985) (provisions in a policy manual which limit the employer's discretion to
terminate an indefinite employment or that set forth a required procedure for termina-
tion may if properly expressed and communicated to the employee become a contrac-
tual undertaking by the employer that are enforceable by the employee). Accord Wool-
ley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985);
Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980),
where the court held:
that [an] employer statements of policy such as the Blue Cross Supervi-
sory Manual and Guidelines, can give rise to contractual rights in employ-
ees without evidence that the parties mutually agreed that the policy state-
ments would create contractual rights in the employee ....
Id. at 892. Thus, where an employer establishes a company policy to discharge for just
cause only, pursuant to certain procedures, makes the policy known to the employee
and committed itself to abide by its policy, the relationship is not terminable at will.
117. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988); K Mart Corp. v.
Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987); Cook v. Alexander & Alexander of Conn., Inc.,
488 A.2d 1295 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1985); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364
N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
Although not all courts recognize exceptions or limitations to the employ-
ment at will doctrine, courts in thirty-two states have adopted public policy
exceptions, eleven states have applied the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and twenty-nine states have used employee handbooks to find con-
tractual limitations on terminations. A total of thirty-nine states now em-
ploy one or more theories to qualify the employment at will doctrine.
Bullock v. Automobile Club of Mich., 444 N.W.2d 114, 119 (Mich. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990) (quoting Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A
Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7, 13-14 (1988)).
The Florida Courts reject the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing as it
pertains to at-will employment contracts. See, e.g. Kelly v. Gill, 544 So. 2d 1162 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 553 So. 2d 1165 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1029
(1990); Muller v. Stromberg, Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1982). Conversely, the courts are quick to imply a duty of good faith and fair dealing
in its commercial contracts. See Coira v. Florida Medical Ass'n, 429 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1983), and cases cited therein. See also FLA. STAT. § 671.203 (1989)
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VI. THE TREND CONTINUES
A. Jarvinen v. HCA Allied Clinical Laboratories, Inc."8
Sandra Jarvinen was employed by HCA Allied Laboratories.
HCA terminated Jarvinen after she responded to a subpoena and testi-
fied truthfully against HCA at trial. 119 As a result, Jarvinen sued HCA
and two other defendants in a three count complaint. Count I, pertain-
ing only to HCA, alleged that HCA terminated Jarvinen in retaliation
for her -testimony.120 She further alleged that her dismissal violated
public policy for witnesses to testify truthfully, without coercion, intim-
idation or threat of adverse consequences.12' Subsequently, the trial
(every contract or duty within the code imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance).
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that "[e]very contract imposes
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its en-
forcement." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979). It is clear that
nothing in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts suggests that it should not apply to
employment contracts. See Parker, supra note 108.
118. 552 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
119. larvinen, 552 So. 2d at 242. Jarvinen was subpoenaed to testify in the trial
of Dr. Raul Romaguera, a physician who was suing HCA. The allegations in Jarvinen's
complaint alleged that the testimony was truthful and that HCA viewed Jarvinen's
testimony as detrimental to its defense of the Romaguera lawsuit.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.410(e) provides that the "[f]ailure by any person without ade-
quate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon him may be deemed a contempt of the




(I) Whoever makes a false statement, which he does not believe to be true,
under oath in an official proceeding, in regard to any material matter shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) Knowledge of the materiality of the statement is not an element of this
crime, and the defendant's mistaken belief that his statement was not ma-
terial is not a defense.
Nessmith v. State, 472 So. 2d 1248, 1252 n.6 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985), rev.
denied, 484 So. 2d 10 (1986).
"Official proceeding" means a proceeding heard, or which may be or
is required to be heard, before any legislative, judicial, administrative, or
the other governmental agency or official authorized to take evidence
under oath, including any referee, master in chancery, hearing examiner,
commissioner, or other person taking testimony or a deposition in connec-
1105S19921
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court dismissed the suit and entered judgment for HCA.122 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision. The court
held that Jarvinen could not state a cause of action since she was an
employee at-will.123 Nonetheless, Judge Glickstein, in a specially con-
curring opinion, urged the Florida Supreme Court to address the issue
tion with any such proceeding.
Id. at 1252 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 837.011(1) (1985)).
FLA. STAT. § 837.021 (1991) states:
(1) Whoever in one or more official proceedings, willfully makes two or
more material statements under oath when in fact two or more of the
statements contradict each other is guilty of a felony of the third degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
FLA. STAT. § 914.13 (1991) states:
When a court of record has reason to believe that a witness or party who
has been legally sworn and examined or has made an affidavit in a pro-
ceeding has committed perjury, the court may immediately commit the
person or take a recognizance with sureties for his appearance to answer
the charge of perjury. Witnesses who are present may be recognized to the
proper court, and the state attorney shall be given notice of the
proceedings.
FLA. STAT. § 914.14 (1991) states:
(1) It is unlawful for any person who is a witness in a proceeding instituted
by a duly constituted prosecuting authority of this state to solicit, request,
accept, or agree to accept any money or anything of value as an induce-
ment to:
(a) Testify or inform falsely; or
(b) Withhold any testimony, information, document, or thing.
(2) Any person violating any provision of this section shall be guilty of a
felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083,
or s. 775.084.
FLA. STAT. § 914.22 (1991) states:
(1) A person who knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, or threat-
ens another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct
toward another person, or offers pecuniary benefit or gain to another per-
son, with intent to cause or induce any person to:
(a) Withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object,
from an official investigation or official proceeding;
(c) Evade legal process summoning that person to appear as a witness, or
to produce a record, document or other object, in an official investigator or
an official proceeding;
(d) Be absent from an official proceeding to which such person has been
summoned by legal process; or




et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
De Nigris
presented by Jarvinen. 24 Judge Glickstein viewed the actual issue as
one which concerned whether a cause of action should exist for retalia-
tory discharge for failure to give false testimony. 2 ' His discussion
spoke to those jurisdictions which recognize a narrow public policy ex-
ception for discharged employees who have chosen to testify truthfully
and have consequently lost their jobs." 6
124. Id. at 243. Obviously concerned by the inequity presented in the case, yet
bound by precedent of the supreme court, Judge Glickstein wrote: "I . . . write in the
hope that the Florida Supreme Court will speak to the issue, given the court's concern
for the administration of justice." Id.
At common law perjury, subornation of perjury and intimidation of witnesses were
offenses. The Florida Legislature broadened the perjury prohibition through legislation.
See supra, note 121. Other courts have manifested similar attitudes toward perjury
offenses. See Sides, 328 S.E.2d at 823 ("[tlhese offenses . . . are an affront to the
integrity of our judicial system, an impediment to the constitutional mandate of the
courts to administer justice fairly and a violation of all litigants in this state to have
their cases tried upon honest evidence fully given.").
125. Jarvinen, 552 So.2d at 243.
126. Id. Judge Glickstein referred to several cases cited by Jarvinen in her brief,
quoting their rationale but taking no further position on the issue except to indicate
that several other courts created exceptions under these circumstances. See, e.g.,
Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959); Sides
v. Duke Hosp., 328 S.E.2d 818, 826 (N.C. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 335 S.E.2d 13
(1985); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 568 P.2d 764 (Wash. 1977). Judge Glick-
stein's opinion clearly reflects that he was disturbed by the inequity of the results in
this instance and the necessity to encourage persons to testify truthfully. Unfortunately,
the court passed up the opportunity to expand upon its discussion, or to utilize other
procedural alternatives available to it in order to avoid upholding the trial court's dis-
missal of the complaint. In that regard, the court might have chosen to certify the
question presented in the case to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public
importance. Article Five of the Florida Constitution provides:
(b) Jurisdiction - The supreme court:
(4) May review any decision of a district court of appeal that passes upon
a question certified by it to be of great public importance, or that is certi-
fied by it to be in direct conflict with a decision of another district court of
appeal.
(5) May review any order or judgment of a trial court certified by the
district court of appeal in which an appeal is pending to be of great public
importance, or to have a great effect on the proper administration of jus-
tice throughout the state, and certified to require immediate resolution by
the supreme court.
FLA. CONST., art V, § 3; see Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987);
accord FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (1991).
Under certification jurisdiction, review by the Florida Supreme Court is discretion-
19921 1107
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B. Bellamy v. Holcomb
More recently, another court proceeding set the stage for the ter-
mination of an at-will employee in Bellamy v. Holcomb.' Karin Bel-
lamy worked as a bookkeeper for Auto Intelligence Devices.'28 Bellamy
brought an auto negligence action which was unrelated to her employ-
ment."'9 The defense attorney in that case issued a subpoena duces, te-
cum for Holcomb's wage and hour records relating to Bellamy. 130
Holcomb refused to comply with the subpoena. The defense attorney
then subpoenaed the company's bookkeeper. The bookkeeper testified
that Holcomb instructed her not to bring or produce Bellamy's person-
ary. Furthermore, since the court of appeal cannot intentionally render a decision
which is in conflict with supreme court precedent, certification would have been the
only viable alternative in order to redress the inequity perpetrated in Jarvinen. The
supreme court notes its preference to this method of review. Speaking to the issue in
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973), the supreme court noted:
This is not to say that the District Court of Appeal are powerless to seek
change; they are free to certify questions of great public interest to this
Court for consideration, and even state their reasons for advocating
change. They are, however, bound to follow the case law set forth by this
Court.
Id. at 434.
In the same vein, the case must present some indication of a need for immediate
resolution in addition to a substantive basis for review. Certainly, dismissal from one's
livelihood in lieu of committing perjury satisfies the immediacy requirement. For a
thorough review of the "immediate resolution" standard, see Department of Ins. v.
Teachers Ins. Co., 404 So. 2d 735, 737 (Fla. 1981) (England, J., dissenting). Finally, a
simple majority of the merits panel at the district court of appeal is all that is needed
to certify a question to the supreme court.
Jarvinen subsequently moved the district court of appeal for certification of the
question to the supreme court. The court denied certification on November 21, 1989.
127. 577 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The reported case provides
no facts. Thus, the facts portrayed in this comment are taken from the brief of the
appellant filed before the court of appeal.
128. Appellant's Initial Brief at 1, Bellamy v. Holcomb, 577 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) [hereinafter Appellant's Initial Brief]. Auto Intelligence Devices
is the alter ego of appellee Holcomb.
129. Bellamy, 577 So. 2d at 610; Appellant's Initial Brief, supra note 128, at 5.
130. Appellant's Initial Brief, supra note 128, at 5; see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.410(b)
(providing "[a] subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to pro-
duce the books, papers, documents or tangible things designated therein .... ").
The defense attorney made service of the subpoena duces tecum upon the com-
pany's records custodian on April 14, 1987. No records were produced in response to it.
Appellant's Initial Brief, supra note 128, at 5.
1108 [Vol. 16
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nel records.131 The defense attorney issued and served Holcomb's firm
another subpoena duces tecum for a records custodian deposition to be
held at Holcomb's office. On the day of the deposition, the attorney was
informed upon arrival at the office that, the records custodian was out
of town. 132 In response, the trial court in the auto negligence case is-
sued an order to show cause why Holcomb's company should not be
held in contempt of court.' 33 The order further directed that a company
representative appear before the court on April 11, 1988.1'' Holcomb
advised Bellamy after learning that he would be subpoenaed, "They'll
have to find me first to serve me and I'm not easily found."'31 3 To his
surprise, Holcomb was found and the trial judge held him in contempt
for not producing the subpoenaed documents.136 The day following the
court hearing, Holcomb discharged Bellamy. 3 7 Bellamy instituted an
action against Holcomb alleging several different theories of recov-
ery. 138 Holcomb moved to dismiss the suit with prejudice. The trial
court granted Holcomb's motion and Bellamy appealed.' 9
In a per curiam decision, the Fourth District Court of Appeal af-
firmed the dismissal of the lawsuit without further discussion." ° Judge
Polen, in his specially concurring opinion, believed that this question
should be certified to the Florida, Supreme Court as one of great public
131. Appellant's Initial Brief, supra note 128, at 5. The bookkeeper testified on
November 17, 1987. Id.
132. Id. The subpoena was returnable'on March 29, 1988.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Appellant's Initial Brief" supra note 128, at 6. Bellamy further alleged that
Wheri'"Holcomb was ordered to show cause, he stated 'that "I have every intention of
firing you." Id.
136. Id.
137. Id Bellamy's brief reflects the following account:
On April 12, 1988, the day after Holcomb appeared in court, Holcomb's personnel
manager approached Bellamy laughing. The following exchange then took place:
Personnel Manager: You know it's coming.
Bellamy: Yes.
Personnel Manager: I have to fire you. I don't know why. I always have to
do the dirty work.
Id. Bellamy's brief indicates that she was a conscientious employee who abided by the
work rules set out in her employee's handbook.
138. Appellant's Initial Brief, supra note 128, at 6; Count I involved Breach of
Unilateral Employment Contract; Count II Promissory Estoppel; and Count Ill Tor-
tious Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy. Id.
139. Id.
140. Bellamy, 577 So. 2d at 609.
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VII. THE NEED To REFORM
Workers' rights continue to suffer in Florida. Relying on the
courts' failure to modify the archaic notion that the legislature makes
public policy,1 '12 employers enjoy a premium on continued lawless-
ness. 14 3 Moreover, the rationale for continuing the at-will doctrine is
inconsistent in several aspects. First, the employment at-will doctrine is
a creation of the Florida Supreme Court and not the legislature or
common law. " ' Accordingly, the court is free to modify the doctrine
without legislative action. 14 5 Second, the doctrine of stare decisis is of
141. Id.; Judge Polen's proposed certified question reads as follows:
Should a cause of action be recognized for tortious wrongful discharge
(from employment otherwise terminable at will), in violation of public pol-
icy where an employee is fired because of her participation in a lawsuit
which requires that the employee's earning records be produced by the
employer pursuant to a subpoena?
Id. Conversely, Judge Stone opined in his specially concurring opinion that the certified
question is properly one for legislative determination. Id.
142. See, e.g., Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 497 So. 2d 644,
646 (Fla. 1986) ("of the three branches of government, the judiciary is the least capa-
ble of receiving public input and resolving policy questions based on a societal consen-
sus"); Greenleaf & Crosby Co. v. Coleman., 158 So. 421, 429 (Fla. 1934) ("acts of the
legislature practically determine the policy of the state"); State ex rel. Church v.
Yeats, 77 So. 262, 264 (Fla. 1917) (legislature establishes the public policy of the state
unless restrained by some constitutional authority).
143. Applied to the Jarvinen holding, the court's holding creates a substantial
dilemma: commit the crime of perjury and go to jail, or refuse to commit perjury and
be fired. Alternatively, Jarvinen could refuse to testify and be held in contempt and
sent to jail. Each alternative, is totally unacceptable given the courts' duty to insure the
fair and impartial administration of justice.
The Bellamy holding is equally disturbing because the process utilized by the de-
fense attorney was the civil rules of procedure as established by the supreme court.
Thus, the results in this case now penalize an employee for using, or in Bellamy's case
not using, the rules of civil procedure that were promulgated to secure the just, speedy
and inexpensive determination in every action. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.010 (rules shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action).
144. See Chipley v. Atkinson, 1 So. 934 (Fla. 1887); Savannah, F. & W. Ry. v.
Willett, 31 So. 246 (Fla. 1901); Florida Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hart, 75 So. 528 (Fla.
1917); Knudsen v. Green, 156 So. 240 (Fla. 1934); Wynne v. Ludman Corp., 79 So. 2d
690 (Fla. 1955).
145. In County Sanitation Dist. v. Los Angeles County Employees Ass'n, Local
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little import because the cases in which the supreme court premised its
original adoption of at-will employment were not based on terminations
for refusal to violate the law. 4" Accordingly, the supreme court's con-
Plaintiff's argument that only the legislature can reject the common law
doctrine prohibiting public employee strikes flies squarely in the face of
both logic and past. precedent. Legislative silence is not the equivalent of
positive legislation and does not preclude judicial reevaluation of common
law doctrine. If the courts have created a bad rule or an outmoded one, the
courts can change it.
Id. at 848.
Section 2.01, Florida Statutes, provides:
The common and statute laws of England which are of a general and not a
local nature, with the exception hereinafter mentioned, down to the fourth
day of July, 1776, are declared to be in force in this state; provided the
said statutes and common law be not inconsistent with the constitution and
laws of the United States and the acts of the legislature of this state.
FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1989). Since the employment at-will doctrine was not part of the
English common law then in effect at that time, the supreme court is free to fashion a
modification. Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952), supports this proposition. In
that case, the court wrote:
When the rules of common law are in doubt, or when a factual situation is
presented which is not within the established precedents, we are sometimes
called upon to determine what general principles are to be applied, and in
doing this we, of necessity, exercise a broad judicial discretion. It is only
proper that in such cases we take into account the changes in our social
and economic customs and present day conceptions of right and justice.
When the common law is clear we have no power to change it.
Id. at 423 (emphasis added). Even more compelling, is the fact that the Florida Su-
preme Court has not hesitated in other respects to reject anachronistic common law
concepts. See, e.g., Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957)
(abrogating, the municipal, immunity doctrine); Morgenthaler v. First Atlantic Nat'l
Bank, 80 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1955) (adopting American testator intent rule and rejecting
English rule); accord Holland v. State, 302 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
In State v. Dwyer, 332 So. 2d 333 (Fla.. 1976), Justice Boyd writing for the court
stated:
Stare decisis is a fundamental principle of Florida Law. It played an im-
portant part in the development of English common law and its importance
has not diminished today. Where an issue has been decided by the Su-
preme Court of the state, the lower courts are bound to adhere to the
Court's ruling when considering similar issues . . . .In the event of a con-
flict between the decision of a District Court of Appeal and this Court, the
decision of this Court shall prevail until overruled by a subsequent decision
of this Court.
Id. at 335 (citations omitted).
146. The doctrine of stare decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action which should
be faithfully adhered to by the court so as to preserve the integrity of the judicial
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tinued adherence to the at-will doctrine and reluctance to create a lim-
ited exception is an enigma in light of its own declarations. For exam-
ple, in Gilliam v. Stewart,1" 7 the court stated: "We recognize that in
this fast changing world the general welfare requires from time to time
reconsideration of old concepts. When the district courts decide that
ancient precedents should be overruled, we welcome their views and
such should be unhesitantly rendered . ".. . 8 Given those words and
its own precedent, the court's reluctance to administer justice in the
employment relationship is inconsistent and unsupportable. 49 In the
administration of law. Nevertheless, the courts have the power to disregard the force of
judicial precedent in a proper case. 13 FLA. JUR. 2D, Courts and Judges §156. Stare
decisis is not a universal, inexorable command. Id. There are nevertheless occasions
when a departure from it is rendered necessary in order to vindicate plain and obvious
principles of law and to remedy a continued injustice. Id. at § 157. It will not be
applied to factual situations when to do so would defeat justice. In that regard, both
the Florida Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have departed from
it to overrule an earlier decision. Id.
Changes in social and economic conditions may compel the extension of legal for-
mulas and the approval of new precedents in order to achieve the administration of
justice. In other words, when the reason for the rule changes, the rule itself should no
longer stand and a new rule in harmony with changed conditions should be recognized.
Id. at § 158.
While it is the function of courts to interpret rather than make law, it
must nevertheless be borne in mind that the common law is not a collec-
tion of archaic, abstract legal principles as the briefs of the defendants
imply-it is a living system of law that, like the skin of a child, grows and
develops customs, practices and necessities of the people it was adopted for
change. The common law had its genesis in customs and practices of the
people, and its genius, as many of the country's greatest jurists and legal
scholars have pointed out, is not only its age and continuity, but its vitality
and adaptability.
Sides, 328 S.E.2d at 827.
147. 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974).
148. Id. at 594.
149. There are numerous examples where the supreme court and the district
courts of appeal have created judicial remedies or judicially modified common law doc-
trines without any direction from the legislature. See, e.g., Farmer v. City of Fort Lau-
derdale, 427 So. 2d 187 (Fla.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983) (refusal to submit to
polygraph not grounds to dismiss public employee); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402(a));
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) (rejecting contributory negligence and
adopting comparative negligence); Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971) (establish-
ing right of wife to recover for loss of husband's consortium), receding from, Ripley v.
Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952); Randolph v. Randolph, I So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1941)
(modifying common law doctrine that gave father superior right to custody of a child);
1112 [Vol. 16
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same vein, the supreme court's rationale in Hoffman v. Jones,1 50 amply
supports the reasons to place the at-will doctrine with the relics of the
past. In that case, the supreme court abolished the doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence and adopted a comparative negligence system. The
court's rationale spoke to the fact that the supreme court judicially
adopted the doctrine of contributory negligence in 1886.151 The court
noted that it exercises broad discretion in changing or modifying a rule
taking into account the changes in our social and economic customs
and the present day conceptions of right and justice. 152 The court's own
words are instructive:
Be that as it may, our own feeling is that the courts should be alive
to the demands of justice. We can see no necessity for insisting on
legislative action in a matter which the courts themselves
originated. . . . It may be argued that any change in this rule
Banfield v. Addington, 140 So. 893 (Fla. 1932) (removing common law exemption of a
married woman from causes of action based on contract or mixed contracts in tort);
Waller v. First Say. & Trust Co., 138 So. 780 (Fla. 1931) (rejecting common law
principle that action for personal injuries abated upon death of tortfeasor); Continental
Ins. Co. v. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing new
tort of negligent spoilation or destruction of evidence for prospective civil suit).
In Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984), rev. denied,
484 So. 2d 7 (1986), the district court addressed the issue of whether to recognize a
cause of action for negligent retention of hospital records. While not a previously recog-
nized tort in Florida, the court wrote:
To be sure, the tort alleged is not a familiar one. That fact, however,
hardly prevents it being recognized by us. As we are reminded by Profes-
sor Prosser:
New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and
the progress of the common law is marked by many cases of
first impression, in which the court has struck out boldly to
create a new cause of action, where none has been recognized
before . . . . The law of torts is anything but static, and the
limits of its development are never set. When it becomes clear
that the plaintiffis interests are entitled to legal protection
against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the
claim is novel will not of itself operate as a bar to the remedy.
Id. at 1312 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS §
I, at 3-4 (4th ed. 1971)); see also Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (adopting Greco inference); Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'g Co., 283 F.
Supp. 978 (W.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 407 F.2d 87 (3rd Cir. 1969).
150. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
151. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700 (1886).
152. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 434-35.
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should come from the Legislature. No recitation of authority is
needed to indicate that this Court has not been backward in over-
turning unsound precedent in the area of tort law. Legislative ac-
tion could, of course be taken, but we abdicate our own function, in
a field peculiarly nonstatutory, when we refuse to reconsider an old
and unsatisfactory court-made rule.' 5"
The court found that the demise of the doctrine of contributory
negligence has been urged by many scholars. Furthermore, the court's
own research indicated that at least sixteen states, as well as several
industrial countries, have adopted some form of comparative negligence
in addition to several industrial countries.1 54 In short, the court
concluded:
[T]here is something basically wrong with a rule of law that is so
contrary to the settled convictions of the lay community ....
[t]he disrespect for law engendered by putting our citizens in a
position in which they feel it is necessary to deliberately violate the
law is not something to be lightly brushed aside; and it comes ill
from the mouths of lawyers, who as officers of the courts have
sworn to uphold the law, to defend the present system by arguing
that it works because jurors can be trusted to disregard that very
law. 155
Unfortunately, these words have little meaning when applied to
the at-will relationship. Indeed, to place an at-will employee in a situa-
tion where she must choose between obstructing justice, committing a
criminal act or loss of employment, engenders that very disrespect that
the court speaks disdainfully of in Hoffman, and is tantamount to an
unconscionable miscarriage, and the destruction of, the administration
of justice.
Fourth, the criminal code of Florida is a legislative pronouncement
of public policy and can be easily and narrowly applied in the employ-
ment at-will context.15 6 Fifth, the Florida Legislature's enactments in-
153. Id. at 435 (citations omitted).
154. Id. at 436. Historically, the doctrine of contributory negligence was adopted
by the courts to protect the essential growth of industries, particularly transportation.
Id. The court also found that the courts created ancillary several doctrines to deal with
the harshness of the doctrine.
155. Id. (citations omitted).
156. See FLA. STAT. § 775.012 (1991). This section reads in pertinent part:
The general purposes of the provisions of the code are:
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dicate that it is not inimical to modifying the employment at-will doc-
trine.167 For example, in Segal v. Arrow Industries Corp.,5'6 the
employee filed a complaint against his employer seeking damages on
the ground that he was wrongfully discharged because he filed a work-
ers' compensation claim.1 59 The trial court dismissed the action and Se-
gal appealed. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the dis-
charge concluding that no action existed, because Segal was an at-will
employee. In response to this decision, the legislature statutorily over-
ruled Segal the following year. 160 Lastly, entertaining actions based on
a violation of public policy for refusing to commit a criminal act
presents no evidentiary impediments as to proof."6 ' Thus, a judicial
(I) To proscribe conduct that improperly causes or threatens substantial
harm or individual or public interest.
(6) To insure the public safety by deterring the commission of offenses
Id. Under the current state of the law in Florida, an employer could direct an at will
employee to commit murder at the risk of losing his job. While the employer could
certainly be charged with solicitation under section 777.04(2), Florida Statutes (1989),
the employee's discharge from employment nonetheless would be upheld. The thought,
however, at using the criminal statutes as a basis for civil suit in an at will employment
is a question left for another day. Yet, before a criminal statute could be used to imply
a cause of action for civil liability, the plaintiff would have to meet the test set forth in
Fischer v. Metcalf, 543 So. 2d 785, 788 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc). In
that case, the court adopted the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), for determining whether a criminal statute implies a private
cause of action. The test as set out by the Court involves a determination by the courts
as to:
(1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose special benefit the
statute was enacted;
(2) whether there is any indication, either explicit or implicit, of a legisla-
tive intent to create or deny such a remedy;
(3) whether judicial implication is consistent with the underlying purposes
of the legislative scheme; and
(4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law
and of concern to the states, such that a cause of action ought not to be
inferred based solely upon federal law.
Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
157. See, e.g., supra note 9.
158. 364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
159. Id.
160. FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (1991).
161. Even if the court were not inclined to create a broad public policy exception
to at-will employment, it could easily create a narrow exception to pertain only to those
claims which involve an employer requiring an illegal act, or retaliation for using the
1992] 1115
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modification of the at-will doctrine will pose no great impact on the
court system or business relationships. 162
VIII. A PROPOSED STATUTE FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
Soon after the Florida Supreme Court modifies the at-will doc-
trine, the Florida Legislature should enact legislation to codify the
court's action. The statute should define what offenses will create a
procedures set forth by the supreme court in litigating a dispute. Accordingly, claims
could be disposed of quickly since a plaintiff. would have to specifically show the crimi-
nal statute that an employer ordered the employee to violate. The standard burden for
allowing a cause of action under this narrow exception would be the test similarly use
to litigate cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In that instance, the plaintiffs burden of
establishing a prima facie case would be met if:
(1) the plaintiff was employed by the employer;
(2) the employer ordered the plaintiff to violate a specific criminal statute;
(3) the employee refused to violate the statute, and;
(4) the employee suffered an adverse employment action by the employer.
If the plaintiff meets this initial showing that the protected conduct was a substan-
tial or motivating reason for discharge, the burden would then shift to the defendant to
show that it would have taken the same adverse employment action in the absence of
the protected conduct. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274 (1977); accord Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Eiland v. City
of Montgomery, 797 F.2d 953 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1020 (1987).
Moreover, proving that the same decision would have been justified
...is not the same as proving that the same decision would have been
made. An employer may not, in other words, prevail in a mixed-motive
case by offering a legitimate and sufficient reason for its decision if that
reason did not motivate it at the time of the decision. Finally, an employer
may not meet its burden in such a case by merely showing that at the time
of the decision it was motivated only in part be a legitimate reason. The
very premise of a mixed-motives case is that a legitimate reason was pre-
sent and indeed the case.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252 (citations omitted).
If the employer meets this burden, then the employee would have to show that the
reason given was pretextual. If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, then the suit is
dismissed.
162. There has been an concern by some courts that a change in the at-will doc-
trine will create confusion and uncertainty in business relationships. See Hartley v.
Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Muller v.
Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266, 270 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983). Courts so
disposed to this theory imply that existing businesses, or the influx of new businesses to
Florida, will be harmed. To the contrary, since 1980, one year after the enactment of
section 440.205, Florida Statutes, creating a wrongful discharge cause of action for
filing a workers' compensation claim, only twenty six cases have been reported.
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cause of action, remedies and a statute of limitations. The proposed
statute should state the following:
CHAPTER 91--
House Bill No.
An' act relating to wrongful discharge from employment; creating s.
-, F.S., providing for certain definitions, rights and remedies
with respect to wrongful and retaliatory discharge from employment;
providing for an effective date.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida;
Section 1: SHORT TITLE: This act may be cited as the "Florida
Wrongful Discharge From. Employment Act".
Section 2: PURPOSE: The Legislature finds that the stability of its
workforce is indispensable to the state's continued economic growth
and to the vitality of its workers. As'a result, the necessity in maintain-
ing full employment and the interests of the employer to make legiti-
mate business decisions are best served if the discharge of an employee
is regulated under certain circumstances. Accordingly, the Legislature
finds that the discharge of an employee for refusing to commit a crimi-
nal act or for exercising a statutory right specifically granted by law is
against the public policy' of this state. In this respect, the Legislature
declares that the purpose of this act is to establish certain rights and
remedies with respect to wrongful discharge. Except as limited in this
act, employment having no specified term may be terminated at the
will of either the employer or the employee on notice to the other for
any reason considered sufficient by the terminating party. 163
Section 3: DEFINITIONS: The following definitions apply to this act:
(a) "Constructive Discharge" means the voluntary termination of em-
ployment by an employee because of a situation created by an act or
omission of the employer which an objective, reasonable person would
find so intolerable that voluntary termination is the only reasonable
alternative.16'
(b) "Discharge" includes a constructive discharge as defined in subsec-
tion (a), any other termination of employment including voluntary res-
163. This section allows for a structured balance to meet the needs of employers
to effectively manage and operate a business and in making legitimate business deci-
sions. Furthermore, the Act allows an employer to discharge an unproductive or disrup-
tive with no civil liability at all since the Act protects only those employees for those
enumerated causes of action as set forth in section 4 of the Act. See MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 39-2-902 (1991).
164. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(1) (1991); STEELE V. OFFSHORE SHIPBUILD-
ING. INC., 867 F.2D 1311 (1ITH CIR. 1989).
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ignation under duress or undue influence,"" elimination of the job, lay-
off for lack of work, failure to recall or rehire, and any other cutback in
the number of employees for other than a legitimate business reason.
(c) "Person" includes an individual, association, corporation, joint ap-
prenticeship committee, joint-stock company, labor union, legal repre-
sentative, mutual company, partnership, receiver, trust, trustee in bank-
ruptcy, or unincorporated organization; any other legal or commercial
entity; the state; or any governmental entity or agency. 166
(d) "Employee" means a person who works for another for hire but
does not include:
(i) an independent contractor
(ii) an elected public official or an appointee of an elected public
official;
(iii) a state, county, municipal or civil service public employee al-
ready statutorily protected against unjust discharge;
(iv) a person elected to his employment by:
(a) shareholders, a board of governors or an executive committee;
(v) a member of top level management;
(vi) a person under a fixed term of employment for two or more
years who has agreed in writing to waive his or her rights under the
Act;
(vii) a volunteer serving without any form of compensation;
(viii) an individual working for his or her parents, legal guardian
or spouse;
(ix) an employee on probation, except when such status is used as
165. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(2) (1991).
A voluntary act is an act proceeding from one's own choice or full consent
unimpelled by another's influence. However, an action cannot be voluntary
if it is performed as a result of duress. Duress involves a step beyond mere
illegality and implies that a person has been unlawfully constrained or
compelled by another to perform an act under circumstances which pre-
vent the exercise of free will. In order to show duress, a plaintiff must show
(1) that one side involuntarily accepted the terms of another, (2) that cir-
cumstances permitted no other alternative, and (3) that said circumstances
were the result of coercive acts of the opposite party. The plaintiff bears
the burden of creating a fact issue with respect to a claim of duress. How-
ever, duress is not measured by a plaintiff's subjective evaluation of a situ-
ation; rather, a plaintiff must tender objective evidence that the retirement
or resignation was the product of duress.
McLaughlin v. Department of Nat'l Resources, 526 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1988) (citations omitted).
166. FLA. STAT. § 760.02(5) (1991).
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a pretext for the exercise of rights enumerated in section 4 of this Act.
(.x) domestic servants;
(xi) an individual protected against wrongful discharge under a
collective bargaining agreement. 16 7
(e) "Employer" includes any person employing 15 or more employees,
for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the cur-
167. Richard D. Himberger, Comment, Unjust Discharge. Why Nonunion Em-
ployees Need A Just Cause Statute, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 135, 154 (1989).
Particular occupations are not covered by the Act. Elected officials
and their appointees (e.g. city managers) are excluded because of the po-
litical nature of their appointment. Business officials are excluded for simi-
lar reasons.
[In the same vein,] [u]nder state public employee statutes, state and
municipal employees may only be dismissed for just cause. These employ-
ees can be excluded from the Act's coverage.
Id. Similarly, employees covered by collective bargaining agreements are excluded
from coverage since the majority of collective bargaining agreements specifically im-
pose a "just cause" standard for disciplinary action or dismissal. Id.
High level managerial employees are excluded for several reasons. First, they are
in a substantially better bargaining position and are economically compensated for the
risks they bear. Second, they are party to the most sensitive type of strategic business
planning and participate in considerable policy making activity. Id. at 154-55.
The Act generally excludes independent contractors as non-employ-
ees. -It also excludes employees working under fixed-term employment con-
tracts of two years or more who have waived their statutory rights against
unjust dismissal in writing. Two justifications emerge. First, these individu-
als have voluntarily contracted away their statutory rights and should have
to accept responsibility for their contractual decisions. Second, if such em-
ployees are discharged in violation of their contracts, they can sue for
breach. In addition, the Act's fixed-term requirement assures that employ-
ers cannot coerce their employees into signing short-term waivers of just
cause statutory rights.
Volunteer employees, individuals working for their parents, guardians,
or spouses, and domestic servants have been excluded . . . . Volunteer
workers do not receive financial compensation or barter in lieu of such
compensation. Therefore, the available remedies of reinstatement with
back pay or compensatory damages are inappropriate. Family members
and domestic employees are excluded because of the "close personal rela-
tionships" that exist.
Because employers often require a probationary period to determine a
worker's qualifications, this statute excludes all employees who have com-
pleted less than six months of service with their employer . . . . The bur-
den is on the [probationary employee] to show that the employer used the
six month period to mask willful acts of unjust discharge.
Id. at 155-56 (citations omitted).
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rent or preceding calendar year and agent of such a person. '68
(f) "Fringe benefits" means the value of any employer paid vacation
leave, sick leave, medical insurance plan, disability insurance plan, life
insurance plan, and pension benefit plan in force on the date of the
termination. "9
(g) "Good cause" means reasonable, job related grounds for dismissal
based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the
employer's operation, or other legitimate business reason.17°
(h) "Lost wages" means the gross amount of wages that would have
been reported to the Internal Revenue Service as gross income on Form
W-2 and includes additional compensation deferred at the option of the
employee.17 1
(i) "Public policy" means the policy in effect at the time of the dis-
charge concerning the public health, safety, or welfare established by
constitutional provision, statute, administrative rule or pronouncements
of the supreme court;1 72
(j) "Probationary Period" means the initial training period following
hiring not to exceed six months;
(k) "Disciplinary Action" includes demotion, loss of pay, suspension,
reduction in seniority, transfer, denial of promotion, reassignment or
otherwise discriminated against, in regard to his employment with re-
gards to the actions enumerated in section 4 of this Act;1 73
Section 4: ELEMENTS OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE. A discipli-
nary action, discharge or constructive discharge is wrongful if it was in
retaliation for:
(a) the employee's refusal to commit an unlawful act or violate a regu-
latory statute or administrative rule or regulation;
(b) the employee's performance of a public obligation;
(c) the employee's exercise of a statutory right;
(d) the employee's testimony before any criminal or civil proceeding,
any administrative proceeding, or any arbitration, whether or not com-
pelled by subpoena;
168. The definition of employer is taken from section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes
(1989). By affixing the lower limit of employer, the Act will not become unduly bur-
densome on small employers and will not omit those employees who require the stat-
ute's protection the most.
169. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(3) (1991).
170. Id. at § 39-2-903(5).
171. Id. at § 39-2-903(6).
172. Id. at § 39-2-903(7); see supra, notes 78-84.
173. FLA. STAT. § 112.532(4) (1991).
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(e) the employee's report of any suspected violation of federal, state or
local law made to any federal agency, state officer, department, board,
commission or council of the executive branch or judicial branch of
state or federal government, so long as the report was reasonably made
and in good faith;
(f) reporting of any criminal or any safety violation of the Federal Avi-
ation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1301, et.seq., as long as the report was reasona-
bly made and in good faith;
17 4
(g) the initiation of any civil proceeding seeking recovery for personal
injuries; or
(h) where the employer violated the express provisions of its own writ-
ten personnel policy in discharging an employee for the exercise of sub-
divisions (a) - (g); or
(i) the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had com-
pleted the employer's probationary period of employment.
Section 5: REMEDIES
The remedy for any adverse employment action as described in section
4 of this Act is limited to the following:
(a) Reinstatement with back pay with interest from the date of discipli-
nary action or discharge;
(b) compensatory damages and/or punitive damages;
(c) removal of any record of the adverse employment action from the
employee's personnel record, file, or any other medium used by the em-
ployer to maintain records of employees;
(e) injunctive relief;
(d) attorney's fees and costs.' 75
174. A provision was specifically included to cover employees who report viola-
tions of the Federal Aviation Act. Its purpose is to cover situations where the courts
have found that no cause of action under that statute existed for employees discharge
for reporting flagrant safety violations of defective aircraft. It allows coverage for em-
ployees not protected by section 112.3187(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), and furthers
the policy of this state to protect its citizens while flying. Accord Tritle v. Crown Air-
ways, Inc., 928 F.2d 81 (4th Cir. 1991) (discharged for reporting FAA safety
violations).
175. Section 5 provides for several traditional make whole remedies. One remedy
included is a provision for reinstatement. It could be argued that in a wrongful dis-
charge proceeding which the Act covers, the employee would not desire reinstatement
because the employer-employee relationship will have deteriorated as a result of bad
feelings engendered from the dismissal. On the other hand, this provision is entirely
consistent with remedies available under the National Labor Relations Act, Title VII,
and enumerable other statutes and arbitration awards. The Act will similarly prevent
employer misconduct in making such wrongful dismissals since it provides for the
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Section 6: LIMITATION OF ACTION
(a) An action may only be maintained -under this chapter within 90
days after the date of the adverse employment action or when the ag-
grieved employee reasonably should have known of the adverse employ-
ment action.176
IX. CONCLUSION
The efficacy of the at-will employment doctrine is in serious doubt.
Created by misapplied authority and distortion, the doctrine is treated
as a treasured artifact from the nineteenth century by the Florida
courts. While many courts have taken the forefront in the eradication
or modification of the at-will doctrine, the Florida Supreme Court's un-
yielding loyalty to the doctrine places a premium on unlawful employer
conduct. Consequently, employers have utilized the doctrine as leverage
to violate federal and state laws with impunity. Such a result is both
illogical and intolerable in light of the supreme court's other pro-
nouncements, and the changes in society. Thus, the supreme court
should no longer sanction the discharge by an employer of an employee
who refuses to commit an unlawful act. Furthermore, the district
courts of appeal should recognize the need for change and utilize the
certification procedure to encourage the modification of the rule. Only
award of punitive damages.
Removal of the adverse employment action requires that all evidence of the dis-
missal will be removed from a personnel record since these records will generally follow
an employee from job to job. In addition, where the employee was wrongfully dis-
charged, it is inequitable for the employer to maintain a permanent record indicating
that the employee was a "bad employee." This section does not limit any other reme-
dies in tort where the employer slanders or libels a former employee with a prospective
employer. If anything, it encourages a "blind" recommendation.
Injunctive relief is provided for in order to allow a court to regulate the conduct of
an employer who engages in persistent egregious conduct with respect to its employees.
It is an extraordinary remedy and should only be granted in those cases where the
employer's conduct is truly outrageous.
Attorney's fees and costs should be provided since it encourages plaintiffs to bring
actions against an employer in order to enforce the statute, and encourages members of
the bar to take on cases in order to protect workers' rights.
176. An employer should not have to have a potential cause of action lingering
for several years, as is allowed under a general personal injury statute of limitations.
Thus, section 6 forces a discharged employee to expeditiously bring its claim. This
allows for an expedited resolution of the dispute and limits damages. Of course, an
employee would be required to mitigate his damages under generally accepted princi-
ples of contract.
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in this fashion, will the rule of law prevail over the rule of the market,
and force the King of the Turtles to speak instead of shout.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Seize first, ask questions later. Operation Polar Cap and
the Hawaii All Monies Cases
Based on sworn testimony that 680 bank accounts in the United
States containing nearly $400 million' were the "operating accounts"
* A.B. magna cum laude, Princeton University; J.D. cum laude, University of
Florida; attorney at law, Richey, Munroe, Fine, Goodman & Armstrong, P.A., Miami,
Florida. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Andre Lebrecht, attorney
at law, Prager, Dreifuss & Lehner, Zurich, Switzerland for his legal and factual
research.
1. Mary Hladky, Lawyers of Many Stripes Watch Money Seizure Cases in Ha-
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of the Medellin cartel, U.S. District Judge William C. O'Kelley issued
an order temporarily restraining them on April 16, 1990.2 Within
weeks almost 580 of those accounts were released.3 The government
then sought civil forfeiture of the remaining 100 accounts, 88 of which
were in the Southern District of Florida representing in excess of $17.6
million." Almost two years later, claims to 82 of those accounts have
been fully resolved returning 94 percent of the funds seized. The dis-
pute over one account has been partially resolved returning thus far 86
percent of its funds. Approximately $830,000 has been forfeited and
less than one million dollars is still in dispute.'
In May, 1989, the federal government sought civil forfeiture of
twenty-four bank accounts seized in Miami and New York and trans-
ferred to Hawaii in what has become known as the All Monies cases.6
waii, MIAMI REVIEW, May 11, 1990, at 1, 4.
2. United States v. Pablo Emilio Escobar-Gaviria, Cr. No. 89-086-A (N.D. Ga.,
April 16, 1990). This order was entered pursuant to 21 U.S.C. section 853(e)(2)
(Supp. 1992) which provides for a temporary restraining order against the property of
a defendant in a criminal case when an information or indictment has not yet been filed
seeking forfeiture of the property. The issuance of such an order requires the govern-
ment to demonstrate probable cause to believe that the property would, in the event of
the owner's conviction on the imminent criminal charges, be subject to forfeiture. In
other words, the 680 bank accounts were seized based on the false verification that they
were owned by the defendants in the criminal case pending in Atlanta, Georgia. See
United States v. Eighty-Eight (88) Designated Accounts Containing Monies Traceable
to Exchanges for Controlled Substances, 740 F. Supp. 842, 844 n.2, 850-51 (S.D. Fla.
1990) [hereinafter Eighty-Eight Designated Accounts].
3. Mike McQueen, Prosecutors Face Tough Questioning on Frozen Funds, THE
MIAMI HERALD, June 9, 1990, at 4B.
4. United States v. Eighty-Eight (88) Designated Accounts Containing Monies
Traceable to Exchanges for Controlled Substances, No. 90-1203-Civ-NESBITT (S.D.
Fla. - amended Complaint filed May 21, 1990).
5. Of the 78 claimants who have settled with the government, the following chart
shows the number of claims corresponding to the percentage of funds returned:
100% 95-99% 90-94% 75-89% 66-74% 50-65 %
44 13 9 8 2 2
In addition, four accounts were forfeited in full: two were by default, in one case the
claim was withdrawn; and one forfeiture was by stipulation. Of the total $830,000
forfeited, more than half, $450,000, was by one claimant who settled with respect to
seven Miami accounts and an unknown number of New York accounts.
6. All of the cases are styled United States v. All Monies [the amount seized] In
Account No. [ ] [name of claimant]. For ease of reference, after the initial full cita-
tion, these cases will be hereinafter referred to as All Monies - [name of the claimant].
The cases were filed in Hawaii as a result of a criminal indictment concerning
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Of the $11.3 million seized from the twenty-four accounts, the federal
government has returned in excess of $9.5 million. The federal govern-
ment lost three cases on the merits, two on improper venue grounds,
and settled the remainder. The federal government was able to retain
the accounts of the drug trafficker, which it won by default.'
In 1991 alone, more than $643 million in cash and property was
"stripped from drug traffickers and other criminals" by the United
States government.8 As the claimants in the Polar Cap and All Monies
cases can testify, some of that money came from innocent owners who
succumbed to the economic reality (some would say coercion) that the
cost of litigating a civil forfeiture case can often exceed the amount at
issue. Mforeover, victory in such cases very rarely leads to the recovery
of attorney's fees. 9
drug trafficking filed in Hawaii. See United States v. Emilio Melendez-Bernal, No. 89-
00647 DAE (D. Haw. 1989). Melendez was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine
into the United States.
7. The author would like to express his appreciation to Hendrik Milne, Esquire,
for his assistance in providing information about, and unreported memorandum deci-
sions in, the All Monies cases. The statistics referred to in the text are derived from his
Reply Brief for Appellant at 15, United States v. All Monies ($572,426.63) in Account
Number 2785800-1 in the Name of Wadi Kahhat, appealfiled, Nos. 91-15847, 91-
15944, and 91-16159 (9th Cir. Feb. 19, 1992). With attorney's fees and interest, the
government may return to claimants, in the aggregate, more than 95 percent of the
amount of money it seized.
8. DEP'T OF JUSTICE ASSET FORFEITURE PROGRAM ANN. REP. 8 (Mar. 30, 1992).
The number of asset forfeitures has grown at an average annual rate of 99% since
1985. Since 1985 more than $2.4 billion ,orth of property has been forfeited. Signifi-
cantly, most of this money has been reinvested in law enforcement. Id. In other words,
those agencies involved in a forfeiture receive a portion of the proceeds. More than
$830 million in forfeited property has been shared with state and local law enforcement
agencies. Id. at Foreword. This "reinvestment' process gives an entirely new meaning
to the expression "you 'eat what you kill." Further, the inclusion of this profit like
motive calls into question the neutrality of law enforcement. No longer are police and
special agents just "doing their job." Now they are working for increased resources
including, in particular, larger budgets. See Winn, Seizures of Private Property in the
War Against Drugs: What Process is Due?, 41 Sw. L.J. 1111 , 1127-28 (1988).
9. In Operation Polar Cap, the government was ordered to pay the attorneys'
fees of one claimant under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. section 2412,
because it seized and attempted to forfeit more than $106,000 when its best argument
for probable cause entitled it to seize only $13,600. United States v. Eight-eight (88)
Designated Accounts, 740 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
In an All Monies case, thus far the government has been ordered to pay one
claimant his attorney's fees. U.S. v. All Monies ($637,944.57) in Account No. 29-
0101-62 (Abusada), No. 89-00386 DAE (D. Haw. September 11, 1991)."
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Both established and emerging legal principles are being applied to
the civil forfeiture of bank accounts pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §
881(a)(6)'0 and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A)"I with uncertain results.
Section 881(a)(6) seizures are based on allegations that a bank ac-
count, or its contents, are traceable proceeds of an exchange for narcot-
ics or were used to facilitate drug trafficking. Title 18 U.S.C. §
981(a)(l)(A) provides for seizure of monies or other property which
was involved in a money laundering transaction. 2 There are several
defenses which an owner of a bank account may interpose to recover
his seized funds. The innocent owner defense under both applicable
statutes and, in proceeds cases, the lowest intermediate balance defense
are the principle defenses.'" This article analyzes the basis for, and de-
10. Title 21 U.S.C. section 881(a)(6) (Supp. 1992) makes the following property
subject to forfeiture:
All monies, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value fur-
nished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a con-
trolled substance in violation of the subchapter, all proceeds traceable to
such an exchange, and all monies, negotiable instruments, and securities
used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of the subchapter,
except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the ex-
tent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission estab-
lished by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the
knowledge or consent of that owner.
id.
11. 18 U.S.C. section 981(a)(l)(A) (Supp. 1992) makes the following property
subject to forfeiture:
Any property, real or personal, involved in a transaction or attempted
transaction in violation of section 5313(a) or 5324 of title 31, or of section
1956 or 1957 of this title, or any property traceable to such property.
However, no property shall be seized or forfeited in the case of a violation
of section 4313(a) of title 31 by a domestic financial institution regulated
by the Securities and Exchange Commission or a partner, director or em-
ployee thereof.
id.
12. By property involved in a money laundering transaction, I refer to all four
predicate crimes in 18 U.S.C. section 981(a)(l)(A): section 1956 [money laundering],
section 1957 [engaging in monetary transactions and property derived from specified
unlawful activity], 31 U.S.C. section 5313(a) [currency transaction reporting require-
ment], and 31 U.S.C. section 5324 [prohibiting structuring transactions to evade the
reporting requirement of 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a)]. Section 981(a) also provides for the
forfeiture of property derived from many other acts including certain acts which are
violations of the law of a foreign jurisdiction. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(B),(C),(D),
and (E) (Supp. 1992).
13. Claimants to any type of property sought to be forfeited under these statutes
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fenses to, seizures of bank accounts funded with purchases of U.S. dol-
lars on the parallel markets of Latin America.
B. Procedure in Civil Forfeiture Cases
Civil forfeiture proceedings follow the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure except where they are inconsistent with the Supplemental Rules
for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims.1 4 Typically, the govern-
ment seizes a bank account, in whole or in part, with a seizure warrant
based on a verified application and later files a verified complaint for
forfeiture in rem to initiate civil forfeiture proceedings." The distin-
guishing characteristic of such a proceeding is that it is "in rem." The
defendant is the property to be forfeited, the property is the "guilty"
party.le The government may seize property without proof of the
may also raise defenses of undue delay and the property's non-involvement in the al-
leged illegal activity.
14. Title 21 U.S.C. section 881(b) and Title 18 U.S.C. section 981(d) incorpo-
rate the procedure of the customs laws. The customs laws in turn are governed by the
Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims which provide for the
application of the Rules of Civil Procedure except to the extent they are inconsistent
with the Supplemental Rules. SUPPLEMENTAL RULE A. One significant consequence of
the application of the Supplemental Rules is that the pleading requirement is more
stringent than the liberal notice pleading of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. See
SUPPLEMENTAL RULE E(2). The particularity requirement has been honored by some
courts because of the drastic consequence of the government seizing and holding prop-
erty. See United States v. $38,000 in United States Currency, 816 F.2d 1538, 1548
(I Ith Cir 1987) (government may not seize and continue to hold property upon con-
clusory allegations that defendant property is forfeitable); United States v. $39,000 in
Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1216-19 (10th Cir. 1986).
15. The other common method of seizure is when the government files a verified
complaint for forfeiture in rem and obtains an ex-parte warrant of arrest in rem simul-
taneously. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (Supp. 1991), 18 U.S.C. § 981(d) (Supp. 1991).
This article will discuss only judicial forfeitures because of the relative infrequency of
administrative forfeitures of bank accounts and the consequent lack of ability to ana-
lyze the deliberative process involved in administrative determinations. At a recent
seminar there was a discussion of a not yet implemented Department of Treasury deci-
sion to use administrative forfeiture for bank accounts of less than $500,000. If imple-
mented, this policy would move most bank account seizures into the administrative
realm.
16. See Piety, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrine
Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 911, 916-927 (1991) (explain-
ing how property can be "guilty" and a thorough critique of civil forfeiture doctrine);
Winn, supra note 8; Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspective on Deo-
dands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP
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owner's complicity in the illegal conduct subjecting the property to
forfeiture.
Civil forfeitures are hybrids of criminal, civil and admiralty prac-
tice. After the concept of guilty or tainted property, the most unusual
aspect of civil forfeiture procedure is the burden of proof structure. As
plaintiff, the government has the initial burden of demonstrating the
existence of probable cause to believe that a substantial connection ex-
ists between the property to be forfeited and the underlying criminal
activity. 17 The government's burden of proof is not to establish forfeita-
bility beyond reasonable doubt, nor by clear and convincing evidence,
nor by preponderance of the evidence. Rather, to show probable cause
to believe that property is subject to forfeiture, the government's bur-
den is less than prima facie proof, but more than mere suspicion.1 "
The nature of probable cause in civil forfeiture cases has four at-
tributes: First, it is the same legal standard as that applied in a crimi-
nal context for arrests and search and seizure warrants. 19 Second, as in
the criminal context, the government may prove probable cause using
hearsay which would be excluded by the Federal Rules of Evidence in
a typical civil case.2" Third, the court, not a jury, determines probable
cause. 2 Fourth, in determining probable cause, judges must view the
evidence not with clinical detachment, but by applying their common
sense to the realities of normal life. 22
Once the government demonstrates probable cause, the burden of
proof shifts to the claimant.23 In order to prevail, the claimant must
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property sought
to be forfeited (e.g., all or certain funds in a bank account) was not
L.Q. 169 (1973).
17. United States v. $4,255,000, 762 F.2d 895, 903 (lth Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 747 U.S. 1056 (1986).
18. Id.
19. United States v. Premises and Real Property at 4492 S. Livonia Rd., Livo-
nia, New York, 889 F.2d 1258, 1267 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017
(1991).
20. U.S. v. Property Known as 6109 Grubb Road, 886 F.2d 618, 622 (3d Cir.
1989).
21. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (Supp. 1992).
22. $4,255,000, 762 F.2d. at 904; Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir.
1985); United States v. Herzbrun, 723 F.2d 773, 775 (1 1th Cir. 1984). For example,
the Eleventh Circuit allowed, in effect, judicial notice of "the fact that Miami has
become a center for drug smuggling and money laundering." $4,255,000, 762 F.2d at
904.
23. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (Supp. 1992).
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used in violation of the applicable statute, or that he is an innocent
owner as defined in the applicable statute. 4 The claimant is entitled to
a jury trial conducted under the Federal Rules of Evidence on his af-
firmative defenses.2 5 A central feature of a parallel market bank ac-
count forfeiture case is explaining to the fact-finder the foreign client's
culture, especially the purchase of dollars on the parallel market.
II. LATIN AMERICAN PARALLEL MARKETS
A monetary parallel market 'is commonly understood to be a non-
government means of exchange of different national monies. Parallel
markets are also called black, grey and unofficial markets. The legality
of participating in a parallel market is a function of the law of the
country where the money is being traded .2  The parallel market is a
free market in the sense that one can purchase dollars at a negotiated
exchange rate, rather than at the official rate established by a foreign
government.
Money exchangers, known as cambistas in Latin America, operate
as brokers of funds, often not even taking possession of the dollars that
they sell. For example, a dollar purchaser pays his cambista local cur-
rency, check or wire transfer depending on the size of the transaction.
In return the cambista provides dollars in cash, money order, wire
transfer or check. Checks are usually from a third party with the
payee's name filled in at the time of the transaction. Wire transfers
come either from the cambista's account or directly from the account
24. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (Supp. 1992) and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2) (Supp.
1992). See United States v. One Single Family Residence, 933 F.2d 976, 979 (11th
Cir. 1991); $4,255,000, 762 F.2d at '904; United States v. One 1944 Steel Hulk
Freighter, 697 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1983).
25. See United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453, 469-71
(7th Cir. 1980) (Sprecker, J., dissenting).
26. For example, there is no prohibition under Peruvian law regarding the ex-
change of national monies. In Colombia prior to February, 1991, participation in the
parallel market was a "contravention cambiaria," a violation of the regulations gov-
erning exchange controls. Decreto 444 which established this regulation was in force
from 1967 through January, 1991. A violation of Decreto 444 was not a "delito," a
crime, and was not punishable by imprisonment. Rather, it was punishable by an ad-
ministrative sanction of forfeiture of the amount of money that was involved in the
transaction and a potential penalty of up to 200% of the amount forfeited. A person
who was sanctioned under this provision and did not pay their fine was subject to ad-
ministrative arrest and incarceration. Enforcement of this regulation was lax to say the
least. And as noted, it was repealed in February, 1991.
Fine 1131
125
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
of the person from whom he is buying dollars.2 7
The demand for dollars is fueled by individuals and businesses who
need to maintain dollar accounts for a variety of reasons. Foreign indi-
viduals and businesses have held dollar accounts in the United States
for more than a century for different reasons including personal secur-
ity (i.e., concern over the lack of confidentiality of bank records which
has led to violence, extortion and kidnapping) and preservation of
wealth (due to the lack of stability of certain banking systems, high
levels of devaluation of local currencies against the dollar, tax avoid-
ance, and the perception of better investment opportunities available in
the United States). Latin American importers have also maintained
dollar accounts in the United States for a variety of reasons including a
desire to escape the cost, delay and bureaucratic inconvenience of buy-
ing dollars from the [United States] government. Furthermore,- the
money in these accounts is used to purchase contraband products be-
cause they are unable to buy dollars from an official source for these
purchases.28 Additionally, if the rate of exchange for dollars is more
favorable on the parallel market, people could easily purchase dollars
in the official market may choose to purchase on the parallel market.
Cambistas obtain their supply of dollars from the parallel market
in the form of cash, money orders and checks (usually with the payee
left blank) and wire transfers. Their sources include tourists needing
local currency, local residents who have received funds from family
members living abroad, the return of flight capital, the under-invoicing
of merchandise legitimately imported into their country, and sellers of
contraband including coffee, gold, emeralds, cattle and, 'of course,
drugs.
27. The account from which the cambista transfers dollars must, of course, be
located in a country which permits dollar denominated deposits. Cambistas operate
from a casa de cambio (money exchange) or simply, a cambio. Often, the dollar pur-
chaser does not pay the cambista until he receives the confirmation that his bank has
received the funds.
The reported decisions on the parallel market involve exchanges of dollars for Co-
lombian pesos or Peruvian intis. See $4,255,000, 762 F.2d at 899; United States v. All
Monies ($477,048.62) in Account No. 90-3617-3, Israel Discount Bank, New York
(Leloach), 754 F. Supp. 1467 (D. Haw. 1991).
28. Such products include electronics and clothing which are imported without
being registered and, therefore, without paying taxes or tariffs.
1132 [Vol.. 16
126
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss3/18
1992]
III. APPLICATION OF CIVIL FORFEITURE STATUTES TO
DOMESTIC BANK ACCOUNTS
The civil forfeiture provisions of the Controlled Substance Act29
were amended in 1978 to include forfeiture of proceeds of illegal drug
transactions.3 0 The purpose of the amendment, codified at 21 U.S.C. §
881(a)(6), was to strengthen the attack on drug traffickers by confis-
cating their profits. 1
Bank accounts are subject to the risk of seizure when the United
States government believes they are sufficiently related to drug traffick-
ing or money laundering.32 In the simplest proceeds case, the govern-
ment may develop proof that a drug seller uses a bank account strictly
for the deposit of dollars earned in drug sales. The government can also
trace the proceeds if they are transferred to another account. The first
account, the account into which the funds obtained in exchange for the
drugs were placed, is called either a "primary" or a "direct recipient"
account. The account which receives the transfer of funds is called the
"secondary" or "indirect recipient" account. Under the above scenario
the direct recipient account would be subject to forfeiture as proceeds
traceable to an exchange for a controlled substance."3
As for the secondary account, the amount seizable " is equal to the
amount of money transferred into it from the direct recipient account,
or its account balance at the time of seizure, whichever is lower. These
29. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 853
(1970).
30. Comprehensive .Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. 95-633, 92
Stat. 3777 (1978).
31. See 124 CONG. REC. S23055-56 (1978) (comments of Senators Nunn and
Culver).
32. In particular, the dollars must be proceeds traceable to drug violations, used
to facilitate the violations, constitute property involved in money laundering transac-
tions or any property traceable to such money laundering property.
33. 21 U.S.C. section 881(a)(6) (Supp. 1992). Depending on the nature in which
the deposits to the direct recipient account were made (e.g., repeated cash deposits in
amounts less than $10,000 with intent to avoid the filing of currency transaction re-
ports) 18 U.S.C. section 981(a)(l)(A) (Supp. 1992) would also subject the direct re-
cipient account to forfeiture through the incorporation of 31 U.S.C. section 5324
(Supp. 1992) (structuring).
34. "Seizable" is used herein to denote the government's presumptive ability to
seize the asset and subject it to forfeiture proceedings. Since a claimant does not have
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funds are seizable regardless of the secondary account owner's lack of
participation in, or even lack of knowledge of, the criminal activity
leading to the deposits into the direct recipient account.
A. Traceable Proceeds or "Follow the Dirty Money" 5
If a drug seller uses the cash he obtained in an exchange for drugs
to purchase a car, the car is seizable. Likewise, if he writes a check
from his account (the contents of which are exclusively proceeds of
drug transactions) to purchase a car, that car is also seizable as a pro-
ceed traceable to the original exchange for drugs.3 6 The federal govern-
ment may seize assets which are far removed in time, place and nature
from the original consideration earned from the illicit drug sale, pro-
vided it can trace the asset seized to the drug violations.3 7 In the con-
text of bank accounts, the government can also seize funds that have
been transferred through numerous bank accounts so long as the funds
seized are, in fact, traceable to drug violations. The government must
35. Although this traceable proceeds section discusses money earned from drug
sales, all of the principles discussed are equally applicable to money derived in violation
of one of the four predicate statutes enumerated in 18 U.S.C. section 981(a)(I)(A)
(Supp. 1992). That is to say, since the enactment of section 981(a)(1)(A), a broad
range of assorted criminal activity independent of narcotics may provide the initial
funds which may be traced and seized.
36. By the same token, the cash or funds used to pay for the asset purchased by
the drug dealer is also seizable. There is a debate concerning whether or not the gov-
ernment could forfeit both the cash and the asset purchased with the cash. See
$4,255,000, 762 F.2d at 905; United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154,
1161 (2d Cir. 1986).
37. See Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles 11 and 11, Psychotropic Sub-
stances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9518, 9522;
Banco Cafetero, 797 F.2d at 1158.
The government is not entitled, however, to seize bank accounts when it cannot
trace tainted funds into them. Although this proposition should be self-evident, in at
least three of the All Monies cases: All Monies (Abusada), supra note 9; All Monies
(Kahhat), No. CV-89-00687-HMF (D. Haw.); and United States v. All Monies
($76,285.91) in Account No. 95-6, in the Name of Henry Feiger, Civ. No. 89-00471-
HMF (D. Haw); the government did just that. The government claimed that there was
a connection between the defendant accounts and a money laundering operation based
on tenuous evidence which did not include the tracing of even a dollar from the money
laundering ring to the defendant accounts. See All Monies (Abusada), 746 F. Supp. at
1438; All Monies (Fieger), supra this note (March 5, 1990 - claimant's motion for
summary judgment on probable cause granted), set aside, (August 7, 1990 - granting
motion to dismiss on venue grounds); All Monies (Kahhat), supra this note (August 8,
1990 - summary judgment granted on reconsideration).
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have probable cause to connect the property with narcotics activity, but
it need not link the property to a specific transaction. 38 The government
does, however, have the burden of tracing a specific amount of money
into a secondary account it seizes. 39
If money is transferred from a secondary account after it receives
tainted funds, how can the funds traceable to those deposits be identi-
fied? The nature of the proof necessary for tracing has been the subject
of a limited number of reported decisions. The seminal case in this
area, United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama,40 adopted trust ac-
counting principles to analyze whether the funds seized by the govern-
ment were properly traceable to an exchange for narcotics in a section
881(a)(6) case. The court approved two approaches to determine
whether an account contained traceable proceeds: "drugs-in, last-out,"
38. See, e.g., $4,255,000, 762 F.2d at 903-04; Banco Cafetero, 979 F.2d at 1160.
Examine the government's burden: it must only show probable cause, that is less than
prima facie proof, to believe that a substantial connection exists between the property
to be forfeited and the applicable criminal activity without even having to prove any
specific drug violations and the government may prove probable cause with hearsay.
Even calling it a burden seems a misnomer.
39. United States v. William Savran & Associate, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1165, 1183
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (before the burden shifts to a claimant to show which funds in the
account were clean funds "the government must first demonstrate that a precise
amount of proceeds from the fraudulent scheme were deposited in a specific bank ac-
counts which also contained untainted funds ....") (emphasis in original) (citing D.
Smith, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES, $ 4.03(4)(d) (1991)). Con-
tra United States v. All Funds and Other Prop., Acct. No. 031-217362, 661 F. Supp.
697, 700-701 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (claimants consisted of a felon convicted of laundering
in excess of $ 50,000,000, two corporations which he controlled and used in his money
laundering operation and another individual as receiver of the same company's assets;
probable cause for forfeiture of the accounts because of vast nature of money launder-
ing operation, no proof required as to any particular amount of money or account,
burden placed on claimants to show that funds were not drug proceeds). This court
cited Banco Cafetero Panama for placing the tracing burden on the claimants by selec-
tively quoting the decision: "The risk of uncertainty in determining the traceability of
[the money linked to drugs] is placed squarely on the claimant." Id. at 701 (citing
Banco Cafetero, 797 F.2d at 1161). However, the full sentence from Banco Cafetero is:
"Under the Congressional scheme, the risk of uncertainty in determining the traceabil-
ity of proceeds of drug sales is placed squarely on the claimant, once probable has been
established." Banco Cafetero, 797 F.2d at 1161. Moreover, in Banco Cafetero the gov-
ernment had traced specific amounts of drug money into the accounts and was resolv-
ing the issue of who bore the burden of distinguishing clean funds from dirty funds
after the government proved how much money in the accounts was dirty and there
were intervening transfers.
40. 797 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1986).
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or "drugs-in, first-out."'" Since the enactment of section 981(a)(1)(A),
these approaches could be rephrased as "tainted money in - last out" or
"tainted money in - first out." These approaches are employed when a
tainted deposit cannot be closely matched with a tainted withdrawal.42
Assume $25,000 of proceeds of drug transactions withdrawn from
an account owned by a drug trafficker is used to purchase a car. The
car dealer then deposits the $25,000 into his dealership's account which
contained $100,000 in clean money at the time of the tainted deposit.
1. If there are no intervening transactions in the car dealership's
bank account between the deposit of the $25,000 and when the govern-
ment comes knocking, $25,000 from that account is seizable; 43
2. If the only transaction after the tainted deposit is the car deal-
ership's transfer of $10,000 out of its operating account to open a time
deposit, the government may seize $15,000 from the operating account
and the entire time deposit under the tainted money-in, first-out ap-
proach or, the government could seize $25,000 from the operating ac-
count under the tainted money-in, last-out approach; and
3. If the only transaction after the tainted deposit is the dealer-
ship's transfer of $120,000 from its operating account to open a time
deposit, the government may seize $25,000 from the time deposit under
the tainted money-in, first-out approach or the $5,000 balance remain-
ing in the operating account and $20,000 from the time deposit under
the tainted money-in, last-out approach.
An important limitation on the government's ability to seize funds
from a secondary account is known as the lowest intermediate balance
rule.44 Under this rule, no matter how much tainted money is put into
the account if, after the last tainted deposit, the account balance goes
to zero and then is brought back to a positive balance with clean funds
prior to the government's seizure of the account, no funds in the ac-
41. Id. at 1159. Banco Cafetero also discussed the accounting principle using a
pro rata share method which would taint that portion of any withdrawal corresponding
to the ratio of the amount of the tainted deposit to the funds in the account immedi-
ately after the deposit. Id. The pro rata share method was neither approved nor disap-
proved by the court.
42. Banco Cafetero assumes that if a tainted deposit can be precisely matched to
a withdrawal then that withdrawal is presumptively tainted and vice-versa. In such
instances there is no need to resort accounting principles.
43. Under a version of the facilitation theory in use by the government today and
approved by one federal judge, the government could seize and seek forfeiture of the
entire $125,000. See infra text accompanying notes 70-79.
44. Banco Cafetero, 792 F.2d at 1159.
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count are traceable proceeds. In other words, the lowest balance after
the last tainted deposit and before the seizure of the account will be the
most money the government could prove is traceable to an illegal
transaction.
Although no published opinion has applied the lowest intermediate
balance to limit the amount of forfeitable funds to something less than
a tainted deposit, numerous unreported decisions and settlements have
been based on the lowest intermediate balance rule."5 This rule is
viewed as an affirmative defense to a seizure because it is used to rebut
the government's claim to have seized tainted funds. The claimant al-
ways has the right to prove that the government was simply wrong and
that the funds seized are not tainted. The lowest intermediate balance
rule provides the claimant with one very straight forward way of limit-
ing the amount of forfeitable funds.
In situations where the government has not had access to the ac-
count records prior to seizure, this burden is appropriately placed on
the claimant.' 6 However, if the government has in fact had access to
the account's records demonstrating the lowest intermediate balance
defense prior to seizure, the claimant will be able to show that the gov-
ernment did not have probable cause to seize any funds in excess of the
lowest intermediate balance.' 7 Likewise, if the government purports to
have traced funds from a direct recipient account through one or more
indirect recipient accounts prior to the deposit into the claimant's ac-
count, then the government, in order to show probable cause to seize
funds from the claimant's account, should have the burden of establish-
45. In United States v. Proceeds Deposited in Account No. 01008054, Bank of
Credit and Commerce International, No. 88-1581-Civ-T13(C) (M.D. Fla. February 8,
1990) (granting summary judgment in favor of the claimant on the basis that a nega-
tive balance in the interim between the deposit of the tainted funds and the govern-
ment's seizure of the account was proof that none of the funds in the defendant account
at the time of the seizure were tainted proceeds; $400,000 was returned to the
claimant).
This author is personally familiar with dozens of cases which have been settled by
applying the lowest intermediate balance theory to the facts alleged by the government.
Often this leads to the return of all or all but a small portion of the funds in an ac-
count. For example, in Eight-eight (88) Designated Accounts, supra note 3, at least
thirty-two claims were resolved by agreement based on the application of the lowest
intermediate balance rule returning $1,912,084.08 to the claimants.
46. See, e.g., Banco Cafetero, 797 F.2d at 1161.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Gavilan, 849 F.2d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 1988)
(allowing award of attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access Justice Act (EAJA),
28 U.S.C. section 2412, where the government knew of clear affirmative defense).
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ing that the funds actually deposited in the claimant's account were
tainted under the applicable tracing rules including lowest intermediate
balance. After all, it is the government, not the claimant, who has ac-
cess to the account records of the intervening accounts prior to the
seizure."'
B. Facilitation, or "Follow the Dirty Money and Watch It
Grow"
Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) any money used or intended to be
used to facilitate any violation of the Controlled Substances Act is sub-
ject to forfeiture. The sole reported decision concerning facilitation in a
§ 881(a)(6) bank account seizure, United States v. All Monies
($477,048.62) in Account No. 90-3617-3 (Leloach),"9 found that prop-
erty was "used to facilitate" if it made "the underlying criminal activ-
ity less difficult or more or less free from obstruction or hinderance."50
The court also found that the connection between the property to be
forfeited and the illegal activity must be "substantial," that is, more
than incidental or fortuitous, but not necessarily indispensable to the
commission of the offense.5 1
48. Indeed, if the records of such intervening transfers are available to the gov-
ernment for tracing purposes, the records of the account balances should also be availa-
ble. In such a case, the government's failure to apply the lowest intermediate balance
rule, if appropriate, to limit the amount eventually seized, could subject the govern-
ment to sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure II for failure to conduct a
reasonable inquiry into the facts giving rise to probable cause. Recovery for a claimant
in such circumstances might also be available under EAJA, or if the government fails
to obtain a certificate of reasonable cause (28 U.S.C. § 2465).
49. 754 F. Supp. 1467 (D. Haw. 1991).
50. Id. at 1473 (citing United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 990 (4th Cir.
1990)).
51. Id. (citing Schifferli, 895 F.2d at 989-90 and United States v. Premises
Known as 3639-2nd Street, N.E., 869 F.2d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 1989). In Schifferli, a
dentist's office was forfeited pursuant to 21 U.S.C. section 881(a)(7) which provides
that all real property which is used to commit or to facilitate the commission of a
violation of the Controlled Substances Act is forfeitable. The dentist was convicted of
writing illegal prescriptions and his office was forfeited because it made it easier for
him to hold himself out as a person authorized to write prescriptions. Schifferli, 895
F.2d at 991.
In United States v. Rivera, 884 F.2d 544 (1 1th Cir. 1989), the government sought
criminal forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C. section 853(a)(2) of a ranch and all of the
assets associated with it on the basis that the rancher used his ranch as a cover for a
heroin distribution business. The rancher was convicted and the jury found that his
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In All Monies (Leloach), the claimant, Henry Leloach, was a
cambista in Peru who used the defendant account both to receive dol-
lars sent by his customers purchasing intis, and to send dollars to his
customers purchasing dollars. At the time of seizure approximately
one-half of the funds in the defendant account were proceeds directly
traceable to the bank account of a narcotics trafficker containing the
proceeds of his crimes. The government was able to establish probable
cause for forfeiture of the entire account using the facilitation theory
based on the following facts:
1. Melendez, a man convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine into
the United States, identified the defendant account as one that he
"controlled.15 2 Melendez was a partner in Dirimex, another Peruvian
casa de cambio,
twenty-seven quarter horses were used to facilitate his drug trafficking but, interest-
ingly, rejected the government's contention that the ranch was also used to facilitate
the crimes. Id. at 546. The rancher used the ranch's telephone to transact most of his
drug business and tape recordings of those telephone conversations revealed that he
bought and distributed heroin using code words, the same words that he used to con-
duct his horse breeding business: "horses," "halters," "bails of hay," and "lead lines."
Id.
There are numerous decisions upholding the forfeiture of conveyances, usually
automobiles, on the basis of their facilitation of the narcotics transaction even though
their involvement was indirect. See, e.g., United States v. One 1977 Lincoln V Coupe,
643 F.2d 154, 157 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981) (automobile forfeitable
because its presence "with its hood up" provided a convenient cover whereas two men
alone in an alley might have appeared suspicious); United States v. One 1968 Ford
LTD Four Door, 425 F.2d 1084, 1085 (5th Cir. 1970) (car forfeitable because it ran
interference for fleeing felons); United States v. 1980 BMW 3201, 559 F. Supp. 382,
385 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (car forfeitable because it provided a means of surveillance, was
the look-out car); United States v. One Mercury Cougar XR-7, 666 F.2d 228, 230 (5th
Cir. 1982) (car forfeitable because it laid the groundwork for the illegal activity by
transporting the participants to search for a landing strip and storage building for the
marijuana to be received).
Title 21 U.S.C. sections 881(a)(4) and (a)(7), however, have broader facilitation
language than that found in sections 881(a)(6) or 18 U.S.C. section 981(a)(l)(A).
Section 881 (a)(4), after referring to the property to be forfeited states "which are used,
or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation,
sale, .... " and section 881(a)(7) states "which is used, or intended to be used in any
manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of .... " (emphasis
added). Neither section 881(a)(6) nor section 981(a)(l(A) contain the "in any man-
ner" broadening provision. Since these three subsections are all part of the same stat-
ute, and indeed the same paragraph, section 881 (a), it must be presumed that Congress
intended that they be treated differently.
52. All Monies (Leloach), 754 F. Supp. at 1475.
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2. Dirimex transferred funds into Leloach's account 38 times from
1987 through May 4, 1989 - only 23 days before the account was
seized. 3 $2,500,000 were tainted. The $2,500,000 laundered through
the defendant account was more than five times the amount actually
seized.""
3. Leloach used his account to transfer money not only to his cus-
tomers, but also to Dirimex's customers pursuant to the instructions of
Melendez and Melendez's associates at Dirimex.55 In fact, various de-
posits to and disbursements from Leloach's account had Melendez's
handwritten name entered by either the claimant or one of his employ-
ees. The claimant could not explain why Melendez's name was written
in his records and, in fact, contended that he dealt directly with an-
other person at Dirimex.5"
Based on the above facts, the court granted the government's mo-
tion for summary judgment on probable cause for forfeiture of the en-
tire account based on the facilitation theory under both 21 U.S.C. §
881(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A). The court's discussion of the
factual basis for probable cause concerned exclusively the use of the
account to facilitate money laundering rather than drug trafficking. 57
The court did not distinguish between the nature of the underlying
criminal activity which must be facilitated in order to forfeit the ac-
count and did not attempt to explain how the account facilitated a vio-
lation of the drug laws as opposed to the money laundering laws. 58
What was the substantial connection between the portion of the
account which was not traceable to a narcotics transactions and the
narcotics transactions themselves? How did the clean money in the ac-
count make the underlying drug sales activity less difficult, less ob-
53. Id. at 1476. Leloach's records indicated, and apparently the government did
not contest, that out of approximately 370 deposits into his account in 1988 and 1989,
only 34 came from Dirimex. Id. at 1481. Since Dirimex was also a cambio and cambios
broker funds, the fact that the funds "came" from Dirimex does not mean they came
from an account titled Dirimex's name. The nature of the government's proof was not
that all of Dirimex's money was dirty, but rather that, on occasions, Dirimex brokered
funds supplied by Melendez. Further, many of the 34 deposits came from accounts
which the government did not seek to prove were affiliated with drug trafficking.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1474.
56. Id.
57. All Monies (Leloach), 754 F. Supp. at 1473-76.
58. Although unstated, the court appears to have concluded that if an account is
used to facilitate the laundering of drug proceeds it, ipsofacto, facilitates the underly-
ing drug crimes. The validity of this assumption is less than obvious.
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structed or less hindered? A possible answer may be found in the
court's conclusion that the account "provided a repository for the drug
proceeds in which the legitimate money could provide a 'cover' for
those proceeds, thus making it more difficult to trace the proceeds." 5
This answer, however, merely assumes that post-facto laundering of
drug proceeds facilitates the underlying crime itself. This conclusion is
not self-evident, especially in light of the other laws specifically
criminalizing such laundering activity (e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957)
and making such property forfeitable (e.g., § 981(a)(1)(A)).
All Monies (Leloach) is also significant because it is the first re-
ported decision finding that section 981(a)(1)(A) reaches property,
such as a bank account, which facilitates a violation of the predicate
statutes.60 Section 981(a)(1)(A) does not contain the word "facilitate."
Rather it makes forfeitable any property "involved" in a transaction or
attempted transaction in violation of the predicate acts. To graft the
facilitation theory onto section 981(a)(1)(A), the court looked to the
clear legislative intent "to include the money or other property laun-
dered (the corpus), any commissions or fees paid to the launderer, and
any property used to facilitate the laundering offense." 1
The' seizure of bank accounts based on allegations of money laun-
dering facilitation has been addressed in only one other reported deci-
59. Id. at 1475-76. Tracing the proceeds, however, does not make the actual
drug sales, the underlying criminal activity, less difficult, less obstructed or less hin-
dered. The difference between the nature of the criminal activities which must be facil-
itated under section 881(a)(6) and section 981(a)(l)(A) is one which received no at-
tention in All Monies (Leloach), probably because there was also a section
981(a)(I)(A) forfeiture claim. In any bank account case involving only a section
881(a)(6) seizure, this could be a critical distinction. However, since the enactment of
section 981(a)(I)(A) and in its revision in 1988, there is unlikely to be a bank account
seizure involving only section 881(a)(6).
60. Id. at 1473. Apparently, the first decision interpreting section 981(a)(1)(A)
to include facilitation is United States v. Real Property Including any Building Appur-
tenances and Improvement Thereon Located at 4643 W. Kennedy Boulevard, 1990
WL 305391 (M.D. Fla. February 12, 1990). The court denied emergency motions for
the return of property seized pursuant to section 981(a)(l)(A). The claimants argued
that seizure under section 981(a)(1)(A) was limited to the corpus, the amount actually
laundered, in this case $25,000, rather than the real estate and liquor licenses, in effect
the businesses of the claimants. The court upheld the seizure of the businesses based on
the legislative history authorizing seizure of property used to facilitate the laundering
offense. Id.
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sion.62 In United States v. Certain Funds on Deposit in Account No.
01-0-71417, (Certain Funds) the government sought forfeiture of sev-
eral accounts under the direct control of alleged participants in a
scheme to illegally obtain credit union funds. 63 The account owners
transferred the tainted funds into the defendant accounts which had
previously contained only clean money.64 The claimants argued that the
government could seize only the amount that was traceable to the al-
leged illegal activity.6 5 The court rejected that argument, adopting the
government's contention that "limiting the forfeiture of funds under
the circumstances to the proceeds of the initial fraudulent activity
would effectively undermine the purpose of [section 981(a)(1)(A)]." 66
The court cited All Monies (Leloach) and held that clean money which
facilitated the money laundering was forfeitable: "[c]riminal activity
such as money laundering largely depends upon the use of legitimate
monies to advance or facilitate the scheme. It is precisely the commin-
gling of tainted funds with legitimate money that facilitates the laun-
dering and enables it to continue."67
Although no reported decisions other than All Monies (Leloach)
have addressed the facilitation argument in the context of bank ac-
counts which received money from parallel market purchases, there are
two unreported decisions addressing this point.68 Unlike All Monies
(Leloach), Certain Funds and United States v. Real Property Located
at 4643 W. Kennedy Blvd.,69 these two cases do not involve allegations
that the owners of the account were knowing participants in the under-
lying criminal activity.
In United States v. Security Pacific Int'l Bank Account No.
13934, the government seized a money market account with an approx-
62. United States v. Certain Funds on Deposit in Account No. 01-0-71417, 769
F. Supp. 80 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) [hereinafter Certain Funds].
63. Id. at 81-83.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 83.
66. Id. at 84.
67. Certain Funds, 769 F. Supp. at 84-85.
68. United States v. Security Pacific Int'l Bank Account No. 13934, No. 90-
2222-Civ-MARCUS (S.D. Fla. April 25, 1991); United States v. Certain Accounts,
Together with All Monies on Deposit Therein, No. 91-1018-Civ-KING (S.D. Fla. Feb-
ruary 21, 1992).
69. United States v. Certain Real Property Including Any Building Appurte-
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imate balance of $39,700 and a time deposit with an approximate bal-
ance of $740,000 after the claimant attempted to deposit 76 money
orders totalling $40,000 into a prior money market account. 70 He pur-
chased the money orders from a cambista in Barranquilla, Colombia.
His bank refused the deposit, in part because many of the money or-
ders were sequentially numbered. Pursuant to the claimant's request,
the bank returned the money orders and he sought a refund from the
cambista. The claimant returned the money orders to his cambista for
two refund checks which he deposited into his account. They were re-
turned unpaid. Approximately one month later, the claimant ex-
changed the two unpaid refund checks for five personal checks totalling
$39,000 from an associate of the cambista and deposited them into his
money market account. After the deposit of the five checks but before
the seizure, the claimant closed the account, opened a new money mar-
ket account, and transferred the contents of the former to the latter. 71
The court found that the following facts offered by the government
established probable cause to believe that the new money market ac-
count and the time deposit were used to facilitate money laundering
and structuring:
1. The cambista used by the claimant was involved in money laun-
dering. The seventy-six money orders originally intended for deposit
into the claimant's account were later sent for deposit to a bank in
New York by "criminal cohorts" of the "extensive money laundering
organization" who "whited-out" Security Pacific as the payee. a
2. The claimant's money market account automatically shifted its
contents into a time deposit at prearranged intervals so that interest
would accumulate at a higher rate and at the expiration of the time
deposit its contents were returned to the money market account.73
3. The IRS determined after the seizure of the accounts that the
associate of the cambista who gave the claimant the five checks for
$39,000 had other bank accounts which contained the proceeds of
structured activity74 and that the accounts contained three deposits to-
70. Order Denying Claimant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Security Pacific
Int'l Bank Account No. 13934, No. 90-2222-Civ-MARCUS (S.D. Fla. April 25, 1991)
(all the money orders were for amounts less than $10,000) [hereinafter Security
Pacific].
71. Id.
72. Id. at 10.
73. Id. at 11.
74. Id. The opinion is not clear but seems to indicate that the five checks actually
deposited in the claimant's account were not drawn from the bank accounts containing
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tailing $63,000 from Miami bank accounts of another individual in-
volved in the money laundering scheme."
In denying the claimant's motion for summary judgment because
there was a real dispute as to whether there was probable cause at the
time of the seizure, the court reasoned as follows:
The defendant accounts are property traceable to the scheme be-
cause of the attempted deposit of the seventy-six money orders with
Merlano's account number on the back. Additionally, Merlano has
apparently admitted that although the money orders were not de-
posited, he was able to "cash" the money orders with Mr. Logreira
[the man who gave him the five checks for $39,000 in exchange for
the two NSF checks from the cambista]. Further, the government
asserts, the bank accounts were roll over accounts directly tracea-
ble to the account into which the seventy-six money orders were to
be deposited. Based on these asserted facts, the government argues
that claimant's motion for summary judgment should be denied...
We agree .7
This decision is not carefully reasoned. Merlano's attempt to de-
posit the seventy-six money orders does not violate any predicate act
leading to forfeiture since there was no evidence that he acted with the
intent to launder the structuring proceeds. In fact, the government
agent testified that he had no knowledge or reason to believe that
Merlano was part of the "extensive money laundering organization" or
that he participated in "whiting-out" the money orders. 77 This admis-
sion alone should have deflated the facilitation claim.
Even assuming the cambista had the intent to launder funds when
she sold the money orders to Merlano, neither Merlano's original
money market account nor the funds contained therein were property
involved in an attempted money laundering transaction as a result of
the failed deposit. The cambista did not know the account the money
orders were going to be deposited into nor how much money was in
that account. What the court failed to take into account was that prop-
erty, in order to become tainted, must be used in an illicit manner by
proceeds of structured activity.
75. Security Pacific, No. 90-2222-Civ-MARCUS at 11-12. See also Supplemen-
tal Response to Claimants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 13, Security Pacific,
(March 5, 1991) and Reference No. 218199-005348 and the contents thereof (listing
the Castro amounts).
76. Security Pacific, No. 90-2222-Civ-MARCUS at 14.
77. Id. at 8.
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someone who has control of it. Although a person without wrongful
intent can have his property seized as traceable proceeds of property
which has been tainted by someone else, no other person can place a
taint on his previously clean property. The only property involved in an
attempted transaction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and, therefore,
subject to forfeiture, were the money orders themselves. If they had
been deposited into the account, the funds corresponding to their value
would have been seizable as traceable proceeds. However, the remain-
ing funds in the account would not have been seizable.
The court relied on information acquired post-seizure that
Merlano deposited the $39,000 arguably traceable to the attempted de-
posit and erroneously concluded that both of the "accounts [the new
money market and the time deposit - approximately $800,000] are
property traceable to the scheme .... -7" Based on the evidence avail-
able at the time of the seizure concerning the failed deposit of the
money orders and their ultimate attempted re-deposit, the government
did not have probable cause to seize anything. The seizure of the ac-
counts was, therefore, unlawful.7 9 Only $39,000 was properly traceable
to the new money market account. Funds are traceable only if, in fact,
they are transferred. Without Merlano's intent to launder the money,
the failed deposit does not lead to any traceable proceeds.8 0
Moreover, the only taint as to the $39,000 provided by Logreira in
the form of five checks, was that they were exchanged for two NSF
checks which were in turn exchanged for the seventy-six money orders.
78. Id. at 14.
79. The evidence concerning the actual deposit of the $39,000 was volunteered
by the claimant in an attempt to have his account freed. In addition, the evidence
regarding the other three deposits, which the government also contended were structur-
ing proceeds, came as a result of discovery during the case. Since all of the evidence
regarding money being rolled over or deposited into the accounts came as a result of an
unlawful seizure the evidence should have been suppressed. Since it was the only evi-
dence which would have supported seizure of any funds in the account, all of the funds
should have been released. See United States v. Six Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand,
Five Hundred Fifty-Eight Dollars ($639,558) in U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d 712 (D.C.
Cir. 1992); United States v. One 1985 Cadillac Seville, 866 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir.
1989); United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d 444, 450 (9th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Certain Real Property on Hanson Brook, 770 F. Supp. 722 (D. Maine
1991); United States v. Leslie, 598 F. Supp. 254 (D. Vermont 1984).
80. The government used the facilitation argument in the previous cases to seize
an entire account where there was proof the account holder intentionally deposited
tainted funds for the purpose of commingling them with clean money and thereby fur-
thering the laundering activity. See supra text accompanying notes 36-56.
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Once the money orders were exchanged for the two NSF checks and
certainly by the time the two NSF checks were exchanged for the five
clean checks,81 the funds were, at most, property traceable to property
involved in an attempted structuring transaction rather than the prop-
erty involved in the attempted structuring violation itself. To conclude
that after several exchanges the five checks were still property involved
in the underlying attempted transaction, rather than merely property
traceable to such property, stretches the facilitation theory beyond the
breaking point. It would subject to seizure the full contents of the ac-
count into which the tainted funds were deposited and then all of the
funds in every subsequent account into which any funds from that first
account were deposited. The Security Pacific court applied the facilita-
tion theory in such a way that if a single tainted dollar can be traced
into an account, the entire account is seizable and every time a dollar
leaves that account it infects all of the funds in all future transferee
accounts, etc.82 This absurd result is a consequence of the court's fail-
ure to limit the facilitation theory to accounts under the control of a
wrongdoer.
A recent unreported decision which does a better job of parsing
the complicated provisions of section 981 (a)(1)(A) is United States v.
Certain Accounts, Together with All Monies on Deposit Therein. 3
The district court granted various claimants' motions to dismiss the
government's verified complaint based on facts similar to those present
in Security Pacific. In Certain Accounts, the government sought the
81. The fact that the remitter of the five checks also had bank accounts, other
than the one from which he drew the five checks, which contained proceeds of struc-
tured activity, may make the five checks suspicious but it certainly does not give rise to
probable cause to believe that they are also proceeds of structured activity.
If, as the opinion implies but does not make clear, the claimants' new money mar-
ket account received deposits directly from other accounts containing the proceeds of
structured activity, then it would be subject to forfeiture but only to the extent of the
amount of the deposits. The only basis for seizure of the entire $740,000 in the time
deposit would have been if the deposits to the money market account traceable to the
structured activity totalled $800,000 and all of those funds were transferred from the
money market account to the time deposit prior to seizure.
This case was settled with the claimant forfeiting $125,000 approximately
$900,000 (with interest). The amount forfeited is roughly the amount of all the argua-
bly traceable deposits plus interest.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Pole No. 3172, Hopkinton, 852 F.2d 636, 639 (1st
Cir. 1988) ("forfeitability does not spread like a disease from one infected mortgage
payment to the entire interest in the property acquired prior to the payment").
83. No. 91-1018-Civ-KING (S.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 1992).
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forfeiture of entire account balances of thirty-one Miami bank ac-
counts, twenty-seven of which, the "indirect recipient" accounts, had
received funds from the other four and from an unidentified number of
New York "direct recipient" accounts into which structured deposits
were placed. Checks drawn on the direct recipient accounts were signed
by the account-holder in blank and transported to Medellin, Colombia
and Caracas, Venezuela where they were subsequently made payable
to the claimants of the indirect recipient accounts and deposited into
their accounts. 4
The court held that the entire balance of the direct recipient ac-
counts was property "involved in" the crime of money laundering and,
therefore, subject to forfeiture. Secondly, the court found that the
checks written on the direct recipient accounts were property "tracea-
ble to" property "involved in" money laundering.85 The court, however,
rejected the effort to forfeit the entire balances in the indirect recipient
accounts, rather than just the amounts traceable to the direct recipient
accounts. The government argued that the entire contents of the indi-
rect recipient accounts were property involved in money laundering be-
cause they were facilitating the concealment of the tainted one. The
court characterized the argument as creating a syllogism under which a
tainted deposit from direct recipient account would subject all the
funds in the indirect recipient accounts, and any subsequent accounts
into which they were transferred, to forfeiture. Under the theory pro-
posed by the government, no separate showing of "taint," i.e., intent to
launder money, other than the mere tracing of tainted funds would be
required to seize the entire balance in the indirect recipient account. 6
As the court observed:
Like a contagious disease, each direct account could contaminate
any account that had dealings with it. The indirect accounts could
then conceivably pass on the infection to other accounts, and so
forth ad infinitum. The outer limits of this theory would be
bounded only by Plaintiff's imagination.
This court rejects such a theory. The government's argument here
would stretch facilitation theory - itself something of a bootstrap
- to the breaking point. As the account in question becomes more
distant from the initial illegal transaction, so too does probable
cause to forfeit become more attenuated. This court holds that the
84, Id. at 3.
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government must allege facts other than the mere tracing of checks
written against a suspect account. Under the Supplemental Rules,
therefore, additional facts that give rise to the requisite "reasonable
belief" that there is "substantial connection" to money laundering
must be pled with particularity. A contrary rule would yield unten-
able results.8 7
During oral argument on the motions to dismiss, the court posed a hy-
pothetical question: "If money from demonstrably dirty accounts was
used to make unsolicited $50 donations to Miami police officers, would
the government have probable cause to seize the entire balances of all
of those officers' accounts?"88 The government responded affirmatively
citing as safeguards to an unjust result its discretion in bringing the
suit and the innocent owner defense. The court noted that these safe-
guards were inadequate stating "[t]he Supplemental Rules guarantee
protection above and beyond plaintiff's good judgment, however well
intentioned it may be."89 As alluded to by the government in Certain
Accounts, the claimant's ultimate defense is innocent ownership.90
C. Innocent Ownership
Claimants to property seized under sections 881(a)(6) or
87. Id. at 13-14 (emphasis in original). In a footnote the court added: "This
holding does not mean that money launderers may insulate themselves from the forfei-
ture laws by adding more layers to their financial network. The court simply holds that
the government must provide some reasonable basis to conclude that probable cause
can be shown as to each layer at trial, without sole reliance on the fact of transfer from
one account to another." Id. at 14 n.11.
88. Certain Account, No. 91-1018-Civ-KING at 14 n.12 (summarizing the hypo-
thetical question which is paraphrased based on the recollection of the several observers
present at hearing).
89. Id. The court dismissed the complaint as to the entire balance of all the
indirect recipient accounts with leave to amend. The government then attempted to
settle some of the twenty-seven cases on the basis that the amount it could trace into
the indirect recipient accounts would be forfeited and the balance would be returned
with interest. For the claims it did not settle, the government filed new complaints
against only the traceable amounts, or where it had some evidence of facilitation, it
filed against the entire account balances.
90. There are those who have not derived much comfort from this safeguard
since it places the burden on the claimant to prove a negative, that she did not know
the funds were derived from drug trafficking or one of the other specified predicate
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981(a)(1)(A) may defeat forfeiture if they prove not just that they are
innocent of the underlying crime but also that their ownership of the
seized property is innocent. This section attempts to explain how a per-
son wholly innocent of any predicate act under section 881(a)(6) or
section 981(a)(1)(A) might fail to qualify as an innocent owner.
Under section 881(a)(6) no property shall be forfeited "by reason
of an), act or omission established by [its] owner to have been commit-
ted or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner." This
innocent owner provision was enacted to clarify the "original language
which could have been construed to reach properties traceable to the
illegal proceeds but obtained by an innocent party without knowledge
of the matter in which the proceeds were obtained."9 The legislative
intent was further clarified by Senator Culver who said it was written
"in order to protect the individual who obtains ownership of proceeds
with no knowledge of the illegal transaction." ' Section 981(a)(2) pro-
vides the same innocent owner defense as section 881(a)(6) except that
it is limited to the claimant's lack of knowledge, making no provision
for lack of consent."3 Section 981(a)(2) has not been construed by a
circuit court of appeals and has no legislative history. Therefore, the
innocent owner provisions are not discussed separately below because
there is no analytical basis to distinguish section 981(a)(2) from the
knowledge component of section 881(a)(6).
Despite the relatively straight forward language used in the stat-
utes and the statement of purpose in the legislative history, the circuit
courts of appeal do not appear to agree on the nature of the claimant's
burden in proving lack of knowledge. The First, Fourth and Sixth Cir-
cuits, as suggested by the plain language of the statute and its legisla-
tive history, have held that a claimant must show only that he did not
have actual knowledge that the property to be forfeited was the pro-
91. Remarks of Senator Culver, 124 CONG. REc. 23056 (1978).
92. Id. Senator Nunn added that the purpose of the innocent owner provision
was "to make it clear that a bona fide party who has no knowledge or consent to the
property he owns having been derived from an illegal transaction, that party would be
able to establish that fact under this amendment and forfeiture would not occur." Re-
marks of Senator Sam Nunn, 124 CONG. REc. 23057 (1978).
93. Title 18 U.S.C. section 981(a)(2) explicitly provides that a lienholder who
was without knowledge of the illegal activity may also qualify as a innocent owner:
"No property shall be forfeited under this section to the extent of the interest of an
owner or lienholder by reason of any act or omission established by that owner or
lienholder to have been committed without the knowledge of that owner or lienholder."
However, there is no legislative history available on section 981(a)(2).
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ceed of the underlying criminal activity.94 The Fifth Circuit may also
have adopted the actual knowledge standard.96 However, a claimant
who remains free from actual knowledge of the illegal acts underlying
a traceable proceed by "sticking his head in the sand" will be deemed
to have the requisite knowledge. 96
The Second Circuit has not interpreted the section 881(a)(6) inno-
cent owner provision but in section 881(a)(7) cases a claimant must
show that either she did not have actual knowledge or, if she did, that
she did not consent to the illegal use of her real property. 97 If the
claimant has actual knowledge, in order to be an innocent owner she
must prove a lack of consent by showing she did all that could reasona-
bly be expected to prevent the illegal activity once she learned of it.98
In the context of a section 881(a)(6) case these circuits are likely to
follow the actual knowledge standard. 99
94. United States v. One Urban Lot Located at 1 Street A-I Valparaiso,
Bayamon, Puerto Rico, 865 F.2d 427, 430 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Lots 12,
13, 14 and 15, Keeton Heights Subdivision, Morgan County, Kentucky, 869 F.2d 942,
946-47 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. $10,694.00 U.S. Currency, 828 F.2d 233-34
(4th Cir. 1987) (discussing section 881(a)(6)).
95. United States v. Lot 9, Block 2 of Donnybrook Place, Harris County, Texas,
919 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1990) (discussing section 881(a)(7)).
96. United States v. 1980 Red Ferrari, VIN No. 9A0034335, Oregon License
No. GPN-835, 827 F.2d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 1987)[hereinafter 1980 Red Ferrari].
97. United States v. Certain Real Property (890 Noyac Road), 945 F.2d 1252,
1260 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Certain Real Property (418 57 Street), 922 F.2d
129, 131-32 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 876-
880 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1017 (1991).
98. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d at 879.
99. The Second Circuit read the "without the knowledge or consent" language of
section 881(a)(7) in the disjunctive. That is, if the claimant fails to prove the absence
of actual knowledge, she can still prevail if she shows that she did not consent to the
use of the property for an illegal purpose. It involves owners of property whose occu-
pants (tenant or husband) who used the real property in an illegal manner subjecting it
to seizure. Once knowledge has been established, in order to give meaning to the term
consent, the courts have imposed a duty on the claimant to prove that instead of merely
acquiescing in the illegal conduct, which would have been consent, they took affirma-
tive steps to prevent it. In other words, once knowledge has been established a claimant
would automatically lose on the consent issue, unless she demonstrates that she took
affirmative action to stop the illegal activity. Without imposing this requirement, the
alternative available to the claimant of showing consent becomes meaningless. A claim-
ant should prevail on an innocent ownership claim under section 881(a)(6) if they
demonstrate their lack of knowledge and the government is unable to rebut that
showing.
The Third Circuit has also adopted the disjunctive approach to section 881(a)(7)
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'Whether or not a claimant must do more than disprove actual
knowledge that the funds were proceeds of specified illegal transactions
is not clear in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits due to inconsistent and
ambiguous holdings.' 00 In its first section 881(a)(6) innocent owner de-
cision the Ninth Circuit required the claimant to prove the absence of
actual knowledge, did not mention a negligence or all reasonable efforts
test and found on the facts presented that the circumstantial evidence
of knowledge was compelling.' 0' However, in its next section 881(a)(6)
decision, the court did not cite its prior decision or analyze the issue
before announcing that the claimant's failure to exercise due care pre-
cluded reliance upon the innocent owner defense. 102 Not only is this
latter decision suspect for its failure to address the plain language of
section 881(a)(6) and the legislative history, but it cites as support a
Ninth Circuit decision involving section 881(a)(4) in 1977 prior to the
amendment to section 881(a)(4) adding a statutory innocent owner de-
fense.' In a January 1992 unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit,
without citing to either of its prior section 881(a)(6) cases, applied the
actual knowledge test.' 0
4
In the Eleventh Circuit, like in theNinth Circuit, the quantum of
knowledge necessary to be an innocent owner is not clear at this time.
but sidestepped the issue of whether "knowledge" means actual knowledge. United
States v Parcel of Real Property Known as 6109 Grubb Road, Millcreek Township,
Erie County, Pa., 886 F.2d 618, 626 (3d Cir. 1989). The trial court had adopted an
actual knowledge test. Grubb Road, 708 F. Supp. at 698, 702 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
100. There are no definitive decisions in the Third, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and
D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeal on the section 881(a)(6) innocent owner standards.
101. 1980 Red Ferrari, 827 F.2d at 478-79.
102. United States v. $215,300, U.S. Currency, 882 F.2d 417, 420 (9th Cir.
1989) (citing United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Blazer, 563 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th
Cir. 1977)).
103. Id. Section 881(a)(4) was not amended until November 18, 1988 to pro-
vide for an innocent owner defense. See Pub. L. 100-690, § 6075(l)-(3), 102 Stat.
4181, 4,324 (1988).
In United States v. One Parcel of Land, Known as Lot 11 I-B, Tax Map Key 4-4-
30-71 (4), Waipouli, Kapaa, Island and County of Kauai, State of Hawaii, 902 F.2d
1443 (9th Cir. 1990), the court seemed to adopt an actual knowledge standard in a
section 881(a)(7) case. Id. at 1445 (the intent of the forfeiture statute "would be sub-
stantially undercut if persons who are fully aware of the illegal connection or source of
their property were permitted to reclaim the property as 'innocent' owners.") (rejecting
the disjunctive reading of knowledge or consent in requiring the claimant to prove both
that he did not know nor did he consent to the illegal activities).
104. United States v. U.S. Currency, $584,091, 952 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1992)
(unpublished disposition text in WESTLAW).
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In its first section 881(a)(6) decision addressing innocent ownership,
the court explicitly stated that the standard was actual knowledge
rather than constructive knowledge. 10 5 In the footnote following this
statement the court questioned the government's invocation of Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,106 which articulated a constitu-
tional defense to forfeiture if a claimant could show that "he had done
all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of
his property." However, in the same footnote the court concluded that
because it found that the claimant failed to meet the actual knowledge
standard it would "leave for another day the question of the applicabil-
ity of the Calero-Toledo dicta to forfeiture actions under 21 U.S.C.
section 881(a)(6).' 10 7
Five years later the court seemed to adopt the actual knowledge
test for the application of the innocent owner provision in a section
881(a)(7) case.108 The following year in another section 881(a)(7) case,
the court explicitly held that "[a]pplication of the innocent owner de-
fense turns on the claimant's actual, rather than constructive, knowl-
edge."109 Then, just two months later in United States v. One Single
Family Residence Located at 15603 85th Avenue North, Lake Park,
Palm Beach, County Florida (15603 85th Avenue North), a panel of
the Eleventh Circuit including one of the same judges who had just
adopted the actual knowledge test, applied the "reasonably possible"
language of Calero-Toledo to an unusual section 881(a)(6) case.110
In 15603 85th Avenue N., two brothers contributed funds to the
construction of a house that they owned jointly. The district court
found that the funds of the bad brother were exclusively the product of
drug trafficking, but that the funds of the good brother were from legit-
imate sources. However, the district court also concluded that the good
brother had actual knowledge that his brother's funds were derived
from drug trafficking. The Eleventh Circuit held that legitimate funds
are forfeitable when they are knowingly commingled with bad funds."'
105. $4,255,000.00, 762 F.2d at 906.
106. 416 U.S. 663 (1974)
107. $4,255,000.00, 762 F.2d at 906 n.24.
108. United States v. One Single Family Residence, Located at 15621 S.W.
209th Ave., Miami, Florida, 894 F.2d 1511, 1513 (11th Cir. 1990).
109. United States v. Real Property at 5000 Palmetto Dr., Fort Pierce, St. Lucie
County, Florida, 928 F.2d 373, 375 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (citing $4,255,00.00, 762 F.2d at
906).
110. 933 F.2d 976, 982 (11th Cir. 1991) (footnote omitted).
111. Id. at 982.
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After finding that the "good brother" had actual knowledge of the
commingling of legitimate and drug funds, the court held he could still
be spared forfeiture as an innocent owner if he proved that he did eve-
rything reasonably possible to withdraw his commingled funds or dis-
pose of the property upon learning of the illegal nature of the other
funds.11
The court's decision can be interpreted as upholding the actual
knowledge test while at the same time allowing a claimant who has
actual knowledge of the illegal source of the funds to show that he did
not consent to commingling his legitimate funds with those from an
illegal source. This is essentially the same approach that the Second
and Third Circuits have followed. 113 On the other hand, the court did
hold the "reasonably possible" language of Calero-Toledo applicable to
a section 881(a)(6) case for the first time.""
The failure of the Ninth Circuit, and possibly the Eleventh, to fol-
low the plain language of the statute and instead impose a negligence
standard derives from the Supreme Court's dicta in Calero-Toledo. In
this 1974 decision, a pleasure yacht was leased by its owners to Puerto
Rican citizens. Fourteen months after it was leased, Puerto Rican au-
thorities discovered one marijuana cigarette on board and sought its
forfeiture pursuant to a Puerto Rican forfeiture statute.1 5 The authori-
ties conceded that the yacht's owner was not involved in the lessee's
activities and "had no knowledge that its property was being used in
connection with, or in violation of [Puerto Rican law]." 6 Recognizing
the extraordinarily harsh result of allowing forfeiture of the yacht
under such circumstances, the court noted the existence of "serious
constitutional questions.""'  One such constitutional question was
whether an owner who proved not only that she was uninvolved in and
unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that she had done all that
reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of her prop-
erty, could suffer its forfeiture." 8
112. Id. (citing 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d at 878-879).
113. See 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d at 876-80; Grubb Road, 886 F.2d at 626.
114. Id.
115. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 1663, 1664-65, 1694
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
116. 416 U.S. at 668.
117. Id. at 689.
118. Id. The Court rejected the application of this defense in the case stating "no
allegation has been made or proof offered that the company did all that it could reason-
ably do to avoid having its property put to an unlawful use." Id. at 690. In other words,
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Unlike section 881(a)(6) and section 981(a)(2), the Puerto Rican
statute at issue in Calero-Toledo did not provide a statutory innocent
owner defense. The dicta in Calero-Toledo, therefore, must be read as
a defense of last resort. In other words, it is only applicable as a saving
provision, when there is no statutory innocent owner defense. There is
simply no legitimate basis to substitute a negligence test based on a
constitutional defense for a statutory defense which specifically requires
that a claimant only prove that she did not know or consent to the
illegal activity.
There is no suggestion in the legislative history of section
881(a)(6) to explain or justify the basis for a negligence standard in
the place of an actual knowledge standard. In fact, the enactment of
the statutory innocent owner defense after Calero-Toledo has been in-
terpreted as a congressional rejection of such a heavy burden.'1 9 More-
over, the First and Sixth Circuits which have adopted the actual knowl-
edge standard have explicitly rejected the application of the "all
reasonable efforts" test.12
0
D. Application of the Innocent Owner Defense in Parallel Mar-
ket Cases
In a case involving a Colombian cambio which received cash from
its customers, the Eleventh Circuit applied the actual knowledge stan-
dard and affirmed the forfeiture of more than $4,255,000 in a bank
account and more than $3,686,000 in cash. 21 More than $240,000,000
because the claimant had not raised a constitutional claim for which there was no prior
case law support, it was sunk.
119. 316 Units of Municipal Securities, 725 F. Supp. at 180.
120. One Urban Lot, 865 F.2d at 430 (unlike Calero-Toledo, "we have a statute
that provides for an exception for innocent owners. 21 U.S.C. section 881(a)(6). This
statute does not in any way limit innocent owners to those who have done all that
reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of the property. Calero-
Toledo. In fact, the statute specifically refers to the knowledge and consent of the
owner as the appropriate considerations in determining who is accepted."); Lots 12, 13,
14, and 15, 869 F.2d at 947 ("[t]he constitutional question [raised in Calero-Toledol
is not presented here, because the statute with which we are concerned [section
881(a)(7)] imposes no requirement that a person who claims the status of an innocent
owner establish that he has done all that he could reasonably be expected to do to
prevent the proscribed use of his property").
121. $4,255,000, 762 F.2d at 902. Although the Eleventh Circuit decision indi-
cates in one place that the $4,255,000 was currency, it indicates the to the contrary at
a later reference and the district court decision is consistent with the latter reference.
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in cash was deposited to the defendant account in less than eight
months. 122 In addition to the numbing amount of money involved and
the fact that it was all in cash, the claimant made several statements
and made one request of the bank demonstrating his "gnawing belief
that the funds being dealt with were tainted. ' 123 Since $4,255,000 is a
case with facts which are not likely to be repeated and involve the
cambista himself, it is of limited predictive value in determining the
limits of actual knowledge.
There are however two instructive decisions among the Hawaii All
Monies cases. In All Monies (Leloach), the claimant was a Peruvian
cambista who bought his dollars from another cambista. 2" Considering
itself bound by the Ninth Circuit's decision in $215,300, the district
court required the claimant to prove not only that he did not know of
the illegal activity or willfully blind himself to it, but also that he "did
all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the illegal use of his
account."' 12 5
The facts examined by the court focused on the legitimacy of the
claimant's money exchange business. The court appears to have broken
down the concept of legitimacy into two issues: whether the currency
exchange business itself was legitimate and then whether Leloach's
cambio in particular was legitimate. The court accepted Leloach's con-
tention that his business operated within the monetary laws in Peru,
but was unable to resolve whether or not the company violated Peru-
vian anti-flight capital laws. 26 The court then examined whether the
claimant's cambio account was under the effective control of the money
laundering organization. The court found numerous admissible facts in-
dicating that it may have been under the actual control of Dirimex,
another Peruvian cambio, as well as the particular partner of Dirimex
who was the money launderer.1 27 The court also noted several facially
See 762 F.2d at 898, 904; 551 F. Supp. at 316 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
122. $4,255,000, 762 F.2d at 904.
123. Id. at 906. Claimant approached the vice president of the bank and asked if
the government could seize the account. When advised that such a seizure was possible,
the claimant asked if the bank would make his company a loan to cover the funds on
deposit in the account in order to thwart a forfeiture. This conversation took place six
months before the seizure. Id. at 900.
124. 754 F. Supp. at 1482 (for pertinent facts of this case, see supra text accom-
panying notes 53-57).
125. Id. at 1478.
126. Id. at 1478-79
127. Id. at 1479-80.
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suspicious aspects of claimant's conduct of his money exchange busi-
ness, but acknowledged the claimant's explanations and denied both
the claimant's and the government's motions for summary judgment on
the innocent ownership defense.128
The innocent owner issue was resolved favorably to the claimant in
All Monies (Abusada), who also purchased tainted dollars from
Dirimex, but for personal use rather than in a commercial setting. 2 9 In
All Monies (Abusada), the court granted the claimants' summary judg-
ment motion because they met their burden of establishing their inno-
cent ownership defense. 130 The claimants produced unrefuted business
records indicating that the transfers into their account were made
through what they believed was a legitimate money exchange house.
Claimants also swore they had no knowledge of the drug trafficker or
of his illegal operation.' With respect to the money transferred into
their account which the government contended was tainted, the claim-
ants presented evidence that they paid for those transfers with money
from their domestic Peruvian bank accounts.1 32 In short, the govern-
128. United States v. All Monies ($477,048.62) in Account No. 90-3617-3,
Israel Discount Bank, New York, New York, 754 F. Supp. 1467, 1479 (D. Haw.
1991). The cambio's dollar bank account was maintained in New York, the records
were kept there, the claimant never saw the records personally, and when the claim-
ant's wife went to New York, she destroyed the records. The claimant did not want any
paper trail in Peru connecting him with wealth because people who are known to be
wealthy are subject to violence, kidnapping and extortion. Id. The claimant admitted
that he never asked the people from Dirimex where they obtained their dollars. He
contended, however, that such questions would have been futile because of the common
practice of Peruvian cambistas to guard the confidentiality of their sources. Id. at 1480.
He also offered two reasons for that confidentiality: a cambista who discloses his source
can lose it to a competitor and inquiry into the sources of money may compromise the
physical safety of both the clients and the people asking the questions because of the
violence which can result if personal wealth becomes known. Id.
Of approximately 370 deposits into the subject account in 1988 and 1989, only 34
were the product of transactions between the claimant and Dirimex. Moreover, many
of the 34 deposits came from accounts as to which the government did not offer any
evidence to prove they were affiliated with drug trafficking.
129. 746 F. Supp. at 1440.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. In fact, at the time of seizure the government was unable to trace any
tainted funds in the account. Approximately one year later, the government was able to
trace approximately one-third of the account balance to allegedly tainted accounts. The
court then held that an illegal seizure would not preclude forfeiture so long as the
government could establish probable cause for the forfeiture without using evidence
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ment failed to present evidence to rebut the claimants' proof that they
neither knew nor consented "to any of the illegal activity taking place
with respect to the defendant account."'' 3
In the context of a bank account seizure, the illegal activity which
the claimant must actually know of can only mean that the funds de-
posited into the account were proceeds of drug trafficking or money
laundering. If the claimant is "without knowledge of the matter in
which the proceeds were obtained" he is an innocent owner."" A for-
eign owner does not lose his innocence merely because he knows that
the funds coming into his account were involved in a violation of a
capital flight restriction, a currency exchange regulation or a tax law of
his country. 35
Once the claimant testifies that he did not know the dollars he
purchased from the cambista were proceeds of drug trafficking or
money laundering and the government has no evidence to show that his
purchase was anything other than a typical parallel market purchase,
can the government properly argue that the mere act of purchasing
dollars on the parallel market demonstrates knowledge that the dollars
purchased were tainted by drug crimes or money laundering? Clearly
not. The appropriate inquiry is a subjective one: whether the claimant
in a particular case had the requisite knowledge, not whether some
tainted funds are laundered through the parallel market. Because virtu-
ally no claimant knows he is buying tainted money, whether a particu-
lar claimant has the requisite knowledge will turn, in almost all cases,
on whether he was willfully blind.
In the legislative history of the Money Laundering Control Act of
1986, Congress gave explicit guidance on what would constitute knowl-
edge in the money laundering context by citing" 6 the leading case on
willful blindness: United States v. Jewel. 37 In considering willful blind-
ness to be the equivalent of knowledge, the Jewel court emphasized
that the requisite state of mind was only different from positive knowl-
tainted by the illegal seizure. Id. at 1438 (citing United States v. One 1985 Cadillac
Seville, 866 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. One 1977 Mercedes
Benz, 708 F.2d 444, 450 (9th Cir. 1983)).
133. Id.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
135. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1992) (laws requiring filing of cur-
rency transaction reports, forbidding structuring of deposits, money laundering, or en-
gaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity).
136. SENATE REP. 99-433 at 9-10.
137. 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
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edge "so far as necessary to encompass a calculated effort to avoid the
sanction of the statutes while violating its substance."1 38 Congress elab-
orated on this definition of knowledge by giving contrasting examples:
Thus a currency exchanger who participates in a transaction with a
known drug dealer involving hundreds of thousands of dollars in
cash and accepts a commission far above the market rate, could not
escape conviction, from the first tier of the offense, simply by
claiming that he did not know for sure that the currency involved
in the transaction was derived from crime. On the other hand, an
automobile car dealer who sells a car at market rates to a person
whom he merely suspects of involvement with crime, cannot be
convicted of the offense in the absence of a showing that he knew
something more about the transaction or the circumstances sur-
rounding it.' 39
To prove innocent ownership a claimant must credibly testify only
that he did not know his cambista had any involvement in money laun-
dering. The claimant must do no more. Requiring a claimant to have
asked the cambista where he purchased his dollars would be an exer-
cise in futility. Commercial considerations render it futile.14 A
138. Id. at 704 (citation omitted).
139. SENATE REP., supra note 137. While the Senate's examples are given in the
context of criminal mens rea, the same standard of knowledge should apply in a civil
forfeiture setting. After all, in civil forfeitures it is the claimant who has the burden of
proving the absence of the requisite knowledge.
Large numbers of foreign citizens' accounts have been seized and subjected to
forfeiture until they could prove that the government had not properly traced the funds
or that they were innocent owners. In contrast, very few car dealership accounts have
been seized; why not more? Could it be that car dealers have more political clout than
non-residents? Imagine the howls of protest in Washington if 680 or even 88 had their
operating accounts seized the same day. Does the government merely give car dealers
or jewelers, rather than Colombians and Peruvians, the benefit of the doubt? Is it is
because the example given by the Senate could be superficially read to condemn cur-
rency exchangers and exonerate car dealers? Seriously though, there is a shared per-
ception in Colombia that innocent Colombian citizens are being made the scapegoats
for the failure of the United States to conquer its drug problem.
140. Cynics might argue that is futile because a crooked cambista will never
indicate that his sources are drug traffickers and money launderers. Assume a claimant
had asked his cambista to identify the sources of his dollars and the cambista re-
sponded by saying that he got his dollars from tourists, exporters of legitimate goods
who did not declare all of their receipts, wealthy Colombians/ Peruvians (that he per-
sonally knows are not involved in drug trafficking or money laundering) who want to
exchange their dollars for pesos/intis in order to repatriate their capital, etc. Surely a
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cambista is a broker. If he reveals his source of funds he runs the risk
that his customers will deal directly with each other."" Additionally,
the identification of sources of wealth is also discouraged if not outright
refused because of the violence in the form of extortion, kidnapping
and sometimes murder of wealthy individuals.'42 So long as the claim-
ant has a good faith belief that he is not buying the proceeds of drug
trafficking or money laundering, his account should be immune from
forfeiture under the current state of the law. Purchasing in the face of
suspicion that some of the funds available on the parallel market are
tainted does not rise to willful blindness that the dollars his cambio is
selling are, in fact, tainted. Even in Congress' example the car dealer
who merely suspected his customer of involvement with crime, did not
have the requisite knowledge. 4"
In the few claims still unresolved from Operation Polar Cap (IV)
as well as in the All Monies cases, the government has attempted to
defeat the innocent owner defense by expert testimony as to the per-
centage of tainted funds in the Colombian and Peruvian parallel mar-
kets. While it is beyond the scope of this article to opine on the validity
of the research methods used to calculate such results, it should be
noted that the estimates range from 25 percent to 60 percent on the
Colombian parallel market.'" The actual percentage of tainted funds
in the parallel markets is a subject of intense debate. 4 5 Since the ac-
tual numbers are inherently unknowable any precisely stated percent-
age is unreliable.
While the actual percentage may be debated by economists and
statisticians, the actual number is irrelevant for purposes of an innocent
owner defense. It is the claimant's knowledge, not the expert's, that is
relevant. A claimant may believe that drug traffickers launder money
in the parallel market. However, if he has never had, and is not aware
of any specific instances where his cambista has dealt in tainted funds,
that should be sufficient to satisfy an actual knowledge/willful blind-
claimant is not under an affirmative obligation to confirm the truth of the cambista's
statement. See, e.g., Banco Cafetero; 797 F.2d at 1162 (claimant bank has no duty to
investigate the source of its customer's deposits).
141. See All Monies (Leloach), 754 F. Supp. at 1480.
142. Id. at 1479.
143. See supra text accompanying note 140.
144. Grosse, Colombia's Black Market and Foreign Exchange, forthcoming in
WORLD DEVELOPMENT (1992).
145. See Deposition of Norman Bailey at 4, Eighty-Eight (88) Designated Ac-
counts, No. 90-1203-Civ-NESBITT (S.D. Fla. January 29, 1991).
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ness standard. To insist on more than that would, at a minimum, entail
the application of the defense of last resort, the constitutionally based
negligence standard. As discussed above, this is not the standard appli-
cable to a statute which specifically provides an innocent owner
defense. 146
IV. CONCLUSION
The government has probably seized more than five hundred bank
accounts based on purchases of dollars in the parallel markets of Latin
America without any reason to believe that the owners of these ac-
counts knew of the drug trafficking or money laundering source of some
of the deposits. In terms of case specific results, this policy and its exe-
cution have been a dismal failure. More than 95 percent of the funds
seized have been returned to claimants who are not themselves cambis-
tas based on defenses of a lowest intermediate balance and/or innocent
ownership. The government's lack of selectivity in applying the facilita-
tion theory has resulted in the seizure of entire accounts instead of only
seizing the traceable proceeds. Such prosecutorial indiscretion has im-
posed significant hardship on hundreds if not thousands of innocent by-
standers in our war on drugs. Whether the in terrorem effect of such
improvident actions truly jeopardizes the activities of the real money
launderers or merely staggers our international banking and investment
communities by driving innocent owners to other shores remains to be
seen.
146. See notes 91, 115, 116 and surrounding text.
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Commentary: AIDS Testing of Health Care Workers
State Representative Lois J. Frankel*
It is very curious how some people think legislators can write laws
that give people absolute protection from certain risks or harm. Laws
which are well-considered may reduce risks and offer substantial pro-
tection from harm; for example, laws prohibiting murder or requiring
the wearing of a seat belt. Both of those laws, when obeyed, save lives
and reduce risks. But, obviously many people still commit murder.
Even more people do not wear seat belts and get injured in automobile
accidents. While saving thousands of lives each year, these laws do not
offer absolute protection.
Each year in this country, and especially in Florida, many children
lose their lives by drowning. Legislation which, for example, would re-
quire all open bodies of water to be fenced might save a few lives a
year. But, the high cost and impracticality associated with the imple-
mentation of such a law would make it an unwise use of resources.
Resources could be better spent teaching children about water safety
and how to swim.
Every year when the state Legislature meets in Tallahassee, legis-
lators are asked to consider hundreds and hundreds of proposed bills.
There are already thousands of pages of law in statute books which
regulates every part of our life and death.
However, it is my opinion, one which I believe is shared by most
Americans, that before government interferes in, or mandates, certain
behavior of a private citizen, a particular government action should be
in the greater public or state interest. And, in looking to prevent a par-
ticular harm or reduce a risk, one must weigh the significance of the
risk against the cost of reducing the risk both in economic and other
social consequences. So, for example, in evaluating the law which re-
quires seat belt usage, law makers would want to assess the cost of seat
belts and enforcement versus the reduction in morbidities and
mortalities.
This general discussion leads nicely to the more specific issue of
whether law makers should require mandatory testing of health care
* Member, Florida House of Representatives, District 83; J.D., Georgetown Uni-
versity, 1973; B.A., Boston University, 1970.
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workers (HCWs) for the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and/or
restrict in any way the practice of an HIV-infected HCW. It is truly a
political dilemma because public opinion polls clearly indicate the pub-
lic overwhelmingly believes that the answer to this question is yes. This
article will analyze the issue and soon it will become evident that the
obvious and simple answer may not be so obvious and simple after all.
First, a review of the chronology of events leading to this discus-
sion would be in order. In July of 1990, the Center For Disease Control
(CDC) reported a transmission of HIV involving a Florida dentist and
a twenty-two-year-old patient. The report issued by CDC indicated
that the patient had no identifiable risk behaviors or factors, the dentist
had AIDS at the time of the dental procedure performed, and that
there was a high degree of DNA sequence similarity between the HIV
strain infecting the patient and the dentist. On September 4, 1990, the
Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services released a
letter written by the dentist to all his patients which advised that they
seek counseling and testing. Subsequently, it was announced four other
patients of the dentist had tested positive for HIV and also had a high
degree of DNA sequence similarity.
On February 21, 1991, the CDC had an open meeting in Atlanta,
Georgia, on the risk for transmission for blood-borne pathogens for pa-
tients during invasive procedures. Representatives from eighty organi-
zations testified. Without exception, every organization opposed
mandatory HIV testing. There was a least one individual representing
himself who was a proponent of mandatory testing, however, and there
were various groups and individual advocates who testified that HIV-
infected professionals should voluntarily restrict their practice and/or
disclose their positivity to their patients.
Prior and subsequent to the February CDC meeting, the first den-
tal patient's family and attorneys went on a media campaign calling for
the mandatory HIV testing of health care workers and for the disclo-
sure by HIV-infected health care workers to their patients of HIV sta-
tus. This media avalanche brought on a flurry of proposed legislation
around the country including: United States Senator Jesse Helms'1
sponsored amendment, which imposed a criminal penalty on HIV-in-
fected doctors who treat patients without disclosing their HIV status;2
1. Helms, a Republican, is the senior United States Senator from North
Carolina.
2. See 137 CONG. REc. S10331-01 (daily ed. July 18, 1991) (discussion of
Helms amendment, No. 734).
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and, Congressman Bill Dannemeyer's 3 bill which requires mandatory
HIV testing for HCWs.4
Congress did not pass either of the foregoing proposals, but instead
enacted legislation requiring states to enforce CDC recommendations
or lose Title 42 funding which equates to billions of dollars for health,
social service, environmental, and housing assistance from the federal
government.5 The new law read:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a State shall, not
later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, cer-
tify to the Secretary that such State has in effect regulations, or
has enacted legislation, to adopt the guidelines issued by the Cen-
ters for Disease Control concerning recommendations for prevent-
ing the transmission, by health care professionals, of the human
immunodeficiency virus and the hepatitus B virus to patients dur-
ing exposure prone invasive procedures. Such regulations or legisla-
tion shall apply to health professionals practicing within the State
and shall be consistent with Centers for Disease Control guidelines
and Federal law. Failure to comply with such guidelines, except in
emergency situations when the patient's life is in danger, by a
health care professional shall be considered as the basis for discipli-
nary action by the appropriate State licensing agent.
(b) . . . [I]f a State does not provide the certification required...
[w]ithin the 1-year period described . . ., such State, should be
ineligible to receive assistance under the Public Health Service Act
(42 U.S.C. 301 et. seq.) until such certification is provided."'
In other words, the pain of noncompliance to a state's budget
would be unbearable.
On July 15, 1991, CDC proposed guidelines for preventing trans-
mission of HIV or HBV7 during exposure-prone invasive procedures.
They advised: 1) all health care workers should adhere to universal pre-
cautions; 2) there was no basis for restricting the practice of health
care workers from procedures not identified as exposure prone, pro-
vided universal procedures. were practiced; 3) exposure prone proce-
3. Dannemeyer is a Republican congressman from California.
4. See 136 CONG. REC. H3520-02 (daily ed. June 13, 1990) (consideration of
House Resolution 4785).
5. See 137 CONG. REc. H7383-01 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1991) (regarding 42 U.S.C.
§ 634).
6. Id.
7. Hepatitis B virus.
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dures should be identified by medical/surgical/dental organizations
and institutions at which these procedures are performed; 4) health
care workers who perform exposure prone procedures should know
their HIV antibody status; 5) health care workers who are infected
with HIV should not perform exposure prone procedures unless they
have sought counsel from an expert review panel and have been advised
under what circumstances, if any, they may continue to perform these
procedures. Such circumstances would include notifying prospective pa-
tients of the health care workers positivity before they undergo expo-
sure prone invasive procedures.
The sixth recommendation by CDC was that mandatory testing of
health care workers for the HIV antibody was not recommended. "The
current assessment of risk that infected health care workers will trans-
mit HIV to patients during exposure prone procedures does not support
the diversion of resources that would be required to implement
mandatory testing programs. Compliance of health care workers with
the recommendations can be increased through education, training, and
appropriate confidentiality safeguards." 8
Following the release of these proposals CDC met immediate re-
sistance. Professional organizations such as the American Dental Asso-
ciation said they would and could not publish a list of so-called risky
procedures. The State of New York. determined it would not cooperate;
thus, risking the loss of billions of federal dollars. Even the American
Medical Association, which at first had been one of the sole supporters
of generating such lists, decided it could not develop such a list.
CDC again went back to the drawing board and at the time of the
writing of this article stated it would be drafting yet another set of
guidelines that would call for a case-by-case evaluation of HIV-in-
fected HCWs.
It is with that backdrop that state legislatures across the country,
including Florida's, must determine whether to follow CDC guidelines
or give up federal public health dollars; or, to go further than federal
law on the issue of testing and restriction. At least one state, Illinois,
has passed a law which requires health care workers with AIDS to dis-
close that information to their patients. In discussing what, if any, ac-
tion the Florida Legislature should take in this regard, this article will
8. Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for Preventing Transmission
of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitus B Virus to Patients During Expo-
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look separately at the two issues of mandatory testing and restriction
and disclosure.
On the issue of mandatory testing, we first need to address the
question of risk. What is the risk that we seek to reduce by testing
health care workers? After we examine the risk, we can then address
the question of how much it would cost to reduce the risk in terms of
economic and other consequences.
To understand risk, one should get a feel for the relative risk.
CDC estimates that a person has approximately a one in 20,000 chance
of being in an airplane crash, a one in 50,000 chance of being struck by
lightning and, if pregnant, a one in 15,000 chance of dying due to preg-
nancy or childbirth complications.
CDC tells us that a patient has about a one in 2.6 million chance
of being infected with AIDS by a dentist. Ironically, there is a one in
5,200 chance of being killed in a car accident on the way to the dentist.
Where, however, the risk involves a known HIV-infected HCW, the
odds of infection are reduced. For example, according to CDC there is
a one in 416,667 probability for transmission to a single patient by a
HIV-infected surgeon. The cumulative probability that an infected sur-
geon will transmit HIV to at least one patient over a period of seven
years is even further reduced. CDC does caution that these probabili-
ties are based on certain models that could be affected by many vari-
ables such as whether or not universal precautions are used.
Even so, of the 200,000 AIDS cases in the United States, there
have been only five documented transmissions from health care worker
to patient - that being the aforementioned case of the Florida dentist.
In look backs of more than 2,100 patients of six different HIV-infected
physicians, researchers have found no linkage between HIV-infected
workers and HIV-infected patients.
According to the scientific community, there is a lack of scientific
evidence indicating that there is more than an infinitesimal risk of
transmission involved even where procedures are labeled exposure
prone. Of course, there are those skeptics who claim that "there is so
much we do not know" about AIDS. That raises the question whether
law makers pass laws based upon what we know or what we don't
know.
It appears that the risk of transmission of HIV infection from a
HCW to a patient is not great. However because the harm we are seek-
ing to reduce is death, we need to look at the cost and other conse-
quences of reducing the risk.
The estimated cost of mandatory HIV testing varies depending
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upon such things as who will be tested, the number of times the test
will occur, and whether there will be counseling with the testing as
currently mandated by Florida law. The Florida Health and Rehabili-
tative Service (HRS) agency estimates that there are 250,000 health
care workers in Florida whose occupations put them in situations where
there could possibly be a blood-to-blood exposure between a HCW and
a patient. At a hearing of the Joint Task Force on AIDS Oversight, a
joint legislative committee of the Florida Legislature, an HRS repre-
sentative testified that it would cost $50 million a year for all those
workers to be tested on a twice-a-year basis. This figure takes into ac-
count not only the cost of a HIV test and in some instances a confirma-
tory test, but also the cost of counseling, increased personnel, labora-
tory space and equipment that would be necessitated by a deluge of
new testing. That figure is more than twice what Florida currently
spends on AIDS education, testing, counseling and treatment.
Should legislators during a time of recession and severe budget
cuts divert so many millions of dollars to protect the public against
what appears to be a minimal risk? And, there are other factors to
consider.
Opponents of mandatory HIV testing claim that it would cause a
false sense of security because the best and only real protection against
transmission of infection is the use of universal precautions. There is an
approximate six-week "window" period in which a person may be in-
fected with AIDS but the virus will not be detected by a test. Thus, a
person could be infected and show a negative test result and, obviously,
a person could be infected any time subsequent to a negative AIDS test
as well.
Then, there is the potential of the reduction of health care profes-
sionals willing to treat HIV-infected persons. If onerous conditions are
placed on HCWs, there is justified concern many of these workers will
question why they should risk their professional careers by treating
HIV-infected patients. Sadly enough, a recent polling of the member-
ship of the American Medical Association indicated only one-third of
all primary care doctors believed that they had a responsibility to take
care of AIDS patients.
There is the logistical problem of screening. How often should it
be done, once a year, twice a year, after every blood exposure, or after
every new sex partner?
There is also the concern that the initiation of mandatory testing
for health care workers would just be the start of costly and questiona-
bly effective mandatory testing schemes for other groups of people. For
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example, HRS estimates that the mandatory testing of all patients en-
tering Florida hospitals in one year would cost $175 million. The Illi-
nois experience after passing law in 1988 requiring HIV tests of all
persons applying for marriage licenses turned out to be a major failure.
Not only did the number of marriages in the state drop by 17,000 in
the year following the passage of the law, but there was a wasteful
diversion of millions of dollars. In the year following passage, 156,000
people were tested and only twenty-six were found to be HIV positive.
At an estimated cost of $25 to $100 per blood test, this represented a
cost of $150,000 to $600,000 to find just one infected person.
In summary, in light of CDC guidelines, the relative unsophistica-
tion of the HIV test, the high cost of a mass testing scheme, the diver-
sion of valuable dollars and the already minimal risk, it is not likely
that many state legislatures will be adopting mandatory testing laws.
The question of what to do with the HIV-infected HCW is a more
difficult issue than that of mandatory testing. Some legal medical ex-
perts who concur in their opposition to mandatory testing disagree on
whether or not a HCW should be obligated to reveal his or her HIV
status to their patient. Larry Gostin of Harvard writes that HCWs who
are infected with HIV should not perform exposure prone procedures
unless they have been before an expert review panel and then notify the
patient before they undergo exposure prone invasive procedures.'
Chai R. Feldblum of Georgetown argues that remote risks associ-
ated with a provider are completely outside of the doctrine of informed
consent. She contends that if providers are required to inform a patient
of HIV infection they should also be required to disclose marital
problems, substance abuse problems, insomnia or any other psychologi-
cal or physical factor that might in some way endanger the patient. She
argues that if a provider truly poses a real risk, the only solution is a
restriction. Otherwise it is an unnecessary invasion of privacy of a
provider.10
Disclosure is most likely tantamount to an automatic restriction
since most patients would probably not seek the services of an HIV
9. Larry Gostin, HIV-infected Health Care Professional: Public Policy Discrim-
ination and Patient Safety, 18 LAW, MEDICINE AND HEALTH CARE 303 (1990). See
Larry Gostin,' HIV-infected Physicians and the Practice of Seriously Invasive Proce-
dures. 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 32 (1989).
10. See Chai R. Feldblum, A Response to Gostin: HIV-infected Health Care
Professional: Public Policy Discrimination and Patient Safety, 19 LAW, MEDICINE
AND HEALTH CARE 134 (1991).
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infected professional. However, the cost there to society is not minimal.
There are figures suggesting a loss of $1.6 billion dollars in training
expenses for HIV-infected health care workers should they leave the
profession.
Proponents of the now-defunct July 1991 CDC guidelines say that
regardless of the minuteness of the risk, any error should be on the side
of protecting the patients. This is the most popular political position to
take. The correct social and health policy still remains fuzzy.
In Florida, we have elected to take an approach leaving the deci-
sion of how to handle HIV-infected health care workers to the profes-
sional regulatory boards and HRS. Under Florida Statute § 455.2224,
the health-related regulatory boards are given the authority to handle,
counsel and serve HIV and hepatitis-infected health care professionals
under their regulations. So, for example, the Florida Board of Medicine
is authorized to handle, counsel and serve any HIV or hepatitis-in-
fected physician. A similar responsibility is given to HRS to serve,
counsel or handle the health care workers that they license under Flor-
ida Statute § 381.045.
The Florida Board of Dentistry has already taken strong steps to-
ward implementing its authority. It have strengthened infection control
procedures and the penalties enforcing them. And, it proposes to refer
HIV-infected dentists to the Impaired Practitioner Program which is
currently used for dentists suffering from drug or alcohol abuse.
Florida law also requires AIDS education as a condition of licens-
ing for all health care professionals under Florida Statutes §§
455.2226, 455.2228, and 381.0034. The direction that the Florida Leg-
islature has chosen to go on this issue is consistent with its longstanding
approach to follow CDC guidelines and to avoid emotionalized legisla-
tion. Unfortunately, the recent incident of the apparent transmission of
HIV infection from the Florida dentist to five of his patients has given
another opportunity to right wing politicians to righteously declare that
it is time to consider AIDS a public health disease and not a civil rights
disease.
Such rhetoric is verbally wrong and inflammatory. In fact, we will
never stop the spread of AIDS unless people feel they can come for-
ward for testing, counseling and treatment without being punished or
ostracized. Confidentiality, informed consent testing and anti-discrimi-
nation laws are not only compatible with public health but actually
facilitate the fight against HIV infection.
The Florida AIDS Omnibus Bill of 1988 and Florida's subsequent
AIDS legislation adopted this strategy and, therefore, the underpinning
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of the Florida AIDS law is education, confidentiality and informed con-
sent testing and strong anti-discrimination laws.
The question now is where do we go from here? If we give in to
fear and. hysteria and put into place what appears to be simple and
obvious, but wrong, strategies, we will be wasting valuable dollars that
could be used to save many lives. Unfortunately, there is no set of laws
that will give the public absolute protection from HIV.
While the television talk show hosts spend hours debating whether
we should test health care workers for HIV we allow hundreds of
thousands of people to die from a known preventable health risk, i.e.,
breast cancer, infant mortality, hospital infections and even tired in-
terns. We continue to sell tobacco and resist sex education in our
schools.
As we struggle with this complex issue of testing, there are many
things we know that we must do now. There must be improvements in
infection control and non-stigmatized evaluation of HIV-infected
health care workers. We must continue to focus on education and drug
abuse treatment. And, at the top of the list is access to health care for
the millions of Americans without it as vigorously recommended by the
National Commission on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome in its
1991 report.
Health care workers need to talk to their patients to alleviate their
fears. Most importantly, politicians should not allow the issue to be-
come political in any way. At stake are too many lives including those
of our own children.
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As I remembered it from law school (Property I, fall semester,
1961), once you closed, that was it! If a purchaser later on discovered a
problem for which his seller would unquestionably be responsible under
the contract of purchase and sale, forget it! That contract died. Some-
thing about a "doctrine of merger" that prevented suing on the original
contract after the deal had closed.
So when the client walked into my office in 1979 (some eighteen
years after my first encounter with "merger" back in Property I) com-
plaining of no access to his recently purchased 4.5 acres of vacant land,
my gut reaction (after first giving thanks that I had not represented
him on the purchase) was: Forget it! "Merger" will preclude an action
against his seller despite the seller's warranty of access under the con-
tract of purchase and sale.
Preliminary research confirmed my recollection about the doctrine
of merger, but also revealed that there were of course several excep-
tions to the doctrine. Maybe we could fall within one of those excep-
tions. Besides, we might also be of service to the client by obtaining
access for his property ("right-of-way of necessity" rang another bell
from Property I).
So, we took the case, and not without surprise summary judgment
was promptly entered against us on our breach of contract action
against the seller: The doctrine of merger barred our action.1 The ap-
pellate court reversed, however, and sustained our claim, finding that
we did in fact fall within one of those exceptions to the merger rule;2
and the Florida Supreme Court upheld that ruling by denying
certiorari.3
Now, another ten years have gone by and, having left private prac-
tice for the world of academia, I find myself teaching the doctrine of
merger in Property class. This has prodded me to re-examine the rule
and the growth of exceptions to the rule, and what I see is repeated
misuse of the doctrine. If you'll stick with me for a while, I shall hope
to adequately convey to you 1) why I conclude that the doctrine of
merger has been bastardized, and 2) what I believe is the more legiti-
1. Opler v. LaValle, No. 80-4345 (Fla. llth Cir. Ct. 1980).
2. Opler v. Wynne, 402 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Author's
note: This is, of course, the same case as noted in the previous footnote.
3. Opler v. Wynne, 402 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev. denied,
412 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1982).
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mate conceptual approach to analyzing these cases, namely that while
there are a limited number of prescribed circumstances in which the
doctrine of merger is the correct rule to apply, the vast majority of the
factual situations should be viewed under the rules of accord and
satisfaction.
II. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of merger, as it pertains to real estate transactions, is
so easily and clearly stated as to defy its complexity: The covenants of
the contract of purchase and sale are merged into the deed of convey-
ance upon the closing of the transaction, and such covenants are there-
after no longer enforceable."
The exceptions to the doctrine, and the circumstances under which
the doctrine is "inapplicable," are not so easily or clearly stated: Yet
the number of recent Florida cases declining to apply the rule exceeds
the quantity of cases in which the rule has been applied;5 . . . which
causes one to wonder: Have the exceptions overtaken the rule? More
importantly, this provokes us to inquire whether the rule and its excep-
tions are being properly applied.
This article: 1) examines the history of and basis for the doctrine
of merger as it applies to real estate contracts; 2) traces the develop-
ment of the doctrine in Florida; 3) reveals a confusion in the case law
in Florida, demonstrated by an attempt to categorize the various cases
by those in which the doctrine is adhered to, versus those which fall
within various exceptions to the rule; 4) attempts to analyze why the
rule has, or has not, been applied in various situations; and 5) con-
cludes that there is a rational basis conceptually and under very recent
Florida case law for discerning when to apply the rule, and that the
more appropriate doctrine to apply in most cases is that of accord and
satisfaction.
IIL HISTORY AND BASIS OF THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER
A classic statement of the merger doctrine is:
4. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 413 (1932); see also ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM
ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 10.12, at 696-97 (1984).
5. See APPENDIX OF FLORIDA CASES DEALING WITH THE DOCTRINE OF
MERGER, infra [hereinafter APPENDIX].
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In the absence of fraud or mistake, and in the absence of collateral
contractual provisions or agreements which are not intended to be
merged in the deed, the acceptance of a deed tendered in perform-
ance of an agreement to convey merges the written or oral agree-
ment to convey in the deed, the agreement to convey being dis-
charged or modified as indicated by the deed, and thereafter the
deed regulates the rights and liabilities of the parties, and evidence
of contemporaneous or antecedent agreements between the parties
is inadmissible to vary or contradict the terms of the deed.'
Similarly, but more simply stated, the Florida courts have repeat-
edly stated the rule "that preliminary agreements and understandings
relative to the sale of property usually merge in the deed executed pur-
suant thereto,"'7 and "acceptance of a deed tendered in performance of
a contract to convey merges or extinguishes the covenants and stipula-
tions contained in the contract .... 198
The classic statement of the doctrine of merger (hereinafter some-
times referred to simply as "the doctrine" or "the rule") has been re-
peated so frequently in essentially the form and substance as quoted
above, that the courts and commentators may have lost sight of why
the doctrine calls for the result of "extinguishing" the covenants of the
contract.
The basis of the rule originates in the common law of England:
Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, states that
"whenever a greater estate and a less coincide and meet in one and the
same person, without any intermediate estate, the less is immediately
annihilated; or, in the law phrase, is said to be merged, that is sunk or
drowned in the greater."9 Thus, with regard to the effect of the real
6. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 240(1)(b), 413 (1932). Because, as above
quoted, such evidence is "inadmissible to vary or contradict" the deed, the parol evi-
dence rule is sometimes stated as the basis for the merger rule, or it is said that the two
rules are equated to or associated with each other. Professor Corbin disapproves of that
connection, because the parol evidence rule is premised on the theory that the docu-
ment represents the complete integration of the parties' discussions, negotiations and
transaction, rather than operating to discharge an earlier agreement (as the deed oper-
ates to discharge the earlier contract under the merger rule). See 6 ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1319, at 316 (1962); 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 587, at 506 (1960).
7. Milu, Inc. v. Duke, 204 So. 2d 31, 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
8. Id.
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property conveyance on the antecedent contract of sale, it is said that
"[t]he lesser equitable estate created by the contract is necessarily
merged in and swallowed up by the legal estate created by the deed."10
As early as 1811,11 and in a series of 1800s cases thereafter, 2 the
common law of England had come to recognize this specific aspect of
the doctrine of merger relating to real property contracts of sale merg-
ing into the deed of conveyance. Foremost among the reasons for appli-
cation of merger to real estate contracts in the early English cases, was
"functus officio,"- 3-the need for certainty and finality in land transac-
tions, a point after which buyer and seller could no longer pursue
claims under the contract."' The functus officio rationale is the natural
consequence of the court's recognition that parties to a contract for sale
were entitled to (and frequently do) modify the contract (either know-
ingly,, or without conscious act) prior to performance thereof;
and--according to the law (and the needs of society)-there must
come a point in time when all of these modifications reach fruition and
are resolved with finality. That point is signified by the parties' issuance
and acceptance of the instrument of conveyance, which is nothing more
than recognition of the elementary principle that a later agreement su-
persedes an earlier agreement addressing the same subject matter.15
At the same historical point in time, the early 1800s, American
courts were likewise espousing the rule," recognizing that "[a]rticles of
agreement for the conveyance of land are, in their nature, executory,
and the acceptance of a deed, in pursuance thereof, is to be deemed,
10. French v. McMillion, 91 S.E. 538 (W. Va. 1917) (the principle is well set-
tled that a contract of sale is merged into the deed).
11. Legge v. Croker 1 Ball & B. 506, 12 R.R. 49 (Ir. Ch.) (1811).
12. Id.; see also Brownlie v, Campbell 5 App. Case. 925 (H.L. 1880); Allen v.
Richardson 13 Ch. D. 524 (1879); Besley v. Besley 9 Ch. D. 103 (1878); Mason v.
Thacker 7 Ch. D. 620 (1878); Wilde v. Gibson 1 H.L. Case. 605, 73 R.R. 191 (1848).
13. Functus Officio is defined as "A task performed. Having fulfilled the function
.Applied to . . . an instrument . . which has fulfilled the purpose of its crea-
tion, and is therefore of no further virtue or effect." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 606
(5th ed. 1979); and "[O]f no further official authority or legal efficacy .... WEB-
STER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 921 (1981).
14. "No rule of law is better settled than where a deed has been executed and
accepted as performance of an executory contract to convey real estate, the contract is
functus officio, and the rights of the parties rest thereafter solely on the deed." R.
DEVLIN, THE LAW OF DEEDS § 850a, at 1571 (3d ed. 1911).
15. See Annotation, Merger of Contract in Deed, 38 A.L.R.2D 1310 (1954).
16. Houghtaling v. Lewis, 10 Johns. 297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813); Howes v. Barker,
3 Johns. 506 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808).
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prima facie, an execution of the contract, and the agreement thereby
becomes void, and of no further effect."" Indeed, in Howes,'8 Chief
Justice Kent placed such emphasis on the merger rule that he referred
to the deed as an insurmountable "impediment" to an action on the
earlier contract-the deed being "the highest evidence of the final
agreement of the parties."9
The doctrine of merger is said to be justified on the basis of vari-
ous, stated reasons ° other than, or in addition to, "functus officio."
Nevertheless, no matter what the stated rationale, thorough analysis
will always bring us back to the basis for the rule being that property
transactions are inherently a "two-act" play2" in which the two acts are
separated by a lengthy "intermission;"22 that the parties may during
the intermission actually or impliedly change their initial agreement
("Act I"); and that whether or not they did in fact evoke a change, the
second act (the closing) is deemed to carry out and fulfill the first act
(the contract), so that the first act has been "swallowed up ' 23 and is of
no further legal effect.2
Along with the development of the merger doctrine to extinguish
rights and obligations under the initial contract, there grew a series of
exceptions to the rule that are utilized by the courts in those instances
in which it would be inequitable, inappropriate, or simply unfair 25 to
17. Houghtaling v. Lewis, 10 Johns. 297, 299 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813).
18. Howes v. Barker, 3 Johns. 506 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808).
19. Id. at 528.
20. Other reasons for the doctrine: "Caveat emptor," the purchaser has a duty to
investigate the title of the vendor. See Lyn L. Stevens, The Role Of The Doctrine Of
Merger In Contracts For The Sale Of Land-The Canadian Experience, 8 U.B.C. L.
REV. 35, 38 (1973). The right of the parties to modify their agreement during the
interval between the contract and conveyance of the deed. See Annotation, Merger of
Contract in Deed, 38 A.L.R.2D 1310, 1329 (1954); Snyder v. Roberts, 278 P.2d 348
(1955). Waiver and release of buyer's rights in the contract upon acceptance of deed.
See Annotation, Merger of Contract in Deed, 38 A.L.R.21 1310, 1312 (1954).
21. The contract of sale being "Act I," and the closing document(s) (e.g., the
deed of conveyance) being "Act II."
22. The executory period being the "intermission;" i.e., the interval in between
the two acts.
23. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
24. Sun First Nat'l Bank v. Grinnell, 416 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1982). The court explained that the contract has been "fulfilled and exhausted," and it
may have "historical, but no legal, significance." Id. at 834.
25. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4, at 697 n.60 (Merger may be so evidently
unfair that a court may go to rather astonishing lengths to 'find' evidence that it was
not intended by the parties.).
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refuse to enforce the antecedent contractual covenants. The early New
York case, Bull v. Willard,2 6 for example, acknowledged and confirmed
the merger rule, prima facie, but also recognized that "cases may arise
in which the deed would be regarded as only a part execution of the
contract," and that the "unexecuted" covenants must remain enforcea-
ble under exceptions to the rule.2 7
In theory, the exceptions fall into several categories:
1. Fraud, mistake or accident28
2. Contract provisions that are not necessarily performed by the
deed,2" such as
a. "Collateral" or "independent"covenants. 30
b. "Bifurcated" contract; "part performance. 31
c. Covenants that the parties "did not intend" to
merge. 2
3. Covenants that by their own terms inherently cannot be per-
formed until after the conveyance.3 3
26. Bull v. Willard, 9 Barb. 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850).
27. The Bull court then stated that it is "a nice and difficult question" to deter-
mine whether contract covenants are to be deemed executed or not; i.e., whether or not
to apply merger, and went on to establish several criteria (referred to hereafter in this
article as the "Bull criteria") to answer the question. The Bull criteria inquire whether
the covenant in question "looks to" or is "connected with" the title, possession, quan-
tity, or emblements of the land; if it is, the covenant is extinguished; if not, the cove-
nant may survive. Id. at 645. The Bull criteria are discussed further in the text accom-
panying notes 192-98 infra.
28. Rather than being exceptions to the rule, some courts and authors comment
that the rule is simply "not applicable" in these situations. E.g., MILTON R. FRIEDMAN.
CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 7.2, at 649 n.5 (3d ed. 1975).
29. See Milu, Inc. v. Duke, 204 So. 2d 31, 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967)
(Merger "'does not apply to those provisions ... which are not necessarily performed or
satisfied by the execution and delivery of the stipulated conveyance.").
30. See Graham v. Commonwealth Life Ins., 154 So. 335 (1934) (sustaining the
exception to the merger rule relating to independent covenants); see also Peterson v.
Peterson, 431 So. 2d 672, 673 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("Where an agreement is
collateral to, or independent of, the provisions of a deed, there is no merger.").
31. See Milu, Inc. v. Duke, 204 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (provi-
sions regarding consideration to be paid usually do not merge).
32. See Graham v. Commonwealth Life Ins., 154 So. 335 (1934) (exception ex-
ists to merger rule concerning provisions not intended to be in the deed).
33. See Peterson v. Peterson, 431 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (cov-
enant to occupy premises could not be performed until after conveyance of the deed);
see also infra note 138 and accompanying text.
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4. Covenants expressly provided to survive. 34
Further discussion of these exceptions appears in Parts V.B. and V.C.
of this article.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE IN FLORIDA
Discussion and approval of the doctrine of merger in the case law
of Florida is found as early as 1850, in the case of Hunter v. Brad-
ford.35 As in the several English and American cases of similar pe-
riod, 36 Hunter enunciated the principle of merger but did not denomi-
nate it as such. In Hunter, the purchaser of property prayed to enjoin
his seller from collecting sums due on the purchase money indebtedness
for the reason that seller's title was defective,3 7 contrary to the agree-
ment for sale. The court sustained purchaser's defense to the debt
(thereby giving life to the seller's contractual covenant to convey good
title), notwithstanding that purchaser was, and had been, in possession
of the property for several years under a "title bond" (described by the
court as a "mere equitable title," an agreement to convey at a future
date). 8 Key to this holding giving life to the original contract, was the
court's finding that no deed of conveyance had been made or accepted,
and that purchaser was in possession merely under the agreement to
convey, an executory contract. For-continued the court-had the deed
been given, the contract would have become executed, and the defense
of defective title contrary to the original contract would be of no avail
to the purchaser. That is, the covenant of title under the original con-
tract would be deemed extinguished and unenforceable. Thus, the
Court distinguished between an executory contract, found to be the
case here, and an executed contract, in which case the defense would
not be allowed and the purchaser would be relegated solely to remedies
based upon his deed. The court thus stated the doctrine of merger,
without calling it by that name:
34. See Gabel v. Simmons, 129 So. 777 (Fla. 1930) (seller's covenant to refund
purchase price did not merge into the deed because it was independent and not in-
tended to merge).
35. 3 Fla. 269 (1850).
36. See supra notes 11, 12, 16 and accompanying text.
37. It is interesting to note that this earliest of Florida cases involved a matter of
title to the land, a topic of great importance as appears infra at note 65 and accompa-
nying text.
38. Hunter, 3 Fla. at 287.
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Courts draw a distinction as to claims for equitable interposition
between contracts executed and executory contracts, a distinction,
we think, founded upon good sense and justice. "Where the pur-
chaser has taken a deed with covenant of general warranty, under
which he has entered, and remains in undisturbed possession of the
land conveyed to him, if there be no fraud in the transaction, he
cannot, before eviction, on the mere ground of defect of title, ob-
tain relief in equity, or have the contract rescinded, or restitution of
the purchase money. In such case, he must seek a remedy upon the
covenant of warranty in his deed." 9
Perhaps the first Florida case to speak of the merger doctrine by
name, and in substance adopt the general rule in the classic sense as
recited above,40 was the 1930 decision, Gabel v. Simmons,41 wherein
the court adopted not only the doctrine of merger, but also certain of
the major exceptions thereto. It seems that on August 25, 1925, the
Simmonses, as purchasers, entered into a contract with Gabel, as seller,
for the purchase of three lots for $30,000, payable $1500 on execution
of the contract, $6000 at closing, and the balance over a subsequent
period post-closing. The contract contained a "special provision" (de-
nominated as such by the court, repeatedly and-as we shall soon
see-with good reason) to the effect that "[i]f purchaser is dissatisfied
after 90 days from closing, all monies paid shall be returned with 10%
interest." '42 The sale was closed on August 28, 1925, by purchasers pay-
ing the $6000 due at closing, and by seller delivering the agreed-upon
closing document. Prior to the expiration of the ninety days, as well as
at the expiration of the ninety days, as well as within a reasonable time
after the expiration of the ninety days, purchasers verbally and in writ-
ing expressed to seller their dissatisfaction with their purchase and re-
quested (nay, demanded) return of the $7500 that they had paid. Seller
refused, and purchasers sued. Seller defended on the basis that the
above-quoted special provision in the contract providing for refund was
no longer enforceable because it merged into the closing document
which was silent regarding any refund rights (and therefore no cause of
action could arise from that document). The classic defense of merger!
As it turned out, seller was right on the rule, but wrong because of
39. Id. (citation omitted); see also Musselwhite v. Oleson, 53 So. 944 (Fla.
1910).
40. See supra note 6 and accompanying quotation.
41. 129 So. 777 (Fla. 1930).
42. [d. at 777.
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The Florida Supreme Court first confirmed its approval of the ba-
sic merger by deed rule of law, citing to Williston on Contracts' 3 and
Paige on Contracts," and quoted with approval from the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court:
[t]he general rule is that preliminary agreements and understand-
ings relating to the sale of land become merged in the deed.""
The Florida Supreme Court then went on to hold that the merger rule
was not applicable to this contract clause in this case for several rea-
sons ("exceptions" to the rule):"6 The 90-day refund provision was an
independent covenant that the parties did not intend to be incorporated
into the closing document; delivery of the closing document was merely
part performance of the contract, was not delivered by seller or ac-
cepted by buyer as full performance of the contract, so the contract
remains binding as to its other provisions; and the closing document
does not cover the entire subject matter of the original contract.' 7 Ad-
ditionally, and perhaps the court's most important statement of ration-
ale when analyzing the holding in this case from the viewpoint of the
doctrine of merger in its classic sense, merger was held inapplicable
here to the special 90-day refund provision because that covenant "con-
stituted a special agreement which was not appropriate to be included
in the [closing document]. . . ."" In other words, merger is applicable
to contract provisions that are "appropriate" to be included in the clos-
ing document; but, merger should not be applicable to a provision that
is "not appropriate" to be included in the closing document. 49
Gabel was but one of four early 1930s Florida cases dealing with
the merger rule. 5° Graham,51 for example, followed Gabel, stating that
43. Id. at 778.
44. Id. (citing 4 PAIGE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2568 (2nd ed. 1929)).
45. Id. (citing Caveny v. Curtis, 101 A. 853, 854 (Pa. 1917)).
46. Gabel, 129 So. at 778. The combined usage of several exceptions to the rule,
as in Gabel, is analyzed further infra note 123 and accompanying text.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. The Gabel court's theory runs parallel to the "Bull criteria" discussed
later in this article, which as will be seen constitutes substantial underpinning for deter-
mining those (limited) situations in which use of the merger rule is conceptually correct
(the "true merger" cases), namely where it would be appropriate for the closing docu-
ment to include the subject matter of the earlier contract.
50. The other three cases are: Graham, 154 So. 335 (Fla. 1934) (discussed infra
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"[i]t is a general rule that preliminary agreements and understandings
relative to the sale of property usually merge in the deed and mortgage
by which the original contract becomes executed."6 The court then
again quoted with approval the very same statement from the Pennsyl-
vania supreme court 3 as was quoted in Gabel, but found the contrac-
tual provision sub judice (a covenant regarding subordination of the
purchase money mortgage to a construction loan mortgage) within sev-
eral of the exceptions to the rule, and therefore enforceable. 5
Thus, by the early 1930s the doctrine of merger (and several of its
exceptions) had become firmly ingrained in Florida case law. During
the next thirty years, however, the appellate courts in Florida were
called upon to visit the rule only once.55 Nevertheless, during the suc-
ceeding twenty-six-year period (from 1965 through current date), not
less than twenty-two Florida cases have dealt with the doctrine of
merger. 56 These latter cases, sometimes referred to in this article as the
"recent Florida cases," are summarized in the Appendix to this article
and are discussed and analyzed throughout the balance of this article.
Analysis of these recent Florida cases gives us pause to look closely at
the conceptual basis for the doctrine of merger as stated, for example,
in the early case of Bull v. Willard,57 and here we question whether the
recent cases are applying the correct doctrine. Thus, as the balance of
this article unfolds, we trace the more recent Florida case law and ap-
proach the headline of this article: Taking the Bull by the Horns.
at notes 51 through 54 and accompanying text); White v. Crandall, 143 So. 871, 879
(Fla. 1932) ("where the defendant has completed the purchase, accepted his deed, the
transaction is closed, and the purchaser is confined to his action for breach of the cove-
nant" contained in the deed); and Riddle v. Coliver, 156 So. 880 (Fla. 1934) (provision
in original agreement of sale that buyer would assume existing mortgage was not "de-
stroyed" by the fact that the deed of conveyance was only made "subject to" the
mortgage).
51. Graham, 154 So. at 337 (sustaining the exception to the merger rule, con-
cerning independent covenants and covenants not intended to be incorporated into the
deed and whose subject matter is not covered by the deed).
52. Id.
53. See Caveny v. Curtis, 101 A. 853 (Pa. 1917).
54. Graham, 154 So. at 337 (the covenant subordinated a purchase money mort-
gage to an anticipated construction loan first mortgage).
55. See Volunteer Sec. Co. v. Dowl, 33 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1947).
56. See APPENDIX infra.
57. 9 Barb. 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850).
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V. ANALYSIS OF RECENT FLORIDA CASES: ARE THE
EXCEPTIONS OVERTAKING THE RULE?
Of the twenty-two recent Florida cases dealing with the merger
doctrine during the period from 1965 through current date, eight ap-
plied the rule and refused to enforce the contract provision, two
augured applicability of the rule by dicta, while twelve cases found that
the subject contract provision fell within some exception to the rule and
was therefore still viable and enforceable. 8 Looking strictly at the last
decade, merger was applied twice (maybe twice more, by dicta), while
exceptions were found and the rule was rejected in ten cases.59 Are the
exceptions overtaking the rule? If so, why?
An attempt was made to categorize the decisions based upon. the
subject matter of the contractual provision. As seen in the Appendix,6"
this exercise proved worthwhile in certain respects,61 yet in other re-
spects the results were confusing and futile.62 The following sections of
this article discuss these decisions in the contexts of:
A) Analyzing the cases in which the merger rule was applied, and.
the contract provision was therefore held unenforceable;
B) Analyzing the cases that found exceptions to the merger rule,
declined to apply the rule, and thus allowed enforcement of the
antecedent contract;
C) Analyzing the cases which held that the merger rule was not
applicable due to mistake, fraud or accident, and therefore allowed
enforcement of the contract;
58. See APPENDIX infra.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. E.g., Stephan v. Brown, 233 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (dem-
onstrating a consistent application of the doctrine or of exceptions to the doctrine);
White v. Crandall, 143 So. 871 (Fla. 1932) (same); see also Bennett v. Behring, 466 F.
Supp. 689 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (those covenants involving matters of "title" consistently
merge into the deed).
62. For example, several cases involved the same subject matter but the appellate
courts reached inconsistent results. See Burkett v. Rice, 542 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1989) (provision for award of attorney's fees do not merge into deed); Stein-
berg v. Bay Terrace Apartment Hotel, 363 So. 2d. 58 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(seller's covenant regarding compliance with city codes does not merge into the deed).
But see Fraser v. Schoenfeld, 364 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (seller's
covenant against city code violations merged into deed); Gordon v. Bartlett, 452 So. 2d
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D) Seeking to discern common threads as to why the merger rule
was or was not applied.
A. Merger Rule Applied; Contract Provision Unenforceable
1. Title Cases
2. Accord and Satisfaction Cases
The Florida case law has generally followed the majority view63
and the "trend" '64 in applying the merger rule to those cases involving
matters of title." This conclusion is not only in accord with the dictates
of Bull,66 but also certainly makes sense as a consequence of the "same
subject matter" rationale.67 For, where the subject matter of the con-
tract (here, a covenant concerning the quality of title) is the same sub-
ject matter as covered in the deed (typically, a Warranty Deed, war-
ranting the quality of title), then it makes perfect sense to hold that the
later instrument superseded the earlier with respect to that subject
matter, thereby extinguishing any further legal efficacy of the earlier
covenant. The difficulty arises, of course, in discerning what is a "mat-
ter of title."
Two fairly early Florida cases 8 dealt with restrictive covenants
["incumbrances" (sic) on the title, wrote the court]69 and in both cases
the merger rule was applied. In the first case, White v. Crandall,7 the
antecedent representation was alleged to have been that the land was
free from encumbrances. In fact, it was shown that several building
restrictions, race restrictions, and easements existed encumbering the
land, and it was further shown that the documentation of these burdens
63. Annotation, Merger of Contract in Deed. 38 A.L.R. 2D 1310, 1327 (1954);
Annotation, Merger of Contract in Deed, 84 A.L.R. 1008, 1024 (1932).
64. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4, at 697-98 nn. 57, 61.
65. See Volunteer Sec. Co. v. Dowl, 33 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1947); White v. Cran-
dall, 143 So. 871 (Fla. 1932); Stephan v. Brown, 233 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1970) (covenants concerning matters of title usually merge into deed); St. Clair v.
City flank & Trust, 175 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
66. See infra notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
68. See Volunteer Sec. Co. v. Dowl, 33 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1947); White v. Cran-
dall, 143 So. 871 (Fla. 1932).
69. White, 143 So. at 879.
70. 143 So. 871 (Fla. 1932).
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upon the land was of public record when title was conveyed and ac-
cepted. The Court held that the antecedent representations of free and
clear title merged into the deed conveying this title, and were no longer
viable.7 The second fairly early case, Volunteer Security,72 involved
the opposite situation from White.7 Rather than a covenant against
encumbrances (as in White), the contract in Volunteer Security affirm-
atively contained the encumbrances to the land, which were residential,
building and race restrictions that the buyer of the property sought to
enforce. The deed to the subject property, however, was silent as to any
restrictions. The court again held the doctrine of merger to be applica-
ble, and ruled that the restrictions contained in the contract had
merged into the (silent) deed, and were therefore unenforceable. 74
Only one of the "more recent" 75 Florida cases dealt with restric-
tive covenants, and that was the Federal district court case, Bennett v.
Behring Corp. Similar to the accusation in White,77 the complaint in
Bennett was that restrictive covenants of record constituted a breach by
seller of its promise under the contract of purchase and sale to deliver
title free and clear of all encumbrances. The particular restriction on
title complained of in Bennett required all homeowners in a certain 31-
community development to become lessees under recreational facilities
leases and to pay rental fees thereunder. In a class action on behalf of
all homeowners, the plaintiffs contended that their seller (the defend-
ant-developer of the communities) breached its contract promise of
clear title by virtue of this encumbering restriction. The facts revealed,
however, that a reference to this restriction appeared on the face of all
of the deeds that were delivered to and accepted by the plaintiff-pur-
chasers. Accordingly, defendant-seller argued-and the court so
ruled-that any complaint that purchasers might have had for defec-
tive title contrary to the covenants of clear title as contained in their
contracts of purchase and sale, was barred by the doctrine of merger.
Those contract covenants respecting the quality of title merged away,
or more accurately merged into, the deeds by which the original con-
71. Id. at 871 (continuing: "The transaction became an executed contract of sale
of the land. The purchase was completed and the defendant accepted the title ....
(emphasis added).
72. 33 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1947).
73. White, 143 So. 871 (Fla. 1932).
74. Volunteer, 33 So. 2d at 151.
75. The period from 1965 to date. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
76. 466 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
77. See White, 143 So. at 871.
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tracts became executed. The title covenants of the deeds controlled,
and since the deeds were expressly made subject to the restriction, no
action could lie thereunder for defective title. The Court went on to
espouse that:
The plaintiffs' remedy would have been to refuse to close, [to re-
fuse to] accept the deed, and sue on the contract. Failing this,
plaintiffs' sole remaining remedy is to sue for a breach of covenant
in the deed which is not possible since the exception to the cove-
nant is clearly stated.s
Continuing in the line of "title" cases, the only other recent Flor-
ida case involving a covenant against encumbrances on title was Ste-
phen v. Brown,79 where again the seller covenanted under the written
contract of sale that the conveyance of title would be free and clear of
all encumbrances. The deed delivered and accepted at closing con-
tained no covenant against encumbrances. Post-closing, purchaser
sought rescission alleging that the property was in sub-standard condi-
tion contrary to the city code, that this violation constituted an encum-
brance on title, and that seller knew of the violation (the "encum-
brance") prior to the closing. The trial court's dismissal of purchaser's
complaint was affirmed on appeal: The contractual covenant respecting
this matter of title was not actionable, it having merged into the (na-
ked) deed.
Another recognizable pattern in the Florida case law is adherence
to the merger rule in factual situations evidencing orthodox accord and
satisfaction. This pattern is clearly illustrated by a graphic analysis in
outline form of the following two recent Florida cases:80 In St. Clair,"
there was:
1. An agreement: Seller covenanted, in the contract of sale, to con-
vey by warranty deed.
2. A problem: During the executory period (between contract and
closing), it was discovered that title to a portion of the property (a
15-foot strip on one side) was not insurable.
78. Bennett, 466 F. Supp. at 701-02.
79. 233 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
80. See Uwanawich v. Gaudini, 334 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976);
St. Clair v. City Bank & Trust Co. of St. Petersburg, 175 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1965).
81. St. Clair, 175 So. 2d 791.
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3. A resolution: To resolve the problem, the seller offered and the
purchaser agreed to accept a quit-claim deed to the 15-foot strip.
4. An accord and satisfaction: In a subsequent action to foreclose
the purchase-money mortgage given in connection with the sale,
the purchaser-mortgagor raised as a defense that seller had failed
to fulfill his covenant to convey by warranty deed. Held, accord
and satisfaction; the obligation under the subject covenant had
been discharged "by merger. "82
In Uwanawich,83 there was:
1. An agreement: Buyer and seller agreed, in the contract of sale,
that the purchase-money mortgage would contain a thirty-day de-
fault clause.
2. A problem: During the executory period, a problem arose con-
cerning the seller's insistence that the purchase-money mortgage be
joined in execution by the buyer's wife (a non-signatory to the con-
tract of sale).
3. A resolution: To resolve the problem, the seller offered to accept
the mortgage without the wife's joinder if the thirty-day default
clause were reduced to a fifteen-day period. Buyer agreed and the
closing documents (deed and mortgage) were so executed and
delivered.
4. An accord and satisfaction: In a subsequent action to foreclose
the purchase-money mortgage, the buyer-mortgagor attempted to
invoke defensive relief under the contracted-for 30-day default
clause. Held, accord and satisfaction; that agreement had been dis-
charged "by merger.""
A variety of particular contractual covenants were involved in the
several other recent Florida cases examined in which the doctrine of
merger was applied. The various types of covenants under adjudication
included an attorney's fee provision,B a representation against code vio-
82. Id. at 792. On point is Corbin's commentary:
If the contract of sale required the vendor to convey a perfect title by a
warranty deed and the purchaser later accepts a quit claim deed as full
performance, he can not enforce the original contract that required more.
If this is correct, it should be described as a discharge by accord and satis-
faction or substituted contract and not by "merger."
6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1319, at 310-12 (1962).
83. Uwanawich v. Gaudini, 334 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
84. Id. at 118.
85. See Gordon v. Bartlett, 452 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); see
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lations, 86 conditions for releasing property from a purchase-money
mortgage, 87 and terms of payment for a business located on (but pay-
ment not directly secured by) associated real property;88 and in each of
these cases, the antecedent contractual covenant was held unenforce-
able because of the merger rule. Additionally, dicta in one very recent
case 811 indicated that although the court did not have to reach this is-
sue, merger would have applied and the court would have refused to
enforce the contract condition discussed there (a warranty against vio-
lation of governmental regulations as of closing) had the plaintiffs' case
not fallen for other reasons.90 However, contrary to the consistency
heretofore noted in the application of the rule to cases involving mat-
ters of title9 and cases involving obvious accord and satisfaction,92 no
pattern or generalized rule of law can be gleaned from this latter group
of miscellaneous Florida cases9" that all applied the merger doctrine.
B. Exceptions to the Merger Rule; Contract Enforced
Continuing our review of the recent Florida cases, we now proceed
to analyze those in which the court declined to apply the merger rule,
and accordingly enforced the provision of the original contract of
purchase and sale on the basis that the particular contract covenant fell
within an exception to the rule under the facts and circumstances sub
judice. A side-by-side analysis of two recent cases, Fraser" and
also infra note 141 and accompanying text.
86. See Fraser v. Schoenfeld, 364 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); see
also infra note 93 and accompanying text.
87. See Sun First National Bank of Orlando v. Grinnell, 416 So. 2d 829, 834
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (the contract for sale was "fully performed when . . .
closed." "Such a fulfilled and exhausted contract has historical, but no legal, signifi-
cance .... ").
88. See Soper v. Stine, 184 So. 2d 892, 894 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (A
preliminary agreement for the sale of the business merged into the deed. The prelimi-
nary agreement was not "outside, collateral to, or independent of" the deed.).
89. Field v. Perry, 564 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
90. Id. at 509-10 (court's decision of reversal was grounded on the lack of sub-
stantial evidence of the violation of governmental regulations). Consequently, the
court's commentary that the cause of action "was dismissible," for merger reasons was
dicta. Id. at 506 n.3.
91. See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
94. Fraser v. Schoenfeld, 364 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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Opler,95 both decided by the same court9" and within three years of
each other, demonstrates quite similar fact patterns, with conflicting
results--one applied the rule and refused enforcement of the contract;
the other found an exception to the rule and allowed enforcement of
the contract covenant. This apparent clash may best be illustrated by
comparing the two cases in outline form: In Fraser:97
1. Contract provision: "8. Seller further states that there are no
code violations of the City of Miami Beach or the County of
Dade."
2. Facts: Buyer knew, before closing, that there existed in the prop-
erty violations of city building and zoning regulations.
3. Buyer closed.
4. Court held: Buyer could not recover for breach of the above-
quoted provision. Buyer was precluded by the doctrine of merger.
The contract provision merged into the deed.
In Opler:98
1. Contract provision: "F: Ingress and Egress: Seller covenants and
warrants that there is ingress and egress to said property."
2. Facts: Buyer knew, before closing, that the property was without
ingress and egress.
3. Buyer closed.
4. Court held: Buyer was entitled to recover for breach of the
above-quoted contract provision. Buyer was protected by an excep-
tion to the merger rule. The contract provision did not merge into
the deed.
An attempt to distinguish these two cases from each other provides
a springboard to scrutinize various exceptions to the merger rule
(which exceptions are not mutually exclusive, but in many cases over-
lap with each other). Both cases first acknowledged, confirmed, and re-
stated the basic doctrine that as a general rule, all preliminary agree-
ments and understandings relative to the sale of property usually merge
95. Opler v. Wynne, 402 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev. denied,
412 So. 2d 472 (1982).
96. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal.
97. 364 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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into the deed of conveyance executed pursuant thereto.99 And each de-
cision then went on to consider and dispose of certain of the recognized
exceptions to the rule. Succinctly stated, Fraser considered but rejected
the "no intent to merge" exception and the "not necessarily performed
by the deed" exception, while Opler sustained the "collateral" or "inde-
pendeni" covenant exception. Perhaps the distinction between the hold-
ings in these two cases, although not specifically so analyzed or dis-
cussed in either opinion, stems directly from the inherent fact that in
Fraser the covenant against code violations was a representation con-
cerning the condition of the property itself (a covenant on the prop-
erty), while the access covenant in Opler dealt with a condition not
involving the deeded property per se but the availability of ingress and
egress over lands outside the boundaries of the deeded property (a cov-
enant off the property). In other words, consistent with the postulate
developed later in this article regarding "true merger"100 and the cru-
cial common law requirement thereof that the subject matter of the
contract must be one that is fundamental to or inherent in the land in
question, 01 it can well be argued that the access covenant pertained to
terra firma other than the land under contract and hence the doctrine
of merger is out of the question.
The "no intent to merge" exception was stated by the court in
Milu as follows: "The rule (of merger) . ..does not apply to those
provisions of the antecedent contract which the parties do not intend to
be incorporated in the deed . .. "102 The "no intent" exception is often
combined with one or more of the other exceptions to the rule. Thus, in
Milu,10 3 where the seller's complaint against his buyer for payment of
the balance of the sales price (which, per the contract was to be certain
shares of stock) was based on the original contract of sale, and the
buyer defended on the basis that the contract was no longer a viable
instrument on which to base a cause of action because the sale was
closed and a deed was delivered to and accepted by the buyer, the court
invoked both the "no intent to merge" exception and the "not necessa-
rily performed by the deed" exception' in sustaining the complaint
99. Fraser, 364 So. 2d at 534; Opler, 402 So. 2d at 1311.
100. See infra notes 202-07 and accompanying text; see also Bull v. Willard, 9
Barb. 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850).
101. See infra notes 192-98 and accompanying text; see also Bull, 9 Barb. 641.
102. Milu, Inc. v. Duke, 204 So. 2d 31,33 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
103. Id.
104. The merger rule does not apply to contract provisions "which are not neces-
sarily performed or satisfied by the execution and delivery of the stipulated convey-
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and holding that the contract provision promising payment ("considera-
tion") was still enforceable:10 5 The same conclusion has been reached
by the appellate courts of numerous other states, to the extent that it
may be said that there is a general exception to the merger rule that
permits enforcement of contract provisions relating to payment of con-
sideration notwithstanding delivery and acceptance of the deed. 0 6 The
reason for this generally recognized exception has been stated that in
practice deeds of conveyance do not usually recite the consideration
with particularity or accuracy10 7 (rather, a typical recitation of consid-
eration is often "Ten dollars and Other Good and Valuable Considera-
tion"), and thus it cannot 'be concluded that the parties intended to
fulfill the earlier consideration covenant by passage of the deed. It
would seem, however, that the issue of whether the consideration cove-
nant was or was not fully performed by passage of the deed, is an evi-
dentiary question in the realm of accord and satisfaction rather than
merger, a point developed further in Part VI of this article.108
The "no intent to merge" exception, combined with the "not nec-
essarily performed by the conveyance" exception, also formed the basis
of the court's decision in Sager v. Turner.109 Relying strongly on
Milu, 10 the plaintiff-buyer in Sager.was allowed to recover against his
seller for breach of seller's contract covenants that 1) buyer would be
able to obtain all necessary permits and licenses to operate the property
(a mobile home park), and 2) there existed no violations of any li-
censes, permits, local ordinances, restrictions or easements, notwith-
standing the seller's arguments of merger. "1 ' Although at first blush the
covenant against violations in Sager appears most identical with that in
Fraser" ' and precedent within the same appellate district would be
compelling of a merger holding, closer scrutiny reveals factual distinc-
ance." Id.
105. "Contractual provisions as to considerations to be paid by the purchaser are
ordinarily not merged in the deed .... " Id. (emphasis added).
106. See Annotation, Merger of Contract in Deed, 38 A.L.R.2D 1310, 1334
(1954) (The deed is not conclusive as to the amount of consideration.).
107. Id.
108. "Merger" has become just a buzzword; "Accord and Satisfaction" is the
more appropriate doctrine in most cases. See infra Part VI.
109. 402 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
110. Milu, Inc. v. Duke, 204 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
111. Sager, 402 So. 2d at 1283.
112. Fraser, 364 So. 2d at 533.
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tions in these two cases. In Fraser, it is recalled,1 13 the buyer closed
with knowledge of and in the face of existing building and zoning viola-
tions, and no recovery was allowed under buyer's subsequent action for
breach of the contract of sale covenant against such violations, because
of the doctrine of merger. In Sager, however, as the court pointed out,
there was no evidence that this buyer knew of any violations pre-clos-
ing, and furthermore the contract covenant sued upon contemplated
that buyers would obtain all necessary operational licenses and permits,
obviously an act that could not take place until after closing' 14 and
which was dependent on there being no ordinance violations. Hence,
the court extracted the buyers in Sager from the fatal consequence of
the merger rule by the "no intent to merge" exception and by the addi-
tional exception that the breached contractual covenant was "not nec-
essarily performed or satisfied by the execution and delivery of the stip-
ulated conveyance. ' '1
5
The "collateral covenant" or "independent covenant" exception,
relied on in Opler" 0 and other recent Florida cases,1 7 had its Florida
genesis as the basis for the court declining to apply merger in the early
1930s cases of Gabel' 8 and Graham."9 The statement of the exception
is rather straightforward: "Where an agreement is collateral to, or in-
dependent of, the provisions of the deed, there is no merger,"'2 0 Never-
theless, the theory behind this exception is really intertwined with the
"no intent to merge" and the "not necessarily performed by the deed"
113. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
114. See Sager, 402 So. 2d at 1283.
115. The Sager court took great pains to distinguish its holding from Fraser.
Sager, 402 So. 2d at 1283. It was the Sager court's holding that the language "plainly
survived the closing" because they contemplated an action (obtaining all necessary per-
mits and licenses) to be taken by buyer after the closing. Id. The "action after closing"
exception is discussed further infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text. See also
Steinberg v. Bay Terrace Apartment Hotel, 363 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (no merger found and contract provisions enforced for city code violation con-
trary to seller's representation as to quantity of units allowable in apartment building).
116. Opler, 402 So. 2d at 1311.
117. See Burkett v. Rice, 542 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Ameri-
can Nat'l Self Storage v. Lopez-Aguiar, 521 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988);
Peterson v. Peterson, 431 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
118. See Gabel v. Simmons, 129 So. 777 (Fla. 1930).
119. See Graham v. Commonwealth Life Ins., 154 So. 335 (Fla. 1934).
120. Peterson v. Peterson, 431 So. 2d 672, 673 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(separate agreement made to quit claim the property back to transferor if transferee
ceased living on the property).
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exceptions. These exceptions are akin to each other in that they all go
to the heart of the merger rule in recognizing that for there to be a
discharge of the antecedent covenant, the parties must have knowingly
done so or the circumstances must be such that knowledge of the conse-
quences of their action is imputed to them; and if such knowledge (or
imputed knowledge) is absent, then the contract covenant will be saved
by an exception to the rule.
For example, the contract covenant sought to be enforced by the
buyer of the property in Gabel,121 we recall, 12 2 was seller's promise that
"[i]f purchaser is dissatisfied after 90 days from closing, all monies
paid shall be returned with 10% interest." In denying seller's defense
that the promise was unenforceable due to merger, the court relied
upon a combination of several of the exceptions to the rule in order to
sustain the life of the subject contract covenant:1 23
1. The covenant was "independent;" it "constituted a special agree-
ment which was not appropriate to be included" in the closing doc-
ument. Therefore, the covenant survived.
2. The covenant was "not intended" by the parties to be incorpo-
rated in the closing document. Therefore, it survived.
3. The delivery of the conveyance was merely "part performance of
the contract, which remains binding as to its further provisions."
Therefore, the subject promise survived.
4. The closing document did not "cover the entire subject-matter
contracted for." Therefore, this promise-being subject-matter not
covered by the closing-survived.
The theory thus was emerging, later confirmed by Graham,1 24 that
for the doctrine of merger to operate, the subject matter of the contract
provision that is claimed to be unenforceable must be the same subject
matter as was encompassed within (or, as is typically deemed included
in) the document delivered and accepted at closing. When that paral-
lelism exists, it may be said that the liabilities under the contract have
been "discharged by merger;"12 5 absent that parallelism, the covenant
may be said to be one which is "outside of, collateral to, or independent
of the provisions of the deed; [and] they survive delivery and accept-
121. 129 So. 777 (Fla. 1930).
122. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
123. Gabel, 129 So. at 777-78.
124. 154 So. at 337-38.
125. See 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 310-12 (1962).
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ance of the deed of conveyance and remain enforceable."" 6
In pursuance of this line of reasoning, seller's contract representa-
tion and warranty that sufficient water, sewer and electric service ca-
pacity was available at the property site was clearly seen by the court
as an enforceable "collateral agreement" in American National Self
Storage v. Lopez-Aguiar,127 the court explained:
The continued efficacy, then, of collateral agreements which are
not usually included in the terms of a deed is not affected by the
merger rule [citing Milu and Soper]. Such collateral agreements
call for acts by the seller which go beyond merely conveying clear
title and placing the purchaser in possession of the property. 12 8
Several general types of contract clauses have become stereotyped
as "collateral" or "independent," and thus generally speaking are
deemed exceptions to the merger rule almost as a matter of course,
without the courts affording much discussion or analysis in the more
recent individual cases.12 One such type of clause, the seller's warranty
concerning availability of water, sewer or other utilities, has already
been examined.'3 0 Another stereotyped group of clauses, closely akin to
the foregoing, is seller's representation about the nature or condition of
the property, such as: "Seller warrants air conditioning and heating
systems, . . . to be in working order at the time of closing."'' 1 Holding
that this warranty did survive the closing, the court observed: "Our
research reveals that the warranty in this case is the type of indepen-
dent covenant generally excepted from the merger doctrine."' 32 The
court's prescient 1980 general observation in Campbell'" has gained
126. Opler v. Wynne, 402 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (seller
covenants ingress and egress to the property), rev. denied, 412 So. 2d 472 (1982).
127. 521 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
128. Id. at 305; see also In re Wildflower Landholding, 49 Bankr. 246 (M.D.
Fla. 1985) (rejecting a claim of merger respecting seller's contract covenants to make
water and sewer services available to the property site (as well as additional covenants
by seller to grant free golf and tennis club membership and to build a road) on the
basis of the "no intent to merge" exception).
129. See Burkett v. Rice, 542 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (attor-
ney's fee provision falls within the collateral agreement exception).
130. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
131. Campbell v. Rawls, 381 So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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virtually universal acceptance in the past ten years.""
A natural by-product of the several exceptions already discussed
("no intent to merge," "not necessarily performed by the deed,"
"merely part performance," "bifurcation," "collateral" or "indepen-
dent" covenant, and "not the same subject matter"), is the "action af-
ter closing" exception. It would seem only logical that where a party
was without the legal power, capacity or ability to perform a contractu-
ally required act until after the closing, then inherent in that contract
is not only the parties' intent but a mandatory legal conclusion that the
covenant survives the closing. This was part of the court's reasoning, we
recall, in Sager,35 where the contract covenants sought to be enforced
contemplated post-closing action (obtaining operating permits and li-
censes in a violation-free property), and thus it was the court's holding
that the covenants must be deemed to survive closing, must be enforce-
able or else the parties' obvious intent could not be fulfilled.
This "action after closing" exception also formed the basis for al-
lowing enforcement of the antecedent contract covenant in Peterson,36
where the covenant sought to be enforced was grantee's promise to re-
convey the residence to grantor (grantee's brother) if grantee should
ever cease to occupy the property. In striking down grantee's defense
that his contract covenant to reconvey was no longer enforceable be-
cause it had merged into the deed, the court noted:
Here the agreement by its very terms reflects the intent of the par-
ties that it be independent of the deed [citation omitted]. More-
over, the agreement, again by its very terms, could not become ef-
fective until after the delivery of the deed, since prior to that time
Jack would have no life estate to forfeit by ceasing to occupy the
property.137
The conclusion was obvious, therefore, that a covenant that could not
possibly be performed until after delivery of the deed, must be "collat-
eral to" and "independent of" that deed; and so held the two out-of-
134. See Burkett v. Rice, 542 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Durden
v. Century 21 Compass Points, 541 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Ameri-
can Nat'l Self Storage v. Lopez-Aguiar, 521 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988);
Kidd v. Fowler, 498 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Sager v. Turner, 402
So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
135. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
136. See Peterson v. Peterson, 431 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
137. Id. at 673 (emphasis added).
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state cases' 38 cited in Peterson in support of this proposition.
Another stereotypical clause has produced conflicting results and
confusing analysis in the recent case law of Florida, and that is the
"prevailing party attorney's fees" clause.' 39 The conflict and confusion
concerning the applicability of the doctrine of merger to this type of
clause is glaring, as illustrated by comparing the holdings in following
five cases, In each of these cases, an attorney's fee provision was con-
tained solely in the particular contract of sale, and in each case en-
forcement of the contract clause was sought after the transaction had
closed and the deed had changed hands. The holding in each of these
cases was as follows:
1. Campbell:"" Attorney's fees properly awarded to the prevailing
party. No merger.
2. Gordon:"' Prevailing party not entitled to attorney's fees, be-
cause that contractual provision merged into the deed.
3. Fleischer: 2 Attorney's fees denied on other grounds (namely,
that the action was in tort, not "arising out of this contract"); how-
ever, substantial dicta approving and reaffirming the denial of at-
torney's fees in Gordon, based upon merger.
4. Burkett:r '" Prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees. No
merger.
5. Field:1 4 Prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees, the
amount to be determined on remand. No merger.
138. The cited cases were: Industrial Development Foundation v. United States
Hoffman Machinery Corp., 171 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1958) (agreement forfeiting life estate
is not effective until after delivery of deed because there is no life estate to forfeit until
delivery); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Wabash Randolph Corp., 51 N.E.2d 1'32 (I11.
1943) (agreement creating easement is not valid until deed is delivered).
139. The contract clause provided for the payment of attorney's fees:
Attorney fees and costs: In connection with any litigation arising out of
this contract, the prevailing party whether Buyer, Seller or Broker, shall
be entitled to recover all costs incurred including reasonable attorney's fees
for services rendered in connection with such litigation including appellate
proceedings and post judgment proceedings.
Fleischer v. Hi-Rise Homes Inc., 536 So. 2d 1105-06 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
140. Campbell v. Rawls, 381 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
141. Gordon v. Bartlett, 452 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
142. Fleischer v. Hi Rise Homes Inc., 536 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1988).
143. Burkett v. Rice, 542 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) ("[T]his
contract provision is not merged into the warranty deed.").
144. Field v. Perry, 564 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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Part of the confusion in the cases involving attorney's fee provi-
sions stems from the fact that in some of the cases the courts focus on
the contract's attorney's fee provision itself in determining the merger
issue, while in other cases the courts consider the attorney's fee clause
an appendage of the primary contractual provision that formed the gra-
vamen of the action or the defense to the action in answering whether
or not merger should apply. 1" Nevertheless, even with the recognition
of this dichotomy, there is still no consistency in the holdings, as illus-
trated by the five cases outlined above. Based upon the criteria ap-
proved in Fleischer"' (the "Bull criteria" as hereinafter discussed), 47
it would seem that a sterile prevailing party attorney's fee provision,
standing by itself, would be "collateral" and would not merge, since it
does not involve title, possession, quantity, or emblements of the land.
However, if the life of the attorney's fees provision is dependent upon
the survival of the substantive contractual provision on which the action
or defense was based,148 then the attorney's fee provision must be
viewed as "a bird riding on a wagon, "149 so that the substantive provi-
sion must first be subjected to the Bull test, and then "as goes the
substantive provision, so goes the attorney's fees." 150
C. Mistake, Accident, Fraud; Contract Enforceable
It has been said that "[tihe execution and acceptance of the deed
does not affect the rights of the purchaser to relief against the vendor
on the ground of fraud or mistake, if the purchaser was laboring under
its influence at the time of his acceptance of the deed."1 51
145. See Burkett v. Rice, 542 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
146. 536 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
147. Bull v. Willard, 9 Barb. 641, 645 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850). See infra notes
192-98 and accompanying text. The four Bull criteria cited in Fleischer are title, pos-
session, quantity, and emblements. Fleischer, 536 So. 2d at 1107.
148. For example, when the attorney's fee provision is "piggy-backed" onto the
substantive provision, as the court seemed to imply in Gordon. See Fleischer v. Hi-Rise
Homes Inc., 536 So. 2d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (as to "possession").
149. This metaphor was used by Professor Powell to descriptively analogize a
covenant that runs with the land. See 5 RICHARD R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 670.2 (rev. ed. 1986).
150. "As goes Maine, so goes the nation." JOHN BARTLETT. BARTLETT'S FAMIL-
IAR QUOTATIONS 1101(a) (14th ed. 1968).
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Thus, in two of the recent Florida cases,' the injured parties
were able to avert the deadly decree of the merger rule by relying on
the excuse of mistake. And it is significant to note that the contractual
subject matters that thus survived passage of the deeds in these two
cases involved 1) the title to the property, and 2) the quantity of land
conveyed, which are both bastions of merger edict under the "Bull cri-
teria"'' 53 and under recognized general rules, as developed elsewhere in
this article. 154
In Southpointe,5 5 the first of these cases, the contract of sale pro-
vided for seller to sell to buyer the "Sunrise Golf Course Club House,
cart sheds, and maintenance sheds.' 56 After the closing of the sale, the
buyer discovered that the deed of conveyance failed to include the
maintenance shed property. Buyer sued seller for breach of its contract
covenant to convey that (maintenance shed) property. Viewed in the
language of Bull, the gravamen of buyer's cause of action was that
there was; a shortage in the quantity and title of the land actually con-
veyed versus the quantity and title of land that the seller had con-
tracted to convey. Seller defended on the basis of merger, and seem-
ingly he could not have been more correct in light of Bull and the long
line of cases following Bull.' 7 However, the buyer was saved from
merger mortality by the court's finding that the omission of the mainte-
nance shed property from the deed may well have been caused by a
mistake (a factual issue to be determined on remand); and if in fact the
omission was by mistake then the doctrine of merger would not apply.
The court quoted Corbin'58 with approval:
This doctrine of merger by deed does not purport to apply primar-
ily to cases of mistake, whether as to title or as to other facts ....
If the case is one in which there was a real mistake as to title, or as
to some fact on which title depends, and is a case in which the
grantee did not intend to assume the risks of failure of title, there
152. Southpointe Dev., Inc. v. Cruikshank, 484 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1986); Kidd v. Fowler, 498 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
153. See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
155. Southpointe Dev., Inc. v. Cruikshank, 484 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1986).
156. hi. at 1362.
157. See infra notes 195-98 (Merger operates automatically without parallel cov-
enants in contract and deed in matters of 1) title, 2) possession, 3) quantity, and 4)
emblements).
158. 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 604 (1960).
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is now no good reason for refusing the appropriate form of relief
that would be given in other mistake cases. "
Title and the quantum of estate conveyed were the subjects at is-
sue in Kidd, 6 ' the other recent Florida case in which the plaintiff suc-
cessfully invoked mistake as his excuse to the otherwise fateful blow of
merger. In most of the merger cases, we have observed,"' the com-
plainant is the buyer who post-closing discovers a situation that is con-
trary to the representations or warranties of seller under the contract of
sale. In Kidd, however, the injured party was the seller of an apartment
building who had reserved to himself, in the contract, a right to occupy
one of the apartments rent-free for the rest of his life. The deed exe-
cuted at closing, however, which had been prepared by a closing agent,
failed to reserve the life estate. The issue arose when seller, having
lived in the apartment rent-free for thirteen months, was evicted at the
behest of his buyer, and the court below found that no life estate ex-
isted because the covenant providing for it was contained only in the
agreement of purchase and sale which had been extinguished by
merger. The appellate court reversed, however, holding that seller's
conveyance at closing of a quantum of estate larger than had been con-
tracted for was a mistake, and
[w]hile the doctrine (of merger) is a viable one, we will not apply it
where a mistake has clearly been made and equity demands refor-
mation . . . . We choose to find a mutual mistake which permits
the reformation of the deed so as to make it express the real agree-
ment and intention of the parties.162
Situations involving fraud or mistake are most often not labeled by
the courts as "exceptions" to the merger rule; rather, it is said that the
doctrine of merger simply "does not apply" to these situations. 63 Thus,
159. Southpointe, 484 So. 2d at 1362-63.
160. Kidd v. Fowler, 498 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
161. See APPENDIX infra.
162. Kidd, 498 So. 2d at 970.
163. See Kidd v. Fowler, 498 So. 2d 969, 970 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986);
Southpointe Development Inc. v. Cruikshank, 484 So. 2d 1361, 1363 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1986); 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 604 (1960); MILTON R.
FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 7.2, at 649; CUN-
NINGHAM, supra note 4, at 697 n.59. "[Merger] is said to be inapplicable to cases of
fraud or mistake." Pryor v. Aviola, 301 A.2d 306, 309 (Del. 1973). The reason for the
rule (that merger is inapplicable in cases of fraud) could not have been more aptly
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it would seem that the real art to survival of the injured party's claim
in these cases involves the characterization of the facts. The very same
factual situation may be characterized to appear as 1) pre-closing
fraud or mistake, in which case the merger rule simply "does not ap-
ply;" or 2) guiltless pre-closing activity, in which case the injured party
searches (sometimes with success; other times not) post-closing for an
"exception" to the rule. For example, why was it that (what turned out
to be) an erroneous statement by a seller concerning ingress and
egress,16 ' or the absence of municipal code violations, 65 was actionable
by the purchaser as an exception to the merger rule in each of those
cases, 166 while (what turned out to be) an erroneous statement concern-
ing the nature of a tenant's tenancy1 67 was there actionable by the pur-
chaser as fraud or misrepresentation?1 68 We could suggest an intellec-
tual answer to this question based upon scienter; i.e., whether the
perpetrator knew or should have known pre-closing of the false or erro-
neous facts or circumstances.' Another answer, intellectually unsatis-
stated than: "A contrary rule would work the absurd result of a fraudulent vendor
being insulated from legal liability by his very success in obtaining consummation of
the sale." Id.
164. Opler v. Wynne, 402 So. 2d Fla. 1309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev.
denied, 412 So. 2d 472 (1982) (the contractual covenant warranting ingress and egress
to the land is collateral or independent of the deed).
165, Sager v. Turner, 402 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (seller's
warranty against code violations did not merge into the deed because it was not in-
tended to merge and it is not necessarily fulfilled or satisfied by the conveyance).
166. Opler, 402 So. 2d at 1311; Sager, 402 So. 2d at 1283.
167. See Durden v. Century 21 Compass Points, 541 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1989) (seller's representation that the tenants in possession at the time of
contract were on a month to month lease was independent of the contract and "not the
type that merges in a deed").
168. See id. at 1266 (A seller's (mis)representations "are not the type that
merge in a deed at closing . . . because clearly they would be of no value or legal effect
unless they did survive the closing and acceptance of deed which act they were given to
induce.") (emphasis added).
169. See, e.g., Fraser v. Schoenfeld, 364 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (The merger doctrine was held applicable to preclude recovery where plaintiff
admittedly knew of code violations existent in the property before closing and neverthe-
less closed in face of them. The court took pains to point out however that this was a
case for breach of contract and not an action for fraud, thereby indicating that if it
were sounding in fraud then merger would be inapplicable); see also Sager v. Turner,
402 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (court emphasized the absence of any
pre-closing knowledge by plaintiff of the code violations, and sustained the plaintiff's
right to recover under an exception to the doctrine of merger).
19921 1199
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fying, was suggested by the court in Steinberg,170 that it really doesn't
matter whether the plaintiff's cause of action is grounded in fraud, mis-
take or breach of contract; the merger defense simply will not be avail-
able where seller's written representations later turn out to be
erroneous.
17 1
D. Why Was the Merger Rule Applied, or Not Applied; An
Attempt at Pigeon-holing
Having traced the history of the merger rule from English com-
mon law, having looked at the reasons for the rule from its origination,
having noted the adoption and development of the rule and its excep-
tions in early Florida case law, and having exposed some confusion and
inconsistencies in recent Florida case law regarding applicability of the
rule, we now address the perplexing question of why was the rule either
applied or not applied in these various cases?1"
One hypothesis in attempting to answer this question might be
that the type of contractual clause involved dictates whether or not the
merger rule should be applied. In pursuance of this hypothesis, all of
the Florida cases since 1930 were chronologically charted and notated
by 1) the nature of the contract clause involved, and 2) whether merger
or not the merger rule was applied.1 73 This exercise revealed that:
1. Merger applied in all of the title cases. 7"
170. Steinberg v. Bay Terrace Apartment Hotel, 363 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1978) (holding, without stated rationale or analysis, that a complaint brought
after closing and after discovery that apartment building could legally house only ten
tenants under city code, and not twenty-three tenants as represented in contract, does
state a cause of action either in fraud, or mistake, or for breach of contract representa-
tion, notwithstanding the defense of merger by acceptance of deed).
171. Of course, the conclusory holding in Steinberg allowing the cause of action
is an intellectual void, and causes us to wonder why the opposite result was reached in
Stephan v. Brown, where merger did apply to sustain the dismissal of plaintiff's com-
plaint in a cause of action for breach of contract due to violation of city code provi-
sions, where notification of such violations had been given to seller prior to closing. 233
So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
172. Perhaps the more worthwhile question is: Why should the rule either be
applied or not be applied in future cases? And even more thought provoking is the
query: Is the merger rule the "right" rule for analysis and adjudication of these types
of cases? These questions are addressed infra in part VI of this article.
173. See APPENDIX infra.
174. Id. (numbers two, five, nine, and thirteen).
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2. Merger applied in the obvious (!!??) accord and satisfaction fact
patterns."7 5
3. Merger did not apply to covenants regarding the physical condi-
tion of the property; those clauses survived.17 6
4. Merger did not apply to covenants that (inherently) were to be
performed post-closing; those covenants survived.' 77
5. Merger did not apply to covenants involving payment of consid-
eration; those covenants survived. 78
6. Merger did not apply to covenants concerning the priority status
of mortgages; those covenants survived.1'7
7. The Florida decisions'80 appear to be following the national
trends' 8' with respect to the subject matter of the several different
clauses summarized in paragraphs 1 through 6, above.
8. There is no consistency in the cases involving covenants against
code violations.' 82
9. There is no consistency in the cases involving attorneys fee
provisions. 83
The: problem with attempting to divide the cases into neat piles of
175. Id. (numbers six and ten).
176. Id. (numbers 14, 20, and 23).
177. Id. (numbers one, eight, and eighteen).
178. See APPENDIX infra (number eight); see also Annotation, Merger of Con-
tract in Deed, 38 A.L.R.2D 1310 (1954).
179. See APPENDIX infra (numbers three and four).
180. See supra notes 174-79.
181. As to the national trend respecting "title" cases, see CUNNINGHAM, supra
note 4, at 597 ("[Merger] is now largely limited to title provisions of the contract.").
See also Annotation, Merger of Contract in Deed, 38 A.L.R. 2D 1310 (1954) (cove-
nants regarding matters of title usually merge into the deed). As to the national trend
respecting "merger and accord and satisfaction," see 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS (1962). As to the national trend respecting the subject of "physical condi-
tion of the property," see Annotation, Defective Home-Vendor's Liability, 25 A.L.R.3D
383, 432 (1968) ("[Elxecutory covenants collateral to the passing of title do not merge
in a deed."). See also Annotation, Merger of Contract in Deed, 38 A.L.R. 2d 1310,
1325 (1954) ([It is generally held ...that provisions to make improvements or re-
pairs; although not incorporated in the deed are collateral thereto and survive it."). As
to the national trend respecting "post closing covenants," see Wiley v. Berg, 578 P.2d
384 (Or. .978) (those covenants to be performed post closing survive merger). As to
the national trend respecting "priority of a mortgage," see Snyder v. Roberts, 278 P.2d
348 (Wash. 1955) (covenants concerning the priority of mortgages usually do not
merge into the deed); Annotation, Vendee's Obligation-Deed-Merger, 52 A.L.R.2D
647 (1955).
182. See APPENDIX infra (numbers nine, eleven, and twelve).
183. Id. (numbers 19, 24, 26, and 27).
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1) "yes, merged," or 2) "no merger," based upon the type of contrac-
tual clause involved, is that the decisions in these cases generally do not
rise or fall strictly on the clause, itself; so many other facts and circum-
stances bombard the court. So, while it would be convenient and or-
derly to pigeon-hole the various types of contract clauses so that deter-
mination of survival is simply a function of checking our master list to
see whether the subject clause falls in the "merged" or the "no
merger" column (and, in fact, certain types of clauses do lend them-
selves to such easy disposition), 184 the vast majority of the cases involve
more complicated circumstances to the extent that the ultimate deci-
sion really turns on rationale other than the merger rule per se (al-
though merger is cited by the court to substantiate its conclusion).186 In
other words, either applying merger or an exception to merger becomes
the justification for the court's result-oriented decision, a determination
reached on other grounds. Thus, the consistencies revealed by a sterile
survey of the recent Florida cases,"" and the conformity of the Florida
cases to "national trends, ' 1 87 is simply fortuitous with respect to docu-
menting patterns or general rules in the applicability of the merger
doctrine, because the preponderance of cases are not "true merger"
cases at all but instead involve some form of accord and satisfaction.
VI. "MERGER" HAS BECOME JUST A BUZZWORD; "ACCORD
AND SATISFACTION" IS THE MORE APPROPRIATE DOCTRINE IN
MOST CASES
The notion of applying the doctrine of merger to terminate obliga-
tions arising under real estate contracts developed, we recall, from the
184. The "Title" cases.
185. See the discussion of Opler, supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text, as
a case in point. In Opler a buyer's action for breach of the contract covenant of access
was sustained, the court holding that "[tihe buyer's acceptance of the seller's deed as
well as his acquiescence to the remainder of seller's performance did not constitute a
merger because the seller's covenant expressly warranted that there was ingress and
egress to the land." 402 So. 2d at 1311 (emphasis added). This circuitous statement
not only begs the question of merger, but sidesteps the true issue of the case, whether
the parties intended that the covenant be released at closing. The court in essence re-
solved that issue in the negative, by allowing the contract action under the guise of
several recognized exceptions to the merger rule.
186. See, e.g., APPENDIX infra.
187. See supra note 181.
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common law precepts involving the merger of estates. 88 It is the thesis
of this section of this article that although the theory is doctrinally cor-
rect and although the application of the theory in the early cases was
correct, its employment in more recent years-both affirmatively, as
well as negatively (through the growth of "exceptions" to the
rule)-has deviated so far from the basic tenets of the merger doctrine
that its use in current cases is for name recognition value only, and its
true analytical worth has been bastardized. Furthermore, this article
postulates that the theoretically correct doctrine applicable in most of
these cases today is that of accord and satisfaction.
Applying the strict tenets of the common law doctrine of merger to
the real estate transaction, the theory maintains that the conveyance of
legal title at closing (such title being the "greater estate" as expressed
in the classic common law statement of the doctrine) absorbs, annihi-
lates and extinguishes the equitable title and rights under contract of
sale (the "lesser estate"). 189 Since the tenets of the common law doc-
trine of merger further dictate that merger shall occur only when the
two estates coincide in one and the same person, at one and the same
time, in one and the same right, and for one and the same purpose, 90
then a fortiori the only time that the merger rule should apply in real
estate transactions is where there exists identity in the content and sub-
stance of' the contested contract clause and the instrument of convey-
ance. This identity requirement may be looked at as the need for "par-
allelism" between the contract and the deed, whereby the separate
contract and deed provisions must address one and the same, identical,
substantive subject matter in order that merger pertain. 19' This paral-
lelism may be found to exist either 1) in actuality in the content of the
two separate instruments, or 2) by implication because the subject at
hand is so fundamental to real property that the law deems it embodied
188. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND
(1966).
189. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
190. Id. See also the very recent Florida case where the court, speaking of the
doctrine of merger in a trust context, stated that, "merger applies only when the legal
and equitable interests are held by one person and are coextensive and commensu-
rate-i.e., the legal estate and the equitable estate are the same." Contella v. Contella,
559 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis in original). "Coextensive"
is defined as having the same scope or boundaries. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 439 (1981). "Commensurate" is defined as equal in measure or
extent; corresponding in size, extent, amount or degree. Id. at 456.
191. 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1319, at 310 (1962).
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within the content of both instruments.
Carefully adhering to the common law roots of the merger doc-
trine, the early cases (e.g., Bull)192 seized upon four specific facets of
any real estate transaction as appropriate for operation of the rule even
if actual parallelism was missing: 1) title, 2) possession, 3) quantity,
and 4) emblements (these four aspects being sometimes referred to in
this article as the "Bull criteria"). 193 Why? If the subject matter of the
contract covenant sought to be enforced involves the title to the land, or
the possession of the land, or the quantity of land conveyed, or the
emblements of the land,"" then-reasons Bull-merger must certainly,
above all, be deemed to apply and the succeeding deed must be deemed
to extinguish the earlier contract covenant because each of these four
aspects are so basic, so essential in every real estate transaction that
the law infers the necessary parallelism even if the parties' documents
did not expressly manifest it. Simply put, these four aspects are inher-
ent in the land.
The "Bull criteria" emerged as the answer to the basic question in
these cases, which was phrased by the Bull court as being "a nice and
difficult question, to determine whether covenants contained in an
agreement for the sale of land are collateral to those providing for the
execution of the deed, or are so connected with it, as to be at an end
and become merged or satisfied in the execution of the deed."' 95 The
Bull court and the plethora of cases that followed and approved Bull
thus analyzed and ruled that these four legal aspects, title, possession,
quantity and emblements, are so basic to real property, are so "con-
nected with it,"' 96 that the law supplies their existence to Act II1 1 of
the real estate transaction play even when the parties themselves were
silent in that Act, thereby fulfilling the common law requirement of
identity and allowing the doctrine of merger to operate. And to com-
plete the equation, Bull further states the corollary to the rule, that
absent actual parallelism the lesser estate (the contract) will not be
deemed merged into the greater estate (the deed) if the contract cove-
nant sub judice involves some subject other than the title, possession,
192. Bull v. Willard, 9 Barb. 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 645.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. "Act II" being the closing document(s); e.g., the deed of conveyance, that
follows-after the intermission-Act I of the play, the contract of sale. See supra notes
21, 22 and accompanying text.
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quantity or emblements of the land (i.e., if the contract covenant does
not involve a "Bull criterion"). 198
Unfortunately, as the years passed, application of the doctrine of
merger to decide real estate transaction cases was extended well be-
yond situations involving the title, possession, quantity or emblements
of the land, and far into situations in which the two sets of provisions
(those in the contract, and those in the deed) lacked identity and did
not address the same subject.'99 The once clear and carefully circum-
scribed doctrine became a hackneyed rule of law, a buzzword or
"handy phrase"200 for the courts to invoke as justification for result-
oriented decisions denying post-closing enforcement of the contract of
sale. Demanding equal if not more time and attention, and perhaps a
product of modernization (could Bull have envisioned contract cove-
nants warranting the sound mechanical condition of the air condition-
ing equipment, or that water, sewer and electric service are available
with sufficient capacity for a 45,000 square foot office building?), 20 1 the
courts also found it necessary to develop a whole series of ad hoc excep-
tions to their supposed body of merger doctrine case law in order to
justify result-oriented decisions allowing enforcement of the contract
after the closing. Having lost its common law historical rudder, the
classic doctrine of merger as applied to real estate transactions was
bastardized and left floundering as an overextended rule, which re-
sulted in cultivation of a multitude of exceptions as an attempt to
maintain direction, but in reality served only to keep the "doctrine" on
a circuitous course. Sadly, the once noble and useful doctrine is being
swallowed by its exceptions.
Fleischer v. Hi Rise Homes, Inc.,202 a December 1988 Florida
case, however, steers us back to Bull to straighten our course in the
application of the doctrine of merger. Whether knowingly or fortui-
tously, Fleischer's unnecessary reference2 03 to Bull planted the seed
198. Bull, 9 Barb. at 644-45.
199. See, e.g., Soper v. Stine, 184 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966)
(applying the doctrine of merger to buyer's covenants to make deferred payments for
inventory, fixtures and goodwill).
200. 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1319, at 310 (1962) ("The
phrase 'discharged by merger' . . . is merely a 'handy' phrase, of convenient uncer-
tainty and obscurity, that is used so as to avoid the necessity of clear thinking and
accurate analysis.").
201. Campbell v. Rawls, 381 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
202. 536 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
203. Id. at 1107.
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that prompts re-evaluation of the merger rule from a refreshing doctri-
nal viewpoint, reminding us of the common law roots and requirements
of the rule. Hearken to the common law identity requirement, pro-
claims Bull, and recall that merger may occur only if the greater and
lesser estates coincide in the same person, in the same right, and for the
same purpose. Recall further that the identity requirement may be ful-
filled in actuality (by parallel content), °4 or by implication (by the
Bull criteria). But since all four Bull criteria may not necessarily be
the salient property characteristics appertaining today,20 5 most impor-
tantly recall the underlying philosophy of Bull, that the law will inject
the deed with the parallelism needed to fulfill the identity requirement
where the subject matter of the contract clause is a type that is inher-
ent in all real property. These are the cases of "true merger," allowing
for (nay, demanding) analysis and determination based on the doctrine
of merger in its purest form. In any other situation, that is in the ab-
sence of either 1) actual parallelism of covenants in both the contract
and the deed, or 2) parallelism inferred under the Bull umbrella of
those covenants so inherently connected to the land, the issue of
whether the covenant remains enforceable must be analyzed and de-
cided based on the theory of accord and satisfaction. °
Thus, the facts of any case seeking enforcement of a real estate
contract covenant after the closing must be critically analyzed in a two-
step process (which is sometimes hereinafter referred to as the "Two-
Step" analysis): 20 7
1. Does the requisite parallelism exist (either in actuality, or by
204. Merger operates to discharge contractual obligations, much as accord and
satisfaction, novation, or substitute contracts discharge, executory covenants. See 6 AR-
THUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1293, at 185 (1962).
205. Whether these particular four categories are still the only or the appropriate
areas that fulfill the identity requirement, is a separate issue; e.g., does anyone know
what an "emblement" is? However, identifying the specific areas of true merger is not
as important as understanding that the principle of "sameness" or identity of right and
purpose must apply to have a "true merger" situation; for once that element is taken
into account, identifying specific areas will naturally follow.
206. "The actual use of the merger rule can often be explained as a way of
regarding the delivery and acceptance of the deed as a sort of accord and satisfaction."
Reed v. Hasell, 340 A.2d 157, 161 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975) (interestingly, merger was
claimed by the purchaser to disallow seller's use of an exculpatory clause contained in
the contract).




et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Ginsburg
implication through a Bull criterion) to invoke operation of true
merger?
-If yes (a "TRUE MERGER" case), the covenant is
deemed extinguished and is unenforceable (absent fraud
or mistake).
-If no (a "NON-MERGER" case), we are not dealing
with an "exception" to the doctrine of merger. Merger
should not even be a topic of discussion. For want of
parallelism, merger cannot be called upon to decide the
case. Does this mean, therefore, that the covenant is au-
tomatically enforceable? Absolutely not! We need to
proceed to step number two, and ask
2. Has an accord and satisfaction occurred under this same set of
facts (in this "NON-MERGER" case)?
The topic of accord and satisfaction, and its various ramifications,
is justifiably the subject of numerous separate law review articles20'
and no pretense is here made to invade that territory. It is sufficient to
say that the term is used in this article in its generally accepted sense,
to identify that certain recognized method of discharging and terminat-
ing an existing obligation by the obligor rendering some performance
different from that originally obliged and the obligee accepting the sub-
stituted performance as full satisfaction of his rights;20 9 or, more simply
put-a settlement.2 10
Applied to contract and deed in real estate transactions, the theory
is that parties may-by this method called accord and satisfac-
tion-discharge (or be deemed to have discharged) obligations existing
under their contract for the sale of property by fulfilling substituted
agreements or by rendering some performance acceptable to the other
party even though different from that originally contracted for. The
"accord" is the agreement (and therefore must be duly supported by
consideration) to give on the one hand, and to accept on the other
hand, something different from that originally and rightfully due, in
full discharge of the original rights and liabilities. The "satisfaction" is
208. See Scott J. Burnham, A Primer On Accord & Satisfaction, 47 MONT. L.
REV. 1 (1986); Joseph C. Sleeth, Jr., Comment, Executory Accord, Accord and Satis-
faction, and Novation - The Distinctions 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 185 (1974); Note, Con-
tracts, Accord & Satisfaction, Liquidated Debt, 14 TEMP. L.Q. 279 (1940).
209. 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1276, at 115 (1962).
210. Id. at 115. Settlement is defined as "Act or process of adjusting or deter-
mining .... ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1231 (5th ed. 1979).
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the execution or performance carrying out the substituted agree-
ment,211 evidenced in the real estate transaction typically by the deliv-
ery and acceptance of the deed.
Hence, in the "NON-MERGER" case (which now more accu-
rately should be called a "POSSIBLE ACCORD-SAT." case), the
parties have delivered and accepted closing document(s) that are differ-
ent (either by silence, or by some degree of conflict) from their original
contract. The issue for analysis in terms of a possible accord and satis-
faction becomes whether the parties by their manifested intentions and
actions during the executory period or at closing arrived at a substi-
tuted understanding-or by law must be deemed to have reached such
substitution-so that the delivery and acceptance of the closing docu-
ment constitutes fulfillment of that understanding and a discharge of
the original contract.
It is interesting to stop a moment and take note at this point that
the presumptions of result are exactly opposite each other in the opera-
tion of the two theories under discussion (although this consequence
should be of no influence in determining which theory is applicable
under a specific set of facts). The presumption under the merger rule is
that the contract covenant died; under accord and satisfaction, it is pre-
sumed to live. Under the doctrine of merger, the contract is deemed
extinguished and therefore unenforceable, unless fraud or mistake can
be shown. Under the theory of accord and satisfaction, the contract
covenant is presumed to survive and thus be enforceable, unless it can
be shown that the parties agreed otherwise. This theme weaves its way
through the following analysis of several recent Florida cases, and we
return to this topic and its significance, infra,21 2 at the conclusion of
this section.
Not surprisingly, if we analyze some of the recent Florida
"merger" cases213 through the Two-Step process we expose that what
have heretofore been labelled as the familiar "exceptions" to merger,
are actually misapplications of the doctrine and its body of departures.
Because parallelism is lacking, the cases are not submissive to true
merger. Thus, these "exceptions" should be cast aside, and these cases
should be viewed more clearly and honestly in the context and theorem
of accord and satisfaction. As an example of this strategy, let us re-
211. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 417 cmt. a (1932); 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1276 (1962).
212. See infra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
213. The cases listed in APPENDIX infra.
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examine several of the recent Florida cases that involved sellers' cove-
nants negating code violations in the property,2 and analyze whether
the parties expressly or impliedly agreed during the executory period
that the particular seller's liability under said covenant would termi-
nate al: closing (for otherwise, his liability carries on).
In each of these cases, Steinberg, Fraser, and Sager,2 15 the respec-
tive seller represented or warranted in the contract of sale, but not in
the deed of conveyance, that there existed no violations of city codes or
ordinances in the property; and in each case, the purchaser closed and
later brought suit for breach of the contract covenant. In Steinberg and
Sager, the contract was held enforceable; in Fraser, the contract was
held unenforceable.
Under the Two-Step analysis, we first probe for parallelism, either
actual ,or by implication.21 6 The reported facts in all three cases disclose
no covenants against code violations contained in any of the deeds,21 7
and such silence is typical.21 8 Hence, there is no actual parallelism.
Can parallelism be inferred under the Bull fundaments? 219 Covenants
against code violations fall neither within any of the four specific Bull
criteria nor within the "inherent-in-the-land" rationale of Bull;220
hence, the facts and logic compel a negative response to the inquiry of
Step One-these three cases are not candidates for "true merger." We
now proceed to Step Two.
Studied from the viewpoint of accord and satisfaction, the cardinal
facts in Fraser are that the purchaser discovered the code violations
during the executory period, confronted his seller with them, and stated
his intention not to close.
However, after the seller threatened suit, the purchaser did close
the transaction and he accepted the deed and possession of the prop-
214. See Sager v. Turner, 402 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Fra-
ser v. Schoenfeld, 364 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App, 1978); Steinberg v. Bay
Terrace Apartment Hotel, 363 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
215. Sager, 402 So. 2d at 1282; Fraser, 364 So. 2d at 533; Steinberg, 363 So. 2d
at 59.
216. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
217. See Sager, 402 So. 2d at 1283; Fraser, 364 So. 2d at 533; Steinberg, 363
So. 2d at 59.
218. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 689.02-.03 (1990) (statutorily prescribed form of
warranty deed).
219. See Bull v. Willard, 9 Barb. 641, 645 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850); see also supra
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erty. This interaction between purchaser and seller during the execu-
tory period and the resolution of their confrontation could well be seen
as an accord, and of course closing the purchase and accepting the deed
constituted the satisfaction. By his actions, the purchaser in Fraser is
deemed to have agreed to acceptance of the property "as is," as he saw
it with his own eyes.22' Therefore, the contract covenant was correctly
held unenforceable, not by the operation of merger but by an accord
and satisfaction. 2
However, in Steinberg223 and Sager " there was no evidence of an
accord during the executory period. Again, analyzing these cases from
the viewpoint of accord and satisfaction, we start with the presumption
that the seller's liability under his contract warranty against present
code violations remains viable until exhausted by the statute of limita-
tions.225 Was there any action by purchaser and seller between the con-
tract signing and the passage of the deed in either of these cases to
evidence an understanding that seller's liability should end any earlier?
Combing the facts in both cases, we find none. Significantly, although
not singularly controlling, knowledge of the code violations came to
light after the respective closings in both Steinberg and Sager;226 thus,
there could be no justification for supposing an accord based upon pur-
chaser's resolution of he had been personally aware of prior to closing
such as the purchaser in Fraser.227 Moreover, there are no other facts
apparent in either Steinberg or Sager to indicate any other intention by
the parties to amend, modify or substitute their original agreement.
There being no evidence of an "accord," the closing cannot be viewed
as a "satisfaction" in either of these cases, and the earlier contract cov-
enant lived on to be enforced in both cases. 2 8
Any number of the other recent Florida "merger" cases229 could
likewise be analyzed from the Two-Step viewpoint suggested above.230
Hopefully, a few more examples will be illustrative of the thesis sug-
221. Fraser, 364 So. 2d at 534 (purchaser who closes with knowledge of a breach
of a contractual covenant is barred, by merger, from suing under the contract).
222. Id.
223. Steinberg, 363 So. 2d at 58.
224. Sager, 402 So. 2d at 1282.
225. Id. at 1283; Steinberg 363 So. 2d at 59.
226. Sager, 402 So. 2d at 1283; Steinberg 363 So. 2d at 59.
227. See supra note 221.
228. Sager, 402 So. 2d at 1283; Steinberg 363 So. 2d at 59.
229. See APPENDIX infra.
230. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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gested herein, that merger has become just a buzzword and that these
cases clamor for deeper analysis. In Campbell v. Rawls,2"' for instance,
plaintiffs-purchasers' cause of action brought after the closing was
based on seller's breach of that part of the contract of sale that pro-
vided: "Seller warrants air conditioning and heating systems, . . . to be
in working order at time of closing." 32 The court affirmed enforcement
of the contract, stating that "the warranty in this case is the type of
independent covenant generally excepted from the merger doctrine.1"23
Under the Two-Step analysis, was the topic of merger even germane to
the court's consideration of the case? That is, was this case a potential
"true merger" situation? The deed was apparently silent (as is typi-
cal)23" with respect to the condition of the air conditioning and heating
systems, so there was no actual parallelism. The only remaining in-
quiry, then, is whether the mechanics of heating and cooling systems
"look to," or are so "connected with," the land2 35 as to be deemed inef-
faceable to the real estate transaction. Assuming a negative response to
this inquiry (the answer suggested by Bull, its legacy, and the dictates
of common law),236 there cannot possibly be true merger. Step Two,
then, calls for scrutiny of the facts in search of possible accord and
satisfaction. Interestingly, the seller's airconditioning warranty quoted
above 23 7 went on to provide that "Buyer, at his expense, may inspect
such systems [three] days prior to Closing, and in the event discrepan-
cies exist, Seller will repair same at Seller's expense." Buyers (plain-
tiffs) did not inspect prior to closing, for had they done so their action
could well have been viewed as the same "accord" as our previous anal-
ysis imputed to the purchaser in Fraser.38
The court in Campbell specifically addressed the question of
whether the above-quoted "three-day" clause made it incumbent on the
buyers to critique the equipment prior to closing, and the court re-
231. 381 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
232. Id. at 745.
233. Id. at 746.
234. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 689.02-.03 (1990) (statutorily prescribed form of
warranty deed).
235. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
236. See Bull v. Willard, 9 Barb. 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850); see also supra notes
194-96 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text. The court achieved the
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sponded in the negative, stating: "[W]e construe the plain language of
the agreement to mean that the [buyers] were not required to inspect
the premises three days before closing and report discrepancies [in or-
der] to preserve their rights under the warranty."23 9 The reported facts
in Campbell reveal no other suggestion of a superseding agreement or
mutually agreed substituted performance.24 0 Hence, since the contract
is presumed to live unless an accord and satisfaction be shown, the
plaintiffs' cause of action for breach of contract should justifiably be
sustained under this analysis. Same result; different theory. The court
reached its conclusion to enforce the contract through exceptions to the
merger doctrine;2"' our audit through the Two-Step process and the
context of accord and satisfaction, which we proffer as the more intel-
lectually honest approach, reaches the same result.
American National Self Storage v. Lopez-Aguiar42 can well serve
as another of the recent Florida cases to be looked at from the new
Two-Step perspective. The plaintiff-buyer there sued his seller, we re-
call,243 for breach of the seller's representations and warranties under
the contract of sale "that water, sewer and electric service are presently
available at the property line or lines of the premises with sufficient
capacity to accommodate a 45,000 sq. ft. office/warehouse building;"2"
and the cause of action was allowed, over the objection of merger, by
virtue of several of the recognized exceptions to the merger rule. 45 The
reported facts specifically state that the deed contained no warranty
regarding the availability of water, sewer or electric service. Testing for
true merger, there surely was no actual parallelism. The inquiry once
again then becomes whether these covenants (about the availability of
water, sewer and electric service) are sufficiently inbred, intrinsic and
deep-rooted in the land so as to justify an implication of the identity
necessary for true merger.
The American National court was certainly on the right track
when it reviewed and recited roughly fifteen cases from Florida and
other jurisdictions that demonstrated the dichotomy between the types
of clauses that are "usually included in the terms of a deed" and there-
239. Campbell, 381 So. 2d at 746.
240. Id. at 744.
241. Id. at 746.
242. 521 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
243. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
244. American Nat'l, 521 So. 2d at 304.
245. Id. at 305-06.
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fore merger is mandated, versus those types of clauses that "call for
acts by the seller which go beyond merely conveying clear title and
placing the purchaser in possession of the property" in which cases
merger does not apply. 46 Indeed, the court's conclusion negating
merger with regard to this seller's warranty of utilities availability was
somewhat reminiscent of Bull when it reasoned that covenant "is not
an agreement usually contained in a deed, related to the condition of
the title to property, or satisfied by the execution and delivery of the
deed.124 7 The court thus closely approached the "true merger" concept,
but did not quite reach it. All that was missing at this point was an
analysis of why merger did or did not apply in the fifteen or sixteen
instances summarized, namely because the requisite identity in "right"
and "purpose," as required by the common law for the merger of es-
tates,2" 8 either did or did not exist in the respective sets of contract and
deed covenants. Instead, the American National court swerved to the
''exceptions" sidetrack to overcome the merger defense.
The court, having reached the correct conclusion in Step One that
true merger was unavailing, was then ready for analysis under Step
Two, as to whether plaintiff's cause of action on the contract might
have been precluded by reason of accord and satisfaction. Again, the
court was on the right track, and did in fact recognize that the parties
might have intended to reach an accord and satisfaction but sufficient
facts simply were not in the record.2 49 Accordingly, the court remanded
the case for further evidentiary hearing, at which time defendant-seller
might "[attempt] to prove, by evidence other than the deed itself, that
the parties intended that the warranty of the contract of sale was to be
extinguished by the conveyance of the property;"2 50 i.e., that the parties
intended and reached an accord and satisfaction.
Another of the recent Florida cases, Southpointe Development,
Inc. v, Cruikshank,25' serves to illustrate that true merger is alive and
well, as is a "true exception" to true merger, and that modern-day
cases may scrupulously be resolved through analysis that extends only
through Step One of the Two-Step process. Although it does not cite
Bull, Southpointe clearly supports the Bull criteria. As recalled from
246. Id.
247. Id. at 306.
241. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
249. American Nat'l, 521 So. 2d at 306.
250. Id.
251. 484 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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earlier discussion,"' the seller in Southpointe agreed to sell to the pur-
chasers the "Sunrise Golf Course Club House, cart sheds, and mainte-
nance sheds, ' 253 and after closing it was discovered that the deed failed
to convey the maintenance shed property; the purchasers sued.
At first blush this would appear to be a modern-day, open-and-
shut case absolving defendant on the basis of true merger since it in-
volved one of the four specific criteria of Bull, the quantity of land
conveyed. Accordingly, the answer to the Step One question254 is "yes,"
and it would seem that the trial court's summary judgment for defend-
ant-seller should be affirmed without much ado: Covenants respecting
the quantity of land to be conveyed merge into the deed and are extin-
guished. 55 However, just as there exist limited situations of true
merger, so too are there limited situations that constitute legitimate
exceptions to true merger, 2 6 and one of those situations happens to be
in the case of mistake. 5 Thus, the court in Southpointe correctly re-
versed the summary judgment for seller grounded on merger and re-
manded the case for trial on the "unresolved material issues of fact
relating to the parties' intention to convey the property in question and
to whether the omission was a mutual mistake."2 58 The doctrine of
merger thus remains viable to factual situations that embrace the req-
uisites of "true merger," but so too is at least one rightful exception
thereto, mistake-even with respect to such core Bull elements as
"quantity" and "title. ' 25 9
Nevertheless, and of most significance to analyzing the "merger"
cases from the Two-Step viewpoint, Southpointe teaches by example
that a true merger case may properly be resolved wholly at Step One.
Having fulfilled the requisites to qualify as a case of true merger, the
Southpointe real estate transaction must be steadfastly viewed as func-
252. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
253. Southpointe, 484 So. 2d at 1362.
254. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. The classic exceptions to true
merger are mistake, accident and fraud. The courts generally (and correctly) do not
refer to these as exceptions, but instead simply say that merger "does not apply" here.
See, e.g., Southpointe Dev. Inc. v. Cruikshank, 484 So. 2d 1361, 1362 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1986) ("[T]he principle of Merger does not apply in cases of mistake.")
(emphasis added).
257. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
258. Southpointe, 484 So. 2d at 1362 (emphasis added).
259. 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 604 (1960).
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tus officio, and it would be doctrinally unsound to consider accord and
satisfaction, if it is factually determined on remand that there was no
mistake. Southpointe further illustrates, however, that progression to
Step Two may nevertheless be warranted in a true merger case if in
fact the omission in the deed was due to mistake, for even though the
plaintiff is saved from the doom of merger by reason of the mistake, it
is still conceivable that the actions of the parties during the executory
period might evidence an accord that was fully satisfied by the delivery
and acceptance of the deed.
In bringing this section to a close, it could not be more fitting than
to harken back to the earliest Florida merger case of this century, Ga-
bel v. Simmons,26 as the bellwether of the Two-Step thesis propounded
herein. With regard to Step One (whether the requisite parallelism ex-
ists to permit the operation of true merger), 261 Gabel warned us, 'tho
superficially, not to become engulfed in the merger rule where "not
appropriate. '26  Yet Gabel itself and at least twenty-six subsequent
Florida appellate cases became so mired,263 and it was not until
Fleischer v. Hi Rise Homes, Inc.264 in December, 1988-by its refer-
ence to Bull-that we are directed out of our quag.
In rejecting defendant's contention that plaintiffs' action on the
contract of sale was barred by merger (i.e., in finding "exceptions" to
the merger rule), the court in Gabel took pains to point out that it was
"not appropriate" for a closing document to include a clause of the
type on which the Gabel breach of contract action was based 26 5 (the
provision for refund of buyers' purchase price if they were dissatisfied
with the property). Conversely, if it was appropriate for the closing
document to include such a provision, then it follows that merger
would apply. This initial stage of the court's analysis concurs in theory
with Bull and with Step One of the Two-Step thesis: If the requisite
parallelism does not exist in order to invoke true merger, the contract
covenant is prima facie enforceable. The court then could have set
about Step Two, checking for an accord and satisfaction, but it didn't.
Rather, the court adjudicated the "merger" issue straightforward on
260. 129 So. 777 (Fla. 1930).
261. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
262 Gabel, 129 So. at 778.
263. Id. at 778; see also APPENDIX infra.
264. 536 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
265. Gabel, 129 So. at 778.
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the basis of several of the well-known "exceptions" to merger,6 Nev-
ertheless, we can advance our analysis to Step Two and scrutinize the
facts of Gabel to see if the elements of an accord and satisfaction were
fulfilled.
Recall,26 7 that plaintiff-buyer here sued his seller for refund of all
monies paid (deposit and down payment at closing) based on a contract
covenant by seller that "[i]f purchaser is dissatisfied after 90 days
from closing, all monies paid shall be returned with 10% interest."26
Purchasers requested (and then, demanded) return of their money on
numerous occasions: Before, at, and after expiration of the ninety days.
About a month after the expiration of the 90 days, defendant-seller
attempted to mollify plaintiffs and attempted to delay return of the
money so as "to allow them (plaintiffs) to dispose of the property at a
profit to themselves," and promised to return the money at an extended
date "if plaintiffs were still dissatisfied with their purchase. ' 269 Was
there an accord and satisfaction under these facts? Impossible. The
covenant contemplated performance after closing,270 and all of the con-
versations and interaction of buyer and seller regarding the requested
refund took place after closing. None of the activity or the conversa-
tions took place during the executory period, so there is nothing to sup-
port an accord, respecting which the closing might have in any fashion
constituted a satisfaction. Perhaps the more relevant question is
whether the parties' post-closing activities constituted a novation, 271
and while the court didn't actually raise this question, it answered it by
ruling that the "new promise" to return the money at the extended
date, which promise was made approximately 120 days after the clos-
ing, "did not affect the plaintiffs' right to a return of the money. "272
The above discussion of several recent Florida cases not only il-
luminates the more honest and clear thinking of the "Two-Step" analy-
sis, but also suggests why the modern trend of the cases is "pro-life" to
the contract, favoring the enforceability of more and more contract
266. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
267. See notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
268. Gabel, 129 So. at 777 (emphasis added).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. The "first cousin" of accord and satisfaction. See 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1300, at 228 (1962) ("A novation is like accord and satisfac-
tion. ... ).
272. Gabel, 129 So. at 778.
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provis;ions.27 3 For while the predominant number of recent decisions has
been in favor of sustaining enforceability of the contract provisions
through "exceptions" to merger, what these statistics really demon-
strate is a shift in presumptions corresponding with the shift in theories
suggested above-the shift from merger to accord and satisfaction.
Under the doctrine of merger, of course, the contract covenant is pre-
sumed to have perished, but under the accord and satisfaction theory,
the "more appropriate" theory in most cases as suggested above, the
covenant is presumed mortal, viable and enforceable. 74 The recent sta-
tistics overwhelmingly bear out the trend towards enforcement of the
contract covenants.2 75 So in the shift of doctrines, and in the shift of
presumptions, the burden of proof also changes from he who seeks to
enforce the contract, to he who seeks to prevent enforcement. And per-
haps, as touched on in the next section,276 this is how it "should be"
from a policy standpoint.
VII. CONCLUSION
So now we reach the point where we lean back, acknowledge the
problem, the confusion and the misapplication of the doctrine, and ask
what can we do to rectify this situation.
More specifically, our travels have revealed that real estate buyers
and sellers are repeatedly confronted with post-closing legal problems
that could have been resolved by their contract covenants if raised pre-
closing, but weren't. So the issue at this point in time (after passage of
the deed) becomes: Is it too late? Not because of a statute of limita-
tions; not because of laches; not because of caveat emptor or the parol
evidence rule (although there certainly is overlap);2 77 but because of a
notion that all good things must (at some point in time) come to an
end. 271l
From a broad, social policy perspective, we can view the problem
thusly::
273. See APPENDIX infra; see also supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
274. 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1276 (1962).
275. See APPENDIX infra; see also supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
276. See infra note 313 and accompanying text.
277. See 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 573-76, at 356
(1960).
278. "Some time an end there is of every deed." CHAUCER, THE KNIGHTES
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Bestowing effect upon the doctrine of merger is typically a boon to
the seller. 279 He stands released and discharged from otherwise en-
forceable contractual obligations. He got away with it, to the detri-
ment of his buyer.
Refusing to recognize merger allows survival of contract covenants
past the closing, and is typically a boon to the buyer. 280 He made
his bed; he slept in it; and he gets a chance to re-make the bed if
his slumber is disturbed. He gets a second bite at the apple, to the
detriment of his seller.
Several ideas are posed as possible resolutions to the problem: 1)
Statutory legislation; 2) Adoption of a "standard" provision on merger
in widely used form contracts; 3) Educated and tailored contract prep-
aration; and 4) Enlightened judicial construction.
A. Statutory Legislation
Legislate a hard and fast rule by statute. For example, all cove-
nants of the contract of sale shall survive delivery of the deed. Or, all
covenants of the contract shall be deemed extinguished by merger into
the deed. Or, should the statute carve out particular contract covenants
that shall always survive closing, and specify other contract covenants
and subject matters that shall always be deemed extinguished and un-
enforceable? And if so, then which type of covenants shall survive, and
which shall be extinguished? And, can statutory language be crafted to
clearly identify the particular subject matters that shall always fall into
one category or the other?2 81 Perhaps this short series of questions
demonstrates the futility of seeking to resolve the problem by statute.
Nevertheless, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws did propose resolution of the merger problem by stat-
ute, in its adoption of the Uniform Land Transaction Act (ULTA). 282
279. The deed typically contains fewer seller covenants than the contract. See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. § 689.02-.03 (1990) (statutorily prescribed form of warranty deed).
Strict merger reduces the number of covenants, by operating to enforce only the cove-
nants in the deed. The seller then by the operation of merger emerges burdened with
fewer obligations when he is freed from the contract covenants.
280. The buyer, conversely, typically wants all of the contractual covenants
enforceable.
281. See infra notes 282-85 and accompanying text.
282. The act was approved by the Conference in 1975. See UNIFORM LAND
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Proposed Section 1-309 of the ULTA essentially would have eliminated
the doctrine of merger, in that it provided as follows:
Acceptance by a buyer or a secured party of a deed or other instru-
ment of conveyance is not of itself a waiver or renunciation of any
of his rights under the contract under which the deed or other in-
strument of conveyance is given and does not of itself relieve any
party of the duty to perform all of his obligations under the
contract. 8"
For whatever reasons (certainly going beyond the sole issue of merger),
the ULTA was never adopted by even one state,2 84 and as of June,
1991 "the ULTA is a dead horse."2 " Perhaps this too demonstrates the
futility of endeavoring to resolve the merger issue through legislation.
B. Form Contracts
Adoption of a standard position on merger by inclusion of an ap-
propriate paragraph in the "standard form" real estate contract(s) in
prevalent use by the bar and by real estate agents in the state, is an-
other suggestion to resolve the merger problem.
Certainly, the courts respect the parties' manifested intent that the
contract covenants shall, or shall not, survive the closing of the transac-
tion.28 Several popular printed-form contracts are in use in Florida to-
day, and all of them are silent with regard to whether the covenants
thereof' survive passage of the deed.287 Inclusion of a "standard"
TRANSACTIONS ACT, 13 ULTA. 472 (1977) (history of the Act); Dunham, Merger by
Deed-Was It Ever Automatic 10 GA. L. REV. 419 (1976) (comprehensive examina-
tion by a Commissioner on Uniform State Laws and the Chairman of the Special Com-
mittee which drafted the Uniform Act).
283. UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 1-309, 13 U.L.T.A. 500-01 (1977)
(repealing the doctrine of merger for realty just as the U.C.C. made merger inapplica-
ble for goods). See generally UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607 (buyer can still sue
for breach of contract after acceptance of tender); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-
608 (buyer can revoke acceptance of goods).
284. UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT, 13 U.L.T.A. 469 (1977 and Supp. 1
1991); see also U.L.TA. DIRECTORY OF ACTS (1991 Pamph.).
285. Telephone interview with John McCabe of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Unification of State Laws (June 19, 1991).
286. See Campbell v. Rawls, 381 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (con-
tract covenants were implicitly deemed to survive the closing).
287. An examination of ten prevalent form contracts used in Florida revealed no
mention of any provisions for the survival or the discharge of contract covenants upon
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merger provision would fill the void of this silence.
For example, The Florida Bar and the Florida Association of
Realtors have for many years jointly prepared and utilized a standard,
printed-form Contract for Sale and Purchase,288 and a joint committee
comprised of members from both of those associations continually re-
views, revises and expands the form contract. 8 9 In its present form
(latest revision, January, 1991) the contract contains no provision re-
garding merger. Similar to the proposal expressed above with regard to
statutorily legislating the answer to the merger question, the proposi-
tion here is to "legislate" the answer by an omnibus clause in the
printed-form contract, addressing survival vel non of all of the cove-
nants, warranties, representations and other agreements of the parties
as contained in that "standard" contract. As with the above statutory
proposal, however, the same series of questions come to mind. Should
the "standard" be that all covenants survive? Or, that all covenants are
merged? Or, that some particular covenants concerning specified areas
are deemed merged, but other specified covenants are deemed to sur-
vive? And, if so, which shall merge, and which shall survive? Could the
bar and the Realtors ever concur on answers to the foregoing questions
sufficiently to reach a "standard" acceptable to the real estate industry
in our state? And, can we draft adequate language that will clearly
identify those types of covenants intended to fall within either of the
specified categories, or are the subject matters inherent in any real es-
tate transaction of such nature as to defy clear expression in this type
of dichotomy? Again, perhaps these questions demonstrate the futility
of attempting to resolve the question of merger by a standard-form
contract.
Nevertheless, the real estate professionals of the state of New
York did just that in their latest, very recently revised standard-form
Residential Contract of Sale,290 providing that:
delivery of the deed. Among those surveyed were, the Florida Association of Realtors
and The Florida Bar (FAR/BAR) Contract for Sale and Purchase, the Miami Board
of Realtors Contract for Sale and Purchase, and the Coral Gables Board of Realtors
Contract of Purchase and Sale.
288. Florida Association of Realtors and The Florida Bar, FAR/BAR Contract
for Sale and Purchase (1991).
289. See generally FAR/BAR Contract Preparation Manual (1988). This man-
ual describes the Realtor-Attorney Joint Committee responsible for creating and updat-
ing the form contract, and generally explains the purpose of, and methodology for, the
preparation of the FAR/BAR real estate Contract for Sale and Purchase.
290. See N.Y. L.J., Mar 13, 1991, at 40. The article describes the creation of
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Except as otherwise expressly set forth in this contract, none of
Seller's covenants, representations, warranties or other obligations
contained in this contract shall survive Closing.2"'
The "except as otherwise expressly set forth" introductory phrase to
this omnibus provision borders on the humorous (were it not that multi-
thousands or millions of dollars in real estate value rides on this form)
when it becomes apparent by combing through this New York form
contract that at least seven separate contractual covenants of this docu-
ment are "excepted out" and are expressly stated to survive Closing.2 92
On the other hand, this revelation may well reflect admirably upon the
diligence of the members of the four committees that jointly prepared
this latest revised form document,293 for they obviously gave serious
thought and consideration to determining on a subject-by-subject basis
which provisions shall live and which shall die. Nevertheless, it must be
noted that their general conclusion as evidenced by the omnibus provi-
sion quoted above294 was to sustain the doctrine of merger, while the
conclusion of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws under the
ULTA section quoted above 295 was to "repeal" the doctrine of merger.
C. Contract Preparation; Draftsmanship
The reported facts in the Florida cases analyzed in this article 296
reflect that each of the respective contracts of sale was silent as to
whether the covenant sub judice was meant to survive; specifically, the
contracts did not contain survival or merger provisions, 97 Of course,
had those contracts addressed the merger issue it is doubtful that we
would have had the benefit of the case law generated by their litigation,
Form A-1.25, Residential Contract of Sale by a joint committee chaired by Bernard M.
Rifkin, consisting of representatives from the Real Property Section of the New York
State Bar Association, the New York State Land Title Association and the Commit-
tees on Real Property Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and
of the New York County Lawyer's Association. Form A-125 is available through Julius
Blumberg Publishers, Inc., New York City.
291. Paragraph I I(c), Form A-] 25, Residential Contract of Sale, (New York).
292. Paragraphs 16(c), 17, 18(e), 21(c), 27, 28(f), 28(g), Form A-125, Residen-
tial Contract of Sale, (New York).
293. See supra note 290 for a list of the four committees.
294. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
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because as noted earlier 98 the Florida courts have given assurance that
if the parties do state their intent regarding survival or merger in the
original agreement, the court will respect that expression.2 99 Thus, an-
other suggestion to resolve the merger problem is that the contract
preparer handcraft the parties' intentions into the original contract of
sale by 1) expressly stating which covenants shall survive and which
shall not, 00 or 2) more realistically, setting forth an omnibus survival
or merger clause with specifically identified exceptions. 30 1 This obvi-
ously requires substantial attention to detail in the drafting of the
agreement of purchase and sale.
In any particular real estate transaction, there will be various pro-
visions that-if the buyer and seller were to stop and think about
them-they would wish to have survive closing; and likewise, there will
be other provisions that-upon thoughtful consideration-the parties
would choose to have extinguished as of the time of closing. Careful
consideration and draftsmanship at the time of preparing the contract
would avoid subsequent litigation by resolving which provisions will
survive, and which will die by merger.3 2 The difficulty with this propo-
sal is that typical real estate buyers, sellers and agents are not aware
of, much less would they stop and think about, the doctrine of merger
when negotiating a purchase and sale of real property, and most con-
tracts of sale are entered into without the advice of counsel and are
signed before the attorney ever sees the agreement. The real estate in-
dustry (buyers, sellers, brokers, and even many attorneys) is simply not
educated to the doctrine of merger, so that the likelihood of considering
the impact of merger and providing for it in the original contract is
diminutive except in the more sophisticated and high dollar-volume
transactions. Moreover, even if the parties or their representatives were
aware of the merger issue pre-contract, it would merely add one more
stumbling block to the negotiation process, pervading virtually every
paragraph of the contract. Naturally, every buyer would like most (if
not all) of his seller's representations, warranties and covenants to sur-
vive closing; and the typical seller wants to stand released of as much
298. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 286.
300. For example, "[tlhe provisions of this paragraph shall [or shall not] survive
the closing of the transaction contracted for hereunder and the delivery of the deed
conveying the subject property."
301. E.g., an omnibus provision similar to the New York standard form contract
provision (paragraph 11 (c), thereof) as quoted supra note 291 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 300-01.
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liability as possible once he has closed and "walked away."
Notwithstanding, silence on the issue of merger is no virtue since,
as emphasized by the review of cases in this article, there can be no
reliance on the courts for consistency in either upholding or circum-
venting the doctrine of merger. Thus, given the opportunity,303 there
can be no excuse for counsel failing to tailor appropriate merger and
survival provisions into careful real estate contract preparation. This is
especially so in recognition of 1) the conflicting presumptions that re-
sult from applying either the merger doctrine or the theory of accord
and satisfaction, 04 and 2) the conflicting predilections of typical buyers
and sellers of real property. "' Recognizing the various consequences
conceivable from the several juxtapositions of these two sets of con-
flicts, it is incumbent on the prudent real property attorney to protect
his client through advice, counsel and documentation concerning
merger and survival provisions.
D. Enlightened Judicial Construction
When all is said and done, the real merger problems will rear their
heads in controversies in judicium venire:
The likelihood of merger legislation is remote, if at all.306 Com-
plete resolution by express contract provisions, whether standard-
form3"7 or tailor-made, 308 is optimistic utopia but not a practical real-
ity. Thus, the ultimate resolution'of the veritable merger problem's will
remain in the hands of the courts, and the most productive and re-
warding accomplishment of this article will be to suggest that the
courts discard tunnel-vision merger rules and instead analyze potential
merger cases through the Two-Step process formulated,309 discussed,31 0
and justified1 ' above. Apply the doctrine of merger (and its resultant
303. I.e., assuming that counsel has been engaged prior to the parties having
executed their contract of sale (which is generally not the case in the realities of the
real estate industry).
304. See supra notes 212, 273-74 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 282-85 and accompanying text (description of the quiet
demise of a similar proposal).
307. See supra notes 290-92 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 213-76 and accompanying text.
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discharge of contractual obligations) only in cases of "true merger;" in
all other cases, enforce the contractual obligations as covenanted by sui
juris parties until terminated by the applicable statute of limitations,
unless a substituted agreement-an accord and satisfaction-can be
proven. This procedure comports with the basic common law tenets of
the merger doctrine; it comports with the strong trend of recent deci-
sions bent on contract enforcement; and this enlightened process of
analysis and construction also conforms with our "current notions of
justice, equity and fair dealing" as well as the current needs of our
society.3 1 2
312. See, e.g. Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985) (court would not
allow the doctrine of caveat emptor to shield a seller because to do so would fly in the
face of society's needs). This article does not propose the frustration of society's needs
by a rigid application of merger. Rather, this paper proposes a legally correct applica-
tion of merger which will fulfill society's need for equity as well as judicial consistency.
See Contos v. Lipsky, 433 So. 2d 1242, 1247-48 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)




et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Ginsburg
APPENDIX OF FLORIDA CASES DEALING WITH THE DOCTRINE
OF MERGER*
1. Seller's covenant to refund purchase price if buyer is dissatisfied
with property after ninety days. Gabel v. Simmons, 129 So. 777 (Fla.
1930) (merger rule not applied).
2. Seller's oral** representations of good right to convey, freedom
from adverse claims and encumbrances, market value and development
prospects, and covenant to resell at a profit. White v. Crandall, 143 So.
871 (Fla. 1932) (merger rule applied).
3. Seller's covenant subordinating the purchase money mortgage to
an anticipated construction loan first mortgage. Graham v. Common-
wealth Life Ins., 154 So. 335 (Fla. 1934) (merger rule not applied).
4. Buyer's covenant to assume existing mortgage. Riddle v. Col-
liver, 150 So. 880 (Fla. 1934) (merger rule not applied).
5. The contract contained restrictive covenants regarding the use
of the land; e.g., only residential use, size and cost of structure, and
race restrictions. Volunteer Sec. Co. v. Dowl, 33 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1947)
(merger rule applied).
6. Seller's covenant to convey by warranty deed. St. Clair v. City
Bank & Trust, 175 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (merger
rule applied).
7. Buyer's covenants to make deferred payments for the inventory,
fixtures, and good will of a business. The business was located on cer-
tain real property also sold to same buyer, regarding which buyer gave
seller a purchase money note and mortgage. Soper v. Stine, 184 So. 2d
892 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (merger rule applied).
8. Buyer's covenant to pay balance of purchase price in shares of
stock. Milu Inc. v. Duke, 204 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967)
(merger rule not applied).
9. Seller's covenant that the property is free and clear of all en-
cumbrances. Stephan v. Brown, 233 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1970) (merger rule applied).
* The cases are listed in chronological order. The 22 cases listed at Numbers six
through 27 are those referred to in the article as the "recent Florida cases." See supra
note 56 and accompanying text. Of these 22 recent Florida cases, the merger rule was
applied eight times-dicta indicated that it would have been applied two more
times-while the courts declined to apply the merger rule in the remaining twelve
cases.
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10. Contract provision that the purchase money mortgage would
contain a 30-day grace period. Uwanawich v. Gaudini, 334 So. 2d 116
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (merger rule applied).
11. Seller's representation as to compliance with city code respect-
ing the quantity of rentable units in subject apartment building prop-
erty. Steinberg v. Bay Terrace Apartment Hotel, 363 So. 2d 58 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (merger rule not applied).
12. Seller's covenant against any city code violations. Fraser v.
Schoenfeld, 364 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (merger rule
applied).
13. Seller's covenant to convey title free and clear of all encum-
brances. Bennett v. Behring, 466 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Fla. 1979)
(merger rule applied).
14. Seller's warranty as to condition of air conditioning and heat-
ing system and provision for awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing
party. Campbell v. Rawls, 381 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (merger rule not applied in either situation).
15. Contingency clause regarding purchaser obtaining all neces-
sary operating permits, and seller's covenant against violations of ordi-
nances, easements, and deed restrictions. Sager v. Turner, 402 So. 2d
1282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (merger rule not applied in either
situation).
16. Seller's covenant of ingress and egress. Opler v. Wynne, 402
So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev. denied, 412 So. 2d 472
(1982) (merger rule not applied).
17. Contract provisions specifying the terms and conditions for
partial release of the purchase money mortgage. Sun Ist Nat. Bank v.
Grinnell, 416 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (merger rule
applied).
18. Buyer's covenant to reconvey the property to seller if buyer
ever ceased using the property as his permanent residence. Peterson v.
Peterson, 431 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (merger rule
not applied).
19. Provision for awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
Gordon v. Bartlett, 452 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(merger rule applied).
20. Seller's covenants to provide water and sewer services, grant
one year free golf and tennis club membership, and build a road for
access to certain parts of the property. Georskey v. Wild Flower Land-
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21. Seller's covenant to convey additional property; i.e., property
that was not included in the deed. Southpointe Dev. Inc. v. Cruik-
shank, 484 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (merger rule not
applied).
22. Seller's reservation of a life estate in a portion of the property.
Kidd v. Fowler, 498 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (merger
rule not applied).
23. Seller's covenants regarding the availability and capacity of
water, sewer, and electric services to the property. American Nat'l Self
Storage v. Lopez-Aguiar, 521 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(merger rule not applied).
24, Provision for awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
Fleischer v. Hi Rise Homes Inc., 536 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1988) (merger rule applied in dicta).
25. Seller's representations concerning the tenancy of parties in
possession. Durden v. Century 21 Compass Points, 541 So. 2d 1264
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (merger rule not applied).
26. Provision for awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
Burkett v. Rice, 542 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (merger
rule not applied).
27. Seller's covenant negating any violation of governmental re-
strictions. Field v, Perry, 564 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(merger rule applied in dicta).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Richard Roe described himself to his interviewers. "Square,
loner-not with crowd."' If he could live his life over, he would "eat
less fast, be instantly likeable and charming, [and] lose 20 pounds."'
Mr. Roe trusted the interviewers and opened up to them, even giving
* J.D. summa cum laude, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center, 1991.
1. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs. v. State ex rel. Schellenberg, 360
So. 2d 83, 90 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978) [hereinafter "Schellenberg"], rev'd sub
nor. Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980)
[hereinafter "Byron Harless"].
2. Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d at 90.
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unflattering opinions of his own son.3 After all, the lawyers for the in-
terviewers had promised him complete confidentiality. The lawyers
were wrong.5
Every word he said to his interviewers and every document he
shared with them, including his psychological test results, could poten-
tially become public.' It made no difference that Mr. Roe submitted
the details of his life to the consulting firm, Byron, Harless, Schaffer,
Reid & Associates [hereinafter "Byron Harless"], along with a letter
saying it was "absolutely essential" that the information be kept se-
cret.7 In that letter, he told Byron Harless that he could be fired from
his current job if it were to become publicly known that he was inter-
ested in a new job.' Moreover, the public revelation of intimate private
facts could "decrease ... [his] effectiveness as a witness in hearings
related to regulatory matters at the federal, state and local level." 9
Unfortunately for Mr. Roe, he was being screened by the private
consulting firm as a candidate for a job with an agency of the State of
Florida-executive director of the Jacksonville Electric Authority
[hereinafter "JEA"]. In Florida, the documents generated by private
firms doing business with a government agency sometimes, by law, be-
come public records. The documents telling Mr. Roe's life story fell
into that category.
State agencies often contract for private enterprises to act on their
behalf. Private institutions often spend public tax dollars. There is no
limit to the number of ways the government, in the business of govern-
ance, entangles itself with the private sector. Hence, the public some-
times has a right of access to documents in the hands of private-sector
businesses, charitable institutions and individuals when they perform
services for the government or spend the government's money.
This article sets forth the law in Florida on the public's right of
access to the documents of private-sector actors pursuant to Chapter
119, Florida Statutes, the Florida Public Records Act. The subject of
the article is closest to the hearts of the media and government lawyers
who frequently must define the right of reporters to inspect documents
3. Id.
4. Id. at 87.
5. Byron Harless, 379 So. 2d at 640-41.
6. id.
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in the news-gathering process, but a far broader range of lawyers
would be well advised to familiarize themselves with the subject.
The legal advisors for the JEA and Byron Harless, for instance,
undoubtedly learned a bitter lesson when the provisions of Chapter
119, Florida Statutes, were applied to force the public release of many
of Byron Harless's records on Richard Roe and other unsuspecting can-
didates. 'Today, any time attorneys in Florida represent a business en-
terprise contemplating a government contract, they should discern in
advance whether any of their client's formerly proprietary internal doc-
uments might become subject to mandatory public disclosure'0 to any
person who asks for them, regardless of that person's identity or
motive."
Unfortunately, as this article concludes, the Florida court cases
are inconsistent in defining whether, and when, documents generated
by private actors are "public records." In some circumstances, the pub-
lic's right of access is clear. In others, the cases have-not articulated a
workable standard for determining whether the public has a right of
access. The law therefore is badly in need of clarification.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT
In its first sentence, Chapter 119 states: "It is the policy of this
state that all state, county, and municipal records shall at all times be
open for a personal inspection by any person."' 2 This sweeping declara-
tion of legislative intent creates a presumption in favor of disclosure. 3
Every government record is subject to public inspection and copy-
ing "' unless it is specifically exempt by statute, and any statute creating
10. See id. at 87. Similarly, the confidentiality expectations of private parties
were dashed in Times Publishing Co. v. St. Petersburg, 558 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1990), see infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text, after counsel for the city
and the Chicago White Sox went to great lengths to avoid being subject to the Public
Records Act.
11. FL.A. STAT. § 119.01(1) (1991) (records open for personal inspection "by any
person"); News-Press Publishing Co. v. Gadd, 388 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
12. FLA. STAT. § 119.01(1) (1991).
13. E.g., Sarasota Herald-Tribune Co. v. Community Health Corp., 582 So. 2d
730, 732 n.2 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Mills v. Doyle, 407 So. 2d 348, 350 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct, App. 1981).
14. The right to make copies of records follows from the right to inspect them.
FLA. STAT. § 119.07(l)(a) (1991) ("the custodian shall furnish a copy"); FLA. STAT. §
119.08(1) (1991) ("[in all cases where . . . any person interested has a right to in-
19921 1231,
223
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
an exemption is narrowly construed."5 Chapter 119 contains specific ex-
emptions for: 1) certain police investigative and intelligence-gathering
materials," 2) the identities of confidential informants,' 3) the ques-
tions and answer sheets of licensing examinations,"8 and 4) various
other categories of documents. Scores of other exemptions are scattered
throughout Florida Statutes.' 9
Circuit courts are given the power to enforce the law by ordering
the release of documents wrongly withheld."° Any public records case
must be given scheduling priority over other cases before the court.2 ' If
a plaintiff prevails in obtaining public records, the court is to order
costs and attorney's fees to be paid by the agency even if the agency
spect ...any public record, . . any person shall hereafter have the right of access
...for the purpose of making photographs of the same"). In his experience as a jour-
nalist, the author occasionally encountered a state official who conceded the right to
inspect a particular document freely and take notes about it, but attempted to disallow
its photocopying. It is unlawful to refuse to allow photocopying of any record required
to be disclosed. Schwartzman v. Merritt Island Volunteer Fire Dep't, 352 So. 2d 1230,
1232 n.2 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977). The alternative would be absurd. There is
surely no reason to disallow photocopying if a person could read the document, tran-
scribe it verbatim and circulate every word publicly; or if indeed every member of the
public, including, specifically, those from whom the agency prefers to keep the docu-
ment secret, could go to the agency and inspect the document. FLA. STAT. §
l19.07(l)(a)-(b) (1991) sharply limits the fees an agency may charge for copies.
15. Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420, 424 (Fla. 1979).
16. FLA. STAT. §§ 119.011, 119.07 (1991).
17. Id. § 119.07(3)(e) (1991).
18. Id. § 119.07(3)(c) (1991).
19. E.g., pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 240.299(4) (1991), all records of State Uni-
versity System-certified "direct-support organizations," which are fund-raising founda-
tions for the nine state universities, are exempt from Chapter 119 except the annual
audit, management letter, and any supplemental data supplied to the Board of Regents.
Special interests have obtained new enactments of such exemptions every year. By
1991, the Government-In-The-Sunshine Manual, updated annually by the Office of the
Attorney General and published by the First Amendment Foundation, contained 83
pages of fine print listing exemptions scattered throughout the Florida Statutes; the
previous year's edition contained 26 fewer pages. The Manual may be ordered by call-
ing the First Amendment Foundation, (904) 222-3518. In 1985, responding to the
growing list of such exemptions, the Florida legislature enacted the Open Government
Sunset Review Act, which automatically repeals every exemption from Chapter 119
every 10 years unless the continuation of the exemption is "compelled" by a restrictive
list of criteria in FLA. STAT. § 119.14((2) (1985). For a thorough review of the debate
on exemptions, see Barry Richard & Richard Grosso, A Return to Sunshine: Florida
Sunsets Open Government Exemptions, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 705 (1985).
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acted in a good faith but with the mistaken belief that the documents
were exempt from public disclosure.22
Suppose a person asks for a file of documents and the agency ref-
uses to provide it. This person need not search through all of the Flor-
ida Statutes to determine for himself whether the agency had a lawful
basis to refuse to produce the file. Chapter 119, Florida Statutes re-
quires the agency, on his demand, to explain what statutory exemption
the agency is relying on to withhold the file, and why the agency thinks
the file is covered by the cited exemption.23 If some of the documents in
the file are not exempt, the agency must produce those documents, and
cite a statutory exemption covering the others.24
The question of whether a document is exempt from public disclo-
sure arises only after a determination that the document is one of the
"records" of an "agency" within the meaning of the Public Records
Act. 5 For purposes of the act, "public records" includes "documents
22. Id. § 119.12 (1991); News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Palm Beach County, 517
So. 2d 743 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987). An exception to the attorney fee require-
ment, created in Fox v. News-Press Publishing Co., 545 So. 2d 941, 943 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1989), is particularly relevant to this article. A private entity was the subject
of a public: records demand. The private entity filed suit for a declaratory judgment
seeking guidance on whether it had to comply with the News-Press's public records
demand. The court held that access to the records was not "unlawfully" denied be-
cause: 1) the recipient of the records demand was not an "agency," and 2) it filed suit
promptly to seek judicial guidance; therefore, attorney's fees were not assessed. See
also PHH Mental Health Services, Inc. v. New York Times Co., 582 So. 2d 1191 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991). News media have been joined by the attorney general in
lobbying the legislature to change the law to eliminate the Fox loophole. Letter from
Gregg D. Thomas of Holland & Knight, Tampa, Florida to Media Lawyers Through-
out the State (Jan. 4, 1991) (specifically explaining Fox; proposing legislative change;
claiming attorney general's support; seeking additional support); Letter from Patricia
Riste Gleason, Assistant Attorney General to Gregg D. Thomas (Dec. 18, 1990) (con-
firming attorney general's support; proposing revisions to section 119.12(1)) (copy en-
closed with Thomas' letter to media lawyers).
23. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(2)(a) (1991); Fox, 545 So. 2d at 942.
24. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(2)(a) (1991); Tribune Co. v. Cannella, 458 So. 2d 1075,
1078 (Fla. 1984), appeal dismissed sub nom., DePerte v. Tribune Co., 471 U.S. 1096
(1985).
25. A "public record" is a "public record" regardless of whether it is exempt
from disclosure. FLA. STAT. § 119.011(1)-(2) (1991). This article focuses on whether
the records of a private-sector actor are within the "definitional reach" of the Public
Records Act. See Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d at 87-88. If the records of a private actor
are "within the definitional reach," they might nonetheless be kept confidential because
of an exemption from Chapter 119's requirement of disclosure. There are hundreds of
exemptions, see supra note 19 and accompanying text, any one of which might cover
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* . . made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection
with the transaction of official business by any agency."26 An "agency'
includes any unit of government at the state or local level "and any
other public or private agency, person, partnership, corporation, or
business entity acting on behalf of any public agency.'"27 The latter
clause, first enacted into the law in 1975,8 swept private-sector entities
under the coverage of the Public Records Law. However, when is a
private person or business "acting on behalf of any public agency?"
The answer to that question is elusive.
III. THE SEMINAL CASE: BYRON HARLESS
Predictably, private business enterprises resist the idea that their
proprietary records are "public records," and hence subject to all the
mandates of Chapter 119. In Shevin v. Byron Harless, Schaffer, Reid
& Assocs., 2 a private consultant claimed that the law was an unconsti-
tutional invasion of privacy when applied to require disclosure of docu-
ments that private parties, between themselves, had agreed to keep
secret."0
Byron Harless was a management consulting firm hired by JEA to
conduct the first phase of a nationwide search for a new executive di-
rector."' Byron Harless advertised nationally, took applications, and
screened them for the JEA. 2 At some point, Byron Harless was to turn
over to the JEA a report naming one or a few finalists. At that time the
report became a public record. Counsel for the JEA advised that Byron
Harless's records were not public records.33 The identities of those ap-
plicants who did not become finalists would never have to be made pub-
any or all the documents of a private actor, as in the case of the example cited in note
11. If the advisor to a private-sector actor determines that it is in possession of public
records, the next step is to determine if any or all of them are exempt from disclosure
under Chapter 119. At that point in the inquiry, the most concise source of exemptions
is the well-indexed Government-In-the-Sunshine Manual. See supra note 19. Also, gov-
ernment lawyers are normally familiar with the statutory exemptions dealing with their
particular agency or field of specialty.
26. FLA. STAT. § 110.011(1) (1991) (emphasis added).
27. Id. § 119.011(2) (1991) (emphasis added).
28. See Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d at 87-88.
29. 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980).
30. Id. at 635.
31. Id. at 634-35.
32. Id. at 635.
33. Id.
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lic; and as to the finalists, extensive information would remain in the
private files of Byron Harless.3'
In the meantime, applicants were assured of confidentiality until,
and unless, they eventually became finalists. Even then, the extremely
personal information used by Byron Harless to evaluate the candidates,
but not turned over to the JEA, would never become public. Richard
Roe was but one of several candidates who said they would suffer "dire
consequences" if this confidentiality were breached.35
A Jacksonville television executive sought, and was denied, Byron
Harless's records. He was joined by then Attorney General Shevin in
suing for the disclosure of the records under Chapter 119. Byron
Harless and some of the persons secretly identified in Byron Harless's
files asserted a right of privacy under the state and federal constitu-
tions. Chapter 119, they said, was unconstitutional to the extent that it
required the release of their identities and certain other private infor-
mation about them in Byron Harless's records."
The Supreme Court of Florida, reversing the First District Court
of Appeal, found first that the persons named in public records do not
have a state or federal right to privacy that is violated by the release of
public records.3 7 Next, the supreme court refined the definition of
"records," 38 which the first district had defined too expansively.
But the supreme court accepted, and thus ratified without discus-
sion, the first district's conclusion that Byron Harless was "acting on
behalf of" a public agency. 39 On that point, the appellate court's ruling
said:
A business entity such as the consultant must be regarded as "act-
ing on behalf of" the public agency if the services contracted for
are an integral part of the agency's chosen process for a decision on
the question at hand . . . .Because the consultant was employed
to perform and did perform a preliminary search and inquiry func-
tion which JEA thought necessary or desirable for its proper deci-
34. Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d at 87.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 85-87.
37. Byron Harless, 379 So. 2d at 638-39.
38. Id. at 640. A "record" includes any materials "intended to perpetuate, com-
municate, or formalize knowledge of some type," and not their "precursors," such as
notes made by a public official (or, in this case, a Byron Harless employee) purely for
his own use.
39. Id. at 635.
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sion, the consultant was "acting on behalf of" JEA and was there-
for an "agency" to which the public records law applied.40
In other contexts, this quote provides little guidance about when
the private sector is "acting on behalf of" a state agency. Whether the
private party is "acting on behalf of" the public agency depends on
how "integral" the private party's role is in the public agency's deci-
sion-making process, but what facts would make a consulting firm's
role more "integral" to the decision-making process, and thus surely
covered by the Public Records Law, or less "integral," and thus more
likely to not be covered by the Public Records Law?
Some guidance might be derived from a case on the application of
the Government-in-the-Sunshine Law, Chapter 286, Florida Statutes,
which requires collegial boards and commissions to give notice of their
meetings and open them to the public. The supreme court has stated
that the Sunshine Law and the Public Records Act are "closely related
in purpose and policy," and case law on one sometimes sheds light on
the other.41 In a Sunshine Law case, Wood v. Marston,"2 the supreme
court required a faculty committee screening candidates for a Univer-
sity of Florida dean's post to meet in the open because of its "undis-
puted decision-making function in screening the applicants. In deciding
which of the applicants to reject from further consideration, the com-
mittee performed a policy-based, decision-making function delegated to
it by the president of the university . . . .
In Wood v. Marston, the committee would have to meet in the
open even though the president or a faculty committee could in effect
ignore its decisions by selecting a candidate from those eliminated by
the committee. The committee is covered by the open-government law
because, if the president or faculty were to accept the committee's rec-
ommendations, then the process by which some candidates were elimi-
nated would never have been scrutinized publicly.4 The policy choice
to eliminate candidates would have been made in a closed session.
This analysis sheds light on whether a hired consultant's activities
are an "integral" part of the decision-making process. If the consult-
ant's activities could (even if they would not necessarily) foreclose JEA
40. Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d at 88 (citation omitted).
41. Wood v. Marston, 442 So. 2d 934, 938 (Fla. 1983).
42. Id. at 934.
43. Id. at 938.
44. Id. at 939.
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from further considering the candidates eliminated by Byron Harless,
or limit the information JEA has about its candidates, then policy-
making choices have been delegated to Byron Harless. This would be
why Byron Harless's activities for the JEA are an "integral" part of
the decision-making process by which JEA chose its director. With less
influence over JEA's consideration of information and screening of can-
didates, Byron Harless would be less likely to be covered by the Public
Records Law.
IV. EVOLUTION OF THE LAW SINCE BYRON HARLESS
The shortcoming of the Byron Harless analysis is that it helps to
define "acting on behalf of" only in limited contexts. The analysis may
be extended to a school board's screening of multiple sites for a new
school,48 for instance, or any other type of outsider-assisted process of
screening many options down to a few. Still, it helps only to define
when a. private actor is making a decision "on behalf of" a state
agency. What other types of acting "on behalf of" a state agency
might there be?
A. An Easy Case: Attorneys
An attorney representing a public agency is a relatively clear case
of a private party "acting on behalf of" the agency.46 Since the attor-
ney is the client's stand-in for purposes of the representation, the con-
clusion seems compelled that he is "acting on behalf of" the agency.
That a staff attorney's documents are public records is obvious; what is
less obvious, but no less true, is that the records of an attorney in pri-
vate practice pertaining to his representation of a state agency in litiga-
tion or negotiation are public records also.
This conclusion may run counter to the intuition of a private law-
yer, accustomed, as he is, to the notion that his files are made confiden-
tial by ethics, the attorney-client privilege, and the work-product doc-
trine.'7 Nonetheless, the confidentiality of an attorney's papers in all
45. Cf. News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, Twitty & Hanser Architectural
Group, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), affid, 17 Fla. L. Weekly
S156 (1992) (No. 77,131).
46. See Jim Smith, The Public Records Law and the Sunshine Law. No Attor-
ney-Client Privilege Per Se, and Limited Attorney Work Product Exemption, 14 STET-
SON L. REv. 493 (1985) (authored by the then-attorney general of Florida).
47. Smith, supra note 46. Smith says there is no attorney client privilege "per
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these doctrines is one running to the client, not the lawyer. The client
of a lawyer working for a government agency is the people; the expres-
sion of those peoples' will can be made only by the legislature; and the
legislature has waived any attorney-client privilege or work-product ex-
emption by enacting Chapter 119. There are several exemptions to
Chapter 119, narrowly crafted and limited in duration, to protect cer-
tain secrets when their release could damage an agency's position in
litigation4 8 or negotiation."9
B. The "Totality of Factors" Test
Another test for gleaning when a private actor is "acting on behalf
of" an agency, found in Schwartzman v. Merritt Island Volunteer Fire
Department,50 has come to be called the "totality of factors test.151 In
Schwartzman, community volunteers organized a nonprofit corporation
to operate the county-owned fire fighting equipment. The corporation
received $850 a month in tax money; the county paid for all supplies
and equipment and owned the fire station property; and all county
funds were placed in the same bank accounts with money the corpora-
tion obtained in such fund-raising activities as fish frys.52 The court
held that the "totality" of these facts led "irresistibly to the conclusion
that this department is subject to the Public Records Act."153
se," and a "limited" attorney work-product doctrine, because there are narrowly fo-
cused exceptions to the Public Records Act resembling the attorney-client privilege and
work product doctrine. To this author, it seems more logical to say that the Public
Records Act waives any attorney-client privilege or work product exemption in behalf
of the public, but that certain documents may be withheld from the public, not under
an attorney-client privilege or work product exemption, but under exemptions to the
Public Records Act. See Edelstein v. Donner, 450 So. 2d 562, 562 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (referring to "a non-existent work product exemption to the Public Records
Act"). Either view obtains the same result by different semantics.
48. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 119.07(3)(n) (1991) (work product exemption no longer
applies when litigation ends).
49. E.g., id. at (3)(p) (appraisals of real property sought by an agency by
purchase or eminent domain exempt from disclosure until conditional acceptance of a
contract for sale).
50. 352 So. 2d 1230, 1232 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 358 So.
2d 132 (Fla. 1978).
51. The name "totality of factors test," was first used in Sarasota Herald-Trib-
une Co. v. Community Health Corp., 582 So. 2d 730, 733 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
52. Schwartzman, 352 So. 2d at 1230.
53. Id. at 1232.
1238 [Vol. 16
230
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss3/18
Rivas
The court held that if certain private-sector entities pass the total-
ity of factors test, all of their documents become public records."' It is
not clear why this is so. Under the logic of Byron Harless, only those
records pertaining to an activity carried out "on behalf of" the county
would be public records. Suppose the Merritt Island volunteers engaged
in some activities that were not on behalf of the county. If they organ-
ized a fish fry to contribute money to help an accident victim, they
might generate planning memoranda, correspondence with the victim's
family, tickets, contracts with vendors and other documents. Why
should these be public records if the volunteers are not acting on behalf
of the county for purposes of the charity drive?
The court must have meant that everything the volunteers under-
take is "on behalf of" the county because the entity would not exist
were it not for the county; none of its activities could be segregated
from the county's contribution of money and property. If so, the total-
ity of factors test can be understood to apply when so much of an en-
tity's money and property comes from an agency that it would not exist
were it not for the agency. Then, every document is a public record.
This would not be inconsistent with Byron Harless; it would sim-
ply deal with a set of circumstances in which the Byron Harless analy-
sis would not be helpful. The Merritt Island Volunteer Fire Depart-
ment was not assisting the county in the type of decision-making
process to which Byron Harless applies; instead, it was deemed to be
totally a creature of the government.
C. Another Test: The Essential Governmental Function
In Fox v. News-Press Publishing Co.,55 the totality test was ap-
plied in a manner so different that it really is not the same test at all.
Fox had entered into a contract to tow wrecked and abandoned vehicles
from public streets and property.56 Concluding, ostensibly based on
Schwartzman, that the documents generated in carrying out Fox's con-
tract with the city were "public records," the Second District Court of
Appeal said:
54. Id. The totality test was followed in Tribune Co. v. Palm River Volunteer
Fire Department, 7 Fla. Supp. 2d 32 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. 1984), although the Palm
River volunteers received no direct cash operating subsidy from the county. Thus, the
totality need not be quite as total as was the case in Schwartzman.
55. 545 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
56. Id. at 943.
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While there is no one factor that determines when records of a
private business under contract with a public entity fall within the
purview of the public records law, a totality of factors which indi-
cate a significant level of involvement by the public entity, such as
the City in this instance, can lead to the conclusion that the records
are subject to the Public Records Act . 7
The court looked to the fact that the vehicles were being towed
away pursuant to city ordinances enacted under the city's police pow-
ers. The contract called for the city police to have extensive control
over the towing activities. Therefore, the court concluded, the totality
of factors involved in the contract showed that the contractor was
"clearly performing what is essentially a governmental function."58
In Schwartzman, the totality of factors pointed to the totality of
the volunteer fire department's dependence on the government for its
existence, and led to the conclusion that all its records were public. In
Fox, a totality of factors pointed to whether the particular contract was
one to perform an "essentially governmental function," and only the
documents related to that function were deemed public records. Fox, in
reality, did not depend on Schwartzman, but created a new test: an
"essentially governmental function" test to determine if a particular ac-
tivity undertaken by a private entity is one in which the entity is "act-
ing on behalf of" a public agency to perform the agency's functions.
Reversing the facts in Fox and Schwartzman illustrates that the
tests they use are not the same. Applying the Fox analysis to
Schwartzman would require looking to a totality of factors involved in
operating a volunteer fire department to determine if that activity was
an "essentially governmental function." The Schwartzman court did
not do that. The Schwartzman court applied the totality test to deter-
mine if the entity was a totally governmental entity. One test looks to
the entity; the other, to the function. The Schwartzman test would find
an entity covered by Chapter 119 if the entity were funded and main-
tained by the government, regardless of whether a particular function
being undertaken by the entity was an "essentially governmental
function."
The totality of factors test was applied in Sarasota Herald-Trib-
une Co. v. Community Health Corp.59 There, the Second District
57. Id. (citation omitted).
58. Id.
59. 582 So. 2d 730, 733 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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Court of Appeal found Fox and Schwartzman to be consistent and pur-
ported to apply both of them60 without recognizing the difference in
their approaches. In reality, however, the court applied the Schwartz-
man approach.
In Sarasota Herald-Tribune, a private, not-for-profit corporation
was created by a local Public Hospital Board to carry out many of the
functions of the hospital tax district. 1 In applying the totality of fac-
tors test, the second district thoughtfully weighed the not-for-profit cor-
poration's creation and existence, funding and capitalization, goals,
purposes, ownership and interdependence with the local hospital taxing
district.62 Note that all these factors look to the character of the not-
for-profit company, not to the character of the function being carried
out by the company. Concluding that the not-for-profit corporation ex-
isted basically as a creature of the public hospital agency, the second
district declared the not-for-profit company's records to be public
records under Chapter 119.1'
This reasoning and result would be consistent with Schwartzman,
but the second district went one step further-and it was a step more
consistent with Fox than with Schwartzman. The court said that if any
particular function of the not-for-profit corporation were found not to
be "performed on behalf of" the hospital board, the records related to
that particular function would not be subject to mandatory disclosure
under Chapter 119.4
This latter dictum contradicts Schwartzman and, indeed, the en-
tire Sarasota Herald Tribune analysis. The court, in accord with
Schwartzman, analyzed the characteristics of the corporation itself to
find the corporation covered by Chapter 119. It did not look to whether
operating a hospital is an "essentially governmental function," as the
Fox court would.
D. Confusion Among the Cases on Contracts with Agencies
Fox's "essentially governmental function" analysis attempts to
provide some guidance as to when a business enterprise that enters into
a contract to provide goods or services to a public agency is "acting on
60. Id.
61. Id. at 732.
62. Id. at 734.
63. Id.
64. Sarasota Herald-Tribune Co., 582 So. 2d at 734.
1992] 1241
233
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
behalf of" the agency, and thus subject to Chapter 119 as to that func-
tion. 5 Other cases, however, show how unworkable the "essentially
governmental function" test can be under different circumstances.
In Fritz v. Norflor Construction Co.,66 an engineering firm was
held to be "acting on behalf of" a city when it served as city engineer
in the construction of a wastewater treatment facility." Throughout
the court's opinion there was no mention as to how or why this type of
contract, to provide a city with professional services, brought the engi-
neers under the Public Records Act.
In contrast, Parsons & Whittemore, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade
County"' found that none of three private-sector companies were "act-
ing on behalf of" Dade County "merely by contracting with a govern-
mental agency." 69 The three included the contractor of a solid waste
facility, a firm that contracted to manage and operate the facility upon
its completion, and a firm that guaranteed the obligations of the other
two. The court, in Parsons & Whittemore, cited to Fritz for the pro-
position that "entities which perform an essentially governmental func-
tion come within the purview of section 119.011(2) only as to those
functions which are performed in that capacity." '
Having acknowledged the governmental function test, the Parsons
& Whittemore court said it was "unaware of any authority which sup-
ports the proposition that merely by contracting with a governmental
agency a corporation 'acts on behalf of' the agency."71 This method of
distinguishing Fritz does not explain why the engineering firm in Fritz
had not "merely" contracted with the city to provide engineering ser-
vices. Parsons & Whittemore might be understood to stand for the pro-
position that acting as the city engineer on a construction project is an
"essentially governmental function." This might be a logical conclusion
because cities often have a person on their staff who is nominally the
"city engineer." However, if that is what the court meant, it did not
say so.
Furthermore, Parsons & Whittemore did not separately explain
why any one of the three corporations was individually distinguishable
65. See Fox, 545 So. 2d at 941.
66. 386 So. 2d 899, (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
67. Id. at 901.
68. 429 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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from the subject of the public records request in Fritz. One could say it
is an "essentially governmental function" to build a waste water treat-
ment plant since the private sector does not. On the other hand, one
might say the contractor was not engaged in an "essentially govern-
mental function" since governments normally do not undertake con-
struction projects themselves, but hire contractors instead. It is far
harder to explain why the firm that was to manage the waste water
treatment plant was not engaged in an "essentially governmental
function. ' 72
E. The Florida Supreme Court's Latest Venture Into the Field
Even more difficult to distinguish from the engineering firm in
Fritz is the architectural firm in.News & Sun Sentinel Co. v. Schwab,
Twitty & Hanser Architectural Group, Inc. .73 There, the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal held that an architect hired by a school board to
design a school was not within Chapter 119.74
In affirming, the Supreme Court of Florida claimed that the dis-
trict courts of appeal "generally have made the determination" of
whether a private entity's records are covered by Chapter 119 "based
on the 'totality of factors.'"-7 The supreme court thus pushed all the
conflicting cases on "acting on behalf of" a public agency under one
giant umbrella. Without mentioning Fritz, the supreme court described
the Schwartzman "totality of factors" test and the Fox "essential gov-
ernmental function" test as if they were on and the same."
Sarasota Herald Tribune and Parsons & Whittemore were cited
72. The Parsons & Whittemore opinion noted that the management firm was to
manage the waste water treatment facility "upon its completion and purchase by the
county, but the county has not yet purchased the plant." Id. at 345. In State ex rel.
Florida Publishing Co. v. Kinard, 14 Fla. Supp. 2d 170, 172 (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. 1985), a
trial court interpreted this fact as explaining why the contractor was not "acting on
behalf or' the county. It does not help explain why the management firm was not
performing an essentially governmental function in the third district's view. If manag-
ing the facility were an "essentially governmental function," and the management firm
was already engaged in activities preparatory to managing the facility, why would the
management firm not already be "acting in behalf or' Dade County for purposes of
the Public Records Act?
73. 570 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), affid, 17 Fla. L. Weekly
S156 (March 5, 1992) (No. 77,131).
74. News & Sun Sentinel Co., 570 So. 2d at 1096.
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in further support of the concept of a single "totality of factors" test.
Byron, Harless's analysis of whether a private entity played an "inte-
gral part" in a decision-making process became not a separate test
designed for the unique situation of a decision-making process, but a
"factor" within the supreme court's super-totality of factors test.7 By
seeming to endorse the outcomes of so many of the district court cases,
News & Sun Sentinel Co. seems to have left all their inconsistencies
intact.
F. The Special Case of the Private Records-Keeper
At least one attempt by a private party to keep its business with
the government private reached the point of being tragicomical. In
Times Publishing Co. v. City of St. Petersburg8 [hereinafter
"Chisox"], the city and the Chicago White Sox commenced negotia-
tions for the White Sox (represented by Chisox Corp., an appellee/
cross appellant) to play in St. Petersburg's Suncoast Dome. Because of
politics in their home state, the White Sox required confidentiality con-
cerning the existence of the discussions and the city assured them it
would try to oblige.
Under a plan worked out by the city attorney and Chisox Corp.,
the city agreed never to take physical possession of any correspondence
or draft contracts.7 9 The city attorney took a five-inch stack of notes on
the drafts. He felt that his notes were not public records because they
were merely his own personal "precursors" to public records.8" Armed
with his notes, he shuttled back and forth between city officials and
Chisox Corp. as the negotiations proceeded, yet nobody from the city
ever took possession of any documents, wrote Chisox any letters or
wrote themselves any memoranda. 8' To illustrate the sham character of
this arrangement, it is worth quoting at length from a letter Chisox
sent to the city. The city attorney helped draft the letter as part of his
77. Id.
78. 558 So. 2d 487, 489 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
79. Id.
80. Id. Whether the city attorney's notes were in fact mere "precursors" and not
public records was never resolved in Chisox for procedural reasons. Id. at 491-92. It
seems clear, however, that some or all of the notes were not "precursors" but were
subject to mandatory disclosure as public records because they were written to "perpet-
uate, communicate, or formalize knowledge of some type," despite the city attorney's
effort to create a fiction to the contrary. Byron Harless, 379 So. 2d at 640.
81. See Times Publishing Co., 558 So. 2d at 489-95.
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participation in the secrecy arrangements.
'This letter is provided to you in conjunction with a proposed draft
Stadium Lease Agreement dated April 27, 1988 between Chicago
White Sox, Ltd. and the City of St. Petersburg. While you are
authorized to examine this document in your office, this document
is not to leave your possession. You are not authorized to receive,
possess, or copy this document. This document is not to come into
your possession or custody and is not transmitted to you.82
In the text of a letter transmitted to the city, and in the possession
and custody of the city, the letter declared itself not to have been trans-
mitted to the city and not to be in the possession and custody of the
city. This was like all the members of the White Sox pointing to a
baseball, declaring it to be a catcher's mitt and agreeing to speak about
the thing for the rest of the day as if it were a catcher's mitt. Unfortu-
nately for the city the local appellate court insisted on calling a base-
ball a baseball.
The court ruled that many of the documents possessed by Chisox
were really owned by the city and were merely left in the possession of
Chisox to evade the Public Records Act.83 Therefore, Chisox was "act-
ing on behalf of" the city as the custodian of the city's records. From
this emerges the most unusual definition of "acting on behalf of" an
agency: A private entity "acting on behalf of" a city as its records-
keeper.
Only two years earlier, in News-Press Publishing Co. v. Kaune,8"
the same court passed up an opportunity to create the records-keeper
concept. Dr. Centafont was hired by the city to perform drug screening
of the city's firefighters.8 5 He kept the records, but, if a firefighter's
blood or urine sample showed drug use, he was to take the results to
the fire chief, show them to him, and then keep physical possession of
the documents so that they would not become public record as part of
82. Id. at 489-90.
83. Id. at 492. Interestingly, a provision of Iowa's public records law would have
made the second district's result easier to reach: "A government body shall not prevent
the examination or copying of a public record by contracting with a nongovernmental
body to perform any of its duties or functions." KMEG Television, Inc. v. Iowa State
Bd. of Regents, 440 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Iowa 1989) (citing IOWA CODE § 22.2(2)
(1987)).
84. 511 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
85. Id. at 1024.
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the firefighter's personnel file.8
The second district found Dr. Centafont's records not to be public
records even though the city paid for them, they were about city em-
ployees, and they were showed to the fire chief to transmit information
to the chief that the city was entitled to receive so that he could act on
the information to remove, discipline or assist a firefighter. 87 After
reading Chisox, it is impossible to explain why Dr. Centafont was not
acting as the records-keeper for the city. Perhaps the court felt sympa-
thy for the traditional notion that medical records are confidential. If
so, the court could have kept the records secret by an expedient that
would not have cast an analytically unsound gloss on the definition of
"acting on behalf of" an agency. The medical records in Kaune were
exempt from disclosure under a specific exemption from the Public
Records Act's disclosure requirement. The court even so held.88
The fire chief, therefore, could have kept them in his office and
kept them secret. The court could have ruled simply that the docu-
ments were exempt from disclosure even if they were public records.
Perhaps the dictum that the documents were not public records should
be ignored. Perhaps it is bad law after Chisox.
G. The Trade Mission Exception To "Acting On Behalf Of'
News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Modesitt89 illustrates well the unpre-
dictable variety of contexts in which "acting on behalf of" might have
to be defined. The records of the Florida Agricultural Trade Mission
Group, which organized many private-sector agricultural interests for
trade missions abroad, 90 were sought under the Public Records Act.
Although the agriculture commissioner's own expenses on the trade
missions were paid by the state, he served as custodian of funds con-
tributed by the private interests to pay their expenses.91 He used his
position to secure cooperation from the U.S. federal officials and those
of foreign governments to make the trade missions a success. 92
The First District Court of Appeal said the records were "clearly"
not public because the commissioner acted only as custodian of private
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1026.
89. 466 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1165 (Wentworth, J., dissenting).
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funds.9" It is not clear why the public versus private character of the
funds was controlling; in Schwartzman, private funds donated to the
Merritt Island Volunteer Fire Department became subject to the Pub-
lic Records Act because of the character of the entity.94
Schwartzman would require an inquiry into whether the Trade
Mission Group owes its existence to the agriculture commissioner, yet
Modesitt did not discuss whether the Trade Mission Group was acting
on behalf of the state. If the Trade Mission Group were not acting on
behalf of the state, the question is begged: Why did these private
agribusiness firms turn their money over to the commissioner as custo-
dian? They presumably wanted to be the Official State of Florida
Trade Mission Group, which would mean they wanted to be seen as a
state agency or be a quasi-public entity. Instead, the court saw the
commissioner as a state official acting on behalf of the private sector.
This case, in sum, does not fit into the analytic framework of any other
case defining "agency" or "acting on behalf of" under Chapter 119. In
fact, it contains no reference to any of the "acting on behalf of" cases
cited in this article, or even to any particular subsection of Chapter
119.
V. CONCLUSION
Countless businesses are engaged in contracts to perform services
or provide goods to government agencies, and countless other entities
are involved with government, spending its money, taking over its ser-
vices, performing its functions. Perhaps the courts of Florida have not
intelligibly defined when such private actors are "acting on behalf of' a
public agency for purposes of Chapter 119 because of the infinite vari-
ety of potential factual settings in which government and the private
sector work together.
For whatever reason, the decisions on this question in Florida are
inconsistent and irreconcilable. They leave the public unable to predict,
except in a few clear circumstances, whether records generated by a
private actor will be subject to mandatory public disclosure.
93. Id. at 1164.
94. See Schwartzman, 352 So. 2d at 1232.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since Antonin Scalia's appointment to the federal court of appeals
in 1982, and his subsequent ascension to the Supreme Court in 1986,
there 'has been a surprising number of legal scholars and members of
the media attempting to ascertain his impact on constitutional doctrine
* This Paper was originally prepared for presentation at the 1991 American
Political! Science Association Annual Convention, August 29-September 1, 1991,
Washington, D.C. I would like to thank Daniel Lowenstein of UCLA Law School, Roy
Schotland of Georgetown Law Center, and John Schockley of Western Illinois
University for their helpful comments and suggestions.
** David Schultz is an assistant professor of political science and constitutional
law at Trinity University. Mr. Schultz has worked on several political campaigns and
served as a government administrator. He is the author of A SHORT HISTORY OF THE
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE (1991); PROPERTY, POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1992);
Business & Plant Closings: The Expansion of the 'Public Use' Doctrine in Eminent
Domain, Chapter 22, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN (1992); The Use of Eminent Do-
main and Contractually Implied Property Rights to Affect Business and Plant Clos-
ings, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. (1990); and The Locke Republican Debate and the
Paradox of Property Rights in Early American Jurisprudence, 13 WESTERN NEW
ENG. C. L. REV. (1991).
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and the Supreme Court. This scholarship is "surprising" because Scalia
was on the federal bench for less than ten years, and has only been on
the Supreme Court for about five years; yet he has already attracted
relatively more attention than other Justices, such as White, Blackmun,
and Stevens, who have been on the Court much longer.
In order to ascertain the accuracy of the current scholarship on
Scalia and, more importantly, to assess the novelty of Scalia's political
philosophy, this article examines the existing Scalia scholarship, the
Justice's own scholarly writings, and the judicial opinions authored by
Antonin Scalia. The phrase "Scalia's political philosophy" refers to his
respective views on the basic institutions and processes of American
government and politics, including the allocation of power among the
major national institutions, the regulation of elections, and the staffing
of federal positions through political hirings.
This article is divided into six sections. First, recent legal scholar-
ship describing Scalia's jurisprudence, his role on the Court, and his
view of the American political process will be briefly reviewed. Then,
the Justice's conception of the role of the federal courts in American
society is discussed. Specifically, the discussion will examine how Scalia
approaches the logic of judicial action suggested by footnote four of
United States v. Carolene Products.' The third section analyzes
Scalia's view of legislatures (Congress in particular) and the presi-
dency. Next, his views on patronage, political parties, and spoils will be
examined. The fifth section focuses on Scalia's views on campaign fi-
nance reform. The article concludes with an overall assessment of
Scalia's political philosophy. In brief, this article offers a tentative
sketch of the Justice's views on the American political process and pro-
vides an appraisal of the claims made by the existing scholarship on
Scalia.
The article is premised on the belief that the existing Scalia schol-
arship has in many ways failed to provide an accurate description of
the Justice's political philosophy. It contends that Scalia's various
scholarly writings and judicial opinions reveal a political philosophy
that endorses a specific conception of the political process, which in
turn endorses a political ideology sympathetic to classical Manchester
Liberalism. Such an ideology, as originally articulated in 19th century
England, emphasized limited government, faith in the marketplace,
commitment to legalism, materialism, property rights, and enforcement
1. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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of majoritarian morality as essential to the creation of free society.2
This view of the political process usually supports a use of federal judi-
cial power to secure that ideology. Additionally, Scalia's jurisprudence
endorses a strong executive branch and a weak Congress because such
a political alignment presently favors his political agenda. 3
Thus, contrary to the existing Scalia scholarship which proposes
that Scalia consistently applies an interpretive strategy and guides his
opinions by judicial restraint, Scalia's ideology generates an inconsis-
tently applied interpretive method that adopts a mercurial attitude to-
wards legislative power and the political process."
II.. ASSESSING SCALIA'S IMPACT AND PERFORMANCE: THE
STATUS OF CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP
Scholarly analysis of Antonin Scalia began when the former Uni-
versity of Chicago law professor and editor of Regulation5 became one
of the conservatives that former President Reagan appointed to the fed-
eral judiciary. The former President's aim was to create a judiciary
that was more sympathetic to the conservative issues he supported,
than was the bench as it existed at that time.
James G. Wilson examined Judge Scalia's voting record on the
court of appeals along with the record of other prominent Reagan ap-
pointees, including Judges Bork, Posner, Easterbrook, and Winter.6
Surveying Scalia's voting record (along with the other four judges) in
the areas of access to the courts, the First Amendment, procedural due
process, equal protection, and governmental structure, 7 Wilson con-
cluded that "President Reagan must be pleased with these men, who to
varying degrees, have made major creative contributions to emerging
right-wing jurisprudence. They have aggressively applied traditional
2. See KENNETH M. DOLBEARE, DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT
16-18, 22-23 (1969).
3. See Arthur Stock, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitu-
tional Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160, 161, 192.
4. David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1699, 1716 (1991); Mark V. Tushnet, Scalia and the Dormant Commerce
Clause: A Foolish Formalism?, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1717, 1740 (1991).
5. A conservative journal published by the American Enterprise Institute.
6. See James G. Wilson, Constraints of Power: The Constitutional Opinions of
Judges Scalia, Bork, Posner, Easterbrook, and Winter, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1171
(1986).
7. Id. at 1181-1203.
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conservative techniques: increasing judicial deference to other branches
of government and imposing new limits on federal court jurisdiction."8
Specifically, Wilson noted that in twenty-three decisions before Scalia
involving criminal defendants, media defendants, and civil plaintiffs, he
ruled against them twenty times.9 However, in contrast to the other
judges appointed by Reagan, Scalia has not sought to build elaborate
constitutional theories. Scalia has eschewed theory building in lieu of
reaching more pragmatic decisions.10
Upon his ascension to the Supreme Court, the initial series of arti-
cles examining Justice Scalia sought to ascertain whether or not there
was a "freshman effect,"'" or to see if in his first year on the bench he
had any major impact on the doctrinal development of the Court. Thea
F. Rubin and Albert P. Melone reviewed Scalia's first year decisions' 2
and found that while he wrote less than his fair share of decisions the
first year (a sign of the freshman effect), he did align himself with the
conservative voting block and also appeared comfortable with his new
role as Justice. 3 Thus, in their opinion, there was no real freshman
effect. Additionally, studies of Scalia's first year decisions by Michael
Patrick King1 and Richard A. Brisbin, Jr.,' 5 concluded that his con-
servative "decisions suggest . . . long-term influence on constitutional
doctrine and the High Court.""' They concluded that the Justice's con-
servatism demonstrates constitutional and political values that place
8. Id. at 1173. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE NEW RIGHT AND THE CONSTITU-
TION: TURNING BACK THE LEGAL CLOCK 223-31 (1990) (similarly includes Scalia
among those Reagan appointees considered to be leaders of the "new right" legal
movement seeking to overturn the more liberal post New Deal and Warren Court
decisions).
9. See Wilson, supra note 6, at 1178.
10. Id. at 1175. Cf. Jean Morgan Meaux, Comment, Justice Scalia and Judicial
Restraint: A Conservative Resolution of Conflict Between Individual and the State, 62
TUL. L. REV. 225, 227 (1987).
11. A "freshman effect" is composed of three characteristics: 1) a new Justice is
bewildered by new duties and needs an adjustment period to define his/her new role; 2)
new Justices write fewer opinions than more senior Justices; 3) freshman justices tend
not to vote or align themselves with a voting block.
12. Thea F. Rubin and Albert P. Melone, Justice Antonin Scalia: A First Year
Freshman Effect?, 72 JUDICATURE 98 (1988).
13. Id. at 101-02.
14. Michael P. King, Justice Antonin Scalia: The First Term on the Supreme
Court-1 986-1987, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1988).
15. Richard A. Brisbin, Jr., The Conservatism of Antonin Scalia, 105 POL. SCI.
Q. 1 (1990).
16. See King, supra note 14, at 5-6.
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him in the tradition of Justices Frankfurter and Bickel, and that he has
indeed become a "Reagan Justice.""
Subsequent to his first year on the Court, studies of Justice Scalia
turned in three directions. First, one set of commentary focused on his
increasingly vocal and often times acrimonious opinions and dissents
that included belittlement of, and harsh criticism towards, other Jus-
tices' opinions."' A second set of articles sought to examine his inter-
pretive method, and the sources of his disagreement with other con-
servative members of the Court. Recent efforts to overturn several
controversial Supreme Court civil rights decisions interpreting the 1991
Civil Rights Act highlight this controversy, as Congress sought to en-
sure its meaning in the legislation and protect it from judicial
misconstruction.19
George Kannar, in his article, examines Scalia's approach to read-
ing the Constitution. Kannar attributes Scalia's literal interpretation
of statutes and the Constitution to his pre-Vatican II catholicism and
his father's professorial background in romance literature.2 On the
other hand, Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey locate Scalia's interpre-
tive approach in the Justice's general distrust of legislative politics and
his questioning of the ability to ascertain legislative intent from com-
mittee reports and comments of particular legislators.2' Farber and
Frickey agree with other studies that state that Scalia's methodology is
important to his approach to the law.2 Similarly, Arthur Stock notes
that although Scalia is unwilling to defer to legislative intent and other
17. See Brisbin, supra note 15, at 28.
18. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Dissenters: Loners or Pioneers?,
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1990, at B8; Linda Greenhouse, Name-Calling in the Supreme
Court: When the Justices Vent their Spleen, is there a Social Cost?, N.Y. TIMES, July
28, 1989, at BI0; S. Taylor, Season of Snarling Justices, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL,
April 5, 1990, at A 1; Christopher E. Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia: Contradictions in
the Opinions and Behavior of the Supreme Court's Institutional Guardian, unpub-
lished paper presented at the April, 1991, Midwest Political Science Association annual
convention, Chicago, Illinois, 11-13 (1991).
19. Robert Pear, With Rights Act Comes Fight to Clarify Congress' Intent, N.Y.
TIMES, November 18, 1991, at Al, col. 6.
20. See George Kannar, Comment, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin
Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 (1990).
21. Id. at 1300, 1316.
22. DANIEL A. FARBER AND PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 89-95 (1991).
23. id. at 89-91.
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extra textual evidence when interpreting Congressional statutes,24 he is
willing to defer to extra textual evidence such as the Federalist Papers
when interpreting the Constitution. 5 Stock argues that this interpretive
strategy is "inconsistent" '26 and is meant to limit legislative power in
order to benefit executive and judicial power.2 7
Jean Morgan Meaux, Richard Nagareda, and Jay Schlosser view
Scalia's interpretive strategies, including his skepticism towards legisla-
tive intent and history, as important to his jurisprudence in the areas of
executive and administrative authority,2 8 the First Amendment, 29 and
church/state issues. 30 Finally, Daniel Reisman contends that the Jus-
tice's interpretive method is not strictly a textual approach but appeals
to extra-textual values, including a belief in a strong executive govern-
ment.31 Hence, Scalia's jurisprudence and appeal to a neutral method-
ology actually mask his commitment to executive power and his depre-
ciation of congressional authority.32
Finally, a third line of scholarship has concentrated on Scalia's
definition of the Court's role in American society, his attitude towards
the other branches of government, and his views on substantive doctri-
nal issues such as the First Amendment. Gary Hengstler reviews
Scalia's 1987 off bench remarks that endorse limiting the Court's ap-
peals workload by creating special tribunals to handle routine issues
such as social security disability and freedom of information disputes. 3
Christopher E. Smith argues that the Justice's "strong views on separa-
tion of powers and the institution of the Supreme Court place him at
odds with his colleagues." 34 Moreover, Smith claims that Scalia's com-
mitment to separation of powers has placed him in the role of "stalwart
24. See Stock, supra note 3, at 160-61.
25. Id. at 180.
26. Id. at 160.
27. Id. at 160-61, 190-91.
28. Meaux, supra note 10, at 227.
29. Richard Nagareda, Comment, The Appellate Jurisprudence of Justice
Antonin Scalia, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 705, 722 (1987).
30. Jay Schlosser, Note, The Establishment Clause and Justice Scalia: What
the Future Holds for Church and State, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 380, 389-92 (1988).
31. David Reisman, Deconstructing Justice Scalia's Separation of Powers Juris-
prudence: The Preeminent Executive, 53 ALB. L. REv. 49, 50 (1988).
32. Id. at 92-93. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 1716; Tushnet, supra note 4, at
1740.
33. Gary Hengstler, Scalia Seeks Court Changes, 73 A.B.A.J. 20 (1987).
34. Christopher E. Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia and the Institutions of Ameri-
can Government, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REv 783, 785 (1990).
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guardian of American governmental institutions." 35 Another analyst,
Brisbin, reaches a similar conclusion, 6 and also indicates that Scalia's
deference to Congress and the Presidency, as the primary policy mak-
ing institutions, is important to his conception of American politics. 37
Both these authors agree, as do others, that the former University of
Chicago law professor's willingness to place limits on standing and
deny access to the federal courts are attempts to preserve the federal
judiciary, and especially the Supreme Court, as an elite institution in
American politics.38
Overall, the Scalia scholarship characterizes him as a brilliant yet
opinionated Justice, favoring a strict and aggressively enforced concep-
tion of separation of powers, limited access to the courts, and generally
granting some deference to Congress, but.more to the President. This
scholarship, while noting Scalia's conservative political views, mostly
downplays the Justice's ideologies as controlling his jurisprudence. Em-
phasis is placed upon his legal pragmatism, his democratic vision of
American society, and most importantly, upon his interpretive method-
ology as crucial to the decisions that he reaches. How accurate is the
legal scholarship in reaching these claims? Analysis of Scalia's views
on judicial review, the legislative process, patronage, and campaign fi-
nance reform, offer some interesting insights and clarifications.
Ii. JUDICIAL POWER, JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND DISCRETE AND
INSULAR MINORITIES
Previous scholarship examining Scalia's view on the role of the ju-
diciary in American society has concentrated on his views towards
standing and separation of powers. 9 For example, Brisbin and Smith
claim that Scalia is acting as an institutional guardian of the Supreme
Court, that he wishes to preserve the Court as an elite institution, and
that this goal may be secured by limiting access to the Court and by
keeping the judiciary out of issues that ought to be resolved by the
35. /d. at 809.
36. ]3risbin, supra note 17, at 25-28.
37. Id. at 5-6.
38. See Smith, supra note 34, at 794-95; Brisbin, supra note 15, at 6-9; Meaux,
supra note 10, at 227, 246; Schlosser, supra note 30, at 385; Schwartz, supra note 8, at
226-27; See also Patrice C. Scatena, Deference to Discretion: Scalia's Impact on Judi-
cial Review in the Era of Deregulation, 38 HASTINGS L. J. 1223; 1235, 1254 (1987).
39. See Brisbin, supra note 15, at 6-8; Smith, supra note 34, at 792-95.
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political institutions of the government.4 0 Evidence for these claims is
found in numerous decisions Scalia wrote on the court of appeals and
on the Supreme Court, as well as in scholarly works of Scalia written
before becoming a justice on the Court.
In a 1979 essay, 41 while a University of Chicago law professor,
Scalia argued that "Congress is . . .the first line of constitutional de-
fense, and the courts-even the activist modern courts-merely a back-
drop."42 According to Scalia, "Congress has an authority and indeed a
responsibility to interpret the Constitution that is not less solemn and
binding than the similar authority and responsibility of the Supreme
Court . . . .Moreover, congressional interpretations are of enormous
importance-of greater importance, ultimately, than those of the Su-
preme Court. ' 43 However, while Congress is the institution primarily
responsible for maintaining constitutional integrity, it does not have
carte blanche authority to check the executive branch's authority or
regulatory power through the use of legislative vetoes." Instead, what
Scalia argues in this essay is that the legislative veto is a form of "leg-
islation in reverse," '4 5 that legislative vetoes are clearly contrary to the
intent of the Framers, and more importantly, a violation of Article I,
Section 7, Clause 3 of the Constitution. Specifically, a legislative veto is
a usurpation of executive authority granted to the President, and if the
legislative veto is left unchecked, it will alter the constitutional balance
between Congress and the presidency; ultimately undermining demo-
cratic government.4 6
This article suggests several points important to understanding
Scalia's political philosophy. First, there is Scalia's concern to protect
executive power along with his general deference to Congress to make
policy and interpret the Constitution.47 Thus, growing out of his notion
of separation of powers, there is a sense of institutional identity and
function for each of the three major branches of the government.
40. See Brisbin, supra note 15, at 7-9, 10-11, 25-26; Smith, supra note 34, at
809.
41. Antonin Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy for System Overload,
3 REG. 19 (1979).
42. Id. at 20.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 19.
45. Scalia, supra note 41, at 22.
46. Id. at 24-25.
47. Scalia's views towards Congress and legislative bodies will be examined. See
infra notes 109 to 152 and accompanying text.
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Scalia's respect for congressional constitutional interpretation reveals
his willingness to make the judiciary less of a prominent and activist
guardian of the Constitution than it had been in the past. Therefore,
his defense of separation of powers suggests that even the judiciary has
clearly delineated powers that can neither be encroached upon by other
branches nor extended beyond by the courts.
In a 1983 article, written while serving on the federal court of
appeals, Scalia's elaborates more fully on his vision of the judiciary."8
In this article, Scalia claims that the doctrine of standing is a "crucial
and inseparable element" of the concept of separation of powers. 9 He
asserts that the failure to respect the notion of standing will result in
both the "overjudicialization of the proces [sic] of self-governance," 50
and in giving greater respect to the general claims of the citizenry
rather than a single plaintiff with a particularized injury."
Furthermore, Scalia claims that the Founders' conception of
standing was developed to place limits upon judicial power. 2 However,
in chronicling the evolution of the doctrine of standing, Scalia notes
that it has expanded well beyond the original conception of the Foun-
ders. The standing requirement has diminished to such an extent that
currently there is almost no limit upon the ability to bring cases to
court.5 3 The result of this expansion has been to require the courts to
"address issues that were previously considered beyond their kin. 15 '
It is inappropriate for the Court to be involved in matters such as
majoritarian policy-making because that is not the function of the judi-
ciary.55 Instead, the concept of standing was "meant to assure that the
courts can do their work well," 5 and to "restrict[] the courts to their
traditional undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities
against impositions of the majority, and [this] excludes them from the
even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches
should function in order to serve the interest[s] of the majority
48. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of Sepa-
ration of Powers, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881 (1983).
49. Id. at 881.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 882.
52. Scalia, supra note 48, at 882.
53. Id. at 891-93.
54. Id. at 892.
55. Id. at 896. Scalia also suggests that even if they did assume this policy-mak-
ing function, "there is no reason to believe they will be any good at it." Id.
56. Scalia, supra note 48, at 891.
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Overall, Scalia's claim in this article is that the concept of stand-
ing must be returned to the original understanding of that term.58 Only
by drawing a narrow definition of standing that respects particularized
"concrete" injury 9 to an individual that separates her from the rest of
the citizenry can the courts assume their traditional role of "protecting
minority rather than majority interests."60 As a result, the judiciary's
main tasks, consistent with the logic of the Founders and De Toc-
queville, is to protect the constitutional rights of minorities against the
tyranny of the majority.61
References to Scalia's separation of powers and standing decisions
are numerous and need not be reviewed here. 62 However, scholarly at-
tention to Scalia's view on the role of the judiciary, as protecting the
rights of minorities, has generally been ignored or limited to assertions
that he is unsympathetic to their claims.6" Yet, Scalia's claim that it is
the role of the courts to protect minorities against majoritarian excess
does not necessarily appear inconsistent with the role that the judiciary
has assumed since 1938.
In what has been referred to as an otherwise unimportant case,64
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products65 hinted at a new
role for the judiciary in the wake of the triumph of the New Deal and
the repudiation of the Court's "first" New Deal decisions. 6 In
Carolene Products, the Court upheld economic regulations upon the
57. Id. at 894.
58. Id. at 897-98.
59. Id. at 895.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 893.
62. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Synar v.
United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986).
Additionally, in McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991) and Madden v.
Texas, 111 S. Ct. 902 (1991) (Scalia as Circuit Justice), Scalia indicates his desire to
limit writs by death row inmates from state to federal courts and his intent to enforce
the 90-day time limit for certs to be filed in death penalty appeals.
For an analysis of Scalia's views on standing and separation of powers, see Smith,
supra note 34, at 792-99, and Stock, supra note 3, at 181-88.
63. See, e.g., Kannar, supra note 20, at 1298-99.
64. Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 713
(1985).
65. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
66. Ackerman, supra note 64, at 714-15.
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shipment of "filled" milk. The Court noted its willingness to defer to
Congress regarding economic regulation, but in footnote four of Justice
Stone's opinion, it was hinted that a different standard of scrutiny
might apply in other cases. Specifically,
[t]here may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first
ten amendments ....
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which re-
stricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to
more exacting judicial scrutiny . . . than are most other types of
legislation ....
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into
the review of statutes directed at particular religious or racial mi-
norities. Whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the op-
eration of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial scrutiny.6
Implied in this footnote is a definition of a judicial role and review that
is aimed at promoting individual liberty, limiting legislative power, and
protecting powerless minorities against intrusive and tyrannical majori-
ties. It is a role that was subsequently adopted most enthusiastically by
the Warren Court.
An accurate description of the Warren Court approach to the
Carolene Products footnote is found in John Hart Ely's arguments
about judicial review in Democracy and Distrust.68 Ely argues that the
role of the Supreme Court should be to keep the channels of political
change open and to facilitate the representation of minorities in the
political process. Relying upon Justice Stone's footnote number four in
Carolene Products, Ely describes the job of the courts not as second
guessing the substance of legislation, but as helping discrete and insular
minorities protect their interests in the political process.69
The Constitution, according to Ely, is generally process orien-
67. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
68. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW (1980).
69. Id. at 75-76.
19921 1259
250
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss3/18
Nova Law Review
tated;70 it does not embody substantive values. 1 Among the processes
deemed important in the Constitution is representation where different
individuals and groups compete to influence legislative deliberations.7
When certain interests are denied access to the political process, or
when the representative system ignores or fails to represent a minority
out of prejudice, hostility, or an incompatibility of interests, the politi-
cal process has "malfunctioned. 173 The role of the judiciary is not to
substitute a legislature's policy judgment with its own, but to take steps
to ensure that unrepresented and unprotected interests and groups re-
ceive a fair and adequate opportunity to be heard in the political pro-
cess. The judiciary's role is broadening and strengthening the demo-
cratic political process by striking down legislation that limits the
access or ability of certain groups to protect themselves in the political
process.
Ely's comments, as well as the Court's interpretation of footnote
number four, were directed in support of intervention to protect blacks
and women, among others, who either lack adequate political represen-
tation or who were the source of prejudice and discrimination. Thus, at
least on its face, the logic of Carolene Products footnote number four
and Scalia's comments that the primary function of the courts is to
protect minorities against majorities appear to be consistent and com-
patible. In effect, it appears that Scalia accepts the basic role of the
courts as defined by this footnote.
However, analysis of Scalia's affirmative action decisions, scholarly
writings, and use of this footnote in his own decisions suggests disagree-
ment with the role of the judiciary suggested by Carolene Products.
First, a review of all of Scalia's D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals deci-
sions during his tenure as Judge found no citations to Carolene Prod-
ucts. 74 During Scalia's tenure as Justice on the Supreme Court, there
have been only six references to Carolene Products in Court opinions,
and none have been directly made by Scalia. 75 There exists an interest-
70. Id. at 92.
71. Id. at 100. Ely qualifies his view that the Constitution is void of substantive
values when he states that preserving liberty is a substantive value.
72. Id. at 103.
73. ELY, supra note 68, at 102-03.
74. The author would like to thank Professor Daniel Hays Lowenstein for this
information.
75. See Airline Pilots v. O'Neill, 111 S.Ct. 1127 (1991); United States v.
Munoz-Flores, 110 S. Ct. 1964 (1990); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S
469 (1989); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988); New York State Club
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ing pattern within these six citations.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,76 Scalia was in the
majority opinion and the dissenters cited Carolene Products (but not
footnote four) in reference to economic regulation and eminent domain
takings." In two cases, South Carolina v. Baker 8 and New York Club
v. New York City,79 the majority cites Carolene Products in reference
to special scrutiny to be given in reference to participants closed off
from the political process8° or placed in a suspect classification. 81 Scalia
writes concurrences with the majority opinion in both cases, but specifi-
cally dissents from those sections of the majority opinion of both Baker
and New York Club where Carolene Products is cited. In United
States v. Munoz-Flores82 Scalia concurs with the majority opinion, but
Carolene Products is cited in a separate concurrence by Justices Ste-
vens and O'Connor.8 In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,84 Jus-
tice O'Connor writes the majority opinion and cites Carolene Products
footnote four and John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust to uphold
the proposition that powerless minorities (here, whites) deserve special
protection. 6 Scalia concurs with the majority, but writes his own sepa-
rate opinion. Only in Airline Pilots v. O'Neill"8 does Scalia specifically
join an opinion in which Carolene Products is cited. In Airline Pilots,
Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court cites Carolene Products and sev-
eral other cases to support the proposition that "legislatures . ..are
subject to some judicial review of the rationality of their actions. 8 7
Overall, Scalia does not use Carolene Products as precedent or
authority for a specific pattern of judicial review. In fact, as Baker and
New York Club indicate, he seems to go out of his way to reject the
Carolene Products premises. However, the Justice's failure to cite this
Assn. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
76. 483 U.S. 825 (1987)
77. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 893 n.l.
78. 485 U.S. 505 (1987).
79. 487 U.S. 1 (1987).
80. Baker, 485 U.S. at 513.
81. New York, 487 U.S. at 17.
82.. 110 S. Ct. 1964 (1990).
83. Munoz-Flores, 110 S. Ct. at 1977.
84. 488 U.S 469 (1989)
85. Croson, 488 U.S. at 495.
86. 111 S. Ct. 1127 (1991).
87. Airline Pilots, 111 S. Ct. at 1134.
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case may not be an indication that he is hostile to minority rights or
that he rejects the logic of footnote four. Instead, as Bruce Ackerman88
and Neil Komesar 89 have pointed out, the logic and definition of the
judicial role underlying Carolene Products is incomplete and in need of
revision. Among other things, the footnote fails to clarify what consti-
tutes political malfunctions or which minorities are discrete and insu-
lar." Thus, Scalia's opinions perhaps reflect an attempt at reforming
Carolene Products to give it new meaning, rather than a rejection of it.
There exists good evidence for this proposition and it carries with it
significant implications for Scalia's view of the political process.
In Croson, there are numerous passages indicating that the major-
ity examined the openness of the legislative process in Richmond, Vir-
ginia. For example, the majority discussed the legislative history of the
Minority Business Utilization Plan (the Plan), and inquired into the
reasons given for the Plan, as well as the decision-making process that
produced the Plan. The majority suggested that the deliberative process
was not open and representative, but rather closed to nonminorities 1
Additionally, the majority claimed that the Richmond political process
failed to show how the 30 percent set aside for Minority Business En-
terprises (MBEs) was reasonable or that the Plan was not simply the
product of the "shifting preferences" of group and racial politics in the
city. Overall, the majority stressed that their decision declaring the city
of Richmond's Minority Business Utilization Plan unconstitutional was
significantly motivated by their concern with the way the decision was
made.92
Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, was most direct in his views,
stating that this Plan looked to be no more than the product of pressure
politics.93 Scalia, in referring to the Federalist Papers and the
88. Ackerman, supra note 64, at 717.
89. Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy
for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1984).
90. Id. at 411, 415, 424-25; see Ackerman, supra note 64, at 718, 723-24.
91. Croson, 485 U.S. at 479-85 (O'Connor, J.).
92. Id. at 493-500.
93. Id. at 521-26. In fact, as pointed out in Farber & Frickey, supra note 20, at
89-102, several of Scalia's decisions have noted that legislatures are often not acting in
the deliberative fashion they are supposed to and, instead, are either adversely influ-
enced by interest groups or pressure politics. Such a view of the legislative process has
influenced Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation, which is to question legislative
intent. Cf. Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F. 2d. I (D.C. Cir. 1985) and United States v.
Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989) for some of Scalia's observations on the deliberative pro-
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problems of factions influencing a legislative process, suggested that the
Court had a duty to inquire into the structure or fairness of the legisla-
tive process to prevent it from damaging the rights or interests of weak
or unrepresented groups.9 ' The majority, as noted above, referred to
Carolene Products and reaffirmed its role in protecting discrete and
insular minorities. The Court noted the black majority on the Rich-
mond City Council and suggested that it had illegitimately worked to
the disadvantage of a white minority that clearly needed some judicial
protection. The conservative Rehnquist Court, Scalia included, demon-
strated that it was concerned with the integrity of the political decision-
making process and in preventing any groups from exerting any undue
influence upon it. Scalia was not hostile to what he saw as a discrete
and insular minority (the white minority) being persecuted by a major-
ity. His objective in Croson was to invoke some type of strict scrutiny
to keep the political process from closing out a weak minority.
Scalia's opinion in Croson does not necessarily suggest a hostility
to Carolene Products, but rather indicates an unwillingness to use it to
sustain affirmative action and preferential action for blacks. In Scalia's
scholarly writings, he has stated that he is "opposed to racial affirma-
tive action for reasons of both principle and practicality. '" 9 In his dis-
sent in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 96 Scalia rejects the gender
based affirmative action program of Santa Clara County and argues
that the hiring of a woman with a written employment test score less
than a white male (Johnson) resulted in discrimination against John-
son.97 Scalia's opinion reiterates his view expressed in Croson that af-
firmative action plans are simply the product of politics and not proper
constitutional or social policy.98
Further insight into Scalia's interpretation of Carolene Products is
found in three cases where he employs a revised form of footnote four
logic, although he does not cite the case directly. First, in Nollan v.
cess in Congress.
94. Croson, 488 U.S. at 824. After discussing Madison's views on the danger of
factions and the tyranny of the majority in politics, Scalia states, in reference to the
politics of the Richmond Plan: "The prophesy of these words came to fruition in Rich-
mond in the enactment of a set-aside clearly and directly beneficial to the dominant
political group, which happens also to be the dominant racial group." Id.
95. See Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure, I WASH. U. L. Q. 147, 156 (1979).
96. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
97. Id. at 662.
98. Id. at 676-77.
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California Coastal Commission," Scalia writes the majority opinion
striking down a California zoning/environmental law compelling a
property owner to give the public a right of way across his property to
the beach and ocean. The majority considered this right of way an un-
compensated taking. Scalia indicated that this law infringed upon indi-
vidual ownership rights and that the strict scrutiny employed in this
instance was necessary to prevent legislatures and the political process
from singling out specific individuals to contribute to the public
good.100 Thus, property rights appear to deserve special protection
against legislative action.
Scalia's dissent in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce"'0 is
a second appeal to Carolene Products logic. Scalia argues against a
Michigan law that would place restrictions on the ability of some cor-
porations to disperse money out of corporate treasury funds for political
purposes.102 According to Scalia, the requirement that money spent for
political purposes be segregated from other corporate funds eliminates
the voice of powerful associations and impoverishes public debate.' 3
There is no evidence that placing limits upon the voice of these power-
ful associations would do what Scalia claims, i.e., "impoverishing pub-
lic debate." Further examination indicates that Scalia is protecting a
wealthy and well financed organization, against the majority. In many
ways, this case, as well as Croson v. Richmond,104 invokes the logic of
footnote four of Carolene Products to protect wealthy corporations and
white constituencies, neither of which can within easy reach of imagi-
nation (or traditional interpretations of Carolene Products) be consid-
ered "discrete and insular minorities" or closed off from the political
process. In neither case is Scalia willing to defer to the electorally ac-
countable branches to make policy; he asserts that the courts must
intervene.
However, Scalia has no problem deferring to the political process
in cases such as Employment Division v. Smith"°0 where he appears to
repudiate the logic of Carolene Products when it comes to protecting a
Native American from majoritarian excess.
99. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
100. Id. at 835 & n.4.
101. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
102. For a fuller treatment of Austin, see infra notes 188 to 212 and accompany-
ing text.
103. Austin, 494 U.S. at 694-95.
104. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 469.
105. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Values that are protected against governmental interference
through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby ban-
ished from the political process . . . . It may fairly be said that
leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a rela-
tive disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely en-
gaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic govern-
ment must be preferred . .. . 0
Thus, while Scalia is willing to defer to the political process to protect
Native Americans, he is not willing to do so for corporations, and he
appears to be quite content to raise white males, property rights, and
corporations to the status of a discrete and insular groups, and to sec-
ond guess legislatures in order to protect them.
Scalia has not abandoned Carolene Products and the logic of cor-
recting political malfunctions, it just appears that his definition of when
the system malfunctions is triggered by different interests, substantive
(political) values, or policy preferences than had been triggered by the
Warren Court. Thus, as Komesar correctly points out, Carolene Prod-
ucts is not completely process orientated and value neutral; substantive
values determine when the logic is invoked and whom to protect.1",
Scalia's jurisprudence is not completely driven by method as Kannar
and others claim,"" but is guided perhaps by his substantive political
values that determine how and when he will employ judicial review and
scrutiny over the legislative process.
IV. SCALIA AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
As previously noted, Justice Scalia invokes the principle of separa-
tion of powers as deference to legislative and executive power and to
remove the judiciary from consideration of political policy questions.10 9
However, as the discussion of Carolene Products revealed, Scalia's
view of legislative politics does not always consider it worthy of respect
and deference. Instead, as Bernard Schwartz contends, the Justice
views legislative policy decisions as nothing more than pressure polit-
ics. 110 Hence, attempts to ascertain intent of legislatures when reading
statutes is unwise; the preferable method being to defer to the executive
106. Id. at 890.
107. Komesar, supra note 89, at 411.
108. Kannar, supra note 20, at 1298-99.
109. See Brisbin, supra note 15, at 9-14.
110. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 244.
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branch when looking for meaning. "1
There is evidence in various articles authored by Scalia that he
respects the legislative process as the primary institution for policy
making. In The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element in the
Separation of Powers,"2 Scalia argues that the judiciary should keep
out of those "affairs better left to the other branches.""1 3 Additionally,
in Originalism: The Lesser Evil,"" Scalia describes the basic decision-
making process in a democracy: "A democratic society does not, by
and large, need constitutional guarantees to insure that its laws will
reflect 'current values.' Elections take care of that quite well."" 5
Scalia further states that "the legislature would seem a much
more appropriate expositor of social values" than the judiciary." 6
Thus, a vision of the political process that endorses legislative deference
to make policy appears.
Clearly, there are examples of policies where Scalia would let the
legislative process act. One, in Scalia's scholarly writings he states that
"how much to spend for welfare programs is almost invariably a pru-
dential [choice]" and this choice should not be excluded from the delib-
erations in the "governmental process.""' Two, in Liberty Lobby Inc.
v. Anderson,"8 Scalia argued that "legislatures rather than courts
should determine whether damages in libel suits against the press
should be limited.""' 9 Three, in Stanford v. Kentucky, 2 ° Scalia wrote
the majority opinion upholding the imposition of the death penalty for
16 and 17 year olds. In this case, Scalia emphasized that his decision
was grounded on the fact the imposition of the death penalty for indi-
viduals this age was not cruel and unusual since a "majority of the
[s]tates that permit capital punishment authorize it for crimes commit-
ted at age 16 or above."'' Thus, deference to the wisdom of state legis-
latures is important to upholding a death penalty policy. Four, in
Ill. Id.
112. 27 U. SUFFOLK L. REV. 881 (1983).
113. Id. at 891.
114. 57 CINN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
115. Id. at 862.
116. Id. at 854.
117. Antonin Scalia, Morality, Pragmatism, and the Legal Order, 9 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 123, 126 (1986).
118. 746 F. 2d. 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
119. Meaux, supra note 12, at 231.
120. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
121. Id. at 371.
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Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,122 Scalia contended that the use
of spoils is not a violation of employees or potential employees First
Amendment rights and that the merit system is not the only way to
staff the government. In Scalia's words, "the whole point of my dissent
is that the desirability of patronage is a policy question to be decided
by the people's representatives. ' 123 Thus, when to use party affiliation
for hiring purposes is a legislative question. 4
Five, as noted above in Employment Division v. Smith, 5 the Jus-
tice indicated that many values found in the Bill of Rights, such as
those protections offered to the religious practices of minorities, are not
banished from consideration in the political process. Therefore, legisla-
tures may deliberate policy matters that affect personal religious prac-
tices of unpopular groups. Finally, as early as 1978, Scalia argued that
in regards to abortion, the Court "had 'no business' deciding an issue
which had been determined through the democratic process.' 2  Not
surprisingly then, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 2 7 where
a majority upheld several state restrictions upon the right to obtain an
elective abortion, Justice Scalia contended that Roe v. Wade'28 should
be overruled and that the Court should defer to other branches to make
policy in this area:
The outcome of today's case will doubtless be heralded as a tri-
umph of judicial statesmanship. It is not that, unless it is states-
manlike needlessly to prolong this Court's self-awarded sovereignty
over a field where it has little proper business since the answers to
most of the cruel questions posed are political and not juridical-a
sovereignty which therefore quite properly, but to the great damage
of the Court, makes it the object of the sort of organized public
pressure that political institutions in a democracy ought to
receive. 29
Moreover, in a somewhat paradoxical decision, Rust v. Sullivan,1 30
122. 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990).
123. Id. at 2752.
124. For a fuller analysis of Scalia's dissent in Rutan, see infra notes 154 to 174
and accompanying text.
125. 490 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
126. See Meaux, supra note 10, at 228.
127. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
128. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
129. Webster, 492 U.S. at 532.
130. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
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Scalia joins Rehnquist's majority decision which upheld a regulation of
the Secretary of Health and Human Services barring abortion counsel-
ing in federally funded Title X clinics. The Court claimed that the Sec-
retary's regulations were made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sections 300-
300a-6, which at 300a-4 stated that "none of the funds appropriated
under this subchapter shall be used in programming where abortion is
a method of family planning."
In this case, Scalia was willing to "second guess" Congress when
there was no evidence presented that the legislation was the product of
pressure politics. Additionally, while Scalia usually dissents from ap-
peals to legislative history, he was willing here to join a decision that
assumed or reconstructed a legislative history or intent, when both were
noted by the majority to be ambiguous.131 Scalia did not follow his
usual methodological rules, or the usual canons of judicial interpreta-
tion and legislative deference that would assume that Congress was not
seeking a constitutional challenge when it wrote this Act. 32 Scalia
strayed from his usual approach in order to reach a constitutional issue
on a policy issue that he felt strongly about.
These six examples, welfare spending, press liability, the death
penalty, the religious practices of minorities, political patronage, and
abortion are instances where the political process should be allowed to
operate freely and unobstructed by judicial scrutiny. However, there
are many policy areas where Scalia does not view the political process
as worthy of deference. As noted above, in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission'"3 Scalia seemed to suggest that property was de-
serving of some type of special protection against legislative excess.13 4
An even clearer example of legislative questioning is in affirmative ac-
tion. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 3 5 Scalia describes the ori-
gin of preferential treatment programs as being in pressure politics. "It
is unlikely that today's result will be displeasing to politically elected
officials, to whom it provides the means of quickly accommodating the
demands of organized groups to achieve concrete, numerical improve-
131. Id. at 1767-68.
132. For clarification of this point, see Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1778-80 (Blackmum,
J., dissenting).
133. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
134. See Antonin Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, in J.A. DORN &
H.G. MANNE, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY 31, 37 (1987), where then
court of appeals Judge Scalia argued for a "constitutional ethos of economic liberty"
that will give more protection to economic rights.
135. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
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ment in the economic status of particular constituencies. "136
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,13 7 Scalia views the 30 percent
MBE set aside Plan as the product of the type of factional politics that
Madison, in Federalist No. 10, sought to prevent.138 In fact, Scalia
states that "an acute awareness of the heightened danger of oppression
from political factions in small, rather than large, political units dates
to the very beginning of our national history."1"9 Thus, factions are
clearly the source of affirmative action programs and they can damage
the integrity of the legislative deliberative process.
In addition to affirmative action, there are other areas where the
Justice second guesses the legislative process, 4" and there are general
indications overall that Scalia is suspect of the integrity of legislative
political decisions. In scattered opinions, Scalia seems to suggest that
policy decisions often are either the product of pressure politics or staff
work, with neither containing significant legislative deliberation or ra-
tionality than can be discerned. In Hirschey v. F.E.R.C.,"4 Scalia dis-
agrees with the majority opinion's attempt to use legislative intent to
ascertain the meaning of a statute.
I frankly doubt that it is ever reasonable to assume that the details,
as opposed to the broad outlines of purpose, set forth in a commit-
tee report come to the attention of, much less are approved by, the
house which enacts the committee's bill. And I think it is time for
the courts to become concerned about the fact that routine defer-
ence to the details of committee reports, and the predictable expan-
sion in that detail which routine deference has produced,are con-
verting a system of judicial construction into a system of
committee-staff prescription.142
136. Id. at 677.
137. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
138. Id. at 522-24.
139. Id. at 523.
140. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and
Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) where Scalia refuses to
defer to congressional legislation that would have authorized either the appointment of
a special prosecutor to investigate alleged criminal activity in the executive branch or
the creation of sentencing guidelines by members of the federal bench. In many ways,
both decisions sought to "close" and not open the legislative deliberative process.
141. 777 F. 2d. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
142. Id. at 7-8 (footnote omitted).
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In Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 43 Scalia reiterates this theme.
I am frankly not sure that, despite its lengthy discussion of the
ideological evolution and legislative history, the Court's reasons for
both aspects of its decision are much different from mine. I respec-
tively decline to join that discussion, however, because it is natural
for the bar to believe that the judicial importance of such material
matches its prominence in our opinions-thus producing a legal cul-
ture in which, when counsel arguing before us assert that "Con-
gress has said" something, they now mean, by "Congress," a com-
mittee report.1 44
Additionally, in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier,145 Scalia
questions the value of committee reports in clarifying whether the Fed-
eral Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 1 6 was
meant to supersede local state regulation of pesticides. 4  Here, he ar-
gues that not only are committee reports unclear on this issue, but that
committee reports are not even relevant because they do "not necessa-
rily say anything about what Congress as a whole thought."1 48 In
Scalia's opinion, reading legislative history is a recent phenomena rep-
resenting a "'weird endeavor' " that is no more than a "'psychoanaly-
sis of Congress.' "149
Elsewhere, Scalia has expressed similar skepticism towards ascer-
taining legislative intent.' 60 Overall, the inability to ascertain a compre-
hensive legislative history intent, or a history that details a legislative
process that is truly deliberative, has led the Justice towards alternative
means for interpreting statutory construction.1
5
1
143. 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
144. Id. at 529-30.
145. 111 S.Ct. 2476 (1991)
146. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-1364 (1988).
147. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. at 2488-89.
148. Id. at 2489.
149. Id. at 2490 (quoting Justice Jackson in United States v. Public Utilities
Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953)).
150. See Chisom v. Roemer, III S. Ct. 2354, 2369 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); Sable Communications of California Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 133 (1989);
Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 750-51 (1989); Puerto Rico Deist. of
Consumer Affairs v. ISLA Petroleum, 485 U.S. 495, 501 (1988). See also Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1184 (1989);
Antonin Scalia, Regulation: The First Year, 6 REG. 19, 21 (Jan. 1982); Nagareda,
supra note 29, at 722.
151. Farber & Frickey, supra note 20, at 89-90.
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Consequently, despite claims by some that Scalia defers to Con-
gress out of respect for its position as the primary policy making body,
his own opinions reveal a deep distrust for the legislative process be-
cause: (1) local legislatures and perhaps Congress are often captured
by factions and interest group politics; or (2) legislative choices are not
the product of rational deliberation but the product of staff or commit-
tee work. Hence, while some of Scalia's own scholarly writings suggest
legislative deference and respect,152 Scalia's opinions often reject an ap-
peal to legislative intent as an unreliable means to interpret statutes.
Overall, we are left with a record that shows Scalia's view of legislative
politics as one threatened by the evils that Madison feared in Federal-
ist No. 10.
The question then becomes, how does Justice Scalia know when
the legislative process is or is not tainted? When is pressure politics
really pressure politics and not simply the reasonable mobilization of
coalitions or minorities to produce a majority? How does Scalia sepa-
rate good majority building in legislatures that respond to the will of
the electorate from the catering to special interests? No rule is pro-
vided by the Justice, and this leaves us with many questions regarding
the consistency, methodology, and aims of his statutory construction,
unless we assume that the Justice is guided by some policy preferences
that would tell him when deference is demanded or not.
V. PARTY POLITICS, PATRONAGE, AND ADMINISTRATIVE
ORGANIZATION
1 5 3
In 1990, the Supreme Court, in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illi-
nois,"' held that the State of Illinois could not consider political affilia-
tion when hiring, transferring, or promoting individuals because such a
consideration violated the First Amendment rights of individuals apply-
ing for government employment.1 5 Rutan was not an aberration or an
152. See Brisbin, supra note 15; Nagareda, supra note 29, at 739; Scalia, supra
note 114, at 854.
153. For a fuller treatment of this subject, see David Schultz, Judicial Enforce-
ment of Neutral Competence, unpublished paper presented at the American Political
Science Association annual convention, Washington, D.C., August 29-September 1,
1991.
154. 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990).
155. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for the majority which was joined by
Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Stevens wrote a separate concurring
opinion. Justice Scalia wrote the dissenting opinion joined by Rehnquist, Kennedy, and
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isolated judicial attack on spoils, but instead it represented a continua-
tion and extension of a series of patronage decisions over the last 20
years in which the Court has attempted to place limits upon the ability
of governmental units to employ the spoils system in the staffing of the
bureaucracy. 156 Scalia's dissent in Rutan is interesting because it
reveals the Justice's sense of how party politics, elections, and adminis-
trative organizations are related.
Rutan, a 5-4 decision, provoked the most intense debate on the
Court surrounding judicial assault upon patronage and spoils since
Powell's dissent in Branti v. Finkel.157 Brennan wrote for the majority
and was joined by Marshall, White, and Blackmun, with Stevens writ-
ing a separate concurring opinion. In dissent was the "Reagan" Court
of Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor, and Kennedy.
The Rutan case grew out of a challenge to the Illinois governor's
use of party affiliation when hiring, rehiring, transferring, and promot-
ing individuals. The majority opinion of the Court struck down this
practice as an unconstitutional infringement of the First Amendment
rights of these individuals. Significantly, Brennan cited his decisions in
Elrod v. Burns1" and Branti; he extended those rulings, which had ap-
plied to patronage dismissals, to also include patronage hirings, trans-
fers, promotions, and recalls after layoffs. 15" Brennan opined that the
government interests in patronage were not vital enough to justify the
limitation of the First Amendment rights of these workers.1 60
More importantly, the majority used this decision to engage in a
debate with the dissenters from this case and Branti to justify the im-
portance of limiting patronage in the governmental system. As in
Elrod, Brennan argued that the preservation of the democratic process
and party organization is not furthered by patronage. 61 Moreover,
given that civil service rules have already limited the number of pa-
tronage positions available in the last few years, the linkage between
parties and patronage is now weak. Thus, "parties have already sur-
vived the substantial decline of patronage employment practices in this
O'Connor.
156. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507
(1980).
157. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
158. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
159. Rutan, 10 S. Ct. at 2731-32, 2739.
160. Id. at 2734.
161. Id. at 2737.
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century."' 162
In his dissent, Scalia launched a ferocious attack on the majority's
anti-patronage position by arguing that while the merit principle is
clearly the "most favored" way to organize governments, it is neither
the only way to do it nor does it enjoy exclusive constitutional protec-
tion. 16 1 In referring to George Plunkitt in his discussion of patronage,
Scalia describes spoils as part of the American administrative/political
tradition, but he backs off from claiming that it is of "landmark status
• . . or one of our accepted political traditions." 16
Scalia's dissent is founded upon two basic claims. First, he rejects
the idea that the merit principle is the only constitutional way to organ-
ize the bureaucracy. Thus, he defers to legislative wisdom in making
this choice. The choice of which way to staff the government should be
up to elected officials and not the courts. Second, Scalia also defends
patronage as having a rational basis because it supports strong parties,
party government, and popular government. Clearly the second claim
will be linked to his first, and more important constitutional claim.
The primary constitutional line of attack that Scalia uses in his
dissent is to argue that the strict-scrutiny standard used by the major-
ity in this case (as well as in Elrod and Branti) to protect the rights of
federal employees is inappropriate, and ought to be rejected in favor of
a balancing of interests test. 65 There are two parts to this claim for a
new standard. First, Scalia argues that the restrictions on the speech of
governmental employees has been held to be different from the restric-
tions that may be placed on the general citizenry.' 66 Second, if the gov-
ernment does have more latitude to act with in regard to its own em-
ployees, then all the Court needs to ask is whether there is a rational
basis for its regulations. 167 Thus, when Scalia turns to the issue of
spoils and patronage, his argument will be that so long as the govern-
ment can show a rational basis or how patronage serves a reasonable
governmental purpose, and that this purpose outweighs the "coercive"
effects on the employee, then the Court should defer to Congress.'68 In
Scalia's words, "the whole point of my dissent is that the desirability of
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2747.
164. Rutan, 10 S. Ct. at 2748.
165. Id. at 2749, 2752.
166. Id. at 2749.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2752.
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patronage is a policy question to be decided by the people's
representatives." 169
The second part of Scalia's dissent is directed at showing how pa-
tronage does serve an important governmental interest. In presenting
an argument in favor of patronage, Scalia states that "the Court simply
refuses to acknowledge the link between patronage and party discipline,
and between that and party success.' 70 Scalia cites numerous works in
the political science and public administration field that discuss how
parties are important to American government and how strong parties
provide challengers with the resources needed to take on an incumbent.
Crucial to the formulation of a strong party, then, is the reward of
patronage that will entice and reward workers.17 1 Scalia indicates how
parties, supported by patronage, will foster two party competition, the
integration of excluded groups, and help build alliances. 72 Thus, all of
these functions are important to democracy and can be aided by
patronage.
In his dissent, Scalia does two important things. First, he seeks to
place the justification for patronage upon the same or similar legal
footing as the Hatch Act decisions which had upheld restrictions upon
the partisan political activity of federal employees.173 The second thing
that Scalia does is to make a forceful argument for patronage that par-
allels a pre-civil service reform and Jacksonian defenses of spoils. In
effect, Scalia joins Rehnquist and Powell from earlier patronage cases
(as well as Rehnquist, Kennedy, and O'Connor in the Rutan dissent) in
rejecting much of the language of neutral competence and administra-
tion reform that had sought to eradicate spoils.
Overall, what Scalia's dissent suggests is a vision of politics that
endorses one of the most brazen types of partisan pressure politics and
political activity, i.e., patronage. 17 In determining how an administra-
tive agency should be organized and staffed, it should be up to a legis-
lative body to determine if party affiliation is an appropriate qualifica-
tion for employment. Not only does the Rutan dissent endorse
legislative deliberations when Scalia has otherwise questioned it, but it
169. Rutan, 110 S.Ct. at 2752.
170. Id. at 2753.
171. See Id. at 2753-58.
172. Id.
173. See U.S. Civil Service Comm'n v. Postal Workers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973);
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
174. George Kannar, Strenuous Virtues, Virtuous Lives: The Social Vision of
Antonin Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1845, 1860 (1991).
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also supports a free wheeling laissez-faire "to the victor belongs the
spoils" vision of political activity. Political activity, party maintenance,
and electoral activity should not be restricted or encumbered even by
the First Amendment rights of government employees.
175
VI. THE PARADOXES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
The last arena of politics that this paper explores is the issue of
campaign finance reform. Since becoming a Justice on the Supreme
Court, Scalia has had the opportunity to rule on two cases involving the
political spending of non-profit corporations. In both cases he ruled on
First Amendment grounds to strike down applicable campaign finance
restrictions.
In the first case, Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life,"7 6 the Supreme Court was confronted with the appli-
cation of a Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) provision'77 that
"prohibits corporations from using treasury funds to make expenditures
in connection with' any federal election and requires that any expendi-
ture for such purpose be financed by voluntary contributions to a sepa-
rate segregated fund.' 178 Here, Massachusetts Citizens for Life
(MCFL) was a nonprofit, nonstock corporation that supported pro-life
issues through a variety of activities including an infrequently pub-
lished newsletter. What was in question was whether section 441b of
FECA applied to an MCFL newsletter published prior to an election
primary that urged Massachusetts citizens to vote for pro-life candi-
dates even though the publication did not specifically say "vote for
Smith," nor anyone else. 179 The Court held that this newsletter was a
violation of section 441b. But, at the same time, the Court also held
that this provision, as applied to MCFL, was unconstitutional because
it excessively burdened the organization's First Amendment rights.
In reaching this holding, the Court first asked whether requiring
corporations to set up segregated funds for political expenditures was a
175. See Tashjijan v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 235 (1986)
(Scalia, .1., dissenting), where Scalia upholds a Connecticut law that places restrictions
upon who may vote in a Republican Party primary. This appears to be a counter exam-
ple of a situation where he does not support a "wide open, no holds barred" form of
political activity and organization.
176. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
177. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1988).
178. Federal Election Commission, 479 U.S. at 241.
179. Id. at 243, 249-50.
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compelling enough state interest to justify incidental limits upon corpo-
rate free speech rights. 80 The Court answered yes and indicated that:
We have described that rationale in recent opinions as the need to
restrict "the influence of political war chests funnelled through the
corporate form;" to "eliminate the effect of aggregated wealth on
federal elections;" to curb the political influence of "those who ex-
ercise control over large aggregations of capital;" and to regulate
the "substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special ad-
vantages which go with the corporation form of organization." ' 181
Thus the Court, with Scalia in the majority, held that preventing
the "corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth"' 82 was com-
pelling enough of a state interest to require separate segregated politi-
cal funds to ensure that resources acquired in the economic market-
place do not have an unfair advantage in the political marketplace. 83
Segregated funds as prescribed by section 441 b would ensure that the
political ideas expressed by the corporation are an indication of the vol-
untary political support for the ideas articulated, and not the ability of
a company to amass wealth through its economic actions."8
However, the Court noted that the justifications for section 441b
restrictions do "not uniformly apply to all corporations.' 85 Some cor-
porations, such as the MCFL, "have features more akin to voluntary
political associations than business firms, and therefore should not have
to bear burdens on independent spending solely because of their incor-
porated status."' 8' Groups such as MCFL that were formed for ideo-
logical purposes, lacking shareholders, and not acting as a conduit for a
business or a union, are really political associations and not corpora-
tions. 8 Therefore, the special accounting procedures and requirements
that compliance with section 441b would entail are "more extensive
than it would be if it (MCFL) were not incorporated."'' 88 Thus, be-
cause this segregated fund requirement is overly broad in its applica-
180. Id. at 256.
181. Id. at 257 (footnotes omitted).
182. Federal Election Commission, 479 U.S. at 257.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 258-59.
185. Id. at 263.
186. Federal Election Commission, 479 U.S. at 263.
187. Id. at 264.
188. Id. at 254.
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tion to the MCFL, its application in this case is unconstitutional.
Scalia's joining of the majority opinion in Federal Election Com-
mission stands in somewhat curious contrast to Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce'89 where he dissented from a majority holding
that upheld a similar segregated fund requirement in Michigan.
The six-person majority held that corporations, even some non-
profit ones such as the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 190 could con-
stitutionally be prohibited from using direct corporate treasury funds
for independent expenditures to support or oppose candidates for office.
Following upon arguments made in Federal Election Commision and
Buckley v. Valeo,' 91 the Court ruled that campaign finance laws may,
to some extent, regulate the conditions affecting the marketplace of
ideas to ensure that it functions fairly and efficiently. Specifically, the
majority gave greater weight to an expanded definition of corruption
that was referred to in Buckley and Federal Election Commission. In-
stead of viewing corruption as merely a narrow, individual quid pro quo
exchange between a candidate and a lobbyist or interest group, the ma-
jority expressed concern over "a different type of corruption in the po-
litical arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega-
tions of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for
the corporation's political ideas."' 92 Therefore, the State of Michigan
may constitutionally regulate corporate political activity more strictly
than many expected the Court to allow. Corporate treasury spending to
support or oppose candidates running for office, even by some non-
profit corporations like the Chamber, may be prohibited.
Unlike the MCFL, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce was not
deemed by the majority to be an ideological and voluntary political as-
sociation and thus exempt from Michigan requirements to segregate
political funds. Surprisingly, Scalia dissented. He opined that the
Michigan law interfered with the First Amendment rights of the
Chamber, which he presumably labeled a voluntary political
association. 93
Important to Scalia's dissent and response to the majority holding
189. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
190. The Michigan Chamber of Commerce received its money from business
members of the local chamber of commerce.
191. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
192. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397.
193. Id. at 1416.
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are three claims.1"4 First, he maintains that the majority's opinion is a
departure from previous Court campaign finance cases. Second, that
the holding is a clear case of censorship because it is not a narrowly
tailored limitation upon the political expression of a speaker, i.e., a cor-
poration. Third, and perhaps most importantly, even "if the law were
narrowly tailored to serve its goal, . . that goal is not compelling. ' 9"
Overall, Scalia claims that the holding is inconsistent with the First
Amendment, both by way of its original intent and by way of recent
rulings on this Amendment.
To support these claims, Scalia argues against the majority's posi-
tion that legislatures can regulate corporate speech because "[s]tate
law grants (corporations) special advantages" that allow them to amass
wealth."' 6 In citing Pickering v. Board of Education'97 and Speiser v.
Randall,'98 Scalia reminds the majority that the "[s]tate cannot exact
as the price of those special advantages the forfeiture of First Amend-
ment rights."' 99 The only way speech can be limited is to secure a com-
pelling state need. In this case, the majority's contention that large cor-
porate treasuries and corporate spending are a threat to public
discourse is not narrowly tailored enough to justify limits upon their
ability to speak."' 0 It is not narrowly enough drawn because the law
excludes the "war chests" 0' of certain individuals whose wealth may
similarly raise the potential of corruption, 20 2 while also including within
the ban many corporations which may not be wealthy and are subject
to the Michigan law.203
194. For a more in depth analysis of Scalia's dissent in Austin, see John S.
Shockley & David Schultz, The Political Philosophy of Money as Articulated in the
Dissents in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, unpublished paper presented at
the 1991 Midwest Political Science Association annual convention, Chicago, Illinois
(April, 1991). Excerpts of that paper are reprinted here.
195. Austin, I10 S. Ct. at 1414.
196. Id. at 1408.
197. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
198. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
199. Austin, 10 S. Ct. at 1408. Note, however, that in both Pickering and
Speiser the rights in question were those of individuals seeking public employment, and
not corporations participating in the political process.
200. Id. at 1409, 1413.
201. Id. at 1413.
202. Id. at 1409-10, 1412-13. The Court has already held that these individuals
cannot be prohibited from making independent expenditures to express their political
views.
203. Id. at 1413.
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Additionally, Scalia indicates that the Michigan Chamber of
Commerce is more like a voluntary political association as described by
the majority in Federal Election Commission, and De Tocqueville in
Democracy in America.20 4 Suppressing these voluntary associations, ac-
cording to Scalia, is destructive. "To eliminate voluntary associa-
tions--not only including powerful ones, but especially including pow-
erful ones-from the public debate is either to augment the always
dominant power of government or to impoverish public debate."2 "
Thus, to burden the Chamber with a segregated political fund require-
ment would be analogous to encumbering the MCFL with such a fund
requirement. This requirement would place an excessive burden upon
the free speech rights of the Chamber, and thus would be unconstitu-
tional as applied in this case.
Moreover, Scalia contends that even if the law correctly distin-
guished between voluntary associations and corporations, and "if the
law were narrowly tailored to achieve its goal . . . that goal is not com-
pelling."2 ' According to Scalia, the "potential danger '2 0 7 of corporate
wealth is not enough of a justification for the Michigan law to establish
the narrow tailoring necessary to support the state's objective of restric-
tions upon corporate political speech. In effect, in breaking with the
dicta that he joined in with the majority in Federal Election Commis-
sion, Scalia questions whether or not there could ever be a compelling
enough state interest to place a limit upon a corporation's First
Amendment rights. Scalia's contention is that the Michigan law is di-
rected at corporations qua corporations, the wealth that they have
amassed, and the presumed potential for corruption such wealth has in
our society.2"8 Such legislation, for Scalia, is clearly a form of censor-
ship directed at the agent of a specific type of speech and is inconsis-
tent with the First Amendment, the intent of Madison and Jefferson, as
well as the observations of De Tocqueville on the need for free speech
204. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1415-16. Although if the three criteria of Federal
Election Commission to distinguish corporations from voluntary associations are ap-
plied, i.e., voluntary associations are formed for ideological purposes, lacking share-
holders, and not acting as a conduit for a business or a union, then it is debatable
whether the Chamber met any of these requirements very well or at all. Unfortunately,
Scalia gives no argument to show the application of the Federal Election Commission
rules to the Chamber of Commerce in Austin.
205. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1416 (emphasis in original).
206. Id. at 1413.
207. Id. at 1414.
208. Id. at 1415.
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and voluntary associations in society.
Scalia also argues that the majority's special corporate exception
for the regulation of political speech is inconsistent with previous rul-
ings such as FCC v. League of Women Voters of California,20 9 which
struck down bans on political editorializing by noncommercial broad-
casting systems. According to Scalia, the majority opinion misuses
FEC v. National Right to Work Comm.210 as precedent for its deci-
sion. Scalia argues that the majority leaps from an assertion in FEC,
where the Court stated that "we accept Congress' judgment that the
special characteristics of the corporate structure create a potential for
.. .influence that demands regulation" to the overbroad and not nar-
rowly tailored limitation upon all corporate speech in Austin."
Scalia views this case as a departure from Buckley v. Valeo, which
struck down direct contributions to candidates, but which left in place
independent expenditures such as the type the Michigan law here
aimed to prohibit. In effect, Scalia contends that while Buckley sought
to eliminate direct quid pro quo corruption where money is given to a
candidate with the understanding of reciprocity, the aim of the Michi-
gan law is to address the "New Corruption" problem whereby the
speech of one unpopular participant is reduced in order to "enhance the
relative force of others."2"2 Such a reduction of speech by one partici-
pant will have the net effect of reducing the total amount of speech in
society, and will limit the amount of free expression, diversity of
thought and exchange of ideas in society.2" s Thus, this law is a form of
censorship.
Overall, Scalia's dissent in Austin amounts to the claim that the
Michigan law as applied to the Chamber of Commerce is unconstitu-
tional either because it burdens a voluntary political association, or be-
cause the law aims at suppressing corporation speech to eliminate
corruption.
When Scalia's views in Federal Election Commission and Austin
are examined together, he appears to be doing two things. First, Scalia
seems to be rejecting the goal of corporate campaign finance reform he
endorsed in Federal Election Commision. In Austin, he declared the
209. 468 U.S. 164 (1984).
210. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
211. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1413 (quoting FEC v. National Right to Work
Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1982)).
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regulation to be a form of censorship. Second, he also appears to be
moving towards an equivalence of corporations with De Tocqueville's
notion of voluntary political associations. He does that without either
providing an analysis of De Tocqueville to show the parallels between
the two entities, or relying upon legal arguments to show why the rules
formulated in Federal Election Commission, to distinguish associations
from corporations, need to be amended, applied differently, or rejected.
Thus, if we follow the direction of Scalia's thought in Austin, we
see that elections represent the expression of political ideas, that corpo-
rations are an important expression of political ideas, and thus, to regu-
late corporate spending in elections would be to suppress important
First Amendment rights of free expression which would result in cen-
sorship and in damage to the electoral process.
VII. CONCLUSION: SCALIA'S POLITICAL PROCESS
What does an analysis of Antonin Scalia's scholarly writings and
judicial opinions in the areas of minority rights, the legislative process,
patronage and administrative organization, and corporate campaign fi-
nance reform tell us about the Justice's political philosophy?
First, Scalia's approach to judicial review reveals a rethinking of
the Carolene Products logic. The Justice appears unwilling to defer to
legislative bodies in the areas of affirmative action and the protection of
white males, property rights, and campaign finance reform as it effects
corporations.2 14 However, he seems content to defer in the areas of
abortion, tort liability for the press, the death penalty, religious prac-
tices of minorities, and political patronage, among other policy areas.
While it appears that Scalia is no longer willing to defer to legislatures
in the areas traditionally covered by footnote four of Carolene Prod-
ucts, he does appear to be willing to second guess in new areas. Scalia's
own writings suggest that he is often suspect of legislative integrity and
perhaps that suspicion, or his interpretive methodology, might explain
this facially erratic pattern of legislative deference. Yet, no clear rule
or criterion in his decisions or writings has emerged to tell readers
when judicial review is needed because the legislative process has mal-
functioned. All that Scalia has given us are policy areas where the Jus-
tice will defer or not. Contrary to his claims and those by his critics,
214. P.B. Edelman, Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence and the Good Society:
Shades of Felix Frankfurter and the Harvard Hit Parade of the 1950s, 12 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1799, 1815 (1991).
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the Justice does not demonstrate a consistently applied attitude towards
the legislative process.
Scalia's opinions in limiting campaign finance and patronage re-
form, and his views on party politics and governmental organization
demonstrate a sympathy for what is traditionally more characteristic of
the Jacksonian area than of the recent 20th century reform movement.
It is a sympathy for a survival of the fittest, a free political market of
democratic competition where all ideas and tactics are permitted and
where to the victor of the political market belongs the spoils. Overall,
Scalia's views in these policy areas describe a judicial role in the politi-
cal process that is different than the role the Court has previously
adopted from Carolene Products. Exactly where Scalia is headed is un-
clear, but it is definitely in a direction different from what is presently
the case.
Second, Scalia's jurisprudence reflects a preference for policies
that have been labeled as Manchester Liberalism."'5 This is a version
of liberalism more supportive of property rights than civil rights, more
supportive of the marketplace than the government, and more support-
ive of the enforcement of majoritarian morality than of respecting indi-
vidual ethical choices when those choices are at odds with majoritarian
preferences. In effect, Scalia's jurisprudence tends to be more support-
ive of the goals of classical liberal thought than of those goals sup-
ported by the 20th century New Deal welfare state.
Third, this article questions previous scholarship on the Justice
which argues for the most part that Scalia's jurisprudence is primarily
methodologically driven and that his methodology is consistently ap-
plied. Instead, this article presents a view of Scalia's political process
that suggests a perhaps inconsistent deference to legislative decision-
making if we assume that his jurisprudence is methodologically driven.
If we assume that Scalia's jurisprudence is results orientated and that
willingness to defer or not to other branches is controlled by his politi-
cal philosophy and policy preferences towards specific issues, then his
writings and decisions reveal a profound commitment to use judicial
power to serve specific goals. Such a hypothesis should not come as a
surprise. In an address to a conference on federalism, 21 6 Scalia cau-
tioned conservatives to "keep in mind that the federal government is
215. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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not bad but good. The trick is to use it wisely.121 7 Clearly Scalia's deci-
sions seem to bear this caution in mind and reveal an attempt to use
federal judicial power wisely to create a political process that nourishes
policy preferences that the Justice supports.
217. Id. at 22.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The grave consequences to an individual of an order expelling him
or her from the United States has long been recognized. Deportation
has been described by the Supreme Court as a "drastic measure and at
times the equivalent of banishment or exile. It is the forfeiture for mis-
* J.D., George Mason School of Law; B.S., James Madison University.
** I.D., Samford University School of Law; M.Ed., Florida Atlantic University;
B.B.A., Drake College.
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of Miami. The authors are United States Immigration Court Judges serving presently
in Miami, Florida. The views expressed in this article are not necessarily the views of
the United States Department of Justice or the Executive Office for Immigration
Review.
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conduct of a residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty." 1
In a recent United States Supreme Court case, Ardestani v. INS,
Justice O'Connor, speaking for the majority, emphasized "the enormity
of the interests at stake."2 Justice Blackmun, speaking for the dissent,
did not disagree with this proposition. He stressed that "the alien's
stake in the proceedings is enormous (sometimes life or death in the
asylum context) . .. .",
These concerns over being forced to leave the country are espe-
cially important when children are involved. As a result, immigration
proceedings recognize the right of children to special protection when
their families are involved in deportation proceedings.4
The purpose of this article is to examine the current state of the
law with respect to the treatment of children in immigration proceed-
ings and to propose certain alternatives to further ensure their protec-
tion. To accomplish this purpose, the article first focuses on proceedings
before the United States Immigration Court, and especially differentia-
tion between exclusion and deportation proceedings. Then, the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act's treatment of children will be explored
and focus will be given to in-custody practices prior to exclusion pro-
ceedings. The article goes on to discuss the detention and release of
aliens; pending litigation; and, children unaccounted for by the law. Fi-
nally, the authors conclude by offering alternatives to the existing
1. Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 9 (1948) (citation omitted).
2. Ardestani v. INS, 112 S. Ct. 515, 521 (1991).
3. Id. at 522. It is important to note that deportation has never been considered
as punishment or criminal in nature and, thus, the procedures and safeguards identified
with criminal prosecutions have been held inapplicable in the deportation context. Bu-
gajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952);
United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 149-54 (1923). Rather, depor-
tation proceedings are deemed civil matters. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580
(1952).
However, the United States Supreme Court has extended other constitutional
guarantees and procedural safeguards to juveniles in non-criminal "juvenile proceed-
ings," because the potentially severe consequences of a juvenile proceeding are similar
to a criminal trial despite the former's ostensibly "civil" nature. John L. v. Adams, 750
F. Supp. 288 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).'
The custody of minors who are in exclusion and deportation proceedings is a rec-
ondite and esoteric topic and is integrally intertwined with the issue of minor's rights in
immigration proceedings. Although there is a plethora of identifiable classes of minors
scattered throughout the Immigration and Nationality Act, there is a dearth of pub-
lished cases, administrative or judicial, on the subject.
4. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION COURT
PROCEEDINGS
In deportation cases, jurisdiction over the hearing matter vests,
and proceedings before a United States Immigration Judge commence,
when the charging document is filed by the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service (hereinafter INS) with the Office of the Immigration
Judge.5 Immigration Judges are similar to administrative law judges
and serve under the jurisdiction of the Executive Office for Immigra-
tion Review (EOIR), which is a component of the United States De-
partment of Justice.6
Hearings before an Immigration Judge may be either in deporta-
tion or exclusion proceedings.' Aliens entering, or seeking to enter, the
United States are dealt with an exclusion proceeding. However, once
an alien has been admitted to the United States, and permitted to pass
through an INS or border patrol check point, he or she can only be
expelled through deportation hearings.8 This is not so, however, when
the admission was only on a parole basis, and upon termination of the
parole the alien is dealt with in exclusion proceedings rather than de-
portation proceedings.' Parole occurs when the INS-released alien is in
the United States for an unspecified period of time while an application
for admission is being adjudicated.
5. 8 C.F.R. § 3.14 (1991).
6. In 1983, the United States Department of Justice, by regulation, created
EOIR as an administrative entity separate and apart from the INS. See 48 FED. REG.
8056 (1983) (amending 8 C.F.R. § 1, 3 & 100).
7. In deportation proceedings, the charging document is called an Order to Show
Cause (hereinafter OSC) and Notice of Hearing. In exclusion proceedings, the charg-
ing document is called a Notice to Applicant for Admission Detained for Hearing
before an Immigration Judge. With regard to minors in deportation proceedings, the
statute specifically deals with service of an OSC on minors under the age of 14. 8
C.F.R. section 242.1(c) states that with respect to minors under the age of 14, the
OSC and any warrant of arrest must be served in the manner prescribed in 8 C.F.R.
section 242.1(c) upon the person or persons named in 8 C.F.R. section 103.5a(c). Ser-
vice is made upon the person with whom the minor resides. Further, "whenever possi-
ble, service shall also be made on the near relative, guardian, committee, or friend". 8
C.F.R. § 103.5a(c)(2)(ii) (1991). Some of this refers more particularly to "incompe-
tents," for whom the service is identical.
8. Matter of VQ, 9 I&N Dec. 78 (BIA 1960).
9. Matter of Lyy, 9 I&N Dec. 70 (BIA 1961).
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In contrast, when an alien actually has entered the United States
free from official restraint, even though the entry may have been sur-
reptitious or in direct violation of law barring entry, the alien's removal
can be accomplished only through deportation proceedings.10
III. TREATMENT OF CHILDREN BY THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATIONALITY ACT
Complicating the matter is the fact that there is no uniformity of
treatment of children by the Immigration and Nationality Act (herein-
after Act). The Act uses different nomenclatures for treating minors
and, at times, differing age criteria. For instance, the word "child" is a
defined term in the Act and children, in turn, are defined as legitimate,
illegitimate, legitimated, step-children, adopted, and orphaned.1 While
the term "infancy" is not defined in the Act, 2 minors are categorized
broken as juveniles 3 and minors under fourteen. 4 Additionally, some
minors are classified as Special Immigrants. 6 Furthermore, the statute
references foundlings,' 6 and minors in foster care. 7 In this morass of
terminology, specific rights involving each definition are hidden. We
shall limit our study to those involving release from custody in exclu-
sion and deportation proceedings.
Yet another statutory definition of what constitutes minority con-
10. Matter of A, 9 I&N Dec. 536 (BIA 1961).
11. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) §§ 101(b), (c), 8 U.S.C. §§
1101(b), (c) (1991). If the child is not the natural, legitimate child, there may be
additional criteria which must be satisfied. For example, an adopted child must have
been in the legal custody of, and reside with, the adopting parent or parents for at least
two years. INA §101(b)(l)(E), 8 U.S.C. §1101(b)(1)(E) (1991).
12. INA § 212(a)(9)(b), 8 U.S.C. § I182(a)(9)(b) (1991); INA § 237(e), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(e) (1991).
13. 8 C.F.R. § 242.24(a) (1991).
14. Id. § 242.3(a).
15. A Special Immigrant is one who has been declared dependent by a juvenile
court and has been deemed eligible by that court for long-term foster care and for
whom it has been determined in an administrative or judicial proceeding that it would
not be in the alien's best interest to be returned to the alien's or parent's previous
country of nationality or country of last habitual residence. INA § 101(a)(27)(J), 8
U.S.C. § l101(a)(27)(J) (1991).
16. A foundling is a person of unknown parentage found in the United States
while under the age of five years until it is shown, prior to attaining the age of 21 years
not to have been born in the United States. INA § 301(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(f) (1991).
17. INA § 101(a)(22), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (1991).
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cerns persons of unknown parentage found in the United States while
under the age of five years. They are presumed to be United States
citizens, unless it is shown, prior to their attaining the age of twenty-
one years, that they were not born in the United States."8 This provi-
sion, however, does not often come into play and is of relatively little
importance.
IV. IN CUSTODY PROCEDURES IN EXCLUSION PROCEEDINGS
When aliens apply for admission into the United States and the
inspecting immigration officer finds that they are not clearly and be-
yond a doubt eligible for entrance, the officer serves them with a notice
that they have been placed in exclusion proceedings."9 If they are at a
border station, they may be taken into custody by the INS and de-
tained for a hearing before an Immigration Judge.
If they have arrived by ship or aircraft, they remain in carrier
custody until the INS decides to take custody. Minors, as well as
adults, may be taken into custody. 0 The INS does not administer facil-
ities strictly limited to the custody of minors. Thus, they may be placed
in a facility meeting the criteria required by regulation for all detained
aliens.2
When the alien is an infant, special problems arise. The term in-
fancy is not a defined term in the Act or the regulations, but the regu-
lations do provide for an examination by public health authorities. The
Public Health Service, after examination, may certify infancy. 2 If the
infant is accompanied by another alien whose protection or guardian-
ship is required by the infant, and the infant is ordered excluded or
deported, such accompanied alien also may be excluded or deported.2 3
If the infant is in custody of a citizen or national of the United
States, the Act is silent on custody. Furthermore, there are no known
cases which have dealt with this issue. When the nationality of the
18. INA § 301(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1402(0 (1991).
19. The form served upon the alien is a Notice to Applicant Detained for Hear-
ing Before a United States Immigration Judge (Form 1-122).
20. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(d) (1991).
21. Id. § 235.3(f).
22. INA § 237(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(e) (1991). The Public Health Service ap-
points a medical officer who is a physician of the Public Health Service assigned or
detailed by the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service to make mental and
physical examinations of aliens. 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(e) (1991).
23. INA § 212(a)(9)(b), 8 U.S.C. § l182(a)(9)(b) (1991).
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child is known, the appropriate consular office may be advised in accor-
dance with their parens patriae interest.2' It would appear that release
on parole to the custody of the appropriate consulate pending the pro-
ceedings would be the best course. An alternative to INS custody is to
release minors, including infants, from custody during the pendency of
the exclusion proceedings.
Release from custody in exclusion proceedings generally is by pa-
role and may be with or without bond. Release on parole is not a mat-
ter of right but is left to INS discretion. That discretion is exercised by
the INS in accordance with specific regulations.25
Although release of minors from custody in exclusion proceedings
is referred to in the rules of release of minors in deportation proceed-
ings, there are significant differences in application for release.
Whereas release from custody in deportation proceedings is a matter of
right, and it is the INS which must justify continued custodial deten-
tion, in exclusion proceedings parole is left to the INS discretion. While
persons in deportation proceedings have a liberty interest under the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in exclusion pro-
ceedings, they have only the due process rights which Congress gives
them.26 In exclusion proceedings they are limited to requesting release
by parole at the INS discretion.
Review of the denial of parole in exclusion procedures is by writ of
habeas corpus to the appropriate United States District Court. The
standard of review is abuse of discretion, a difficult burden to establish,
even in cases where the detention is so seemingly without end as to be
permanent.2 7 This is the reason why there are so few cases generally
dealing with release from custody in exclusion proceedings and no pub-
lished cases specifically dealing with minors.
Taking custody of minors in either exclusion or deportation pro-
ceedings is a troublesome problem for the INS. In either case, since the
release from custody of children involves not an actual release but a
transfer of custody from the INS to someone else, the service is faced
with having to screen prospective guardians for their suitability.28 The
24. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(g) (1991).
25. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a)(20)(iii) (1991) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 242.24(b) regarding a
deportation regulation concerning detention and release of juveniles, defined as minors
under 18 years of age).
26. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
27. See Lency May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958); Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
28. 8 C.F.R. § 242.24(b) (1991).
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transfer of custody can be an even bigger problem, especially in depor-
tation proceedings. 9
The only references to INS custody of minors is contained in the
provision of the Act which deals with foster care and the regulation
dealing with release from custody. 30 Other than these two provisions,
there is nothing in either the Act or the regulations which directly ad-
dresses issues pertaining to the custody of minors.
V. DETENTION AND RELEASE
In contrast to the INS provisions above, which define minor as
under the age of fourteen, the definition of juvenile for purposes of de-
tention and release is an alien under the age of eighteen years.3 ' With
respect to juveniles for whom bond has been posted, for whom parole
has been authorized, or who have been ordered released on recogni-
zance, certain guidelines are applicable."2 The order of preference to
which the juvenile will be released to starts with the parent, then goes
on to the legal guardian, and finally an adult relative who is not pres-
ently in INS detention. 3 There is a caveat that the juvenile should not
be released if detention is required to secure the juvenile's timely ap-
pearance before the INS or the United States Immigration Court, or
further, to insure the juvenile's safety or that of others.34
If neither parents, legal guardians, nor adult relatives not in deten-
tion are located to accept custody, and the juvenile has identified a
person in one of these categories who is also in the INS detention, the
decision of whether to simultaneously release the juvenile and the adult
person is evaluated on a case by case basis.3 5
Where the juvenile's parent or legal guardian is in INS detention
or out of the United States, the juvenile may be released to a person
designated by the parent or the legal guardian in a sworn affidavit exe-
cuted before an immigration officer or counselor officer as capable and
willing to care for the juvenile's well-being." Such individual must exe-
29. See infra discussion on custody provisions.
30. INA § 101(a)(22), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(22) (Supp. 1992); 8 C.F.R. § 242.34
(1991).
31. 8 C.F.R. § 242.24(a) (1991).
32. Id. § 242.24(b).
33. Id. § 242.24(b)(1).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 242.24(b)(2).
36. 8 C.F.R § 242.24(b)(3) (1991).
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cute an agreement to care for the juvenile and ensure the juvenile's
presence at all future INS or Immigration Court proceedings.3 7
In unusual and compelling circumstances, the district director or
chief patrol officer may exercise discretion and release the juvenile to
an adult other than those falling within the specified categories above,
provided that the adult executes an agreement to care for the juvenile's
well-being and to ensure the juvenile's presence at all future immigra-
tion proceedings. 38 Thus, the statutory provisions logically focus on the
well-being of the juvenile, as well as ensuring that he or she will be
present at future proceedings.
If a juvenile cannot be released into the custody of an adult and
detention is determined to be necessary, the juvenile is referred to a
"juvenile coordinator," whose responsibilities include finding suitable
placement in a juvenile facility.3 9 Further, if detention is determined to
be necessary, the juvenile may be temporarily held by the INS authori-
ties or placed in an INS detention facility having separate accommoda-
tions for juveniles, pending suitable placement made by the juvenile
coordinator. 0
In situations in which a juvenile does not wish to be released to his
or her parents, who are otherwise suitable, the parents are notified and
afforded the opportunity to present their views to the district director,
chief patrol agent or Immigration Judge before a custody determina-
tion is made.41
Notice to parents also is required if the juvenile seeks release from
detention, voluntary departure, parole, or any other form of relief from
deportation, when the grant of such relief "may effectively terminate
some interest inherent in the parent- child relationship and the juve-
nile's rights and interests are adverse with those of the parents,"' 2 if
the parent is presently residing in the United States. In such case, the
parent shall be given notice of the juvenile's application for relief and
afforded the opportunity to propound his or her views or interests to the
district director or Immigration Judge prior to determination on the
merits of the requests for relief.' 3
37. Id.
38. Id. § 242.24(b)(4).
39. Id. § 242.24(c).
40. Id. § 242.24(d).
41. Id. § 242.24(e).
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. A distinction is made between juveniles who are apprehended "in
the immediate vicinity of the border who reside permanently in Mexico
or Canada," and all others. As to the former, before they are presented
with a form for voluntary departure, they must be informed that they
may make a telephone call to a parent, close relative, friend or an or-
ganization found on the free legal services list."" Other juveniles appre-
hended must be provided with access to a telephone and must, in fact,
communicate with either a parent, adult relative, friend, or an organi-
zation found in the free legal services list prior to being presented with
the voluntary departure form. 5
* Finally, when a juvenile is apprehended, he or she must be given a
notice and request for disposition advising the alien of his or her
rights."' Interestingly enough, the definition of minor, under fourteen
years of age, is found only in this particular provisions, which provides
that if the juvenile is under fourteen or unable to understand the no-
tice, the notice shall be read and explained to the juvenile in a language
that the juvenile understands.
As a practical matter, the better approach would be for agents of
the INS to ensure the notice is read and explained to all juveniles in
their native language, unless it is clear they understand English. This
would have the effect of obviating the different age cutoff for juveniles,
as opposed to minors.
VI. PENDING LITIGATION
The INS policy of detaining alien children unless the regulatory
requirements' 7 have been met has been found unconstitutional by a
majority of the en banc Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Flores v.
Meese." Since the appellate court concluded that the INS had ac-
knowledged that the regulation was not necessary to ensure attendance
at immigration proceedings or that release of the children so detained
would create a threat of harm to the children or anyone else, the
court's analysis was limited to the interests advanced by the INS.
The INS contended that detention of a child, when no parent or
44. Id. § 242.24(g).
45. Id. If the juvenile, on his or her own volition, asks to contact a consular
officer and, in fact, makes such contact, the requirements of this section are met.
46. Id. § 242.34(h).
47. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.24 (1991) (listing the applicable requirements).
48. 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991).
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legal guardian was able to take custody, better served the child's inter-
ests than release to an adult whose living environment the INS was
unable to investigate. In a related argument, the INS urged that the
policy was necessary to protect the agency from potential litigation in
the event harm should befall children so released."9
However, the court held that accepted principles of habeas corpus
are applicable, citing Carlson v. Landon,5 0 and that aliens have a fun-
damental right to be free from government detention unless a determi-
nation is made that such detention furthers a significant government
interest. The court concluded the INS failed to support either of the
above arguments as to the interests served by the regulations. There-
fore, the INS failed to demonstrate the necessary furtherance of the
significant government interest.
The dissent, led by Chief Judge Wallace, determined that the
right involved was that of children to be released to unrelated adults
without the INS approval and that it was a non-fundamental right.
Accordingly, the appropriate test was not whether a significant govern-
ment was furthered, but, rather, whether the INS interest, of protect-
ing the children and avoiding potential liability, was legitimate and to
which the regulation was rationally related. The dissent, affirmatively
answered the latter question by emphasizing the significant deference
courts traditionally have paid to immigration laws and to regulations
promulgated by the political branches of government.5"
The court majority affirmed the district court order which found
the blanket detention policy unlawful. In addition, the majority ordered
that children be released to responsible adults when no parent or legal
guardian is available to take custody, where determined appropriate on
a case by case basis. Further, the court directed that hearings be held
before Immigration Judges for determination of the terms and condi-
tions of such release.52
VII. RESPONSIBILITIES FOR UNACCOMPANIED OR ABANDONED
FOREIGN NATIONAL CHILDREN
While the above mechanisms appear to be in place for minors
49. Id. at 1362.
50. Id. at 1359-60 (citing Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952)).
51. Id. at 1377. (Wallace, C.J., dissenting) (citing inter alia Mathews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67 (1976); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11 th Cir. 1984) (en banc)).
52. Id. at 1364.
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under federal law, the next question is the protection to be afforded to
a child who enters the United States without a parent or a legal guard-
ian. This, in turn, raises a further issue: who is responsible and ac-
countable for them pending the outcome of their deportation proceed-
ings in Immigration Court?
Because federal law is silent on this issue, the ultimate answers
may well be found by turning to the laws of those jurisdictions in which
the Immigration Court proceedings are conducted. Since this article
has been authored by judges situated in the Miami Immigration Court,
it appears appropriate to reference Florida law in these issues, notwith-
standing the fact that the ultimate status of alien children is governed
by federal immigration law.
Moreover, most state laws, including those of Florida, make no
distinction between a child who is a foreign national or a Florida resi-
dent. This is premised on the notion that the state has an overriding
social and humanitarian interest in the welfare of all children, no mat-
ter what their citizenship or nationality, if they fall within the jurisdic-
tion of the state.
In Florida, a mother and a father are jointly the natural guardians
of their natural and adopted children during the latter's minority, 5 and
if one parent dies, the natural guardianship passes to the surviving
spouse and continues even if the surviving parent marries." Moreover,
guardianship generally follows custody. 55
The circuit courts in Florida have authority to award custody, and
therefore guardianship, to a father, a mother, or non-relative, as the
circumstances may dictate.56
Florida law also clearly provides that a "'child who is found to be
dependent' means a child who . . . is found to have been abandoned
• . . or neglected by his parents or other custodians." 57 The word de-
pendent has also been construed to mean any person who is in need of
aid, assistance, maintenance and care. Additionally, a dependent child
may be taken into protective custody58 or may have a guardian ap-
pointed to supervise, oversee, and provide for their needs and welfare.
53. 28 FLA. JUR. 2d Guardian and Ward § 7 (1981).
54. FLA. STAT. § 244.301(a) (1991).
55. 39 AM. JUR. 2d Guardian and Ward §§ 65-66 (1968).
56. Smith v. Smith, 36 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1948).
57. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(10)(a) (1991) (emphasis added).
58. FLA. STAT. § 39.401 (1991).
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Since a child is classified as a minor under eighteen years of age,5 9 then
it naturally follows that they may not be competent to handle their own
affairs and therefore are in need of protection.
What becomes of the unaccompanied or abandoned child who is
placed in proceedings before the Immigration Judge and has no
mother, father or other relative in the United States? Is this a depen-
dent child or a child in need of services under the provisions of Florida
law?
In Florida, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
normally has an affirmative duty to take steps for an unprotected mi-
nor, regardless of their legal residency or citizenship."' This would be
one way to treat unaccompanied children, as described above. In the
alternative, Florida law also allows for appointment of guardians ad
litem. A guardian is one to whom the law has entrusted the custody
and control of the person or incompetent61 and one category of incom-
petency is one who because of minority is incapable of caring for him
or herself."
Most importantly, a guardian ad litem can only be appointed by a
circuit court judge before whom litigation is pending, to represent the
ward in that particular matter,63 as governed exclusively by statute.6 4
In Flores v. Meese,65 the Ninth Circuit confirmed the district
court judge's determination that United States Immigration Judges
should decide child custody decisions. Query whether it may be a nec-
essary part of that responsibility for Immigration Judges to have the
authority to appoint guardians ad litem on behalf of minors who find
themselves before the Immigration Court?
VIII. CONCLUSION
Because of the importance of both proper enforcement of both the
United States immigration laws and the need to insure that minors in
immigration proceedings have their rights and personal well-being fully
protected, this issue should be addressed by Congress. The legislature
59. FLA. STAT. § 744.102(11) (1991).
60. FLA. STAT. § 39.002 (1991).
61. See FLA. STAT. § 744.102(8) (1991).
62. See FLA. STAT. § 744.102(11) (1991).
63. See FLA. STAT. § 744.102(9) (1991).
64. Poling v. City Bank & Trust Co., 189 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1966).
65. 942 F.2d 1352, 1364 (9th Cir. 1991).
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should give serious consideration to vesting such authority in the
United States Immigration Judges, who directly adjudicate deportation
and exclusion proceedings. This would seem to be the best way to pro-
tect the: legal interests of those children without parents or other re-
sponsible persons to see to their needs, who are faced with the prospect
of forced removal from the United States.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 1972, the United States Supreme Court issued its
landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia,1 vacating the death sentences
imposed upon capital defendants in Georgia and Texas. The decision
effectively invalidated all state death penalty statutes then in existence,
thereby preventing the execution of over 600 inmates incarcerated on
various death rows. Though the Court left open the possibility that
more narrowly drafted capital sentencing statutes might survive judi-
* J.D., Yale University School of Law, 1988; M.Phil., Yale University, 1991;
M.A., Yale University, 1987; A.B., Princeton University, 1979. Former law clerk for
United States Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun, 1989-90.
The author would like to thank the following people for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this article: Vikram Amar, John Blum, Robert Burt, Evan Caminker,
and Jordan Steiker.
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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cial scrutiny, many observers doubted that states would in fact choose
to enact new laws.2 Within the next six months, however, the Florida
legislature passed, and the state's governor signed, a bill authorizing
the imposition of the death penalty. By 1976, when the Supreme Court
next examined the constitutionality of capital punishment, a total of
thirty-five states had enacted capital sentencing statutes designed to
comply with the ruling in Furman.3 This article examines the process
by which the Florida statute was enacted in 1972.
Although two members of the Furman Court argued that capital
punishment was per se unconstitutional, the other three Justices of the
majority stated only that the capital sentencing procedures then in
place were constitutionally defective. The ensuing debate in Florida
centered on the effort to devise a procedural scheme that would survive
judicial scrutiny. That debate furnished an enlightening case study of
constitutional decision-making by elected representatives. For the most
part, the legislature was astute and conscientious in its efforts to parse
the nine separate opinions issued by the Supreme Court in Furman.
The evidence indicates, however, that legislators were motivated by
pragmatic concerns rather than by any sense of obligation to abide by
the Supreme Court's instructions. A bill that would be upheld (and
thus could be enforced) was preferable to one that would be struck
down; but any bill was preferable to no bill at all.
At the time Furman was decided, the case was widely regarded as
brazenly undemocratic In an abrupt and hazily reasoned fashion, it was
said, the Court had brought an end to a form of punishment utilized in
a large majority of the country. Justice Powell, in dissent, argued that,
[i]t is important to keep in focus the enormity of the step under-
taken by the Court today. Not only does it invalidate hundreds of
state and federal laws, it deprives those jurisdictions of the power
to legislate with respect to capital punishment in the future, except
in a manner consistent with the cloudily outlined views of those
Justices who do not purport to undertake total abolition. Nothing
short of an amendment to the United States Constitution can re-
verse the Court's judgments. Meanwhile, all flexibility is fore-
2. For example, NAACP Legal Defense Fund attorney Jack Greenberg asserted
that "[t]here will no longer be any more capital punishment in the United States."
MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 291 (1986).
3. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 & n.23 (1976) (Stewart, Powell
& Stevens, JJ.) (listing statutes).
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closed. The normal democratic process . . . is now shut off."
In retrospect, however, it is clear that Furman stimulated rather than
aborted the national debate over the death penalty. In an important
sense the decision was not at all undemocratic. The Court ensured that
capital sentencing schemes would not remain in operation simply be-
cause of inertial forces within the legislature. Rather, imposition of the
death penalty would be allowed to continue only if it could be demon-
strated that contemporaneous support for capital punishment remained
strong. Furman did not simply command that the states adopt new cap-
ital sentencing procedures-it invited the states to decide anew whether
they wished to have capital punishment at all.
Did Furman induce the Florida legislature to undertake a true re-
evaluation of the propriety of capital punishment? The record is mixed.
Certainly the decision brought an end to the legislature's prior unwill-
ingness to discuss the issue. The burden of going forward was shifted to
proponents of the death penalty, and abolition was conceded to be an
option genuinely open for consideration. Had opponents of the death
penalty been numerous within the legislature, it is quite possible that a
thorough re-examination of the subject would have ensued. In the end,
however, support for capital punishment was so overwhelming that the
inquiry was a cursory one. Although Furman ensured that Florida
would not retain the death penalty simply through legislative inertia, it
did not induce the legislature to put aside its preconceptions and start
from scratch.
II. HISTORY
A. Furman v. Georgia
The vote in Furman was 5-4; the five Justices in the majority is-
sued five separate opinions, and no Justice in the majority joined the
opinion of any other. Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that
capital punishment was per se violative of the Eighth Amendment ban
on "cruel and unusual punishments." Justices Douglas, Stewart, and
White did not go so far. Their opinions were not models of clarity, and
there were differences of emphasis among them; all three Justices, how-
ever, appeared to share the view that the Texas and Georgia statutes
were unconstitutional because they conferred upon juries unlimited dis-
4. Furman, 408 U.S. at 461-62 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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cretion to decide which defendants would live and which would die.
Justices Stewart and White placed particular emphasis on the rarity
with which capital sentences were actually imposed. Justice Stewart as-
serted that "[t]hese death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same
way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual . . . . [T]he
petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon
whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed."' 5 Justice White
argued that "the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even
for the most atrocious crimes . . . . [T]here is no meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases
in which it is not.
' 6
Lurking at the edges of the debate was the question of race. Jus-
tice White's opinion did not allude to the issue of racial discrimination,
and Justice Stewart mentioned it only obliquely.7 But, as the concur-
ring opinions of Justices Douglas8 and Marshall9 made clear, capital
punishment during the previous half-century had been disproportion-
ately imposed upon blacks. That history of discrimination formed the
centerpiece of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's constitutional chal-
lenge to the death penalty. 10 The evil of discretionary capital sentenc-
ing, then, was not simply that it could lead to "random" or "arbitrary"
results. The absence of any check on the jury's discretion also increased
the danger that the death penalty would be applied in a racially dis-
criminatory fashion. The attempt to develop improved capital sentenc-
ing schemes was, in an important sense, an effort to devise procedures
5. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("My concurring Brothers have demon-
strated that, if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced
to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race. But racial discrimination
has not been proved, and I put it to one side.") (citations omitted).
8. Id. at 249-51 (Douglas, J., concurring).
9. Justice Marshall noted that,
[a] total of 3859 persons have been executed since 1930, of whom 1751
were white and 2066 were Negro. Of the executions, 3334 were for mur-
der; 1664 of the executed murderers were white and 1630 were Negro; 455
persons, including 48 whites and 405 Negroes, were executed for rape. It is
immediately apparent that Negroes were executed far more often than
whites in proportion to their percentage of the population.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
10. See, e.g., Eric L. Muller, The Legal Defense Fund's Capital Punishment
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that would reduce the likelihood that race could influence the choice
between life and death.'1
Several Justices, both in the majority and among the dissenters,
emphasized that the constitutionality of certain types of capital sen-
tencing laws remained an open question. Justice White noted that
"[t]he facial constitutionality of statutes requiring the imposition of the
death penalty for first-degree murder, for more narrowly defined cate-
gories of murder, or for rape would present quite different issues under
the Eighth Amendment than are posed by the cases before us.""2 Jus-
tice Stewart also reserved judgment as to the constitutionality of laws
mandating a death sentence for particular crimes, 13 and Justice Powell
observed that the legality of such statutes "remains undecided."'"
Mandatory sentencing was not identified as the only method by
which states might seek to draft new death penalty laws. Chief Justice
Burger suggested that "legislative bodies may seek to bring their laws
into compliance with the Court's ruling by providing standards for ju-
ries and judges to follow in determining the sentence in capital cases or
by more narrowly defining the crimes for which the penalty may be
imposed." 15 In the main, however, contemporary observers concluded
that mandatory statutes would enjoy the greatest chance of Supreme
Court approval. The concerns expressed by Justices Stewart and
White--that vesting absolute discretion in the sentencing jury had led
to unjustified variations in the treatment of similarly-situated defend-
ants, and that the infrequency with which capital punishment had been
imposed rendered it useless as a method of deterrence-seemed to
many to be best addressed by a sentencing statute that gave the jury no
discretion at the sentencing stage and provided that all defendants con-
victed of enumerated crimes would receive the death penalty.
There was a certain irony to the suggestion that the Eighth
Amendment prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments" might re-
quire that any capital sentencing statute be mandatory. As the Court
had noted only a year prior to Furman, mandatory capital sentencing
statutes had, in the distant past, been the norm within the United
11. Controversy over the racially disproportionate impact of the death penalty
has not yet abated. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
12. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310.
13. Id. at 307 (Stewart, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 417 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 400 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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States.'" Such statutes had been universally repudiated, however. If ju-
ries conscientiously followed their oaths, these laws led to unduly harsh
results in cases which fell within the statutory definition of a capital
crime but which, due to mitigating factors, seemed not to merit a death
sentence. Moreover, juries were frequently tempted to disregard their
oaths and acquit the defendant of a capital offense if they regarded him
as undeserving of the death penalty.
It was to address these problems that discretionary sentencing
schemes were enacted. Legislatures "adopted the method of forth-
rightly granting juries the discretion which they had been exercising in
fact."1 7 Indeed, the principal thrust of the Furman dissenters' attack
lay in their contention that the states might respond to the Court's de-
cision by enacting mandatory capital sentencing statutes, and that such
laws would be far more cruel and oppressive than the discretionary
schemes struck down in Furman. Chief Justice Burger commented that
"[i]f [mandatory sentencing] is the only alternative that the legisla-
tures can safely pursue under today's ruling, I would have preferred
that the Court opt for total abolition." 8 Justice Blackmun agreed:
"This approach, it seems to me, encourages legislation that is regressive
and of an antique mold, for it eliminates the element of mercy in the
imposition of punishment. I thought we had passed beyond that point
in our criminology long ago.'' 19
B. The Florida Response
Within the State of Florida, editorial reaction to Furman was
mixed. The St. Petersburg Times expressed strong support for the
decision:
The American civilization reached a new height of respect for
human life this week when the U.S. Supreme Court declared the
death penalty unconstitutional . . . .Now that the high court has
spoken, it is doubtful that the penalty will be revived, despite Chief
Justice Warren Burger's attempt to make a place for it.2"
The Miami Herald concluded: "Our own view is that capital punish-
16. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 198-201 (1971).
17. Id. at 199.
18. Furman, 408 U.S. at 401 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
20. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 2, 1972, at 2D.
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ment can be (and has been) performed in irreconcilable error and that
it is repugnant to take human life in the name of society." 21 The
Tampa Tribune, by contrast, excoriated the ruling:
The five Justices [in the majority] let their personal feelings or the
emotions aroused by the cases of three members of a minority race
lead them astray from a constitutional course . . . .The states'
Constitutional right to impose [capital punishment] ought to be re-
stored-but it will be restored, we think, only by another Nixon
appointment to the Supreme Court. 22
The Tallahassee Democrat stated that "[tihe majority opinions give
some indication of how far some justices have strayed from the nation's
Constitution.12 3 The paper also decried the ambiguity of the decision:
If the Congress or any State legislature should ever pass such a
jumble of separate views and present them as law to be followed by
the people, the Supreme Court itself would immediately and very
properly rule it out as too vague and arbitrary for a citizen to un-
derstand and obey.24
The Florida Times-Union asserted:
Now, along comes the U.S. Supreme Court with a masterpiece of
legal obfuscation which at least severely limits-and perhaps elimi-
nates-use of capital punishment as a deterrent against capital
crimes such as murder, kidnapping, and rape. The court has stead-
ily been pulling the teeth of society so that its remaining response
capability toward crime is so weak as to be almost laughable to the
predatory criminal . . . . [I]n the dire straits in which the United
21. An End to Death Penalties, More or Less, and Unless . MIAMI HERALD,
June 30, 1972, at 6A.
22. What Punishment is Usual and Uncruel?, TAMPA TRIBUNE, June 30, 1972,
at 20A. A subsequent Tribune letter to the editor was less sanguine about the prospects
for the Court should George McGovern be elected President: "The first vacancy would
possibly be filled by a female Chicano under age 30, the next by a Yippie earning less
than a thousand dollars a year who believed water should be used only for human
consumption, the next by an impoverished octogenarian, etc." John F. King, Majority
Rule Aborted, TAMPA TRIBUNE, July 2, 1972, at 2C.
23. Supreme Court Adds Fuel to National Controversy, TALLAHASSEE DEMO-
CRAT, July 1, 1972, at 4.
24. Malcolm B. Johnson, Death Penalty Decision Shows Prime U.S. Conflict,
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, July 2, 1972, at 2B.
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States now finds itself in the battle against crime-to remove its
most formidable weapon is cruel and unusual punishment for
thousands upon thousands of citizens who will be murdered be-
cause the court has held their lives so cheap. 5
Florida newspapers' initial reactions to Furman (whether pro or
con) were generally emphatic and unequivocal. By contrast, Governor
Reubin Askew's response was cautious and noncommittal:
I'm pleased that the Supreme Court has made a decision on the
very difficult question of capital punishment. Apparently, however,
the decision is limited in its application and we'll have to carefully
review the actual court opinions before we can determine the effect
upon those who are now under the death penalty in Florida."
A supporter of capital punishment during his tenure as a state legisla-
tor, Askew had become ambivalent about the death penalty. In 1971,
he had called upon the legislature to establish a moratorium on execu-
tions within the state, and to authorize the appointment of a commis-
sion to study the issue. The legislature had rejected both requests. In
February 1972 Askew had issued an Executive Order staying all execu-
tions in Florida until July 1, 1973;2" he again appealed to the legisla-
ture for the establishment of a study commission, a request that was
again denied.
The Supreme Court in Furman had not expressly considered the
constitutionality of the Florida capital sentencing law. Its holding was
limited to the Georgia and Texas statutes. The Florida statute then in
effect, however, gave the jury absolute discretion to grant or withhold
mercy in a capital case, and therefore clearly fell within the Furman
rationale. 8 The state conceded that the statute was invalid under
Furman. The law was quickly declared unconstitutional by the Florida
25. FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, June 30, 1972, at A6.
26. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 30, 1972, at 8A.
27. Executive Order No. 72-8 (1972). The stay order had no immediate effect; a
stay order issued in 1967 by a federal district judge already prevented Florida from
executing any of its death row inmates. See Adderly v. Wainwright, 272 F. Supp. 530
(M.D. Fla. 1967). No one was executed in Florida during Askew's eight years as gov-
ernor, either prior to Furman or after passage of the new statute.
28. Florida law in effect at the time of Furman provided that "[a] person who
has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death unless the verdict
includes a recommendation to mercy by a majority of the jury, in which case the pun-
ishment shall be life imprisonment." FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (1971).
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Supreme Court in Donaldson v. Sack,29 and by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Newman v. Wainwright.0
The state's death row inmates were resentenced to terms of imprison-
ment pursuant to orders issued in Anderson v. State1 and In re
Baker."' A Florida law passed in March 1972, with an effective date of
October 1, 1972, provided that if the state's death penalty law were
declared unconstitutional, all inmates under sentence of death would be
resentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.33
Since all the state's death row prisoners were resentenced prior to that
law's effective date, however, all remained eligible for parole.
Although Furman clearly invalidated the Florida statutory scheme
in effect on June 29, 1972, that scheme had in any event already been
amended by the Florida legislature. A bill passed in March 1972, with
an effective date of October 1, 1972, had established a new procedure
for capital sentencing.3 4 The statute listed eight aggravating and eight
mitigating circumstances.35 The law also provided for a bifurcated
trial: if a defendant was convicted of a capital offense, a separate sen-
tencing hearing would follow, at which both the defendant and the
state could present "evidence of the circumstances surrounding the
crime, of the defendant's background and history and any facts in ag-
gravation or mitigation including but not limited to those circum-
stances enumerated in" the statute.36 The defendant would continue to
be sentenced to death unless a majority of the jury recommended
mercy. The new law provided some degree of guidance to the penalty
jurors, though the jury remained free to base its decision on factors not
enumerated in the statute. For the moment, at least, it was unclear
whether the new statute sufficiently constrained the jury's discretion to
withstand a constitutional challenge.
The first significant step toward enactment of a new death penalty
statute occurred on July 7, 1972. At a press conference in Starke, Flor-
ida, Attorney General Robert Shevin recommended passage of a new
29. 265 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1972).
30. 464 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1972).
31. 267 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1972).
32. 267 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1972).
33. 1972 Fla. Laws 118.
34. 1972 Fla. Laws 72.
35. The aggravating and mitigating circumstances were taken from the capital
sentencing statute included in the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
36. 1972 Fla. Laws 72.
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capital punishment law.37 Shevin expressed the view that "in all likeli-
hood neither Mr. Justice Stewart nor Mr. Justice White would find a
statute calling for the mandatory imposition of death under certain
enumerated circumstances offensive to the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution" and that a statute mandating a capital
sentence for specified crimes was therefore likely to withstand Supreme
Court review.38 Shevin argued that only a mandatory statute could be
upheld and that the Florida law scheduled to take effect in October was
therefore a nullity:
The purpose this statute was designed to serve was to permit addi-
tional evidence to go before the jury so it could make a more intel-
ligent disposition of its discretionary power to grant or withhold
mercy. This was condemned by the Court in Furman v. [Georgia],
and as a consequence can no longer form any facet of a determina-
tion in a capital case. 9
Shevin recommended passage of a bill mandating a capital sentence for
anyone convicted of a premeditated killing "[o]f any law enforcement
officer;" "[o]f any penal institution officer;" "[p]ursuant to a contract
for profit;" "[c]ommitted or perpetrated during the commission of any
felony directed against another person;" "[b]y an assassin or person
taking the life of any state or federal official;" "[c]ommitted by a pa-
rolee or probationer previously convicted of first degree murder;" "[o]f
a person in connection with the hijacking of an airplane, bus, train,
ship or other commercial vehicle.' Shevin further recommended that
Governor Askew call a special session of the legislature, either immedi-
ately or after the November elections. Passage of a new capital sen-
tencing bill during the April 1973 legislative session would be inade-
quate, he argued, because "[a]ny extended delay in remedial legislation
. . . may unfortunately result in the loss of lives between the present
37. The Florida Attorney General is an independently elected official who typi-
cally exercises considerable autonomy. During the fall of 1972, Shevin also proposed
enactment of a sweeping new human rights statute and a strong reporters' shield law.
ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1972, at B3; ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 5, 1972, at
BI. Shevin served as Attorney General until 1978, when he sought the Democratic
nomination for Governor. He won a plurality in the opening primary but was defeated
in the runoff by Bob Graham who subsequently won the general election.
38. Memorandum from Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida 6 (July 7,
1972) (copy on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series 19, Carton 464).
39. Id. at 9.
40. Id. at 14.
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day and the regular session of the Legislature."'
On July 10 Governor Askew announced that he would not call an
immediate special session of the legislature but would convene a special
session after the November elections. In the meantime, he stated, he
would appoint a commission to study both the desirability of capital
punishment generally and the specific form that any death penalty stat-
ute might take. An immediate session could nevertheless have been
called by agreement of the Senate President and House Speaker, or by
a three-fifths vote within each chamber.' Senate President Jerry
Thomas (D-Jupiter) pushed for an immediate session, arguing that
"the general public is entitled to optimum protection."' 3  House
Speaker Richard Pettigrew (D-Miami) demurred, however, arguing
that "[t]his complex and vitally significant decision of sentencing one
of our citizens to death deserves dispassionate and deliberative legisla-
tive study unfettered by the hectic and emotional demands of campaign
time."' Senator Thomas' attempt to secure the necessary votes within
the legislature received negligible support, eliminating the possibility of
an immediate special session.'5
During the late summer and early fall, several ad hoc committees
were formed within the state to study the issue of capital punishment.
On July 19 Representative Pettigrew appointed a House Select Com-
mittee, chaired by Representative Jeff Gautier (D-Miami) and com-
41. Id. at 13.
42. Terrell Sessums, who succeeded Richard Pettigrew as Speaker of the House,
recalls 'that,
[i]n 1968 when we revised the Constitution we were so offended by Gover-
nor Kirk's tendency to call special sessions out of the clear blue sky that
we-I don't know that we really put any restrictions on the governor's
ability to call a special session, but we put in a proviso that the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House could jointly call a special
session. And we used that to suggest to the governor that if he was too
imperial in calling special sessions without prior legislative consultations,
we were going to call special sessions as soon as he left on vacation, or on a
trade mission to Europe, or something like that ....
Interview with Terrell Sessums in Tampa, Fla. (Dec. 17, 1990).
43. William Mansfield, Shevin Asks Executions to be Restored, MIAMI HERALD,
July 8, 1972, at IA, 20A.
44. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 20, 1972, at lB.
45. Senator Thomas did not seek re-election in 1972; an immediate special ses-
sion would thus have afforded him his only opportunity to participate directly in the
enactment of a new death penalty statute. Senator Thomas switched to the Republican
Party in December 1972 and ran unsuccessfully for Governor in 1974.
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posed entirely of members of the Florida House. That committee's sec-
ond session revealed confusion as to the nature of the group's
assignment. When Tobias Simon, a Miami attorney appearing as a wit-
ness before the committee, commenced a broad, slashing attack on the
death penalty, Gautier interrupted him:
Let me say, Mr. Simon, before I call for any questions from the
committee members, that our committee was not charged with
whether or not to reinstate the death penalty. That is the subject of
another committee's deliberations. The Governor of the State of
Florida, Reubin Askew, has appointed a committee to do just that.
To recommend to the legislature whether or not the death penalty
should be reinstated ...I would suggest that if [the governor's
committee] has a separate hearing that you should appear also, be-
cause his committee really is making the basic determination that
you are alluding to today."'
Gautier's apparent impression that the committee's sole task was to
draft suitable legislation was soon corrected. A few minutes later Gau-
tier announced: "I received a note from the Speaker that he did not
mean to limit the scope of this Committee's work and if, at the conclu-
sion, the Committee feels that an alternative to the death penalty can
be imposed, that we're certainly not restricted from recommending
it.",47
Even after this clarification, however, the focus of the Committee's
inquiry was remarkably narrow. On August 18 the committee inter-
viewed former death row inmates at the state penitentiary. One inmate
characterized the judicial system in the panhandle as a "kangaroo
court" and asserted that lies had been told throughout his trial. The
possibility that an innocent man would be condemned to death (and,
more generally, the fairness of capital trials in Florida) would seem
highly relevant to the propriety of reinstating the death pen-
alty-though a single inmate's unsupported claim of innocence might
be of small probative value. Chairman Gautier, however, admonished
the witness to confine his remarks to the topics before the committee:
1) whether the death penalty should be revived, 2) whether capital
punishment deters, and 3) whether life imprisonment without parole
46. Hearings of the House Select Committee on the Death Penalty 29 (Aug. 9,
1972) (unofficial transcript on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series
19, Carton 464) (hereinafter House Hearings-transcript).
47. Id. at 44.
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would be an adequate alternative."8 Committee members thereafter
contented themselves with asking inmates what punishment would be
appropriate if one of their best friends were murdered, or whether they
would be "deterred" from resistance if they were robbed at gunpoint.
At the beginning of its fifth session on August 31, the committee
voted 5-1 that the death penalty should be reinstated. 9 At no time did
the committee discuss or debate the propriety of capital punishment.
Gautier then admonished the witnesses that from this time forward
their comments should be limited to the merits of particular bills.50
In accordance with Shevin's recommendation, the bill developed
by the House Committee attempted to eliminate jury discretion by
mandating a sentence of death upon conviction. There were, however,
significant differences between the Attorney General's bill and the bill
ultimately drafted by the committee. The Shevin bill mandated the
death penalty only for certain categories of premeditated murder. As
Assistant Attorney General Ray Marky explained, this limitation was
seen as essential, since history had shown that a statute mandating
death for all premeditated murders would lead to widespread jury
nullification:
Jury nullification came about when the death penalty was geared
toward homicides generally . . . . The fact that juries engaged in
jury nullification when we were talking about all types of homicides
does not mean that we are going to have jury nullification in speci-
fication [sic] types of crimes of a very aggravated nature.51
Shevin expressed uncertainty about the constitutionality of a bill re-
quiring the death penalty for all first-degree murders:
By saying that all premeditated murders are mandatory death pen-
alty you're getting into the areas where juries have traditionally
been willing to grant mercy . . . . You may be running headlong
into another constitutional problem at the U.S. Supreme Court
level and. . . you may be, in this instance, providing a punishment
48. Hearings of the House Select Committee on the Death Penalty (Aug. 18,
1972) (tape on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.) (hereinafter House
Hearings-tape).
49. The only member of the committee to vote against reinstatement of the death
penalty was Representative Gwendolyn Cherry (D-Miami), a longtime foe of capital
punishment.
50. House Hearings-tape, supra note 48 (Aug. 31, 1972).
51. House Hearings-transcript, supra note 46, at 19 (Aug. 4, 1972).
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that perhaps is a little bit too harsh.52
The committee, however, was unreceptive to the limitations established
by the Shevin bill; committee members argued both that the criminal's
punishment should not depend on the status of the victim and that the
bill would create disruptive line-drawing problems. Ultimately the com-
mittee recommended passage of a bill mandating a sentence of death
for five classes of crimes: premeditated murder, felony murder, treason,
"[t]hrowing a destructive device which results in the death of a per-
son;" and "[r]ape of a person under the age of thirteen.153
Other ad hoc committees meeting during the late summer and fall
also recommended that the death penalty be reinstated. The Senate
Council on Criminal Justice, appointed by outgoing Senate President
Jerry Thomas, with Florida Supreme Court Chief Justice B.K. Roberts
acting as honorary chairman, voted 12-2 to recommend a law making
the death penalty mandatory for specified categories of murder and for
the rape of a child under eleven. 5' Chief Justice Roberts asserted that
"[t]here has been no capital punishment for six years and we are living
in the greatest crime wave in the history of the world."' 55 The presence
52. House Hearings-tape, supra note 48 (Aug. 31, 1972).
53. Final report of the House Select Committee on the Death Penalty 5 (Nov.
27, 1972) (copy on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series 19, Carton
464).
The bill drafted by the committee did contain a definition of "premeditation" nar-
rower than that which had prevailed under prior Florida law. The bill provided that,
[a] premeditated design to kill is a fully formed conscious and deliberate
purpose to take human life, formed upon reflection and deliberation and
present in the mind at the time of the killing and which was not primarily
induced by great and unjustified provocation on the part of the intended
victim, nor was committed under a sudden heat of passion or other such
condition which precludes the idea of reflection and deliberation.
Fla. HB I-A § 2 (Spec. Sess. 1972). That definition was intended to ensure that kill-
ings committed during barroom brawls or lovers' quarrels would not be capital offenses,
despite the fact that they were considered premeditated murders under prior Florida
law.
54. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, October 31, 1972, at lB.
55. Chief Justice Roberts did not place all the blame on the absence of capital
punishment. In the fall of 1972, the Florida Supreme Court briefly rescinded, then
reinstated, the state rule requiring unanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases. Roberts
dissented from the order reinstating the rule, arguing that "[w]e cannot escape the fact
that numerous mistrials are a contributing factor to the greatest crime wave ever ex-
isting in this country." Unanimity Stays in Jury Verdicts, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 7,
1972, at 2B (Street Edition).
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of a sitting state supreme court justice on such a committee raised the
obvious specter of a conflict of interest should a death penalty bill be
passed and its constitutionality challenged. Chief Justice Roberts de-
fended his participation on the ground that "I make recommendations
to Legislative committees all the time as chairman of the Florida Judi-
cial Council."56 However, Roberts ultimately recused himself in State
v. Dixon, 5 7 the case in which the Florida Supreme Court first passed
upon the constitutionality of the state's new death penalty statute. The
Florida Judicial Council (chaired by Roberts) also recommended rein-
statement of capital punishment,5" as did the Board of Directors of the
Florida State Chamber of Commerce.5 9
The most far-reaching inquiry into the issue was conducted by the
study committee appointed by Governor Askew. Chaired by E. Harris
Drew, a former Florida Supreme Court Justice, the seventeen-member
committee included two former governors of the state, three state Sena-
tors and three state Representatives, as well as eminent members of the
bench, bar, and public. The committee was provided with a staff and
was assisted by an advisory committee and a legal advisory commit-
tee.60 The group held hearings throughout the state, taking testimony
from the public, former death row inmates, police and correctional offi-
cials, and experts in the field of criminal justice. Governor Askew
pledged to withhold judgment on the issue pending the preparation of
the committee's report.
On October 20, the committee voted 9-6 to recommend reinstate-
ment of the death penalty. Former Governor LeRoy Collins delivered
56. Tom Raum, Six Are Winners With 'Walking' Races, TALLAHASSEE DEMO-
CRAT, Nov. 15, 1972, at 2.
57. 283 So. 2d I (Fla. 1973).
58. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 5, 1972, at lB.
59. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 15, 1972, at 4B.
60. The legal advisory committee was composed of five professors from Florida
law schools. Its report concluded that "no constitutional basis can justify any attempt
to reinstate capital punishment without an accompanying fundamental change in our
system of criminal justice." Final Report of the Governor's Committee To Study Capi-
tal Punishment 114 (Nov. 21, 1972) (hereinafter Governor's Committee Report). A
slightly revised version of the legal advisory committee's report has been published as
Charles W. Ehrhardt et al., The Future of Capital Punishment in Florida: Analysis
and Recommendations, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 2 (1973). Two members of the
committee have written a short article describing the legislative debate over reinstate-
ment of the death penalty in Florida. See Charles W. Ehrhardt & L. Harold Levinson,
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an impassioned statement in opposition to reinstatement of the death
penalty, asserting that capital punishment,
degrades us all and runs counter to values I have believed in and
sought to uphold over my lifetime. In future years, I believe people
will look back on the hangman's noose, the electric chair, and the
gas chamber, as we now view the barbarous instruments and trap-
pings of torture utilized by our ancestors."1
After reviewing in detail the statistical evidence presented to the com-
mittee, Collins concluded that the use of capital punishment bore no
verifiable relationship to the rate of crime. He conceded that public
support for the death penalty was substantial, but argued that public
demand for executions "is due in large part to frustration over our fail-
ures in law enforcement and will go away in my judgment if our meth-
ods of dealing with criminals and potential criminals are made more
effective and certain. 62 Recalling his tenure as governor, Collins stated
that "I signed death warrants of twenty-nine men in my six years as
governor. And I can still almost call each name, it caused such a trau-
matic experience for me."63
Chairman Drew, also opposing reinstatement, asserted that "I am
as firmly convinced, as I am sitting here at this table, that this country
has witnessed its last execution.""' He found it "inconceivable," he ex-
plained, that the United States Supreme Court "could one day turn
loose 600 people who had the shadow of death hanging over them, and
in a short time turn around and say it's okay to execute others. ' 65 De-
spite his fervent opposition to reinstatement of the death penalty, Drew
argued that Furman had been wrongly decided, characterizing it as "a
flagrant usurpation of the power of the legislative branch of govern-
ment."'6 In opposing reinstatement of the death penalty, he identified a
diverse range of concerns: his belief that, "statistically, there is no evi-
dence that its imposition contributes to the prevention of murder or
other crimes;" the fact that "once such sentence is carried out, there is
no way to effectively correct an error;" his perception that "intermina-
61. Governor's Committee Report, supra note 60, at 126.
62. Id. at 129.
63. Askew Study Group Backs Death Penalty, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Oct. 21, 1972,
at IA, 20A.
64. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 21, 1972, at lB.
65. Id.
66. Governor's Committee Report, supra note 60, at 122.
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ble delays in the disposition of capital cases in the courts creates disre-
spect for all criminal laws;" and, perhaps most important, his convic-
tion that reinstatement would be pointless given the likelihood that any
new statute would be struck down by the United States Supreme
Court.6 7 Drew retained that conviction throughout the debate; after a
statute was ultimately passed, he labeled it an "exercise in futility." 8
In the end, the margin of support for reinstatement of the death
penalty came from the state legislators on the committee, who voted 4-
1 in favor. 69 That result seems unsurprising since advocates and oppo-
nents of capital punishment agreed that public support for the death
penalty was overwhelming. One committee member, Representative
Eugene Brown (D-Tavares), stated that an informal poll of his constit-
uents showed 1100 in favor of the death penalty and fifty-two op-
posed.70 Representative Brown noted that "[there's a message there, at
least to one who's seeking public office. ''71
After the vote of the Governor's Committee, passage of a new
death penalty statute appeared almost certain. There remained consid-
erable controversy, however, concerning the form that such a statute
should take. Attorney General Shevin, interpreting Furman to require
the elimination of jury discretion in capital sentencing, had recom-
mended that death be mandatory upon conviction for specified crimes.
The House and Senate committees had agreed, though they had broad-
ened the range of crimes for which death would be mandated. The
67. Id. at 123.
68. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 3, 1972, at I IA.
69. Voting in favor were Sens. Jim Williams (D-Ocala) and Louis de la Parte
(D-Tampa), and Reps. Robert Johnson (R-Sarasota) and Eugene Brown (D-Tavares).
Representative Cherry was the only legislator on the Governor's Committee who voted
against reinstatement. Governor's Committee Report, supra note 60, at 142.
In the view of Hugh McMillan, Jr., Askew's assistant for legislative affairs, the
most significant aspect of the Committee's vote was that "neither de la Parte nor Wil-
liams wanted to follow the senior statesmen [Collins and Drew] . . . .At that point
they were both highly ethical, highly effective members of the state Senate." Interview
with Hugh McMillan, Jr. in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Dec. 21, 1990). Their support for
capital punishment was significant both because of Askew's respect for their views and
because it suggested that any effort to block reinstatement would meet with opposition
from Senate leaders.
70. Harold Stahmer, another member of the committee, recalls that Representa-
tive Brown "wheeled in on a dolly a pile of letters" as a visible symbol of his constitu-
ents' support for the death penalty. Interview with Harold Stahmer in Gainesville, Fla.
(Dec. 12, 1990).
71. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 22, 1972, at 9B.
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Governor's Committee, by contrast, preferred a statute similar to the
one passed the previous March, which required a bifurcated trial and
consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The staff
report of the committee argued that a mandatory sentencing law would
not eliminate the potential for arbitrariness identified in Furman:
The jury's discretion to convict or not convict a defendant of a cap-
ital felony remains intact in the guilt or innocence phase of the
trial. It is entirely conceivable that the jury will continue to send
minority defendants to the electric chair by convicting them of the
capital offense and that the more affluent majority will be spared
by an arbitrary jury finding of guilt of a lesser-included offense, not
capital.72
The bill ultimately recommended by the Governor's Committee was
drafted by a subcommittee headed by Representative Robert Johnson
(R-Sarasota). 7' That bill was modeled after the March statute but dif-
fered from it in two significant respects. First, the sentencing determi-
nation was to be based exclusively upon the statutory aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, and the finding of at least one aggravating
factor was a prerequisite to a sentence of death. Second, the choice
between imprisonment and death was to be made not by a jury, but by
a special panel made up of the judge who had presided at trial and two
other circuit judges assigned by the Chief Justice of the Florida Su-
preme Court. The three-judge sentencing scheme, inspired by European
trial procedure,7 ' was defended as a means of reducing the likelihood of
arbitrariness by utilizing sentencers who would be free from the pas-
sions of the local community in which the crime had occurred. 75
Surprisingly little attention was paid to the possibility that the bill
passed the previous March (with an effective date of October 1) itself
72. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 21, 1972, at lB.
73. Governor's Committee Report, supra note 60, at 146.
74. Defending the bill on the House floor, Johnson stated that "I got this frankly
out of reading extensively on capital punishment and found that it's being used in
France, West Germany, Scandinavia, and most of South America." Tape of Florida
House of Representatives Floor Debate (Nov. 29, 1972) (on file at Florida State
Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
75. On the House floor, Representative Johnson noted that the two additional
judges would be appointed from outside the circuit where the crime occurred "because
they don't stand election in that circuit. They don't have to face the emotional trauma
of the people of that circuit every day, and they would be totally objective and unbi-
ased in their decision." Id.
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imposed sufficient constraints on the jury's discretion to meet constitu-
tional requirements. 6 A special committee of the Florida Bar took the
position that the March statute was constitutional, 7 as did Senator
David McClain (R-St. Petersburg), the sponsor of the bill.78 The legal
advisory staff to the Governor's Committee disagreed, arguing that,
the statute apparently contains constitutional infirmities, since it
does not require a finding of the presence of an aggravating cir-
cumstance prior to the imposition of the death penalty but rather
allows the jury the same discretion in determining when the death
penalty should be imposed that was condemned in Furman.7 9
The Attorney General's office, of course, had condemned the bill on the
ground that any non-mandatory sentencing scheme would be constitu-
tionally deficient. The Florida Supreme Court's enigmatic decision in
State v. Whalen, 0 rendered on November 22, 1972, appeared to fore-
76. Robert Johnson recalls that "[tihe feeling was that that bill ... was a band-
aid type approach" that would not survive judicial scrutiny. Interview with Robert
Johnson in Sarasota, Fla. (Dec. 18, 1990).
77. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 20, 1972, at 6B.
78. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 24, 1972, at 12B.
79. Governor's Committee Report, supra note 60, at 146.
80. 269 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1972). Whalen involved a defendant who pleaded guilty
to first degree murder shortly after the decision in Furman. The trial judge certified to
the Florida Supreme Court the following question: "Does a trial court sitting as the
sole trier of fact after accepting a plea of guilty to first degree murder and holding an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of the extent of the penalty, have the power to impose
the death sentence?" Id. at 679. Apparently the judge sought to invoke the provisions
of the bifurcated trial law. The Florida Supreme Court, relying on Donaldson v. Sack,
265 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1972), held that "[tihis question concerning bifurcated trials is
moot since at the present time capital punishment may not be imposed. This Court has
held that there are currently no capital offenses in the State of Florida. If there is no
capital offense, there can be no capital penalty." Whalen, 269 So. 2d at 679.
That is odd reasoning. In stating that there were no capital offenses in Florida, the
Donaldson court meant simply that on the date of its decision (July 17, 1972), Florida
had no constitutionally adequate procedure for capital sentencing. If the bifurcated
trial law passed in March was sufficient to comply with Furman, then when the new
law became effective on October 1, capital offenses would once again have existed. It
therefore made no sense to say that the absence of capital offenses rendered moot the
issue of the new law's constitutionality. The effect of Whalen was to remove all doubt
that a new statute was required, while giving no indication as to the Florida Supreme
Court's views on the constitutionality of non-mandatory capital sentencing.
Of course, even if the bifurcated trial law was constitutional, its retroactive appli-
cation to a crime committed before its effective date might have been problematic,
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close the possibility that the March statute could be constitutionally
applied.
On November 20, Governor Askew broke his silence, announcing
that he would recommend passage of a bill to restore capital punish-
ment. 1 Two days later, in a twelve-page letter to the legislature,
Askew placed his support behind the bill drafted by the Governor's
Committee, calling it "the only proposal which, in my judgment, can
pass constitutional muster."82 Askew noted that "[i]n essence, this pro-
cedure is a modification of the state's 'bifurcated trial' law, which I
recommended and the Legislature adopted at the last Regular Session,
except that the list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is
made 'obligatory rather than advisory,' in order to limit discretion." '
On November 27 the House Select Committee on the Death Pen-
alty held its first meeting of the new legislative session. Chairman Gau-
tier began by admonishing the witnesses to concern themselves only
with the "technical aspects" of the various bills before the committee,
and not to speak to the desirability of capital punishment.8 4 A series of
witnesses spoke in favor of the Governor's Committee bill, arguing pri-
marily that it had the greatest chance of withstanding the scrutiny of
the United States Supreme Court. Assistant Attorneys General George
Georgieff and Ray Marky, arguing in favor of a mandatory sentencing
law, were outspoken in their condemnation of the bifurcated sentencing
scheme. Georgieff, reading Furman to require that the legislature
rather than individual sentencers must decide precisely which crimes
merit a sentence of death, stated:
I put it to you very plainly: if you put in any system that vests
discretion in the people as to whether this individual should live or
die and takes it out of your hands, which is what they condemned
in Furman, I promise you that the result has to be the same, they'll
strike it down. When you decide that an individual must die if he
particularly if the sentencing was artificially delayed in order that the new law might
be applied. But see Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 297-98 (1977). The Whalen
court, however, did not suggest that its holding was influenced by retroactivity
concerns.
81. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 21, 1972, at lB.
82. Letter from Reubin Askew to Senate President Mallory Horne, and House
Speaker Terrell Sessums 3 (Nov. 22, 1972) (copy on file at Florida State Archives,
Tallahassee, Fla., Series 757, Box 11).
83. Id.
84. House Hearings-tape, supra note 48 (Nov. 27, 1972).
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commits crime A or crime B, ... then that is all that's
necessary. 5
Marky attacked the concept of a discretionary sentencing scheme,
and also ridiculed the particular aggravating and mitigating factors
used in the Governor's bill: "These standards are so nebulous, so vague
• .. that I can fit them in every death case that I've ever handled
. . . . The standards are ludicrous. They're vague, they're ambiguous,
and they exist both pro and con in every death case . . . .That's the
height of arbitrariness."86 Indeed, Marky, who had previously stated
that the Askew bill "absolutely defies" the ruling in Furman, suggested
that the bill might be a ploy to scuttle capital punishment entirely:
"Some people may be trying to pass a bill that is patently unconstitu-
tional. Opponents of a bill have done that before, you know." 87 Ulti-
mately the vote was 6-5 to report to the floor the mandatory sentencing
bill drafted by the House Select Committee.
On November 28, the governor addressed the legislature at the
special session. Governor Askew called for passage of a death penalty
statute,8 though he acknowledged that "I continue to have mixed feel-
ings as to the necessity, the rightness, and even the legality of capital
punishment in any form." 89 Askew again stressed his support for the
bill recommended by his committee, arguing that a mandatory sentenc-
ing law was unsound as a matter of policy and unlikely to gain the
approval of the United States Supreme Court:
I'm convinced that a law providing for mandatory imposition of the
death penalty, with no opportunities for mercy, would merely
prompt juries to convict on lesser charges. And the discrimination
to which the court so clearly objected would still be present. It
merely would take place sooner ...in the conviction itself. The
same groups discriminated against in the past would draw convic-
tions of premeditated murder-and therefore die; while others
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Jere Moore, Jr., Rift Develops over Capital Punishment, TALLAHASSEE DEM-
OCRAT, Nov. 27, 1972, at 15.
88. Although the special session was initially scheduled for the purpose of debat-
ing a capital punishment bill, the session was not limited to that issue. The Governor's
Proclamation convening the session also requested action on eight other topics, includ-
ing ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (on which the legislature ultimately
declined to act). Fla. J. Senate I (Nov. 28, 1972).
89. Id. at 7.
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would be convicted of lesser crimes, and therefore live. I think it's
obvious the court would reject such a system and therefore render
your efforts counter-productive. 0
In arguing that the United States Supreme Court would strike down a
mandatory sentencing statute, Askew emphasized the Furman dissent-
ers' disapproval of such laws 9 1-a tack also taken by his supporters in
the legislature. Askew's speech was interpreted by many as a threat to
veto any mandatory sentencing bill passed by the legislature-an impli-
cation that the governor would neither confirm nor deny.9 2
The debate over mandatory versus discretionary capital sentencing
revealed a tension between the goals of consistency and individualized
consideration that subsequent jurisprudence has not successfully re-
solved. On the one hand, fairness seems to require that all capital de-
fendants (at least within a given state) should be judged by uniform
criteria rather than by the idiosyncrasies of a randomly selected jury,
and that race in particular should play no part in the sentencing deci-
sion. On the other hand, it may cogently be argued that no person
should be put to death without an individualized assessment of his
crime and of any evidence that he may proffer in mitigation.9 3 Advo-
cates of the mandatory approach essentially argued that the values of
consistency and individualized treatment were irreconcilably in conflict
and that, of the two, consistency was more important.
Proponents of the bifurcated trial approach believed that the two
values could be accommodated. By drafting precise sentencing stan-
dards, the legislature could provide for an individualized assessment in
90. Id. at 7-8.
91. Askew noted that "Chief Justice Burger, who dissented from the court's re-
cent decision regarding capital punishment, nevertheless condemned the mandatory ap-
proach as archaic. And the other members of the court who also dissented from the
majority, concurred with the Chief Justice on that point." Id. at 8.
92. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 29, 1972, at lB.
93. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion), where the
Court opined that an individualized sentencing determination is required in order to
treat each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of
the individual and, in addition, because,
a statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving inde-
pendent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character and rec-
ord and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the
risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may
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every capital case while ensuring that all capital defendants would be
judged by the same criteria." To put it another way, the advocates of
this approach argued that a system of "guided discretion" could strike
a balance between the extremes of mandatory sentencing and standar-
dless jury discretion that would be preferable to either.95
94. The drafting of such statutes was not an enterprise that the Supreme Court
had encouraged. In McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), the Court had sug-
gested that the effort was doomed to failure:
Those who have come to grips with the hard task of actually attempting to
draft means of channeling capital sentencing discretion have confirmed the
lesson taught by history . . . .To identify before the fact those character-
istics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death
penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be
fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be
tasks which are beyond present human ability.
Id. at 204. Indeed, the McGautha Court cited the Model Penal Code's capital sentenc-
ing statute-which has served as the model for most post-Furman laws-as an example
of the futility of such an exercise. See id. at 207 ("It is apparent that such criteria do
not purport to provide more than the most minimal control over the sentencing author-
ity's exercise of discretion.").
95. The Supreme Court's capital sentencing jurisprudence has proceeded along
two largely independent tracks. Decisions involving constitutional limitations on the
states' freedom to define aggravating factors have stressed the Furman principle that
the sentencer may not be given unfettered discretion, See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright,
486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988) ("Since Furman, our cases have insisted that the channeling
and limiting of the sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty is a fundamen-
tal constitutional requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary
and capricious action."). In discussing the states' obligation to permit consideration of
mitigating factors, however, the Court has stressed the need for an individualized sen-
tencing determination. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) ("By
holding that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant
mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett recognizes that a consistency produced by ignor-
ing individual differences is a false consistency."). The uneasy coexistence between
these two lines of authority has in turn spawned a vigorous counterattack, articulated
most recently, and at greatest length, in Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Walton
v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3058 (1990).
Justice Scalia appears to overstate his case when he refers to "[t]he simultaneous
pursuit of contradictory objectives," Id. at 3064, and argues that the Court's invalida-
tion of mandatory capital sentencing in Woodson v. North Carolina was "rationally
irreconcilable with Furman." Id. at 3067. There is nothing incoherent or self-contradic-
tory about the view that some medium between mandatory sentencing and uncon-
strained discretion is preferable to either extreme. Justice Scalia appears correct, how-
ever, in arguing that the individual sentencer's absolute discretion to decide what
factors are and are not mitigating cannot be squared with Furman. The quest for con-
sistency requires that the legislature place some limitations on the factors which the
judge or jury may consider in making its sentencing determination; the evil of unguided
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The mandatory statute reported by the committee initially at-
tracted "seventy or eighty co-sponsors" in the House 9 6 In the end,
however, supporters of the Governor's bill prevailed. The mandatory
sentencing bill approved by the House committee was reported to the
House floor on November 29. Representative Gautier, arguing in favor
of the bill, circulated a memorandum from Attorney General Shevin.
That memorandum stated that the Askew bill "flies into the teeth of
that which was condemned in Furman v. Georgia"'97 and that "it con-
tinues to be my view that the more nearly legislation approaches the
status of mandatorily imposing death, the more likely the chance of
surviving [Supreme Court] scrutiny." 98
Representative Johnson offered the Askew bill as an amendment.
In contending that the Supreme Court would strike down a mandatory
sentencing scheme, Johnson placed heavy emphasis on Chief Justice
Burger's condemnation of a mandatory death penalty. The four
Furman dissenters99 would vote against such a statute, he argued, as
discretion, after all, was that different sentencers might have widely varying notions as
to the concerns that are relevant to the decision between life and death. The fact that
this arbitrariness might be thought to work in favor of the defendant (by expanding the
range of factors that might cause a jury not to impose a capital sentence) does not
make the system consistent with Furman. The sentencing schemes condemned in
Furman were struck down, it should be recalled, partly because of the infrequency with
which capital sentences were imposed. The central premise underlying the opinions of
Justices Stewart and White in Furman was that an otherwise lawful sentence of death
could be rendered unconstitutional if other, similarly-situated defendants were spared
due to the idiosyncrasies of local juries.
96. Robert Johnson asserts that Democrats "wanted their name on a bill-they
wanted their name on a program, there's no question about that. They didn't want a
bill passed that was under a Republican banner or Republican sponsorship." Interview
with Robert Johnson in Sarasota, Fla. (Dec. 18, 1990). In light of Askew's support for
the bifurcated trial approach, it seems more accurate to describe that bill as a biparti-
san, rather than a Republican, measure. Johnson is surely correct, however, in sug-
gesting that the mandatory sentencing bill was strictly a Democratic product. Demo-
crat Robert Shevin had first advanced the idea of mandatory sentencing; the bill itself
was drafted by the House Select Committee, composed entirely of Democrats, that met
during the fall of 1972.
97. Memorandum from Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General 2 (Nov. 27, 1972)
(copy on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series 19, Carton 464).
98. Id. at 4.
99. Representative Johnson's conclusion that all four Furman dissenters would
oppose a mandatory sentencing scheme was presumably based on the fact that Justices
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist had joined Chief Justice Burger's dissent. Although
Justice Blackmun's dissent (with which no other Justice joined) expressed abhorrence
for mandatory death penalties, the dissents of Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no
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would Justices Brennan and Marshall: "Now that's four men who say
they will not accept mandatory death, and you have two more that say
they will not accept anything. And that's six to three, no matter how
you cut the pie." 100 Johnson also noted that sentencing is traditionally
performed by judges and asserted that,
[wle [on the Governor's Committee] read Furman v. Georgia to
say that juries cannot play a part in sentencing . . . . We believed
that if you have a bifurcated trial with a jury you still have the
same subjection to arbitrary, capricious, and discriminating judg-
ment in sentencing, and it would not be upheld. So we said, can we
use one judge? And we felt that the Supreme Court would say one
judge alone would have the same possibility of whimsical, freakish
application . . . .1o-
Johnson concluded that "I really feel that what we have done is credi-
ble and it has the best chance of any to be upheld under Furman v.
Georgia. I do know that mandatory death has none." 1021
The motion to amend passed by a vote of 70-47. Despite Governor
Askew's emphatic support for the nonmandatory bill, Democrats voted
38-36 against the amendment; Republicans, perhaps swayed by John-
son's presentation, supported the Governor's position 34-9.101 Propo-
nents of the Governor's bill, moreover, were far more successful in ral-
lying support outside the legislature than were advocates of mandatory
sentencing. A long list of witnesses appeared in support of the Askew
bill at the House Select Committee hearing on November 27; only
Marky and Georgieff testified in favor of the mandatory bill. The pub-
position on the issue.
100. Tape of Florida House of Representatives Floor Debate (Nov. 29, 1972) (on
file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 30, 1972, at 5B. Johnson's persuasiveness was
due in part to his evident familiarity with the issue:
I personally had read everything there was at that time, the most recent
studies on capital punishment . . . . I wrote about a sixty page document
on capital punishment out of all the reports that I had read and out of the
studies of the commission and I gave it to every member of the body, and
when I stood and debated for several hours I think they believed that I
.. . had some idea what I was talking about.
Interview with Robert Johnson in Sarasota, Fla. (Dec. 18, 1990). A copy of Johnson's
paper is on file at the Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series 757, Box II.
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lic defenders from all twenty Florida judicial circuits expressed a pref-
erence for the Governor's bill, 1'0 as did a statement issued on behalf of
the Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 10
The question of which bill to pass was the only subject of conten-
tion on the House floor. After the successful motion to substitute the
Askew bill for the measure approved by the Committee, the bill was
approved by the astounding margin of 119-0. Representative Cherry,
an adamant opponent of capital punishment in previous years, ex-
plained her vote on the ground that the Governor's Committee bill was
"the best we can come up with" and maintained that sentiment within
the legislature was "just like a steamroller . . . .Everybody wants to
kill somebody . . . .They think they must do this in order to go
home." 06
Within the Senate there was general agreement with the use of an
aggravation-mitigation hearing as opposed to a mandatory sentencing
scheme.""7 The Senate, however, was unreceptive to the proposal for
three-judge sentencing. Opposition to that feature of the Askew bill
was based on several grounds: the state's tradition of jury sentencing in
104. The public defenders recommended that capital punishment not be rein-
stated but expressed support for the Askew bill in the event that a law was passed.
(Telefax on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series 757, Box 11).
105. On behalf of the Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association, James T. Rus-
sell, President, stated that,
the Association believes that the bifurcated trial approach as set forth in
the Governor's proposal has the best chance to be sustained in the United
States Supreme Court and is the most realistic and practical procedure for
eliminating the evils condemned by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
Furman decision.
Statement on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series 757, Box 11.
Representative Johnson argued on the House floor that "when you can come up
with a bill that the state attorneys say is just, and fair, and reasonable in every manner,
and the defenders say the same thing about [it], then I think that we have done a very
credible job." Tape of Florida House of Representatives Floor Debate (Nov. 29, 1972)
(on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
106. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 30, 1972, at 5B.
107. Senators Dempsey Barron (D-Panama City), Louis de la Parte (D-Tampa),
and Jim Williams (D-Ocala) were particularly influential within the Senate on this
point. Interview with Jack Gordon in Miami Beach, Fla. (Dec. 20, 1990); Interview
with Hugh McMillan, Jr. in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Dec. 21, 1990); Interview with
Edgar Dunn in Daytona Beach, Fla. (Dec. 12, 1990); Interview with Richard Pettigrew
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capital cases; 0 8 the fact that the two additional judges would be as-
signed only after a conviction and thus would not have heard the evi-
dence at trial;'09 the fear that three-judge sentencing would impose a
strain on judicial resources;" 0 and the possibility that the assignment
of circuit judges would be subject to manipulation by the Chief Justice
of the Florida Supreme Court."' The Senate bill placed the initial sen-
tencing recommendation in the hands of the trial jury. If the jury rec-
ommended life, that recommendation was binding on the judge; but if
the jury recommended death the judge could nevertheless sentence the
defendant to life. The bill passed by a vote of 39-1. The lone opponent
was freshman Senator Jack Gordon (D-Miami). 12 Gordon acknowl-
edged that the bill had "refined" prior law but argued: "However re-
fined a process, it is still a barbaric process. Refined barbarism is no
way to preserve a social order that values the sanctity of human
108. FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Dec. 1, 1972, at 14A.
109. A Fair System to Punish Murderers, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Dec. 2, 1972, at
14A.
110. William Cotterell, Gov. Askew Not Likely to Get What He Wants, TALLA-
HASSEE DEMOCRAT, Nov. 28, 1972, at 13.
111. Senator Dempsey Barron (D-Panama City) argued: "Suppose the chief jus-
tice was against capital punishment? His choice of the judges would be influenced by
his own feelings. Or he might be a hanging chief justice which would be unfair to the
defendant." FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Dec. 1, 1972, at I IA.
Robert Johnson recalls that "Dempsey Barron took the lead on the Senate side.
He was adamantly against the three-judge [panel] . . . .[Barron] was a very strong
defense lawyer and believed very strongly in the jury system" Interview with Robert
Johnson in Sarasota, Fla. (Dec. 18, 1990).
112. Gordon explains that,
I had no intention of speaking on anything certainly the day I was sworn
in. I figured I'd be patient until ... April . . . .On the other hand, I also
expected that there'd be some opposition. I figured that it would probably
pass, but there'd maybe be ten, twelve votes against it, primarily on reli-
gious grounds . . . .So when the debate started, I just sort of waited for
somebody else to say something, and nobody did.
Interview with Jack Gordon in Miami Beach, Fla. (Dec. 20, 1990).
Gordon's opposition to capital punishment was based on his religious convictions
rather than on civil liberties concerns:
From a Jewish theological perspective, [capital punishment] is not some-
thing you should be for . . . .Even though there's an eye for an eye and a
tooth for a tooth in the Bible, the history of Jewish jurisprudence,
Talmudically, is that if the court sentences ...someone to death more








The conference committee met on November 30 until well after
midnight and then reconvened before 8:00 A.M. 14 The committee ap-
peared ready to accept a compromise offered by Representative Wil-
liam Rish (D-Port St. Joe) under which each defendant would be given
the choice between jury sentencing, three-judge sentencing, or sentenc-
ing by the trial court alone.1 15 Edgar Dunn, Askew's general counsel,
indicated that this arrangement was unacceptable to the Governor, and
negotiations continued. Ultimately, the committee agreed upon a sys-
tem whereby the jury would recommend a sentence of either death or
life imprisonment and the trial judge, based upon his assessment of
aggravating and mitigating factors, would make the final decision. The
system approved by the conference committee thus permitted a single
individual to sentence a defendant to death-a result that both the
House and Senate sentencing schemes were designed to avoid.
The ultimate impact of Florida's "jury override" provision has
proved anomalous. The initial decision to involve the trial judge in the
sentencing process was intended as a protection for the defendant and
was based on the belief that judges would be less prone to an emotional
response than would a jury. The bill that emerged from the conference
committee, however, permitted the judge to impose a capital sentence
despite the jury's recommendation of mercy. That change stemmed
from the conferees' belief that an "asymmetrical" sentencing scheme
would be invalid under Furman."'
In practice, however, the jury override provision has furnished
minimal protection to defendants. In only a small number of cases
since the statute's enactment have trial judges overridden jury recom-
mendations of death. Life recommendations, by contrast, have quite
frequently been overridden. '1 7 As United States Supreme Court Justice
113. ST, PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 1, 1972, at IA.
114. For a very interesting article describing the frenzied nature of the confer-
ence committee's work, see ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 3, 1972, at 12B.
115. John Van Gieson, House Approves Death Penalty, TALLAHASSEE DEMO-
CRAT, Dec. 1, 1972, at 1.
116. Interview with Edgar Dunn in Daytona Beach, Fla. (Dec. 12, 1990);
Michael Mello & Ruthann Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice of Imposing
Death Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 31, 70 (1985).
117. As of 1985, trial judges had overridden jury recommendations of life on 84
occasions. Michael L. Radelet, Rejecting the Jury: The Imposition of the Death Pen-
alty in Florida, 18 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1409, 1413 (1985). Precise figures on overrides
of death recommendations are unavailable. Professor Radelet states, however, that
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John Paul Stevens has noted, "a procedure that was probably intended
by the legislature to provide the defendant with two chances to obtain
mercy seems actually to have provided the prosecutor with two oppor-
tunities to obtain the death penalty." '118 Efforts to amend or repeal the
jury override provision have been rebuffed by the legislature, largely
out of fear that any change in the statute will furnish new grounds for
appeal for defendants previously sentenced. 119
The bill as amended by the conference committee placed the final
sentencing decision in the hands of the trial judge but did not indicate
what deference, if any, was owed to the jury's recommendation.12 Sim-
ilar uncertainty characterized the statutory provision governing the
Florida Supreme Court's review. The statute provided that "[t]he judg-
ment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic
review by the Supreme Court of Florida . . . . Such review by the Su-
preme Court shall have priority over all other cases and shall be heard
in accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court."12' The
statute does not otherwise define the scope of the appellate court's re-
view-whether it is limited to claims of legal error, for example, or
whether it includes de novo reconsideration of the propriety of the capi-
tal sentence. Prior Florida law provided no guidance, since under the
old death penalty statute, the Florida Supreme Court could not over-
turn a sentence of death unless it reversed the underlying conviction. 12
"[n]umerous inquiries to several criminal attorneys and state officials ... make us
confident that less than a dozen such cases have occurred [as of 1985] since the current
statute was enacted." Id.
118. John Paul Stevens, Legal Questions in Perspective, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1, 4 (1985).
119. Interview with Edgar Dunn in Daytona Beach, Fla. (Dec. 12, 1990); Mello
& Robson, supra note 119, at 68, 71; interview with Robert Johnson in Sarasota, Fla.
(Dec. 18, 1990). Johnson states:
I am not willing to vote to change one comma on the Florida capital pun-
ishment act. Period. If you change one comma, you open up every avenue
of appeal that ever existed all over again . . . . They said it's constitu-
tional, and until they change their minds, we're not going to change the
law.
Id.
120. The bill stated only that "[n]otwithstanding the recommendation of the
jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall
enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death." 1973 Fla. Laws 724 § 9, codified at
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1972).
121. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4) (1972).
122. Ehrhardt & Levinson, supra note 60, at 11.
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The statute thus established a "trifurcated sentencing procedure
' 128
which divided power among judge, jury, and appellate court, but the
law gave no indication as to the proper allocation of responsibility
among the three sentencing authorities.""
The Florida legislature was anxious to adjourn, and debate on the
123. Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533, 542 (Fla. 1975) (England, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
124. The Florida Supreme Court's efforts to resolve these issues have not been
entirely successful. Early on, the court held that "[a] jury recommendation under our
trifurcated death penalty statute should be given great weight. In order to sustain a
sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sen-
tence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person
could differ." Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). The Florida Supreme
Court's application of the Tedder standard has been erratic, however. See Grossman v.
State, 525 So. 2d 833, 851 (Fla. 1988) (Shaw, J., concurring) ("During 1984-85, we
affirmed on direct appeal trial judge overrides in eleven of fifteen cases, seventy-three
percent. By contrast, during 1986 and 1987, we have affirmed overrides in only two of
eleven cases, less than twenty percent.").
Similar inconsistency has characterized the Florida Supreme Court's discussions of
its own authority; compare Songer v. State, 322 So. 2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1975), where the
court stated: "When the death penalty is imposed, this Court has a separate responsi-
bility to determine independently whether the imposition of the ultimate penalty is
warranted" with Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327, 1331 (Fla. 1981) where the
court stated:
Florida's death penalty statute . . . directs that a jury and judge, not this
Court, must weigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances delineated in the statute to determine whether death is an appro-
priate sentence . . . .This Court's role after a death sentence has been
imposed is "review," a process qualitatively different from sentence "impo-
sition." It consists of two discrete functions. First, we determine if the jury
and judge acted with procedural rectitude . . . .After we have concluded
that the judge and jury have acted with procedural regularity, we compare
the case under review with all past capital cases to determine whether or
not the punishment is too great . . . .Neither of our sentence review func-
tions, it will be noted, involves weighing or reevaluating the evidence ad-
duced to establish aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Our sole con-
cern on evidentiary matters is to determine whether there was sufficient
competent evidence in the record from which the judge and jury could
properly find the presence of appropriate aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstances. If the findings of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
are so supported, if the jury's recommendation was not unreasonably re-
jected, and if the death sentence is not disproportionate to others properly
sustainable under the statute, the trial court's sentence must be sustained
even though, had we been triers and weighers of fact, we might have
reached a different result in an independent evaluation.
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amended bill was minimal. The vote was 116-2 in the House and 39-1
in the Senate.128 Governor Askew signed the bill a week later, describ-
ing it as a "good product of the legislative process;" 2' the Governor
had previously explained that "I still prefer a panel of three judges, but
I'm primarily concerned with the fact that the death sentence shouldn't
be mandatory. 11 7 One legislator referred to the bill as "a model piece
of legislation that all the other states will look at with a great deal of
envy." 1' 8 Editorial reaction was generally favorable. The Tampa Trib-
une stated:
Justices of the Supreme Court in their readiness to bend the Con-
stitution to fit their own sentiments may find the new Florida law
as invalid as the old. But, if so, some of the responsibility for future
callous killings of innocent citizens will rest with the Court, not
with Governor Askew and the Legislature. They have fashioned a
fair method for punishing the guilty and deterring the potential
killer.""
The Florida Times-Union took the view that the death penalty is "in
the opinion of many, including us, a deterrent to heinous crime. It is a
protective device sorely needed by a society which has been stripped of
many of its former protections against rampant crime."' 30 Only the St.
Petersburg Times dissented:
Askew . . . should, but probably won't, veto the compromise death
penalty bill which fails to fully conform to standards he proposed.
If Florida must bear the stigma of being the first state to try to
restore capital punishment, it should be with a system less barbaric
than the Legislature's final product."3'
125. Representative Cherry and Representative Eugene Tubbs (R-Merritt Is-
land) voted against the bill in the House, though two days earlier they had supported
the bill which provided for three-judge sentencing. Senator Gordon again cast the lone
negative vote in the Senate.
126. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 7, 1972, at 4B.
127. Death Penalty Hits a Snag in Senate, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Nov. 30,
1972, at 14.
128. John Van Gieson, Legislature Approves Death Sentence Bill, TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT, Dec. 2, 1972, at 14 (quoting Representative George Williamson (R-Fort
Lauderdale)).
129. A Fair System to Punish Murderers, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Dec. 2, 1972, at
14A.
130. FLORIDA TIMES-UNIoN, Nov. 24, 1972, at A8.
131. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 2, 1972, at 16A.
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Significant misgivings remained, however, even among supporters
of capital punishment. Several legislators expressed dissatisfaction that
so important an issue had been debated and resolved in the frenzied
setting of a special session. Senate President Mallory Horne (D-Talla-
hassee), for example, stated: "We all got caught up in the commitment
to have a session. None of it really passed muster on the question of
absolute emergency. I think we handled too much too fast." '32 Senator
Louis de la Parte (D-Tampa) asserted: "If we're going to decide
whether to have something as important as the death penalty in Flor-
ida, I don't think we should have to do it on a rush-rush-rush basis."13
Governor Askew defended his decision to schedule a special session on
the ground that "[h]ad I not indicated last summer that I would call a
special session in the fall, the chances would have been better than av-
erage that the Legislature, in the middle of the campaign, might have
called themselves back into session. This is better." 34 Also, many of
the bill's proponents expressed serious doubts as to the prospects for a
favorable decision in the United States Supreme Court. Senator Demp-
sey Barron (D-Panama City) stated that "it's very unlikely any bill we
pass will have a great deal of influence on the Supreme Court." 35 Sen-
ator Jim Williams (D-Ocala), a supporter of the death penalty on the
Governor's Committee and in the legislature, asserted that "[tihe next




A. Public Attitudes Towards Capital Punishment
No referendum was taken in Florida on the issue of capital pun-
ishment in 1972. No statewide polls were published. And, because leg-
islative candidates were virtually unanimous in their support for the
death penalty, the results of the November elections provide few clues
as to popular sentiment on the issue. The available evidence indicates,
132. Bill Purvis, Legislature Passes Death Penalty Bill, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Dec. 2,
1972, at 12A.
133. Tom Raum, De La Parte Criticizes Special Session, TALLAHASSEE DEMO-
CRAT, Nov. 29, 1972, at 24.
134. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 21, 1972, at lB.
135. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 3, 1972, at IlA.
136. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 2, 1972, at IA.
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however, that a sizeable majority of the Florida electorate supported
the enactment of a new capital sentencing bill. A poll of Pinellas
County residents showed seventy-three percent in favor of reinstate-
ment.137 Letters to the editors of Florida newspapers ran heavily in
favor of capital punishment.13 8 The dearth of candidates who expressed
opposition to the death penalty is itself an indication-albeit an indi-
rect one--of the strength of popular feeling.
Perhaps the most compelling indication of the strength of public
support for capital punishment in the fall of 1972 may be found in the
arguments of those who opposed the death penalty. Those who argued
against passage of a new capital sentencing statute did not claim to
represent. the views of a majority of Floridians. Instead, they expressly
acknowledged their minority status and urged legislators to resist the
pressures of public opinion. LeRoy Collins, for example, stated that "I
know most people in the state want the death penalty, but I dissent."' 139
Miami attorney Tobias Simon, testifying before a legislative commit-
tee, referred to Florida abolitionists as "the silent minority."' 4 Virgil
Mayo, president of the Florida Public Defenders Association, told the
House Select Committee that he opposed capital punishment but ac-
knowledged that "I say in all fairness if I sat in your position I'd vote
for capital punishment . . . because I think that [representing the
views of one's constituents] is the duty of the elected representative."'"'
In part, the public's attitude reflected tradition. Participants in the
1972 debates suggest various explanations for the state's history of sup-
port for the death penalty. James Apthorp, Governor Askew's chief of
staff in 1972, states:
I think that the more rural parts of our state are no different from
other parts of the South, and they generally support capital punish-
137. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 23, 1972, at lB.
138. A St. Petersburg Times' request for letters pro and con elicited 461 letters
in favor of reinstatement and 142 against. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 30, 1972, at
23A. That result is especially striking in light of the Times's fervent opposition to capi-
tal punishment and its status as Florida's leading liberal newspaper.
The most poignant expression of support for capital punishment that my research
has revealed is a letter to the editor from "A.C." which concludes: "If some one [sic]
were to murder me, my last wish would be that the one that did it hangs. And with my
last breath I would condemn the Supreme Court." A.C., Letters, TAMPA TRIBUNE,
Dec. 6, 1972, at 23A.
139. Reaction Favors Decision, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Dec. 2, 1972, at 14.
140. House Hearings-transcript, supra note 46, at 21 (Aug. 9, 1972).
141. House Hearings-tape, supra note 48 (Oct. 27, 1972).
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ment. I think the . . . retirement areas of our state, where we have
an older population, tend to support capital punishment; it's the
view of older people, and people who are frightened at times about
their personal safety . . . . Maybe the combination of those two
things .... "I
Richard Pettigrew notes that "Florida's always been . . . a state that's
almost like a frontier state, in that there's a huge movement of new
people in all the time,"1 " and argues that the influx of new residents
creates a sense of instability and a consequent desire for strong mea-
sures to combat crime. Jack Gordon perceives a connection to the reli-
gious makeup of the state, arguing that support for capital punishment
is rooted in the belief "that people ought to be punished for their
sins-a very Calvinistic way of looking at the world. 144 Whatever its
roots, in 1972 that tradition was well-established; at the time that
Furman was decided, Florida's death row was by far the nation's
largest. 1 5
Other factors were significant as well. Sharply rising crime rates
during the years prior to Furman created the impression of a society
that was careening out of control.140 Controversy over busing during
142. Interview with James Apthorp in Tampa, Fla. (Feb. 15, 1991).
143. Interview with Richard Pettigrew in Miami, Fla. (Dec. 18, 1990).
144. Interview with Jack Gordon in Miami Beach, Fla. (Dec. 20, 1990). Partici-
pants on both sides of the debate frequently invoked religious principles in justification
of their positions. However, Harold Stahmer, a professor of religion who served on the
Governor's Committee, states that the connection between religious affiliation and atti-
tudes towards the death penalty turned out to be less predictable than he had
anticipated:
Collins and I sat next to each other, and he's a pillar of his Episcopal
church. We started-we'd get a list of people who had asked to appear
before us. And there'd be a clergyman, and initially if they came from
what I would call established denominations-Lutherans, Methodists,
Presbyterians-I would assume they'd be opposed to the reinstatement of
the death penalty. Didn't work that way. [Collins] and I sort of gave up
guessing . . . . Sometimes the Baptists, the Fundamentalists who normally
come on hard for retribution, they were kind of split. Some of them were
high on retribution, and reinstatement, and others were opposed to it.
Interview with Harold Stahmer in Gainesville, Fla. (Dec. 12, 1990).
145. Florida had 99 inmates on death row; Ohio was second with 55. ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES, June 30, 1972, at 8A.
146. As LeRoy Collins pointed out, however, the incidence of non-capital crimes
in Florida rose far more dramatically during the 1960s than did the rate of capital
crimes. See Governor's Committee Report, supra note 60, at 127, 130.
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the spring of 1972, and the disastrous performance of George McGov-
ern's presidential campaign,14 stirred distrust of "liberalism" in any
form. Lingering public resentment at the campus and urban unrest of
the previous decade, coupled, perhaps, with disgruntlement over the
Warren Court's innovations in the field of criminal procedure, in-
creased the electorate's impatience with those who appeared overly
concerned with protecting the rights of society's "deviant" members
and insufficiently committed to the maintenance of public order.""8 Any
attempt to assess the relative importance of these various factors can
only be a matter of speculation. It seems safe to say, however, both
that elimination of capital punishment in Florida would have been a
very difficult task in any year, and that 1972 was an extraordinarily
unpropitious time to make the attempt.
Among proponents of the death penalty, there was no consensus as
to the primary justification for capital punishment. Some advocates re-
lied on retributionist arguments;"4 9 many expressed distrust of the
state's parole commission and argued that murderers sentenced to life
imprisonment would be released to kill again.150 Supporters of the
death penalty relied most heavily on the argument that the threat of
capital punishment would deter potential murderers. These proponents
rarely contended that the death penalty's deterrent effect could be
demonstrated by statistical evidence.' 5 ' They relied instead on anecdo-
147. In 1972, Richard Nixon carried 72 percent of the Florida vote. ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES, Nov. 12, 1972, at 17A.
148. Retired Circuit Judge Ernest Mason, a member of the Governor's Commit-
tee, stated: "I am of the opinion that of late too much emphasis has been placed upon
the so-called humanitarian rights of the criminal at the expense of the victims of homi-
cides or their relatives." Governor's Committee Report, supra note 60, at 125.
149. Stella Thayer, a Tampa lawyer who served on the Governor's Committee,
recalls that Dr. Vernon Fox of Florida State University "was quite persuasive as a
proponent. He had a concept of social aggression, and that if a society didn't ensure
swift, prompt, and honest justice, then he felt that that deterioration continued down
through all of society." Interview with Stella Thayer, in Tampa, Fla. (Dec. 17, 1990).
15(0. For example, a statement issued by the Florida State Chamber of Com-
merce's Board of Directors argued that "a life sentence does not mean a life sentence,
as all convicted persons are entitled to be considered for parole after six months in
Florida." (copy on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series 19, Carton
464).
151. Indeed, proponents of capital punishment generally conceded that the em-
pirical evidence failed to establish a deterrent effect. Robert Johnson states that the
empirical evidence presented to the Governor's Committee "certainly raised various
questions, the questions were debated very heavily. . . .But it certainly didn't sway
the commission, obviously." Interview with Robert Johnson in Sarasota, Florida (Dec.
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tal evidence,152 or on the intuitive notion that an increase in the penalty
for a given activity would reduce the frequency with which that activity
occurred.
Due to the dearth of candidates who opposed reinstatement, news-
paper coverage of the 1972 legislative campaign includes little discus-
sion of the death penalty, and the elections themselves provided little
opportunity to test the strength of public sentiment on the issue. It nev-
ertheless appears to have been an article of faith among Florida
lawmakers that any elected official who opposed capital punishment
would risk political ruin. Mallory Horne, for example, recalls that,
I'd been Speaker of the House already, and had the pledges at the
time to be President of the Senate, and I knew going into that de-
bate . . . that if I didn't assume a comfortable consensus position,
that I would give up the presidency of the Senate . . . . [I]t was
that volatile a political issue . . . . You could not say that you
were against the death penalty and survive politically. 153
18, 1990). Ernest Mason's response to the available statistical evidence was typical: "In
spite of all the so-called expert testimony that we have heard, I am of the opinion that
the death penalty is a deterrent to homicides and that it should be restored as such."
Governor's Committee Report, supra note 60, at 125.
152. Anecdotal evidence of very dubious reliability was frequently treated with
extraordinary seriousness. Senator Thomas, for example, read a statement provided by
Palm Beach County sheriff's deputies which quoted a recently-arrested murder suspect
as saying, "I should have killed two or three more people that I didn't like because
according to the new Supreme Court ruling I can only get life imprisonment no matter
how many I kill." ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 29, 1972, at lB. Shevin recounted the
tale of a New York bank robber who told his terrorized victims that "You have to have
the death penalty, otherwise this can happen every day." House Hearings-tape, supra
note 48 (Aug, 31, 1972). Representative Gautier stated that to him the most convinc-
ing evidence of the death penalty's deterrent value was the statement of one Florida
prison inmate that without capital punishment his mother would be unable to walk
safely to church on Sunday. Id.
153. Interview with Mallory Horne in Tallahassee, Fla. (Feb. 13, 1991).
Horne himself expresses substantial reservations about the wisdom of capital pun-
ishment-reservations based primarily on a general dissatisfaction with the criminal
justice system:
I worry not so much about the death penalty as I do it in conjunction with
the trial system itself. I worry about somebody being electrocuted that
wasn't really guilty . . . . [TIhere's just enough of a motivation on the
part of prosecutors to succeed that I've just seen so many shortcuts by
them-withholding evidence from the defendant, withholding knowledge
of big, major doubt, and going ahead with the case nonetheless because the
death itself was grisly. That's what worries me, and I can't separate that
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Hugh McMillan, Jr., Askew's legislative assistant during 1972, states
that "everybody was a little bit relieved that it was probably mainly a
technical, legal, constitutional issue and not a political issue, 'cause the
common wisdom was that on the political side, there's only one side;
there's no political future to being against it."'' 54
The fate of Senator Gordon-the only member of the 1972 Flor-
ida legislature who expressed an absolute opposition to the death pen-
alty-is therefore illuminating. One might expect that the freshman
Senator, having characterized capital punishment as "refined barba-
rism" during his first week in office, would suffer the ire of both his
constituents and his colleagues. Gordon states, however, that his stance
has never hurt him electorally 55 and that it significantly enhanced his
stature within the legislative body:
[There were a] number of the north Florida legislators[] who were
sort of in control of the Senate at the time . . . [and upon whom]
it made a very positive impression . . . that somebody would be
willing to take the unpopular position and take the heat and not let
it bother him. So they came to rely on me and my word, and it was
a strange alliance; we're not sharing too much political philosophy,
'cause they're pretty conservative, but the way legislatures work,
being able to count on somebody when they tell you something is
exceptionally important . . . . I've twice been the Appropriations
[Committee] chairman . . . from a [Senate] President I didn't
support, because the north Florida gang wanted me there. . . . So
that's my estimate of what effect it had on.me politically. 56
The experience of a single official is admittedly a paltry basis upon
which to draw conclusions as to the political climate in 1972. Gordon's
experience at least suggests, however, that other assessments of the po-
litical costs of opposing the death penalty may have been overstated.
out from any punishment.
Id.
154. Interview with Hugh McMillan, Jr. in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Dec. 21,
1990).
155. Although the issue has sometimes arisen in campaigns, Gordon states that
"I've generally answered it simply by saying it's just a matter of personal conscience."
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B. The Legislature and the Court
Commenting upon the bifurcated sentencing bill soon after its final
passage, Robert Shevin stated: "Since the Legislature passed what may
be a more socially acceptable bill, rather than constitutionally accept-
able, it becomes our job to defend it and hope that I am wrong."'1 7 In
defending the statute before the Supreme Court, Shevin characterized
the legislature's actions in much the same way:
[W]hen I went to the legislative committees, the expression of the
legislative body was this: We would rather pass a good law, a fair
law that might be suspect, than to pass a mandatory death penalty,
even if it's allowed by Furman, because it is harsh. And that's the
kind of legislation the Florida legislature passed.I5s
There is a certain self-serving quality to these statements. Having lost
the argument over mandatory sentencing, Shevin sought to convince
the public that the legislature had not rejected his constitutional posi-
tion at all, but had simply elevated policy over constitutional concerns.
Shevin's statements nevertheless raise extremely important issues. How
did the Florida legislature view its relationship to the United States
Supreme Court? How conscientiously did the legislature consider its
constitutional obligations? How ably did individual legislators, and
other participants in the legislative debate, articulate the constitutional
arguments on either side of the issue?
Participants in the committee debates did occasionally express the
view that the legislature should pass the bill it deemed superior as a
matter of policy rather than attempt to divine the preferences of the
157. FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Dec. 2, 1972, at Al. In light of the position taken
by Shevin (and his assistants Ray Marky and George Georgieff) during the 1972 de-
bate, the state's brief in the United States Supreme Court is illuminating. The
brief-signed by Shevin, Marky, Georgieff, and one other attorney-was openly con-
temptuous of the petitioner's challenge: "[T]he positions advanced by Petitioner . . .
whether measured in Furman's scale or that of any other rational thought process are
lacking in any merit whatever . . . . Respondent is at a total loss as to just how the
Petitioner could conclude that the newly created Florida system violates Furman v.
Georgia." Brief for Respondent at 85-86, 94, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976)
(No. 75-5706). It was of course entirely ethical for Shevin and his assistants to defend
the statute in the courts despite their misgivings as to its constitutional status; but the
contrast between their pre-and post-enactment rhetoric is surely striking.
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United States Supreme Court. Representative Brown, for example, ar-
gued that,
no one has the ability to predict what the next decision of the
United States Supreme Court will be. So don't you believe that
we're better off doing what we think is right within that framework
rather than trying to make a decision based on what we don't know
they're going to do? "
As a characterization of the legislature's principal motivation, however,
Shevin's statements are simply insupportable. Presumably, the legisla-
ture did prefer a bifurcated sentencing bill to a mandatory statute as a
matter of policy-after all, a quite similar bill had been passed in
March, when constitutional concerns were not at issue. But advocates
of a nonmandatory bill also argued throughout the debate that such a
statute was more likely to withstand Supreme Court scrutiny than was
a mandatory sentencing scheme. Governor Askew emphasized this
point; witness after witness made the argument at the House Commit-
tee hearing on November 27, and Representative Johnson, leading the
fight on the floor, made this the focus of his attack.
The debate over which bill should be enacted was thus, to a very
large extent, a constitutional debate-a colloquy over the proper inter-
pretation of the various opinions in Furman. That debate, it should also
be stated, generally proceeded at a high level. Few legislators spoke on
the floor, and there is no way of knowing how thoroughly the rank-and-
file assimilated the arguments on either side. But the central arguments
were accurately identified and skillfully articulated by the leading par-
ticipants-Governor Askew and Representative Johnson in the one
camp, Representative Gautier and the Attorney General's office on the
other.
Despite the high quality of the debate, the ultimate vindication of
the Florida statute was, in an important sense, fortuitous. Those who
predicted that the Court would sustain a bifurcated sentencing law, but
reject a mandatory statute, were proved correct: the Florida law was
upheld, while mandatory laws were struck down in Woodson v. North
Carolina"'° and Roberts v. Louisiana.16 ' But their heavy reliance on
the votes of the Furman dissenters proved to be unwarranted. Of the
159. House Hearings-tape, supra note 48 (Aug. 31, 1972).
160. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
161. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
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four Justices who dissented in Furman, only Justice Powell subse-
quently voted to strike down mandatory sentencing laws. Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun, who in Furman expressed vehement dis-
approval of mandatory death penalty measures, voted to uphold the
statutes at issue in Woodson and Roberts.
It is of course quite common for Supreme Court Justices to argue
that a particular state policy should be upheld lest the government re-
spond to its invalidation by adopting an even more retrograde ap-
proach.1"2 And the Justice who employs such an argument does not
thereby suggest that the feared alternative would be unconstitutional.
On this point Robert Marky was more prescient than his opponents:
while conceding that the dissenting Justices had expressed distaste for
a mandatory death penalty, he insisted that "I don't think Burger and
Blackmun will cross over the line of judicial restraint . . . .I mean,
that's the foundation of their judicial attitude."'16 3 Some state legisla-
tures, it appears, adopted mandatory sentencing schemes in the mis-
taken belief that such action was required by the opinions of Justices
Stewart and White. Florida lawmakers avoided that fate, at least in
part, because of their misreading of two dissents.
In deciding which death penalty bill to support, I have argued that
Florida legislators were heavily if not primarily influenced by constitu-
tional concerns. Constitutional scruples appeared notably absent, how-
ever, when legislators decided whether to vote for any capital sentenc-
ing bill at all. Forty-seven members of the House, for example, voted
against the proposal to substitute the Askew bill for the mandatory sen-
tencing bill reported by the House Committee. Many of these legisla-
tors presumably acted in the belief that Furman required mandatory
sentencing-indeed, that was the only argument advanced in favor of
the mandatory approach. Yet all forty-seven voted "yea" on the next
vote, when the choice was between a bifurcated sentencing scheme and
no death penalty bill. Nor is there any evidence that these legislators
perceived themselves (or were perceived by the public) to be on the
horns of an ethical dilemma. The record suggests that the Florida legis-
lature was acutely aware of the limitations placed upon it by the
United States Supreme Court, but that legislators saw their relation-
162. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13
(1979) ("if parole determinations are encumbered by [judicially mandated] procedures
that states regard as burdensome and unwarranted, they may abandon or curtail
parole").
163. House Hearings-tape, supra note 48 (Nov. 27, 1972).
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ship to the Court as one of power rather than of duty. These
lawmakers were serious and conscientious in their efforts to understand
the Supreme Court's instructions because they recognized that without
Supreme Court approval no executions could take place. But they ac-
knowledged no obligation to support only those measures which they
believed would satisfy the standards announced by the Court.1'6 Fresh-
man Senator Bruce Smathers (D-Jacksonville) no doubt spoke for
many legislators when he inserted into the Senate Journal the following
explanation for his vote:
I am voting yea because of the necessity to reinstate capital punish-
ment in Florida. I have many reservations as to the constitutional-
ity as well as the content of many sections. However, the special
session did not allow the necessary time for open hearings, nor
careful consideration that a bill of this magnitude deserves. Rather
than have no bill at all-I support this compromise.6
164. A single legislator did state that, despite his support for the death penalty,
constitutional scruples prevented him from supporting the bill drafted by the confer-
ence committee. Representative F. Eugene Tubbs (R-Merritt Island) inserted into the
House Journal the following explanation for his vote:
I voted negative on the Capital Punishment Conference Committee report
for the following reasons:
1. I do not feel that this legislation overcomes the objections
raised by the nine Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.
2. In the unlikely event that the U.S. Supreme Court finds
this legislation constitutional, I have serious doubts that the
death penalty will be utilized by the courts of Florida.
As I favor the death penalty and as I favor the three judge tribunal con-
cept for sentencing, I cannot in good conscience vote for this bill.
Fla. J. House Rep., Dec. 1, 1972, at 51.
165. Fla. Sen. J. 40 (Dec. 1, 1972).
The argument here is that many legislators voted in favor of the Florida death
penalty bill despite their serious doubts as to its constitutionality. One scholar has ad-
vanced the more disturbing suggestion that some state legislatures may have enacted
death penalty statutes in the wake of Furman because they believed that the Supreme
Court would strike them down:
Rather than inhibiting legislative action, the constitutional rhetoric had
created an atmosphere in which legislators could have it both ways. They
could satisfy some constituents by voting for capital punishment and yet
explain their votes, to themselves and to their anti-death law constituents,
on the plausible grounds that the law would never be applied.
GuIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 27 (1982). At least in
Florida, the evidence does not support this theory. All the evidence indicates that a
very large majority of the legislature supported capital punishment, believed that their
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Two eminent students of the death penalty have recently argued
that the explosion of post-Furman capital sentencing statutes was pri-
marily the product of resentment at the United States Supreme Court's
intrusion into an area traditionally reserved to the states. Noting that
the great majority of post-Furman executions have occurred in south-
ern states, these scholars contend that,
[r]ather than a resurgent national perception of capital punishment
as the solution to the criminal homicide, what this pattern illus-
trates is a state response to a federal slight that was seen as arbi-
trary and unwarranted. There is, after all, a long history of disa-
greement with, and of political and legislative challenge to, the
Supreme Court's antimajoritarian rulings.1"6
At least as to Florida, the evidence does not support this view. The
meticulous efforts to decipher the various opinions in Furman, and
thereby to divine the Supreme Court's instructions, bespeak an attitude
very different from defiance. Some proponents of capital punishment
did accuse the Supreme Court of overreaching, but no one appears to
have urged that the desire to assert state autonomy furnished a suffi-
cient reason for passage of a new statute. Representative Johnson, for
example, argued that,
Furman v. Georgia was a very harsh case, in my opinion, and one
which should never have been rendered. It was a great injustice to
our nation . . . . But we can't argue with that now. I would say
this to you, that whether or not Furman v. Georgia was ever de-
cided, we should be here today anyway, deciding whether or not we
can come up with a better system of justice for the state of
Florida. 167
constituents supported it, and would have voted for a death penalty bill even if they
had known that it would lead to executions. Moreover, the lengthy and often acrimoni-
ous debate over which sentencing statute should be enacted would have been altogether
pointless if legislators had in fact assumed that no bill would survive judicial review. It
is surely possible that some lawmakers who might otherwise have opposed the bill de-
clined to do so in the belief that the courts would intervene, but there is no reason to
suppose that these members formed a sizeable percentage of the legislature.
166. FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN AGENDA 44 (1986).
167. Tape of Florida House of Representatives Floor Debate (Nov. 29, 1972) (on
file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
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Many of the leading participants in the debate, moreover, did not
quarrel with Furman at all, but expressly acknowledged the capricious-
ness of pre-Furman capital sentencing in Florida. When Governor
Askew finally recommended passage of a new death penalty statute, he
deplored the,
unbridled use of discretion in the sentencing process by which we
have applied capital punishment, which has resulted in discrimina-
tion. This I found to be particularly true in Florida at the time the
Furman decision was handed down, where out of twenty-six (26)
inmates on death row for rape, nineteen (19) were black. I find it
of paramount importance, therefore, both from a legal and moral
standpoint, to recommend legislation to you which substantially
improves the process.10 8
Ray Marky, testifying before a legislative committee, stated:
We must discern the difference between the jury reaching a com-
peting conclusion of fact predicated upon reasonably accurate in-
structions from a jury whim because there was no instructions for
them to follow whatever, which is what you had in Furman. See, in
Furman, the judge just says, "It's up to you." . . . [W]e just said
(to the jurors], "Here, go and have your fun, decide what you want
to do with this human." So there was no real frustration of the
legislative determination. 1"
Indeed, one of the most emphatic (and persuasive) denunciations of
pre-Furman capital sentencing is set forth in Florida's brief to the
United States Supreme Court in Proftt v. Florida:
It is not surprising that sentences determined under the "system"
condemned by Furman produced uninformed, irrational, and
freakish results . . . . The legal "system," was not a "system" at
all! It had none of the attributes of a "system" designed to achieve
any degree of uniformity. Indeed, the "system" was such that the
ultimate question was presented to twelve citizens without any
guidance whatsoever who were told that they and they alone could
determine the question within their unbridled and unfettered dis-
168. Letter from Reubin Askew to Senate President Mallory Horne and House
Speaker Terrell Sessums 2 (Nov. 22, 1972) (copy on file at Florida State Archives,
Tallahassee, Fla., Series 757, Box 11).
169. House Hearings-tape, supra note 48 (Aug. 31, 1972).
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cretion. Such a method is about as rational as submitting the issue
of the defendant's guilt to a jury without instructing them as to
applicable law and letting them wonder in utter speculation as to
whether the accused committed any "crime." Such was the system
which was finally found wanting by this Court because it conferred
upon juries and/or judges the power to indiscriminately sentence a
person to death and actual experience has demonstrated contradic-
tory sentences were returned in cases involving similar crimes.170
At least in Florida, support for a new capital sentencing statute in the
fall of 1972 cannot persuasively be portrayed as a means of defying the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Furman.
C. Furman as a Remand to the Legislature
Public officials at the time Furman was decided, and commenta-
tors then and since, have deplored the ambiguity of the Court's deci-
sion.1" 1 That ambiguity-which stemmed both from the opaque quality
of the individual opinions and from the fact that each Justice in the
majority wrote separately-unquestionably had significant costs. In
Florida, for example, the legislature enacted the jury override provision
in the mistaken belief that such action was required by Furman. If the
Court's goal was to force legislatures to adopt new and more reliable
170. Brief for Respondent at 89-91, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (No.
75-5706). Tactical considerations might of course have induced the state's attorneys to
refrain from a challenge to Furman when they defended the new statute before the
United States Supreme Court. The state's brief, however, did not simply assume or
even concede the correctness of Furman: it articulated the strongest possible argument
in favor of that decision. Moreover, the state set forth the same argument in its brief to
the Florida Supreme Court-a tribunal that would hardly have been flattered by refer-
ences to the inequities of pre-Furman capital sentencing. See Brief for State of Florida
at 14-15, State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973) (No. 43,521).
171. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Constitution and the
Death Penalty, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1758 (1987) ("Furman so starkly deviated
from the traditional format that it can be characterized as a decision in which there
was not only no Court opinion but no Court-only a confederation of individual, even
separately sovereign, Justices."); Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT.
REV. 305, 315 (Furman "is not so much a case as a badly orchestrated opera, with nine
characters taking turns to offer their own arias."); Daniel D. Polsby, The Death of
Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 40 ("[T]he way that
the Furman majority presented itself to the world-five separate opinions with none
commanding the concurrence of any Justice other than its author-seemed almost de-
liberately calculated to make this judgment of dubious value as a precedent.").
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capital sentencing schemes, the argument goes, why did the Court not
clearly state what procedures would survive constitutional scrutiny? It
may be, however, that Furman is best understood not as a failure to
provide guidance, but as an effort to provoke debate. More precisely,
Furman may be read as holding that death penalty statutes then in
place were void on the ground of desuetude.
Alexander Bickel recognized that some rarely-enforced statutes
may remain on the books even though they no longer embody the pub-
lic will-partly because it is always more difficult politically to repeal a
statute than to prevent its enactment, and partly because non-enforce-
ment (or selective enforcement) may itself reduce the likelihood of a
public outcry for repeal. "When [such a statute] is resurrected and en-
forced," Bickel recognized, "it represents the ad hoc decision of the
prosecutor, unrelated to anything that may realistically be taken as
present legislative policy. ' 'l 7a The opinions of Justices Stewart and
White-which argued that the infrequency with which capital punish-
ment was imposed had transformed the death penalty from an instru-
ment of policy to one of caprice-sounded a similar theme. These Jus-
tices employed the Eighth Amendment ban on "unusual" punishments
as a textual basis for striking down the Texas and Georgia laws on a
ground that was functionally indistinguishable from reliance on
desuetude. 17
By invalidating an infrequently used statute on the ground of des-
uetude, Bickel argued, the Court can shift to the statute's proponents
the burden of demonstrating that contemporaneous public and legisla-
tive support for the law still exists, while leaving open the possibility of
re-enactment if such support can be gathered.17 ' In a somewhat similar
vein Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Furman, acknowledged that he
was,
not altogether displeased that legislative bodies have been given the
opportunity, and indeed the unavoidable responsibility, to make a
thorough re-evaluation of the entire subject of capital punishment
. . . .The legislatures can and should make an assessment of the
deterrent influence of capital punishment, both generally and as af-
172. Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40,
61-64 (1961).
173. At least one scholar has previously noted a possible connection between the
Court's decision in Furman and the jurisprudential theories of Bickel. See GUIDO CAL-
ABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 26 (1982).
174. Id. at 63.
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fecting the commission of specific crimes.'78
It is at least plausible to suppose that some members of the Furman
majority were influenced to vote as they did not simply by their percep-
tion that capital sentencing procedures were deficient, but by their de-
sire to ensure that capital punishment would continue only if contempo-
raneous public support for the death penalty was sufficient to achieve
the passage of new statutes.
It is clear, moreover, that when the Court revisited the issue in
1976, it assumed that a wide-ranging public debate over capital punish-
ment had occurred in the four years since Furman. The opinion of Jus-
tices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens in Gregg v. Georgia 1 6 stated:
The petitioners in the capital cases before the Court today renew
the "standards of decency" argument, but developments during the
four years since Furman have undercut substantially the assump-
tions upon which their argument rested. Despite the continuing de-
bate, dating back to the 19th century, over the morality and utility
of capital punishment, it is now evident that a large proportion of
American society continues to regard it as an appropriate and nec-
essary criminal sanction. The most marked indication of society's
endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative re-
sponse to Furman. The legislatures of at least 35 States have en-
acted new statutes that provide for the death penalty .... 7
In a companion case, Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, also relied on the legislative
activity as dispositive evidence "that capital punishment is acceptable
to the contemporary community as just punishment for at least some
intentional killings.' 178 Each of the thirty-five states listed, however,
had a death penalty statute on the books in 1972 when Furman was
175. Furman, 408 U.S. at 403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
176. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
177. Id. at 179-80.
178. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 353 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
Ray Marky had anticipated the possibility that the legislative reaction to Furman
might influence the Supreme Court's conclusions as to the propriety of capital punish-
ment. Testifying before the House Select Committee in 1972, Marky stated that "the
contemporary notions [of decency] predicted by the Supreme Court in June of '72 after
a lot of referendums and a lot of committees meet may be different." House Hear-
ings-tape, supra note 48 (Nov. 27, 1972).
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decided.1 79 The legislative activity cited by these seven Justices can be
regarded as "new evidence" only if we assume that the recent passage
of a statute is a more accurate indicator of public sentiment than is the
failure to repeal a law enacted in the distant past. That assumption
seems reasonable enough; but it surely reflects Bickelian ideas of legis-
lative inertia rather than the Supreme Court's ordinary view that stat-
utes of whatever vintage are presumed to embody the majority will.
The Gregg plurality's reliance on recent legislative developments
reflects another unspoken premise as well: that the process of enacting
new capital sentencing procedures will in some way involve a debate as
to the propriety of capital punishment vel non. That this premise is not
necessarily accurate may be seen by considering the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in Spaziano v. Florida.180 In Spaziano, the
Court upheld Florida's jury override provision, which allows the trial
judge to sentence a defendant to death despite the jury's recommenda-
tion of life imprisonment. Suppose, however, that Spaziano had pre-
vailed. Many Florida inmates would have been removed from death
row, of course, but it hardly seems likely that a broad debate over the
propriety of capital punishment would have ensued. The legislature
would simply have repealed, quickly and with little discussion, the jury
override provision. Much the same result could have been expected, it
seems to me, if the Furman Court had clearly announced that the arbi-
trariness of prior capital sentencing could be prevented by the adoption
of the standards articulated in the Model Penal Code. 8' It was the
very ambiguity of the Furman decision which, by creating the sense
that nothing could be taken for granted and that every aspect of the
problem must therefore be explored, increased the likelihood of a de-
bate which would include the wisdom of the death penalty itself.
For present purposes, my concern is not with whether the Furman
Court actually sought to produce the "thorough re-evaluation of the
entire subject of capital punishment" forecast by the Chief Justice, nor
with whether the effort to produce such a re-evaluation would be an
179. Compare Gregg 428 U.S. at 179-80 n.23 (opinion of Stewart, Powell &
Stevens, JJ.) with Furman, 408 U.S. at 340 n.79 (Marshall, J., concurring).
180. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
181. Indeed, the Florida legislature's actions during the spring of 1972 should
dispel the notion that revision of capital sentencing procedures is necessarily accompa-
nied by a re-examination of the propriety of capital punishment. In March 1972, the
state enacted its bifurcated trial law, yet the legislature rebuffed Governor Askew's
request for the establishment of a commission to study the death penalty.
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appropriate use of federal judicial power.182 I am concerned instead
with whether such a re-evaluation did in fact take place in Florida.
Insofar as the legislature is concerned, the record is mixed. Certainly
no meaningful deliberations occurred at the special session itself: Rep-
resentative Gautier, in fact, began the November 27 meeting of the
House Select Committee by admonishing the witnesses that their com-
ments should be limited to the "technical aspects" of the various bills
under consideration and that discussion of the propriety of capital pun-
ishment would be inappropriate. On the eve of the legislative session,
passage of some death penalty bill was universally presumed to be inev-
itable, and controversy centered entirely on the nature of the statute to
be drafted. Indeed, the sense of inevitability was so great as to induce
"lesser-of-evils" reasoning even among those not ordinarily inclined to-
wards moral relativism. Florida's Catholic bishops asserted:
It is certainly our hope that the time is not far distant when capital
punishment will be abolished altogether. Many men of goodwill
nevertheless remain since convinced that the death penalty serves
as a strong deterrent of the more heinous crimes. For this reason
alone it would be unrealistic to assume that capital punishment will
not be restored on a very limited basis in Florida. 83
The statement then went on to stress the importance of safeguards to
prevent arbitrariness in capital sentencing.
To what extent did the legislative committees which met during
the summer and fall provide a substitute for plenary consideration of
the issue at the special session? The Senate Council on Criminal Jus-
tice, appointed by outgoing Senate President Jerry Thomas, drafted a
proposed statute which established a mandatory death penalty; but the
Council included only two Senators, held no hearings,18 4 and offered no
182. See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the 'Passive Virtues'-A Com-
ment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
183. Statement issued by the Catholic Bishops of Florida on Capital Punishment
(Nov. 29, 1972) (copy on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series 757,
Box 11).
184. The Council explained that "[s]ince public hearings have been held by the
Governor's Committee to Study Capital Punishment and by the House Select Commit-
tee on the Death Penalty, it would be an unnecessary expenditure of public funds for
this Council to duplicate that procedure .... " Letter from Senate Council on Crimi-
nal Justice to Senate President Mallory Horne 1 (Nov. 20, 1972) (copy on file at Flor-
ida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series 19, Carton 464).
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explanation for its conclusions.188 The House Committee conducted far
more extensive deliberations, but its attention was focused primarily on
the question of what sort of bill should be drafted. Nor did the House
Committee function effectively in its role as an assimilator of informa-
tion and ideas on which other legislators could draw. Addressing the
committee soon after its formation, outgoing House Speaker Richard
Pettigrew cautioned the committee that much of the legislature in the
special session would be new and that the committee's report should
therefore be comprehensive.18 Pettigrew stated: "I think you should
have an in-depth majority and minority report or a series of minority
reports, if need be, so that every viewpoint is available to the Legisla-
ture as a whole, come November. ' 18 7 The committee's final report,
however, was only six pages long; the final four pages discussed the
debate between mandatory and nonmandatory sentencing, and the only
argument advanced in favor of enacting a new death penalty statute
was that "[i]n reviewing the testimony received, there was actually
very little opposition to the reenactment of capital punishment."1 8
To say all this is not to say that Furman accomplished nothing, or
that the legislative response to the decision was reflexive or uninformed.
The need to pass a law served to ensure that there existed a contempo-
raneous majority within the state favoring capital punishment; repre-
sentatives were given ample time and opportunity to ascertain and act
upon the wishes of their constituents. That is hardly an insignificant
point: a principal aim of Bickelian jurisprudential techniques is to com-
bat the inertial forces that often prevent the repeal of statutes that lack
contemporary support. Moreover, Furman at least helped to create a
climate in which abolition of the death penalty was deemed to be
among the options "on the table." This was due largely, I have argued,
185. The Council's final report included findings that "[t]he death penalty is a
deterrent to homicide, and there is a place in the field of law enforcement for capital
punishment; so the death penalty should be reinstated" and that "[tihe mandatory
death penalty is the proper method to follow in reinstatement." Id. at 3. The only
statement as to the basis for these conclusions was that "[t]he Council, in its delibera-
tions, was able to draw upon the experiences of its members, the report of the Attorney
General, and the reports of the Governor's Committee to Study Capital Punishment
and the House Select Committee on the Death Penalty." Id. at 2-3.
186. House Hearings-transcript, supra note 46, at 3-4 (Aug. 9, 1972).
187. Id. at 6.
188. Final Report of the House Select Committee on the Death Penalty 2 (Nov.
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to the ambiguity of the Furman opinions. Had the Supreme Court
clearly identified the sort of sentencing scheme that would withstand its
review, it is unlikely that the propriety of capital punishment would
have been considered a legitimate subject for debate.
Furman did not, however, at least in Florida, produce the "thor-
ough re-evaluation" more optimistically forecast by the Chief Justice:
the legislature undertook no systematic study of the issue beyond its
effort to determine the will of the people. This is not to say that legisla-
tors acquiesced in a policy of which they did not approve. There is
every reason to believe that most lawmakers shared the public's view as
to the morality and the efficacy of capital punishment. The point is that
Furman did not induce either the public or the legislature to rid itself
of its preconceptions and start from scratch; society did not so much
"re-evaluate" the issue as simply "re-affirm" that it continued to ad-
here to its former view. Legislators did thoroughly and astutely debate
the issue of mandatory versus nonmandatory sentencing; but in other
respects the details of the statute ultimately passed did not reflect any
special expertise as to the mores and problems of Floridians. The ag-
gravating and mitigating factors were taken directly from the Model
Penal Code; the jury override provision (the only feature of the statute
that is distinctive to Florida) was an accidental feature that no one
actually wanted and that has plainly failed to serve its intended
function.
D. The Role of the Governor
Of all the participants in the Florida debate, the most enigmatic
was surely Governor Reubin Askew. Governor Askew was, for most of
the debate, a non-participant; he expressed no view on the issue until
November 20, a week before the special session convened. His ultimate
recommendation that a statute be enacted was accompanied by expres-
sions of doubt as to the wisdom of his chosen course. Yet in the end,
Askew must be deemed the most influential actor of all, in the sense
that he, and he alone, might single-handedly have changed the out-
come. Whether Askew's opposition could have prevented the enactment
of a new death penalty statute remains a matter of conjecture.18 9 Un-
189. The question whether Askew's opposition could have prevented the enact-
ment of a death penalty statute evoked widely varying reactions from those I inter-
viewed. Mallory Horne states that "[ilf he had absolutely in the trenches opposed
it-in the first place I don't believe it would have passed, but if it had passed, his veto
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questionably, though, no other individual could have done so.
In the end, of course, Governor Askew recommended that a death
penalty statute be enacted. Harold Stahmer, a professor of religion at
the University of Florida who served on the Governor's Committee,
states: "I sized [Askew] up that he'd stick his neck out on race, on
integration, but he wasn't going to stick his neck out on the death pen-
alty."19  Jack Gordon notes that "Askew, like most governors-they
don't like to be beaten. And so, they kind of use that veto pretty judi-
ciously . . . . I don't think that Askew was overridden in eight years,
on anything-a product of very careful choosing." 191 Political consider-
ations surely cannot be discounted. It seems clear that Askew would
have had nothing to gain and much to lose by opposing the reinstate-
ment of capital punishment, particularly if his opposition had ulti-
mately proved unsuccessful. But it is at least equally plausible that the
governor acted out of a sincere belief, after a period of exhaustive de-
liberation, that enactment of a new death penalty statute was in the
best interests of the state. Governor Askew, after all, did not have the
issue thrust upon him against his will; even prior to Furman, the gover-
nor had unsuccessfully urged the legislature to re-examine the propri-
ety of capital punishment. Askew's aides (themselves adamant oppo-
nents of the death penalty) insist that political calculations played an
inconsequential role in his decision.1 92 Askew had shown himself willing
would have been sustained. He was a very popular governor at the time." Interview
with Mallory Horne in Tallahassee, Fla. (Feb. 13; 1991). Edgar Dunn expresses the
view that Askew could have sustained a veto if he had put his weight behind it. Inter-
view with Edgar Dunn in Daytona Beach, Fla. (Dec. 12, 1990). James Apthorp is more
doubtful: "I don't think he could have changed the majority opinion in the legislature.
It's possible he could have sustained a veto-maybe; that would have been hard, too.
There was very strong support-still is-in the Florida legislature." Interview with
James Apthorp in Tampa, Fla. (Feb. 15, 1991). Robert Johnson states unequivocally
that "I have no doubt that if [Askew] had come out against capital punishment, we
would have passed a bill and we would have overridden a veto." Interview with Robert
Johnson in Sarasota, Fla. (Dec. 18, 1990).
190. Interview with Harold Stahmer in Gainesville, Fla. (Dec. 12, 1990).
191. Interview with Jack Gordon in Miami Beach, Fla. (Dec. 20, 1990).
192. James Apthorp states:
I don't think he engaged in a lot of political considerations in thinking
about the issue. I mean, it was there, there was the specter of doing some-
thing unpopular, but that didn't bother him a lot on other issues. He was
• ..pretty courageous in taking public positions that didn't enjoy public
support . . . .He was never really afraid of public opinion as long as he
felt good about what he was doing.
Interview with James Apthorp in Tampa, Fla. (Feb. 15, 1991).
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to buck popular sentiment, particularly in the busing controversy that
erupted earlier that year.
Throughout his years as a legislator, Askew had consistently sup-
ported capital punishment. As Hugh McMillan, Jr. (Askew's legislative
assistant during 1972) explains, that position reflected the governor's
professional background and his instinctive reluctance to break sharply
from the past:
The governor as a young lawyer had been a prosecutor, and he's
basically a very compassionate person, but he comes out of a pretty
classically conservative value system. The few points where he re-
ally broke from that would be in his absolutely total commitment
to racial justice .. . .His background would be the background of
an essentially conservative person, which doesn't necessarily mean
you'd be for or against capital punishment, but he's basically not
looking for new ways to develop bold new approaches to things.'19
Though no one was executed during his two terms as governor, Askew's
perception of the unique responsibilities of his office appears to have led
him to re-evaluate his position. As one of his closest aides puts it,
"[ilt's a lot easier to favor capital punishment on some theoretical level
than it is to have to sign a death warrant."' 94 The same aide states that
Askew,
started out and wound up in the same position, but he really had a
struggle in between . . . .I think it was a real struggle between his
religious beliefs and his civic duty . . . .He sort of came from the
law enforcement, prosecutorial mindset at this issue. And he never
quite got beyond that, in my view, except that he was nagged, and
Hugh McMillan, Jr. agrees:
On an issue like this, he would be mostly trying to do what he thought was
the right thing to do; and by mostly I mean like about ninety-nine percent
. .. I compare him to Lincoln in some ways, in that he wasn't necessa-
rily looking for trouble, he wasn't necessarily looking for a chance to be a
great leader, or a political hero, but he would absolutely not flinch from
doing what he thought was the right thing to do.
Interview with Hugh McMillan, Jr. in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Dec. 21, 1990). Both
Apthorp and McMillan recall that they attempted to persuade Askew to oppose capital
punishment during the fall of 1972.
193. Interview with Hugh McMillan, Jr. in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Dec. 21,
1990).
194. Interview with James Apthorp in Tampa, Fla. (Feb. 15, 1991).
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bothered, and almost brought down by his religious beliefs.195
McMillan notes that "[p]articularly any suggestions that there
was any racial bias or an economic class bias in the way it was either
applied or administered-Askew would have a sensitivity to those kinds
of concerns."'" 6 That assessment is borne out by the governor's em-
phatic denunciation of pre-Furman capital sentencing, in which Askew
focused on the disproportionate frequency with which blacks had been
sentenced to death. Askew may ultimately have become con-
vinced--though not without lingering qualms 1 9'-that the sentencing
procedure devised by the Governor's Committee could alleviate the dis-
criminatory aspects of the prior system, and that narrowly targeted use
of capital punishment could be an effective deterrent to violent crime.
In the end, the precise mix of factors that led to Askew's decision
must remain unknowable-even to the man himself. But if any true re-
evaluation of the issue took place in Florida during 1972, it took place
in the office of the governor. It was the Governor's Committee that
undertook the most thorough and systematic inquiry into the issue.
Only the Governor's Committee, for example, made any effort to grap-
ple with the empirical evidence concerning the deterrent value of capi-
tal punishment. The governor himself, almost alone among Florida
public officials, appears to have made a genuine effort to set aside his
preconceptions and think through the problem anew.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Florida legislature's debate over the death penalty in 1972
furnishes a highly instructive example of the interaction between the
195. Id.
196. Interview with Hugh McMillan, Jr. in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Dec. 21,
1990).
197. James Apthorp indicates that Askew remained troubled by the issue
throughout his tenure as governor:
The things he did between 1972 and 1978, when he left-I mean it was six
years that ... he could have been faced with this issue, but he avoided it
right down to the end. He stretched 'em out, he sent 'em back, he'd want
to know more about 'em; I mean, he'd ask for another report. He really
had a hard time facing this issue . . . . He spent the whole six years
struggling with it, and worrying about it, and trying to avoid having to do
it, and all the time he maintained this public position in favor of having
capital punishment, but it was really difficult for him.
Interview with James Apthorp in Tampa, Fla. (Feb. 15, 1991).
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United States Supreme Court and the elected representatives of the
people. The most obvious aspect of that interaction lay in the legisla-
ture's efforts to devise capital sentencing procedures that would with-
stand judicial scrutiny in the future. The debate within the legislature
furnished an odd species of constitutional discourse. The aim was not to
discover unifying principles shared by the Court generally. Rather, the
legislature's technique was to examine each of the Furman opinions
individually in order to determine each Justice's likely attitude towards
the bills under consideration, and the preferences of the Furman dis-
senters consequently assumed as much importance as did the views of
the majority. Given the disjointed nature of the Furman decision, how-
ever, no other method of constitutional inquiry would seem to have
been possible; and it should be said that leaders on both sides of the
debate were astute and careful in their parsing of the Supreme Court's
"instructions." At the same time, however, legislators acknowledged no
obligation to withhold their support from any bill that they believed
the Court would disapprove. Legislators sought to pass the bill that
enjoyed the greatest chance of Supreme Court approval; but virtually
all members of the body deemed it preferable to support a bill of
doubtful constitutionality rather than to support no bill at all.
The interaction between Court and legislature, however, went be-
yond lawmakers' efforts to devise capital sentencing procedures that
would satisfy the Court's concerns. The Supreme Court's decision in
Furman, I have argued, was not simply a command that new proce-
dures be developed to determine which individuals would be con-
demned to die. The decision was, in addition, an invitation to renewed
debate on the question whether capital punishment should be employed
at all. An evaluation of the Florida legislature's performance during
the fall of 1972 must ultimately depend on one's conception of the
proper relationship between the people of a democracy and their
elected representatives.
One version of democratic theory holds that the elected represen-
tative should act solely as a proxy whose duty is to determine, and then
to advocate, the views of his constituents. Adherents of this position
could have no quarrel with the Florida legislature's disposition of the
death penalty issue. Insofar as the legislature's proper role is to give
effect to the values and preferences of its constituents, the decision to
reinstate the death penalty cannot be faulted. In concluding that capi-
tal punishment was not per se violative of the Eighth Amendment, the
Supreme Court in 1976 was heavily influenced by the spate of legisla-
tive activity that had occurred in the four years since Furman. Passage
[Vol. 161352
341
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Stewart
of new death penalty statutes, the Court concluded, was persuasive evi-
dence that public support for capital punishment remained strong. At
least as to Florida, that inference appears justified. Capital punishment
was not foisted upon the public through parliamentary machinations. It
was not the brainchild of a single charismatic individual. It was not a
means of asserting state autonomy in defiance of the United States Su-
preme Court. The simplest explanation for the passage of the statute
appears also to be the correct one; capital punishment was reinstated in
Florida because a sizeable majority of the Florida public believed rein-
statement to be a wise policy.
A second view of the legislative function emphasizes the need for
independence on the part of individual lawmakers. Although the legis-
lator's duty is to seek the public good, the argument goes, the premise
of a representative democracy is that the people should elect officials
who possess a heightened understanding of political issues. The legisla-
tor's responsibility, on this view, is to act upon his own conception of
the common good. His decisions should be informed but not controlled
by the opinions of his constituents. Judged against this model also, the
performance of the Florida legislature in 1972 is difficult to criticize.
Had every legislator voted his conscience, there would presumably have
been more than one vote against the death penalty; but there is every
reason to believe that a sizeable majority of Florida lawmakers sin-
cerely shared their constituents' support for capital punishment.
A third model of legislative action stresses the importance of the
lawmaking process. This view holds that legislatures can improve upon
the wishes of the electorate-not because individual lawmakers neces-
sarily possess superior insights into public problems, but because the
fact-finding capabilities of the legislature, combined with the increased
understanding that emerges through collective deliberation and debate,
can enable the lawmaking body to develop solutions that no individual
member could achieve on his own. Those who believe that the legisla-
ture is obligated to engage in a process of deliberation that goes beyond
the ascertainment of public sentiment may be more troubled by the
performance of Florida's lawmakers. Individual legislators may have
thoroughly studied the issue of capital punishment; but the legislature,
as a collective body, engaged in no meaningful deliberation before vot-
ing in favor of reinstatement.
Even a theorist who generally adheres to this conception of the
legislative process, however, might be cautious about applying it to the
issue of capital punishment. Some aspects of the issue may be incapa-
ble of resolution by means of deliberation and debate. Whether retribu-
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tion is a legitimate function of the criminal justice system; whether it is
inherently wrong for the state to kill individuals in service of public
ends-these are questions which appear simply unsuited to rational ar-
gument. 198 To a significant extent capital punishment is one is-
sue-abortion is another-on which the most committed members of
the opposing camps may share so few common premises as to make a
fruitful debate almost impossible. As to some of the moral issues impli-
cated by the death penalty, it is doubtful that a legislative resolution
can ever be more than a poll.
The question whether capital punishment acts as a deterrent to
crime, however, would seem to be well-suited for elucidation through
the fact-finding mechanisms of the legislature. As to this aspect of the
problem, the Florida legislature's performance is more difficult to ap-
prove. Some individual legislators may have studied the available em-
pirical evidence. But neither the House nor the Senate committee, nor
the legislature as a body, made even a cursory effort to accumulate or
consider the data bearing on this issue.
Models of legislative behavior tend to focus on individual issues
viewed in isolation. Implicitly they ask how an ideal legislature would
resolve a particular problem if it had no other business before it.
Viewed against this version of the deliberative process theory, the en-
actment of the Florida death penalty is easy to criticize. The delibera-
tions conducted by the Florida legislature did not remotely resemble
the sort of inquiry one would expect from decisionmakers who deemed
the issue important and regarded the propriety of capital punishment
as a truly open question. At the same time, however, it seems unlikely
that any other measure which attracted the opposition of only one leg-
islator would have been more thoroughly discussed. The cursory nature
of the legislative debate was to a large extent the result of the virtual
unanimity of the Florida legislature. Though prolonged deliberation
and debate might seem desirable as to any issue viewed in isolation, the
truth is that a productive legislature has neither the time nor the re-
sources to give exhaustive consideration to more than a small number
of questions. These are almost certain to be issues which are perceived
as both significant and hotly contested. When legislators believe that
198. Jesse McCrary, Jr., a member of the Governor's Committee who opposed
reinstatement, asserts that "any time you start talking about capital punishment, if one
has dealt with it any at all, people have a mindset about it, and it's very difficult to
change people about that. It's a very emotional problem ...... Interview with Jesse
McCrary, Jr. in Miami, Fla. (Dec. 20, 1990).
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their intuitions about a public problem are universally shared, there is
little reason to move beyond intuition.
It seems likely that some "critical mass" of opposition to a state's
prevailing practice is necessary before the legislature can realistically
be expected to undertake a true re-evaluation of the issue. The after-
math of Furman in Florida thus demonstrates both the potential and
the limitations of Bickelian jurisprudential techniques. The Court's de-
cision ensured that capital punishment would not remain in place un-
less contemporaneous public support could be demonstrated. It even
created an atmosphere in which opposition to reinstatement was re-
garded as an alternative that was legitimately on the table. The Court
could not, however, create a genuine clash of views where none had
previously existed; and without disagreement there is unlikely to be
debate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The death penalty applies to two offenses under Florida law; first
degree murder' and capital drug trafficking.2 Although Florida law also
defines sexual battery of a minor as a capital offense, the Florida Su-
preme Court has ruled that the death penalty does not apply to that
offense.' Section 921.141 of the Florida Statutes governs sentencing
proceedings in first degree murder cases and Section 921.142 governs
sentencing proceedings for capital drug trafficking offenses. As of this
writing, Section 921.142 has not been used to sentence anyone to
death. Accordingly, this article will examine only first degree murder
cases and Section 921.141 sentencing proceedings.
The foregoing statute sets out a three-stage procedure for sentenc-
1. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1) (1991).
2. FLA. STAT. § 893.135 (1991).
3. See Coler v. State, 418 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1982) (construing what is now FLA.
STAT. § 794.011(2) (1991)).
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ing in capital cases. Subsection 2 of the statute provides that, after the
defendant has been found guilty, the jury is to render a penalty verdict:
(2) ADVISORY SENTENCE BY THE JURY. - After hearing
all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory
sentence to the court, based upon the following matters:
(a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumer-
ated in subsection (5);
(b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which out-
weigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and
(c) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be
sentenced to life imprisonment or death.4
Subsection 3 provides for the trial court to engage in its own weighing
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, notwithstanding the
jury's recommendation, and enter written findings of fact supporting
the sentencing decision.5 Nevertheless, the trial judge may not override
a life verdict unless the facts suggesting a sentence of death are "so
clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ."'6
Subsection 4 provides for automatic appellate review by the supreme
court.
7
During the period from January 1, 1990 through July 1, 1991, this
author notes the Florida Supreme Court issued a total of 82 opinions
on direct capital appeals.' In thirty-six cases, the supreme court af-
firmed the death sentences. In three, it ordered new sentencing pro-
ceedings before the trial judge. In eight, it ordered new sentencing pro-
ceedings with a new jury. In twenty, it reduced death sentences to
terms of life imprisonment. In fourteen, it ordered new trials.9 And, in
4. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (1991).
5. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1991).
6. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). The supreme court has
followed this "Tedder doctrine" with uneven fidelity. In Cochran v. State, 547 So. 2d
928, 933 (Fla. 1989), noting that it had been inconsistent in applying Tedder over the
years, the court asserted that it would be more consistent in the future. Apparently
keeping this promise, the court reversed all but one of the override sentences to come
before it in the survey period. Thus, at least as of now, a life verdict almost guarantees
a life sentence. Hence, defects in the penalty verdict procedure will necessarily result in
defective sentencing decisions.
7. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4) (1991).
8. One case, Bryant v. State, 565 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 1990) involved the appeals of
four co-defendants. The convictions of all four were reversed.
9. Again, Bryant is counted as one case here although the court reversed the
convictions of all four appellants.
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one, it ordered the defendant discharged. The author will not undertake
to discuss each of these cases at length in this article. Rather, the au-
thor will examine pertinent changes or questions created by these re-
cent decisions. This article, as shown in its table of contents, will evalu-
ate capital cases in a step-by-step approach which follows a format
beginning with the charge of a capital crime, proceeding through sen-
tencing issues, and concluding with appellate issues.
II. THE CHARGE AND DETERMINATION OF GUILT
A. The Charge
Article 1, section 15(a) of the Florida Constitution provides that
"[n]o person shall be tried for capital crime without presentment or
indictment by a grand jury."'" Although this requirement has been re-
laxed for capital sexual battery, a grand jury indictment is still a neces-
sary predicate for a prosecution for first degree murder. In the past,
Florida law has taken a dim view of attempts to open up grand jury
proceedings: grand jurors, witnesses, and prosecutors are forbidden
from discussing the proceedings; the defense has been denied access to
transcripts of grand jury proceedings; and there have been no restric-
tions on the evidence presented to the grand jury by the prosecution.
Recent decisions have called into question this traditional attitude to-
ward grand jury proceedings.
1. Presentation of Evidence
In Anderson v. State," the court ended its long-standing prohibi-
tion of judicial inquiry into evidence presented to the grand jury and
incorporated a long set of principles from other jurisdictions into Flor-
ida law. In Richard Harold Anderson's trial for first degree murder, an
important state witness, Connie Beasley, admitted that her grand jury
testimony differed from her trial testimony. Ms. Beasley testified to the
grand jury that she saw Mr. Anderson with the decedent shortly before
the murder, and that she later saw Mr. Anderson with blood on his
clothes and hands, but that she did not see the murder. At trial, she
testified that she was present when Mr. Anderson killed the decedent in
accordance with a prearranged plan. Mr. Anderson unsuccessfully
10. FLA. CONST. art. 1, sect. 15, cl. (a).
11. 574 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1991).
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moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it was based on
perjured testimony. On appeal, the supreme court upheld the trial court
ruling, concluding that the change in testimony did not "remove the
underpinnings of the indictment," and that the perjurious portion of
the grand jury testimony could not have affected the decision to in-
dict.1" Although it ultimately ruled against Mr. Anderson, the court
substantially rewrote Florida law regarding grand jury proceedings:
We agree with the authorities cited by Anderson that due process
is violated if a prosecutor permits a defendant to be tried upon an
indictment which he or she knows is based on perjured, material
testimony without informing the court, opposing counsel, and the
grand jury. This policy is predicated on the belief that deliberate
deception of the court and jury by the presentation of evidence
known by the prosecutor to be false "involve[s] a corruption of the
truth-seeking function of the trial process," United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 104, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2398, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976),
and is "incompatible with 'rudimentary demands of justice.'" Gig-
lio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153, 92 S.Ct. 763, 765, 31
L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (citation omitted). Moreover, deliberate decep-
tion is inconsistent with any principle implicit in "any concept of
ordered liberty," Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, (1959), and
with the ethical obligation of the prosecutor to respect the indepen-
dent status of the grand jury. Standards For Criminal Justice Sec-
tion 3-3.5, 3-48-3-49 (2d ed.1980); United States v. Hogan, 712
F.2d 757, 759-60 (2d Cir.1983); Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d at 108-09,
464 N.E.2d at 453, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 85 (the "cardinal purpose" of
the grand jury is to shield the defendant against prosecutorial ex-
cesses and the protection is destroyed if the prosecution may pro-
ceed upon an empty indictment).
The Florida Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be de-
prived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Art.
I, § 9, Fla. Const. The state violates that section when it requires a
person to stand trial and defend himself or herself against charges
that it knows are based upon perjured, material evidence. Govern-
mental misconduct that violates a defendant's due process rights
under the Florida constitution requires dismissal of criminal
charges. State v. Glosson, 462 So.2d 1082, 1085 (Fla. 1985)." s
Anderson is in keeping with a general trend toward opening up
12. Id. at 92.
13. Id. at 90-92.
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grand jury proceedings. A United States Supreme Court case during
the survey period addressed the constitutionality of section 905.27,
Florida Statutes, which forbids witnesses from discussing their grand
jury testimony. In Butterworth v. Smith, 4 the Court held the statute
unconstitutional insofar as it prevented a witness from discussing his
own grand jury testimony."5 The witness, a journalist, wished to write a
news story about his testimony and experiences in dealing with the
grand jury.16 The Court ruled that Florida's interest in grand jury se-
crecy, when weighed against the first amendment rights of grand jury
witnesses, diminished substantially in importance after conclusion of
the grand jury proceedings." It further noted that under present day
criminal procedure requiring the disclosure of witnesses, the interest in
grand jury secrecy is further diminished. 18
2. Access to Evidence by Defense
Anderson and Butterworth point toward further litigation of grand
jury issues. One likely area for controversy concerns access to tran-
scripts of grand jury proceedings. Section 905.27(1) of the Florida
Statutes allows for court orders for disclosure of grand jury testimony
to ascertain whether it is consistent with testimony in court, to deter-
mine whether the witness is guilty of perjury, and for the purpose of
"furthering justice."' 9 In Jent v. State,20 the supreme court affirmed
denial of the defendants' motion for access to grand jury testimony,
writing without further discussion that a "proper predicate" must be
laid to obtain access to grand jury testimony. The court has never said
what might constitute a "proper predicate." Subsequent decisions of
other courts may provide the answer.
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,2 the Court held that a defendant
charged with rape of a minor was entitled to in camera review of the
minor's welfare file notwithstanding that the file was confidential under
state law. He was entitled to this review upon his assertion that the file
14. 110 S. Ct. 1376 (1990).
15. Id. at 1379.
16. The grand jury was investigating alleged improprieties committed by the
Charlotte County State Attorney's Office and Sheriff's Department.
17. Id. at 1380-83.
18. Id. at 1382.
19. FLA. STAT. § 905.27(1) (1991).
20. 408 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1981).
21. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
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"might contain the names of favorable witnesses, as well as other, un-
specified exculpatory evidence."2 Thereafter, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held that in camera review of the records by the trial
judge was not a sufficient safeguard for the defendant's confrontation
rights, and that therefore defense counsel is entitled to see the
records.23
In Hopkinson v. Shillinger,4 the court held that Ritchie applied
to state grand jury testimony where exculpatory evidence "could have
been presented" to a post-trial grand jury investigating Hopkinson's co-
horts. On rehearing en banc, the court affirmed denial of the writ of
habeas corpus on other grounds, but let stand the panel decision on the
grand jury issue.8
In Miller v. Dugger,26 the appeals court applied Ritchie to Florida
grand jury proceedings, requiring in camera review in federal district
court.
In view of the foregoing, it seems likely that the defense will ob-
tain greater access to grand jury testimony. But what if the grand jury
testimony is not recorded? It would then be almost impossible for the
defense to make a showing of improprieties regarding grand jury pro-
ceedings or testimony. In Thompson v. State,2 7 the supreme court
showed little regard for such concerns:
Thompson made three claims regarding the grand jury proceed-
ings, two of which merit brief discussion. First, he contends that
the trial court erred by denying his pretrial request to record the
grand jury proceedings. Sections 905.17 and 905.27 of the Florida
Statutes (1987), do not establish a duty to record grand jury pro-
ceedings, nor do we find any constitutional basis to impose such a
duty in all cases. In re Report of the Grand Jury, 533 So.2d 873,
875 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); accord United States v. Head, 586 F.2d
508 (5th Cir.1978). Although recordation may be the best and
most desirable practice, e.g., State v. McArthur, 296 So.2d 97, 100
(Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 306 So.2d 123 (Fla.1974); United
States v. Head, 586 F.2d at 511, that choice generally is one for
the legislature. We agree with McArthur that the interests of jus-
22. Id.
23. Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 567 A.2d 1357 (Pa. 1989).
24. 866 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1989).
25. Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286 (10th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
26. 820 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1987). Mr. Miller and Mr. Jent were co-
defendants.
27. 565 So. 2d 1311, 1313 (Fla. 1990).
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tice may require trial courts to order recordation in some instances.
McArthur, 296 So.2d at 100. However, no showing was made to
establish that Thompson had a particular need to preserve grand
jury testimony through recording. Under these circumstances, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion.
We also know of no statutory or constitutional authority to support
Thompson's second contention, that the state should be precluded
from conducting voir dire of prospective grand jurors. Implicit in
the statutory right to challenge individual prospective grand jurors,
section 905.04, Florida Statutes (1987), is the opportunity to ob-
tain information from them about their qualifications. We have
been presented with no argument to show why that should not be
done through voir dire. Certainly, Thompson has a right to fair
treatment by a lawfully composed grand jury. However, he did not
present us with the record of the voir dire, nor did he present any
evidence to show that his rights were jeopardized by the voir dire.
This claim has no merit."
It is curious for the court to uphold the refusal to record grand jury
proceedings and then complain that Mr. Thompson did not provide a
record of the voir dire of the grand jurors. Also curious is the court's
failure to mention Rule 2.070(a) of the Florida Rules of Judicial Ad-
ministration which provides for reporting of grand jury proceedings.
B. The Elements
Under section 782.04(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes, first degree
murder is the unlawful killing when "perpetrated from a premeditated
design to effect the death of the person killed or any human being" or
when "committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the
attempt to perpetrate" one of eleven listed felonies."
1. Murder Perpetrated From Premeditated Design
Although Section 782.04 refers to murder perpetrated from a pre-
meditated design, the term "premeditated design" is seldom used in the
cases, and it is not defined for the jury. Instead, the cases and jury
28. Id. at 1313.
29. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a) (1991). The felonies are: drug trafficking; arson;
sexual battery; robbery; burglary; kidnapping; escape; aggravated child abuse; aircraft
piracy; unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; and
unlawful distribution of various drugs.
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instructions generally refer to "premeditated murder." 80
2. Felony Murder
Can a defendant be guilty of felony murder if the felony occurs
after the murder? The statute provides that an unlawful killing is first
degree murder when it is committed by someone perpetrating or at-
tempting to perpetrate an enumerated felony.31 Strictly construed, this
should mean that the felony cannot occur after the murder. But the
Florida Supreme Court has not always been strict in its construction of
the statute. For instance, it has construed "in the perpetration of" as
30. The court defined "premeditated design" in McCutchen v. State, 96 So. 2d
152, 1:53 (Fla. 1957) as including an element of "deliberation" separate from
"premeditation":
A, premeditated design to effect the death of a human being is a fully
formed and conscious purpose to take human life, formed upon reflection
and deliberation, entertained in the mind before and at the time of the
homicide. The law does not prescribe the precise period of time which
must elapse between the formation of and the execution of the intent to
take human life in order to render the design a premeditated one; it may
exist only a few moments and yet be premeditated. If the design to take
human life was formed a sufficient length of time before its execution to
admit of some reflection and deliberation on the part of the party enter-
taining it, and the party at the time of the execution of the intent was fully
conscious of a settled and fixed purpose to take the life of a human being,
and of the consequence of carrying such purpose into execution, the intent
or- design would be premeditated within the meaning of the law although
the execution followed closely upon formation of the intent.
The standard jury instructions are not so complete:
"Killing with premeditation" is killing after consciously deciding to do so.
The decision must be present in the mind at the time of the killing. The
law does not fix the exact period of time that must pass between the for-
mation of the premeditated intent to kill and the killing. The period of
time must be long enough to allow reflection by the defendant. The pre-
meditated intent to kill must be formed before the killing.
The question of premeditation is a question of fact to be determined by
you from the evidence. It will be sufficient proof of premeditation if the
circumstances of the killing and the conduct of the accused convince you
beyond a reasonable doubt of the premeditation at the time of the killing.
Ifa person had a premeditated design to kill one person and in attempting
to kill that person actually kills another person, the killing is premeditated.
FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 827, 854 (1990).
The last paragraph has the following annotation: "Transferred intent; give if
applicable."
31. FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1991).
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including flight after completion of the felony.32 Recent cases reflect
the tension between the court's tendency toward loose construction and
its duty of strict construction.
In Jones v. State,3" the evidence showed that Randall Scott Jones
and another man killed a man and woman and that Mr. Jones then had
sexual union with the woman's body. He was convicted both of first
degree murder and of sexual battery, but the supreme court reversed
the sexual battery conviction because a victim of sexual battery must
be alive at the time the battery occurs and, in Jones, the victim was
dead at the time of the battery.3" Although the court did not address
the issue in the context of felony murder, it would stand to reason that,
under Jones, a defendant could not be convicted of felony murder
where the state did not prove that the decedent was alive at the time of
the felony.
But Holton v. State,3 5 decided only two weeks after Jones, sug-
gested a different result:
As his next issue, Holton claims the evidence at trial was insuffi-
cient to support a conviction for first-degree arson. He correctly
points out that an element of first-degree arson requires that the
structure be occupied by a human being. However, even though the
medical examiner testified that the victim's death occurred before
the fire was set, the jury reasonably could have inferred from all of
the evidence that Holton believed the victim was alive at the time
the fire was set.
Holton also challenges his conviction for sexual battery with great
force. This challenge is based on two grounds. The first centers on
Holton's belief that the use of the word "person" in section
794.011(3), Florida Statutes (1985), contemplates that the victim
of sexual battery must be alive. Holton argues, therefore that be-
cause the evidence could not conclusively establish the bottle was
inserted in the victim's anus before death but could only prove that
insertion occurred prior to the fire, the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction under section 794.011
Again, we are persuaded that the jury could have believed that
Holton thought the victim was alive at the time he initiated the
sexual battery. Under the facts of this case, we find there was sub-
32. Hornbeck v. State, 77 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1955).
33. 569 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1990).
34. Id. at 1237.
35. 573 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1990).
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stantial, competent evidence to support Holton's conviction for sex-
ual battery with great force. 6
The court cited no authority for the mental element it read into the
crimes of arson and sexual battery and also did not note that it had
previously held that arson and sexual battery are general intent crimes
requiring no specific intent.3"
III. DETERMINATION OF THE SENTENCE
A. The Jury Verdict Procedure
The supreme court has frequently turned down opportunities to
make the verdict more reliable by use of more accurate penalty phase
jury instructions. During the previously-mentioned survey period, the
supreme court continued to refuse to acknowledge problems with the
standard jury instruction on the "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" and "cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any
pretense of moral or legal justification" aggravating circumstances. 38
Similarly, it affirmed trial court judges' refusals to instruct on various
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.
1. The Jury as Finder of Fact
The traditional role of the jury is that of finder of fact. It would
seem that in capital cases, this would involve making factual findings
regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances. On the other
hand, the role of the capital sentencing jury has been characterized less
as a fact-finder and more as a voice of the community; it is to make "a
reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and
crime. '"" The characterization of the penalty verdict as "advisory"
makes the jury's role yet more ambiguous.
Section 921.141 of the Florida Statutes provides that the jury is to
determine whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist and
whether there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the
36. Id. at 290 (footnote omitted).
37. Linehan v. State, 476 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1985) (arson); Buford v. State, 492
So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1986) (sexual battery).
38. FLA. STAT. §§ 921.141(5)(h), (i) (1991).
39. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (emphasis in original).
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aggravating circumstances; but does not provide for special verdicts as
to the circumstances."' The statute provides that the verdict is to be
rendered by majority vote, but does not provide whether a majority is
needed to find particular aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 4'
Suppose that four jurors find the existence of only one aggravating cir-
cumstance, and four others find only the existence of a different cir-
cumstance, so that a majority of the jury rejects both circumstances.
Has there been a finding of one of the circumstances, of both, or of
neither? Neither the statute nor any decision of the Florida Supreme
Court answers these rather basic questions.
2. Jury Instructions
a. The Heinousness Circumstance
The "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" circumstance has
been the subject of controversy and criticism for years. Commentators
have written that it has not been applied consistently by the Florida
Supreme Court and that the supreme court has adopted confusing and
contradictory guidelines for its application.42 This in turn has led to
controversy regarding the standard jury instruction on the circum-
stance promulgated in 1981 and still in use during the early 1990s.
That jury instruction states without elaboration that the jury may con-
sider as an aggravating circumstance that the crime for which the de-
fendant is to be sentenced was especially wicked, evil, atrocious or
cruel.' Some historical perspective is necessary for an understanding of
40. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (1991). The court has routinely denied arguments in
favor of special verdicts on the sentencing circumstances. Jones v. State, 569 So. 2d
1234, 1238 (Fla. 1990) (citing such cases).
41. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1991).
42. See Craig Barnard, Death Penalty (1988 Survey of Florida Law), 13 NOVA
L. REV. 908 (1989); Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in
Capital Cases - The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C.L. REV. 941 (1986); and Mello,
Florida's "Heinous, Atrocious or Cruel" Aggravating Circumstance. Narrowing the
Class of Death-Eligible Cases Without Making It Smaller, 13 STETSON L.REV. 523
(1984). For an example of the confusion in the case law, compare Mills v. State, 476
So. 2d 172, 178 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986) (intent and method
employed by the wrongdoers is what needs to be examined) and Card v. State, 453 So.
2d 17 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 989 (1984) (fact that defendant enjoyed killing one
consideration in finding factor) with Pope v. State, 441 So. 2d 1073, 1078 (Fla. 1984)
(rejecting use of defendant's mental state to show heinousness).
43. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 827, 859
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the present controversy concerning this instruction.
In State v. Dixon,44 the court upheld the constitutionality of the
circumstance, writing:
The aggravating circumstance which has been most frequently at-
tacked is the provision that commission of an especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel capital felony constitutes an aggravated capital
felony. Fla.Stat. §921.141(6)(h), F.S.A. Again, we feel that the
meaning of such terms is a matter of common knowledge, so that
an ordinary man would not have to guess at what was intended. It
is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or
shockingly evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile;
and that cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with
utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others.
What is intended to be included are those capital crimes where the
actual commission of the capital felony was accompanied by such
additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital
felonies - the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessa-
rily torturous to the victim.45
The court subsequently promulgated the following standard jury in-
struction regarding the circumstance:
That the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was es-
pecially heinous, atrocious or cruel.
"Heinous" means extremely wicked or shockingly evil.
"Atrocious" means outrageously wicked and vile.
"Cruel" means designed to inflict a high degree of pain; utter indif-
ference to, or enjoyment of, the suffering of others; pitiless.46
In Proffitt v. Florida,47 the United States Supreme Court wrote
concerning the heinousness circumstance:
[The Florida Supreme Court] has recognized that while it is argua-
ble "that all killings are atrocious, . . .[s]till, we believe that the
Legislature intended something 'especially' heinous, atrocious or
(1990).
44. 283 So. 2d 1 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
45. Id. at 9. One can only speculate as to the difference between "extremely
wicked" and "outrageously wicked."
46. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 78 (1975).




et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
cruel when it authorized the death penalty for first degree mur-
der." Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d, at 910. As a consequence, the
court has indicated that the eighth statutory provision is directed
only at "the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily
torturous to the victim." State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d, at 9. See also
Alford v. State, 307 So.2d 433, 445 (1975); Halliwell v. State,
supra, 323 So.2d at 561. We cannot say that the provision, as so
construed, provides inadequate guidance to those charged with the
duty of recommending or imposing sentences in capital cases. See
Gregg v. Georgia, ante, 428 U.S., at 200-203:18
It is noteworthy that the part of the Dixon definition on which the Su-
preme Court focused [that the killing must be "conscienceless or piti-
less" and "unnecessarily torturous to the victim"] is not directly men-
tioned in the 1975 jury instruction.
In 1981, the Florida Supreme Court promulgated the standard in-
struction ["The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was
especially wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel"] in use through the survey
period, deleting the Dixon definitions."9
So was the state of things when the supreme court decided Pope v.
State.50 There, relying on prior decisions of the Florida Supreme Court,
the trial court applied the heinousness circumstance based on a finding
that the defendant had not shown any remorse "having elected to
steadfastly deny his guilt.""1 Holding this finding improper, the su-
preme court went on to condemn the Dixon definition of the circum-
stance as being too broad.5" The supreme court specifically disapproved
48. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255-56 (footnotes omitted). The Court mentioned
Spinkellink v. State, 313 So. 2d 666 (1975) ("career" criminal shot sleeping traveling
companion) in a footnote. It is somewhat ironic in view of subsequent decisions holding
that the heinousness circumstances does not apply when a person is killed while asleep
or unconscious. The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Spinkellink does not specify
what facts justified finding the circumstance.
49. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES (1981). The
substitution of "wicked" for "heinous" in the instruction is a mystery.
50. 441 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 1984).
51. Id. at 1077.
52. Id. In a previous case, Vaught v. State, 410 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1982), the court
had disapproved of the Dixon definition as too narrow, writing:
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding that the killing was
especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. He argues that since the shooting
was spontaneous and caused nearly instanttaneous death, it cannot come
within the meaning of this aggravating circumstance, which, under the in-
terpretations given by this Court, focuses on the infliction of physical pain
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of the "conscienceless or pitiless" phrase on the ground that it improp-
erly focused on the "mindset of the murderer," thus leading to im-
proper application of the circumstance.53 On the same ground it disap-
proved of the "utter indifference to, or enjoyment of, the suffering of
others. . ., "the pitiless" portion of the definition of "cruel" in the
1975 instruction. It approved of use of the 1981 instruction, adding:
"No further definitions of the terms are offered, nor is the defendant's
mindset ever at issue." '54 Thus, the court eliminated the construction
that had made the circumstance constitutional under Proffitt. The Pope
instruction gives the jury no suggestion of the constitutional limitations
on the circumstance. The jury is free to apply the circumstance to any
homicide, for reasonable jurors could conclude that any murder is espe-
cially wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel.
At this point, the Oklahoma death sentence of William Cartwright
enters the story. 5 In sentencing Mr. Cartwright, an Oklahoma jury
employed that state's "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravat-
ing circumstance.56 The court's instructions to the jury defined the cir-
cumstance in terms taken directly from Dixon.57 Cartwright's death
sentence ultimately came before the United States Supreme Court,
which unanimously held that the Oklahoma circumstance was uncon-
or mental anguish. State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d I (Fla.1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 943, 94 S.Ct. 1950, 40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974); White v. State, 403
So.2d 331 (Fla.1981). In response the state correctly points out that the
factor heinous, atrocious, or cruel has also been approved based on the fact
that a killing was inflicted in a "cold and calculating" or "execution-style"
fashion. See, e.g., Magill v. State, 386 So.2d 1188 (Fla.1980), cert. de-
nied, 450 U.S. 927, 101 S.Ct. 1384, 67 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981); Alvord v.
State, 322 So.2d 533 (Fla.1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923, 96 S.Ct.
3234, 49 L.Ed.2d 1226 (1976); Sullivan v. State, 303 So.2d 632
(Fla.1974), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 3226, 49 L.Ed.2d 1220
(1976).
id. at 151.
53. Pope, 441 So. 2d at 1077.
54. Id. at 1078.
55. See Cartwright v. State, 695 P.2d 548 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985).
56. Id.
57. Id. On habeas review of the death sentence, the Tenth Circuit wrote: "The
jury at Cartwright's trial had been instructed that the term 'heinous' means extremely
wicked or shockingly evil; 'atrocious' means outrageously wicked and vile; 'cruel' means
pitiless, or designed to inflict a high degree of pain, utter indifference to, or enjoyment
of, the sufferings of others." Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1488 (10th Cir.
1987) (en banc). The federal appeals court traced the history of the circumstance and
showed that Oklahoma's definition derived from Dixon. Id. at 1487.
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stitutionally vague because it gave the jury no guidance as to its appli-
cation. 8 In reaching this result, the Court relied on its decision in God-
frey v. Georgia,59 which found unconstitutional a Georgia death
sentence based on a jury finding that the murder "was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity
of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim." The Maynard Court
wrote:
[T]he language of the Oklahoma aggravating circumstance at issue
- "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" - gave no more guid-
ance than the "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman"
language that the jury returned in its verdict in Godfrey. The
State's contention that the addition of the word "especially" some-
how guides the jury's discretion, even if the term "heinous" does
not, is untenable. To say that something is "especially heinous"
merely suggests that the individual jurors should determine that
the murder is more than just "heinous," whatever that means, and
an ordinary person could honestly believe that every unjustified, in-
tentional taking of human life is "especially heinous." Godfrey,
supra, at 428-429, 100 S.Ct. at 1764-1765. Likewise, in Godfrey
the addition of "outrageously or wantonly" to the term "vile" did
not limit the overbreadth of the aggravating factor. 60
58. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
59. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
60. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363-64. The premise underlying Maynard is that the
Eighth Amendment requires greater definiteness in the definition of aggravating cir-
cumstances than the Due Process Clause requires of criminal statutes:
The difficulty with the State's argument is that it presents a Due Process
Clause approach to vagueness and fails to recognize the rationale of our
cases construing and applying the Eighth Amendment. Objections to
vagueness under the Due Process Clause rest on the lack of notice, and
hence may be overcome in any specific case where reasonable persons
would know that their conduct is at risk. Vagueness challenges to statutes
not threatening First Amendment interests are examined in light of the
facts of the case at hand; the statute is judged on an as-applied basis.
United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92-23, 96 S.Ct. 316, 46 L.Ed.2d 228
(1975); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42
L.Ed.2d 706 (1975); Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 91 S.Ct.
1563, 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971) (per curiam); United States v. National
Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 36, 83 S.Ct. 594, 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963).
Claims of vagueness directed at aggravating circumstances defined in capi-
tal punishment statutes are analyzed under the Eighth Amendment and
characteristically assert that the challenged provision fails adequately to
inform juries what they must find to impose the death penalty and as a
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The Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to declare the
Pope instruction unconstitutional. In Smalley v. State,6 1 the court
wrote:
His first claim involves the aggravating circumstance that the kill-
ing was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. His argument is
predicated on the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100
L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). In that case, the Court relied upon its early
[sic] decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759,
64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), to hold that Oklahoma's aggravating fac-
tor of "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" was unconstitution-
ally vague. Smalley argues that because Florida uses the same
words (section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1987)), Florida's
aggravating factor also is unconstitutionally vague under the eighth
amendment.
Initially, we note that Smalley did not object to the standard jury
instruction given on this subject which explained that in order for
this circumstance to be applicable, it was necessary for the crime to
have been especially wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel. Therefore, to
the extent that Smalley now complains of the jury instruction, the
point has been waived. Sullivan v. State, 303 So.2d 632 (Fla.
1974), cert. denied, 428 U.S.911, 96 S.Ct. 3226, 49 L.Ed.2d 1220
(1976). However, Smalley's claim has broader implications because
he contends that the aggravating circumstance of heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel is unconstitutionally vague under the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. In order to set the issue at rest, we will
discuss the merits of Smalley's argument.
It is true that both the Florida and Oklahoma capital sentencing
laws use the phrase "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." How-
ever, there are substantial differences between Florida's capital
sentencing scheme and Oklahoma's. In Oklahoma the jury is the
sentencer, while in Florida the jury gives an advisory opinion to the
trial judge, who then passes sentence. The trial judge must make
findings that support the determination of all aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances. Thus, it is possible to discern upon what
facts the sentencer relied in deciding that a certain killing was hei-
nous, atrocious, or cruel.
result leaves them and appellate courts with the kind of open-ended discre-
tion which was held invalid in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct.
2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972).
Maynard, 486 U.S. at 361-62.
61. 546 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1989).
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This Court has narrowly construed the phrase "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" so that it has a more precise meaning than the
same phrase has in Oklahoma. In State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9
(Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943, 94 S.Ct. 1950, 40 L.Ed.2d
295 (1974), we said:
It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely
wicked or shockingly evil; that atrocious means outra-
geously wicked and vile; and, that cruel means designed
to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference
to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others. What
is intended to be included are those capital crimes
where the actual commission of the capital felony was
accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime
apart from the norm of capital felonies - the con-
scienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily tor-
turous to the victim.
It was because of this narrowing construction that the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld the aggravating circumstance of
heinous, atrocious, or cruel against a specific eighth amendment
vagueness challenge in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct.
2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976). Indeed, this Court has continued to
limit the finding of heinous, atrocious, or cruel to those conscience-
less or pitiless crimes which are unnecessarily torturous to the vic-
tim. E.g., Garron v. State, 528 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1988); Jackson v.
State, 502 So.2d 409 (Fla. 1986), cert denied, 482 U.S. 920, 107
S.Ct. 3198, 96 L.Ed.2d 686 (1987); Jackson v. State, 498 So.2d
906 (Fla. 1986); Teffeteller v. State, 439 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1074, 104 S.Ct. 1430, 79 L.Ed.2d 754
(1984). That Proffitt continues to be good law today is evident
from Maynard v. Cartwright, wherein the majority distinguished-
Florida's sentencing scheme from those of Georgia and Oklahoma.
See Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S.Ct. at 1859.62
Thus, the supreme court avoided the jury instruction issue on the
ground of procedural default, but went on to assert that the circum-
stance was constitutional as construed in Dixon.6" The supreme court
62. Id. at 722.
63. Close below the surface in Smalley is the notion that accurate penalty phase
jury instructions are not necessary because the trial judge will apply the "correct" con-
struction of the circumstance. This idea is contrary to the many cases in which the
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apparently forgot that in Pope it had read Dixon out of the statute and
jury instructions. Since Smalley did not purport to deal with the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of the jury instruction, it would have
seemed that another case would have to deal with that issue.
But thereafter, the supreme court acted as though Smalley had
disposed of the issue. In Brown v. State,64 the supreme court rejected
an argument that the jury instruction on the premeditation aggravating
circumstance was unconstitutionally vague under Maynard and wrote:
In Maynard the Court held the Oklahoma instruction on heinous,
atrocious, and cruel unconstitutionally vague because it did not ad-
equately define that aggravating factor for the sentencer (in
Oklahoma, the jury). We have previously found Maynard inappo-
site to Florida's death penalty sentencing regarding this state's hei-
nous, atrocious, and cruel aggravating factor. Smalley v. State,
546 So.2d 720 (Fla.1989). We find Brown's attempt to transfer
Maynard to this state and to a different aggravating factor mis-
placed. See Jones v. Dugger, 533 So.2d 290 (Fla.1988); Daugherty
v. State, 533 So.2d 287 (Fla.1988). We therefore find no error re-
garding the penalty instructions.65
Similar findings resulted in Roberts v. State66 and Occhicone v.
State.67 In the meantime, the court "approve[d] for publication" the
following jury instruction resurrecting the Dixon definition condemned
in Pope:
The aggravating circumstances that you may consider are limited
to any of the following that are established by the evidence:
court has reversed for resentencing where the trial court committed error in instructing
the penalty jury. It is also contrary to Cochran v. State, 547 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1989)
and other cases emphasizing the importance of the penalty verdict. Most curious of all,
is how Smalley interplays with the presumption (espoused in Gilliam v. State, 582 So.
2d 610 (Fla. 1991)) that the judge is presumed to follow the jury instructions. If the
judge follows the jury instructions, and the jury instructions are unconstitutional, how
can there be a presumption of correctness regarding the trial court's findings in the
sentencing order?
64. 565 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1990).
65. Id. at 308. Jones and Daugherty involved collateral attacks on death
sentences. In both cases, the court held without analysis that Maynard did not apply
where the trial court did not find the heinousness circumstance.
66. 568 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 1990).
67. 570 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1990).
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8.The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was espe-
cially heinous, atrocious or cruel. "Heinous" means extremely
wicked or shockingly evil. "Atrocious" means outrageously wicked
and vile. "Cruel" means designed to inflict a high degree of pain
with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of
others. The kind of crime intended to be included as heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel is one accompanied by additional acts that show that
the crime was conscienceless or pitiless and was unnecessarily tor-
turous to the victim.68
In originally submitting the instruction,69 the chairman of the jury in-
struction committee wrote that the committee decided that additional
language, based on Dixon, improved the instruction enough to address
any problems posed by Maynard v. Cartwright.
The supreme court made no mention of Pope, Vaught, or the
Smalley line of cases. One can only wonder why it is necessary to
amend the jury instructions if, as the supreme court has asserted, May-
nard does not apply to Florida.
It is questionable whether the new instruction satisfies the require-
ments of Maynard. The new instruction's definitions of "heinous,"
"atrocious," and "cruel" are virtually identical to the definitions used
at Mr. Maynard's Oklahoma trial, and are exactly identical to defini-
tions declared unconstitutional in Shell v. Mississippi."' Although the
final sentence includes the terms "conscienceless or pitiless" and "un-
necessarily torturous" approved in Proffitt, the instruction does not in-
form the jury that the circumstance applies only to the conscienceless
or pitiless crime that is unnecessarily torturous. Further, Proffitt itself
is suspect on this point because it did not use Maynard's Eighth
Amendment analysis in ruling on the constitutionality of Section
921.141 of the Florida Statutes. The Court wrote in Proffitt that the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances
require no more line drawing than is commonly required of a
68. Standard Jury Instructions, 579 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1990).
69. After the court initially approved the instruction, the Florida Public Defend-
ers' Association and the Volunteer Lawyers Resource Center sought reconsideration.
The court then remanded the matter to the jury instruction committee for further con-
sideration, and the committee proposed a different instruction, incorporating language
from Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1990). The supreme court rejected the
Porter instruction, and denied rehearing, thus approving again the Dixon instruction
and the original committee note.
70. 111 S. Ct. 313 (1990).
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factfinder in a lawsuit. For example, juries have traditionally evalu-
ated the validity of defenses such as insanity or reduced capacity,
both of which involve the same considerations as some of the
above-mentioned mitigating circumstances. While the various fac-
tors to be considered by the sentencing authorities do not have nu-
rnerical weights assigned to them, the requirements of Furman are
satisfied when the sentencing authority's discretion is guided and
channeled by requiring examination of specific factors that argue
in favor of or against imposition of the death penalty, thus elimi-
nating total arbitrariness and capriciousness in its imposition. 71
Proffitt held only that the conscienceless/pitiless construction saved the
circumstance from attack as being facially constitutional, but did not
decide whether it defined the circumstance adequately for lay jurors.
Finally, the new instruction does not inform the jury of various other
restrictions on application of the circumstance, such as that acts per-
formed on the dead body cannot be considered in determining the cir-
cumstance,"7 that lack of remorse cannot be considered, 7 and that
there must be a showing of torturous intent. 4
b. Other Aggravating Circumstances
In Brown and other cases discussed above, the court has flatly re-
fused to apply the principles of Maynard to the premeditation aggra-
vating circumstance. 75 Now the jury instruction on this circumstance
merely tracks the language of the statute,7" so it is likely to violate
Maynard if the statutory language is unconstitutionally vague under
the eighth amendment. In Rogers v. State,8 the supreme court as
71. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 257-58.
72. See Jones v. State, 569 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1990).
73. Id. at 1240.
74. An on-again, off-again requirement.
75. "The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated,
and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification." FLA.
STAT. § 921.141(5)(i) (1991).
76. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 827, 859 (as
amended through March 30, 1989).
77. The Florida Supreme Court has never adopted a precise and authoritative
construction of this circumstance. For a detailed discussion of the circumstance, see
Jonathan Kennedy, Florida's "Cold, Calculated and Premeditated" Aggravating Cir-
cumstance in Death Penalty Cases, 17 STET. L. REV. 47, 96-97 (1987) and Craig Bar-
nard, Death Penalty (1988 Survey of Florida Law), 13 NOVA L. REV. 907 (1989). As
discussed in this article, the court produced considerable confusion in trying to define
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much as acknowledged that the circumstance was on its face suscepti-
ble to misapplication, receded from prior applications, and wrote that it
was to apply only where there was "heightened" premeditation.7 9 Nev-
ertheless, the court has not promulgated any jury instruction narrowing
the circumstance as required by Rogers, and seems to consider the pre-
sent instruction acceptable. Similarly, although the court has adopted
narrowing constructions as to almost all of the other aggravating cir-
cumstances, the standard jury instructions merely track the statute and
give no hint of these limiting constructions. The failure of the standard
instructions to define the circumstances would seem to make them un-
constitutional under Maynard.
c. Mitigation
As originally promulgated, Section 921.141 of the Florida Statutes
contained a list of eight mitigating circumstances.8 0 During the first
few years of the statute's operation, it was thought that the jury and
judge could consider only the listed circumstances in reaching their
sentencing decisions. 1 But, subsequent decisions by the United States
Supreme Court have made clear that such a limitation on mitigation
violates the Eighth Amendment.82 Accordingly, the Florida Supreme
and apply the circumstance during the survey period.
78. 511 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020 (1988).
79. As discussed in this article, Rogers purported to define only the "calculated"
element of the circumstance. In Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1063-1064 (Fla.
1990), the court indicated that the Constitution required the narrowing construction
given in Rogers.
80. FLA. STAT. § 921,141 (1991). Over the years, the list has been shortened and
otherwise modified in ways that narrow the application of the circumstances. One cir-
cumstance ("The capital felony was committed under circumstances which the defend-
ant believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.") has been
eliminated. The duress circumstance ("The defendant acted under duress or under the
domination of another person.") has been narrowed by requiring that the duress be
"extreme" or the domination "substantial." The impairment circumstance ("At the
time of the capital felony the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a
result of mental disease or intoxication.") now requires that the defendant's capacity be
"substantially" impaired, although it no longer requires that the impairment be caused
by mental disease or intoxication. On the other hand, the youth circumstance has been
changed so that the "age" (rather than the "youth") of the defendant may be consid-
ered in mitigation.
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Court has promulgated a "catchall" jury instruction to allow considera-
tion of so-called nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. 8 But, although
it has gone so far as to formally recognize "categories" of nonstatutory
circumstances in Campbell v. State,' and to recognize various nonstat-
utory circumstances as "particularly compelling" in Songer v. State,85
the court has refused without discussion to allow penalty phase instruc-
tions bearing directly on different nonstatutory circumstances.
In Jackson v. State,8" the court gave short shrift to an argument
that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury according to a
written list of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances prepared by the
defense: "We find these contentions without merit. Florida's standard
jury instruction complies with the constitutional principles set forth in
Lockett v. Ohio."87
During the survey period, the court continued to disfavor jury in-
structions on nonstatutory circumstances. In Randolph v. State,88 the
court listed as "meritless and warranting no discussion" argument that
"the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury separately on spe-
cific nonstatutory circumstances. "89
In Stewart v. State,90 a state witness testified that the defendant
was "'drunk most of the time" in the period after the shooting, and one
Dr. Merin, a psychologist, testified that the defendant was (in the
court's phrase) "impaired but not substantially so" at the time of the
offense.91 The defense sought a jury instruction on the "substantially
impaired" statutory mitigating circumstance,92 and, alternatively, an
instruction on the same circumstance without the adverb "substan-
tially." The trial court denied both requests. 9 Without comment or
elaboration, the supreme court wrote that the trial court "properly re-
83. "Any other aspect of the defendant's character or record, and any other cir-
cumstance of the offense," FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL
CASES 827, 860 (as amended through March 30, 1989).
84. 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990).
85. 544 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1989).
86. 530 So. 2d 269, 273 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 882 (1989).
87. Id. at 273 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)).
88, 562 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1990).
89, Id. at 339.
90. 558 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1990).
91. Id. at 420.
92. "The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired." FLA.
STAT. § 921.141(6)(f) (1991).
93. Stewart, 558 So. 2d at 420.
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fused" to give the instruction without the adverb, but then held that
the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the "substantiNlly
impaired" circumstance:
The trial court determined that the instruction on impaired capac-
ity was inappropriate on the basis of Dr. Merin's additional testi-
mony that he believed that Stewart was impaired but not substan-
tially so. The qualified nature of Dr. Merin's testimony does not
furnish a basis for denying the requested instruction. As noted
above, an instruction is required on all mitigating circumstances
"for which evidence has been presented" and a request is made.
Once a reasonable quantum of evidence is presented showing im-
paired capacity, it is for the jury to decide whether it shows "sub-
stantial" impairment. (No instruction required upon bare presenta-
tion of controverted evidence of alcohol and marijuana
consumption, without more). To allow an expert to decide what
constitutes "substantial" is to invade the province of the jury. Nor
may a trial judge inject into the jury's deliberations his views rela-
tive to the degree of impairment by wrongfully denying a requested
instruction.
The Legislature intended that the trial judge determine the sen-
tence with advice and guidance provided by a jury, the one institu-
tion in the system of Anglo-American jurisprudence most honored
for fair determinations of questions decided by balancing opposing
factors. If the advisory function were to be limited initially because
the jury could only consider those mitigating and aggravating cir-
cumstances which the trial judge decided to be appropriate in a
particular case, the statutory scheme would be distorted. The jury's
advice would be pre-conditioned by the judge's view of what they
were allowed to know.
We are unable to say beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure to
give the requested instruction had no effect on this jury's recom-
mended sentence. This error mandates a new sentencing
proceeding. 94
Thus, the supreme court upheld the refusal to instruct on a nonstatu-
tory circumstance95 directly supported by the evidence and reversed the
94. Id. at 420-21.
95. There can be little doubt that less than substantial impairment is a mitigat-
ing circumstance. Cf. Perry v. State, 522 So. 2d 817, 821 (Fla. 1988) (jury could prop-
erly consider "psychological stress" as nonstatutory mitigation) and Cheshire v. State,
568 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1990) (error for judge to limit consideration of mental distur-
bance to "extreme" mental disturbance - Florida's capital sentencing statute does in
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refusal to instruct on a statutory circumstance directly contradicted by
the evidence.
Another paradox arises from Nixon v. State,"' and Jones v.
State.9" After Joe Elton Nixon was convicted of first degree murder,
kidnapping, robbery, and arson, the trial court at the penalty phase
refused to give a defense requested jury instruction on the maximum
penalties for the noncapital offenses of which he was convicted [defense
counsel wished to argue that the jury could consider in mitigation the
possibility that Mr. Nixon would receive long consecutive sentences for
those offenses and would therefore never be released from prison].
The supreme court approved of the trial court's ruling on two grounds:
first, that Rule 3.390(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, forbids
jury instructions on the penalties for noncapital offenses; and second,
that "[t]he fact that Nixon was convicted of three other offenses each
of which carried lengthy maximum penalties is irrelevant to his charac-
ter, prior record, or the circumstances of the crime." 9 The court went
on to note that, in any event, the proposed instruction did not state that
the noncapital sentences could be considered as mitigation, that counsel
did argue them as mitigation, and that the jury was instructed that the
factors which it could consider in mitigation were unlimited. 100
Nixon seems irreconcilably contrary to Jones, which had been de-
cided less than three months earlier. In Jones, the court held that the
trial court had erred by not letting defense counsel argue that the jury
could consider in mitigation that the defendant could receive consecu-
tive sentences for the two murders of which he was convicted:
fact require that emotional disturbance be "extreme," however, it clearly would be
unconstitutional for the state to restrict the trial court's consideration solely to "ex-
treme" emotional disturbances. Under the case law, any emotional disturbance relevant
to the crime must be considered and weighed by the sentencer).
96. 572 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1990).
97. 569 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1990).
98. Nixon, 572 So. 2d at 1344-45.
99. Id. at 1345.
100. Id. To the extent that Nixon stands for the principle that argument of coun-
sel is a substitute for jury instructions, it is contrary to, e.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436
U.S. 478, 488-89 (1978) (failure to instruct on presumption of innocence - arguments
of counsel cannot substitute for instructions by the court) and Mellins v. State, 395 So.
2d 1207, 1209 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (argument of counsel no substitute for
complete jury instructions - it is not a sufficient refutation of appellant's argument to
suggest that her counsel's summation sufficiently apprised the jury of the effect of in-
toxication on the scienter required to support the charge to relieve the Court of its duty
to give an appropriate instruction).
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The standard for admitting evidence of mitigation was announced
in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, (1978). The sentencer may not
be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, "any aspect
of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances
of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death." Id. at 604. Indeed, the Court has recognized that
the state may not narrow a sentencer's discretion to consider rele-
vant evidence "that might cause it to decline to impose the death
sentence." McClesky v. Kemp, 482 U.S. 279, 304, (1987) (empha-
sis in original; footnote omitted). Counsel was entitled to argue to
the jury that Jones may be removed from society for at least fifty
years should he receive life sentences on each of the two murders.
The potential sentence is a relevant consideration of "the circum-
stances of the offense" which the jury may not be prevented from
considering."'
In Randolph, Stewart, and Nixon, the supreme court refused to
authorize various jury instructions regarding specific nonstatutory miti-
gating circumstances. The supreme court has not offered any detailed
explanation for this refusal, and it is difficult to reconcile it with the
announcement in Campbell that "categories" of nonstatutory circum-
stances are to be treated like the statutory circumstances, and with the
general trend toward greater reliance on the jury's penalty verdict. 102
How, one wonders, can the penalty verdict be reliable where the jury
does not receive instructions on the rather elaborate body of law gov-
erning the consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances?
The court's response would seem to be that the "catchall" instruc-
tion sufficiently directs the jury's attention to the nonstatutory evidence
and gives the jury sufficient guidance in evaluating them. Blystone v.
Pennsylvania,10 3 lends support for such a position. Scott Wayne Blys-
tone was convicted of first degree murder, robbery, conspiracy to com-
mit homicide, and conspiracy to commit robbery. The evidence showed
that he and others picked up a hitchhiker, and took him to a field
where Mr. Blystone robbed and killed him.'04 The defense presented no
101. Jones, 569 So. 2d at 1239-40. In Cooper v. State, 581 So. 2d 49, 52 (1991)
(Barkett, J., concurring), Justice Barkett pointed out that evidence that the defendant
would not be released from prison even after service of the mandatory minimum
twenty-five years supported the mitigating circumstance that the defendant did not "in
the future pose a danger to the community if he were not executed."
102. See Campbell, 571 So. 2d at 415.
103. 110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990).
104. Id. at 1080.
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mitigating evidence at sentencing. After affirmance of his conviction
and resulting death sentence on appeal, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari "to decide whether the mandatory aspect of
the Pennsylvania death penalty statute renders the penalty imposed
upon petitioner unconstitutional because it improperly limited the dis-
cretion of the jury in deciding the appropriate penalty for his crime."' 10 5
Mr. Blystone's principle argument attacked as unconstitutional the pro-
vision of the statute requiring imposition of the death sentence where
the jury found at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating
circumstances. 10 6 A subsidiary argument was that jury instructions
pursuant. to 42 Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes section 9711(e)
[which contains a list of mitigating circumstances similar to the list in
section 921.141(6) of the Florida Statutes] were unconstitutional.107
The Court wrote regarding this subsidiary argument:
Next, petitioner maintains that the mandatory aspect of his sen-
tencing instructions foreclosed the jury's consideration of certain
mitigating circumstances. The trial judge gave the jury examples of
mitigating circumstances that it was entitled to consider, essen-
tially the list of factors contained in § 9711 (e). Among these, the
judge stated that the jury was allowed to consider whether peti-
tioner was affected by an "extreme" mental or emotional distur-
bance, whether petitioner was "substantially" impaired from ap-
preciating his conduct, or whether petitioner acted under
"extreme" duress. This claim bears scant relation to the mandatory
aspect of Pennsylvania's statute, but in any event we reject it. The
judge at petitioner's trial made clear to the jury that these were
merely items they could consider, and that it was also entitled to
consider "any other mitigating matter concerning the character or
record of the defendant, or the circumstances of his offense." App.
12-13. This instruction fully complied with the requirements of
Lockett and Penry.
Three Terms ago, in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, we sum-
105. Id. at 1081. The Pennsylvania statute is generally similar to the Florida
Statute in that it contains lists of aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be con-
sidered at sentencing. It differs in that it leaves the sentencing decision with the jury,
and mandates that the jury sentence the defendant to death "if the jury unanimously
finds at least one aggravating circumstance . . . and no mitigating circumstance or if
the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any
mitigating circumstances." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (1990).
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marized the teachings of the Court's death penalty jurisprudence:
In sum, our decisions since Furman have identified a
constitutionally permissible range of discretion in im-
posing the death penalty. First, there is a required
threshold below which the death penalty cannot be im-
posed. In this context, the State must establish rational
criteria that narrow the decisionmaker's judgment as to
whether the circumstances of a particular defendant's
case meet the threshold. Moreover, a societal consensus
that the death penalty is disproportionate to a particular
offense prevents a State from imposing the death pen-
alty for that offense. Second, States cannot limit the
sentencer's consideration of any relevant circumstance
that could cause it to decline to impose the penalty. In
this respect, the State cannot channel the sentencer's
discretion, but must allow it to consider any relevant in-
formation offered by the defendant.
We think petitioner's sentence under the Pennsylvania statute satis-
fied these requirements. The fact that other States have enacted
different forms of death penalty statutes which also satisfy consti-
tutional requirements casts no doubt on Pennsylvania's choice.
Within the constitutional limits defined by our cases, the States
enjoy their traditional latitude to prescribe the method by which
those who commit murder shall be punished. 08
Blystone does not address the question of whether the trial court
must instruct on specific recognized nonstatutory circumstances. 10 9
Thus it does not resolve the following questions arising from Stewart:110
If the "catchall" instruction acts as a panacea by permitting considera-
tion of all mitigation why was a new sentencing hearing required in
Stewart and the cases cited in it? Could the jury not have used the
"catchall" instruction as license to consider Dr. Merin's testimony?
Why have jury instructions on the statutory circumstances at all, yet
not have them on the Campbell categories? The Florida Supreme
108. Id.
109. Curiously, neither the majority nor the dissent considered Mr. Blystone's
specific argument, which was that the jurors could reasonably have concluded that they
were forbidden from considering duress or disturbance that was not extreme or impair-
ment that was not substantial.
110. 558 So. 2d at 416.
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Court has yet to address these questions.
B. Reliance on the Penalty Verdict
Florida's capital sentencing statute provides for an "advisory" pen-
alty verdict rendered by the jury, but places on the trial court judge the
responsibility for imposition of sentence."' But a jury verdict for life
imprisonment is not merely "advisory." It has a powerful presumption
of correctness and is to be overridden by the trial court only where
"virtually no reasonable person" could agree with it.1 2 The override
procedure and the Tedder doctrine have been criticized both in and out
of the court. Justice Shaw has written at some length in favor of aboli-
tion of the Tedder doctrine." 3 Other commentators have suggested
that the override procedure itself cannot be administered consist-
ently."' Both Justice Shaw and these commentators agree that the
court has not been consistent in its application of Tedder.
Over the years, a recurring problem in the application of Tedder
has arisen when the sentencing judge has had information typically
from a pre-sentence investigation report" 5 unavailable to the jury. In
111. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2), (3) (1991).
112. Tedder, 322 So. 2d at 910. As noted in a previous section of this article, the
supreme court de-emphasized the importance of the jury's role in Smalley, indicating
that, since the judge knows the law and will therefore apply it accurately, it is not
necessary that the jury be accurately instructed on the law.
113. Grossman v. State, 525 So.2d 833, 846-51 (Fla. 1986) (Shaw, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989).
114. Skene, Review of Capital Cases: Does The Florida Supreme Court Know
What It's Doing?, 15 STET. L. REV. 263, 298-306 (1986). Mr. Skene writes that "it is
hypocritical to deem a jury 'unreasonable' in discounting its sentence recommendation
while upholding a verdict of guilt 'to the exclusion of and beyond every reasonable
doubt.'" Id. at 305. See also Mello and Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice
of Imposing Death Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 31 (1985).
115. The use of pre-sentence investigation reports (generally referred to as PSI's)
promises to be the source of litigation in years to come. Prepared by probation officers,
these reports typically contain specific sections for "Victim Impact Statements" and for
personal remarks and recommendations by police officers and prosecutors. Also, their
preparation typically involves interviews with defendants without notice to, or the pres-
ence of, counsel. Thus the preparation of such reports often involves substantial viola-
tions of the principles set out in cases such as Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)
(victim impact statement), Jackson v. Dugger, 547 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1989) (effect of
killing on law enforcement officers), and Powell v. Texas, 109 S. Ct. 3146 (1989)
(statement of defendant to state psychiatrist for use at sentencing). See Mills v. Dug-
get, 574 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1990) (declining to address issue on ground of procedural
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Cochran v. State,"" the court directly confronted this problem. Guy
Cochran was convicted of first degree murder in the death of Carol
Harris. The penalty phase of the jury proceeding occurred immediately
after the guilt phase and resulted in a life verdict.1 17 Prior to sentencing
by the judge in that case, Mr. Cochran was tried and convicted of an-
other first degree murder. Using, as an aggravating circumstance, this
subsequent capital conviction of which the Harris jury was unaware, 18
the trial court overrode the life verdict and imposed a death sen-
tence. 1 9 In reducing the sentence to one of life imprisonment, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court wrote that the existence of the additional aggravat-
ing circumstance did not make the jury's life verdict so unreasonable as
to justify the override. The court recognized that in the past it had
upheld override sentences in such circumstances, but wrote that the life
verdict retains its strong presumption of correctness even when based
on less information than is available to the judge. After examining the
mitigating evidence presented by the defense, the court concluded that
the evidence was sufficient to support a life sentence. 120 In response to a
vigorous dissent by Justice Ehrlich, joined by Justices Shaw and
Grimes,' 2 ' and belatedly, to Justice Shaw's concurring opinion in
Grossman v. State,'22 the Cochran majority acknowledged that the su-
preme court had not consistently applied Tedder in the past:
Finally, we agree with the dissent that "legal precedent consists
more in what courts do than in what they say." However, 'in ex-
pounding upon this point to prove that Tedder has not been applied.
with the force suggested by its language, the dissent draws entirely
from cases occurring in 1984 or earlier. This is not indicative of
what the present court does, as Justice Shaw noted in his special
concurrence to Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833, 851 (Fla. 1988)
(Shaw, J., specially concurring):
During 1984-85, we affirmed on direct appeal trial
judge overrides in eleven of fifteen cases, seventy-three
percent. By contrast, during 1986 and 1987, we have
default).
116. 547 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1989).
117. Id. at 929.
118. A prior conviction of a capital offense is a statutory aggravating circum-
stance. FLA. STAT. § 941.141(5)(b) (1991).
119. Cochran, 547 So. 2d at 929.
120. Id. at 932.
121. Id. at 933.
122. 525 So. 2d 833, 846-51 (Fla. 1986) (Shaw, J., concurring).
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affirmed overrides in only two of eleven cases, less than
twenty percent. This current reversal rate of over eighty
percent is a strong indicator to judges that they should
place less reliance on their independent weighing of ag-
gravation and mitigation ...
Clearly, since 1985 the Court has determined that Tedder means
precisely what it says, that the judge must concur with the jury's
life recommendation unless 'the facts suggesting a sentence of
death [are] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable
person could differ." 2 '
During the survey period, the court seemed committed to keeping
the promise of Cochran, reversing all but one 2 " of the override
sentences that came before it. The court substantially ratified Tedder
in two cases. In the first, Cheshire v. State,2 5 the court subtly extended
Tedder by casting the sentencing judge's role as more like an appellate
court than a factfinder. In the second, Buford v. State,' it applied
Tedder even when there was a gulf of more than ten years between the
life verdict and the ultimate imposition of sentence.
Steven Cheshire was convicted of two counts of first degree mur-
der in the deaths of his estranged wife and a man with whom she was
living. Although the defense presented no mitigating evidence, the jury
rendered life verdicts as to both murders, but the trial court overrode
one of the verdicts, and imposed a death sentence for the wife's mur-
123. Cochran, 547 So. 2d at 933. The admission in Cochran that Tedder has not
been consistently applied in the past may bode ill for the continuing constitutionality of
the override procedure. In Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), the Court upheld
the procedure against a facial attack, but left open the question of whether it could
later be challenged upon a demonstration that it was applied in an arbitrary manner:
"We see nothing that suggests that the application of the jury-override procedure has
resulted in arbitrary or discriminatory application of the death penalty, either in gen-
eral or in this particular case. . . . [T]here is no evidence that the Florida Supreme
Court has failed in its responsibility to perform meaningful appellate review of each
death sentence, either in cases in which both the jury and the trial court have con-
cluded that death is the appropriate penalty or in cases when the jury has recom-
mended life and the trial court has overridden the jury's recommendation and sen-
tenced the defendant to death." 468 U.S. at 466. It may be that Cochran supplies the
evidence found lacking in Spaziano.
124. Zeigler v. State, 16 FLW S257 (Apr. 11, 1991).
125. 568 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1990).
126. 570 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1990).
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der.""7 On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reduced the sentence to
life imprisonment, finding that the jury could reasonably have ex-
tracted from the state's case evidence that could support a life sen-
tence. The court's approach was novel in that it discounted the judge's
rejection of controverted mitigating evidence.12 8 In a prior felony con-
viction override case, the court had accepted the trial court's rejection
of controverted mitigating evidence, apparently treating the trial court
judge as the ultimate factfinder. 129 In Cheshire, however, the court
seemed to consider it improper for the judge to make an independent
evaluation of the mitigating evidence, writing that "under Tedder, the
trial court's role is solely to determine whether the evidence in the rec-
ord was sufficient to form a basis upon which reasonable jurors could
rely in recommending life imprisonment."' 30 If followed in subsequent
cases, Cheshire will constitute a substantial advance toward regular-
izing the procedure by which trial court judges are to make sentencing
decisions in cases involving life verdicts.
Buford involved an unusual example of the vitality of a life ver-
dict. Robert Buford was convicted in 1978 for the rape and murder of a
seven-year-old girl. Although the jury rendered a life verdict, the trial
court imposed a death sentence. After lengthy litigation, resentencing
was ultimately ordered by a federal court on the ground that the trial
court had improperly limited its own consideration of mitigating evi-
dence.' When the case came up for resentencing more than ten years
after the original trial, a considerable amount of evidence was
presented to the judge that was not available to the 1978 jury. Noting
"the anomaly that the jury did not hear the additional mitigating evi-
dence which must be considered in determining whether the life recom-
127. Cheshire, 568 So. 2d at 910.
128. Id. at 911. Thus, the court wrote: "...there was some evidence that
Cheshire had been drinking at the time of the murder. Although the judge concluded
that Cheshire was not sufficiently intoxicated, we nevertheless must acknowledge that a
reasonable jury could have relied upon this evidence to conclude that Cheshire was not
in control of his faculties." Id.
129. In Thompson v. State, 553 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1989), the supreme court up-
held an override sentence where the trial judge rejected the testimony of a defense
psychiatrist that the defendant suffered from organic brain damage so that his capacity
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law was substantially impaired.
130. Cheshire, 568 So. 2d at 911.
131. Buford, 570 So. 2d at 924. The federal appeals court noted that the trial
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mendation was reasonable" and that the override had previously been
upheld on direct appeal, the court applied Tedder and found the over-
ride improper given the new evidence. 13 Thus, the supreme court held
that the presumption in favor of the life verdict continues to apply even
where the evidence presented to the judge differs considerably from the
evidence heard by the jury.'
. McCrae v. State,' extended the effect of Buford. James Mc-
Crae's override death sentence was initially affirmed in 1980,135 but the
sentence was eventually vacated because of a Hitchcock violation. 136 At
the new sentencing hearing, much of the new mitigating evidence in-
volved Mr. McCrae's life after he was initially sentenced to death:
"while i:n prison and receiving treatment, McCrae has demonstrated an
above-average intelligence and writing ability; has developed and evi-
denced strong spiritual and religious standards; has contributed to the
lives of others; has demonstrated a high potential for rehabilitation and
for making a contribution to the community; and has expressed sincere
remorse for his actions.' 3 7
Contrary to the foregoing cases is Zeigler v. State, 38 in which the
supreme court seemed to resort to the approach condemned in
Cochran. Under Cochran and like cases, the Florida Supreme Court
has looked to see whether the evidence could reasonably support the
jury's life verdict and has resolved conflicts in the evidence in favor of
the verdict. But in Zeigler, as in Thompson, the supreme court ac-
corded the judge's sentencing order the presumption of correctness, and
resolved conflicts in favor of the order rather than in favor of the ver-
dict. It approved the trial court's rejection of mitigating evidence re-
garding Mr. Zeigler's character and involvement in church and com-
munity activities noting that it found "no error in the weight the trial
132. Buford, 570 So. 2d at 924-25.
133. Douglas v. State, 575 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1991) involved a similar situation.
After convicting Mr. Douglas of a 1973 murder, the jury rendered a life verdict, which
the trial court overrode. After many years of litigation, a new sentencing hearing was
ordered at which a substantial amount of additional mitigating evidence was presented.
As in Buford, the supreme court reversed Mr. Douglas's resulting death sentence in
light of the additional mitigating evidence.
134. 582 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 1991).
135. McCrae v. State, 395 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1041
(1981).
136. McCrae v. State, 510 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1987).
137. 582 So. 2d at 616.
138. 580 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1991).
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judge assigned to this mitigating evidence. The judge could properly
consider the witnesses' relationships to the defendant and their personal
knowledge of his actions in deciding what weight to give to their
testimony. ' 1'39
C. The Sentencing Order
Section 921.141(3) of the Florida Statutes contemplates specific
factual findings of the trial court respecting mitigating evidence. It pro-
vides in pertinent part that the trial court shall produce written findings
upon which its sentence of death is based and also that there are insuf-
ficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating
circumstances.
In holding Section 921.141 constitutional in Proffitt v. Florida,"
the United States Supreme Court anticipated that this requirement of
written findings would result in meaningful appellate review and there-
fore prevent arbitrary application of the death penalty.' 4' Nevertheless,
the Florida Supreme Court has sometimes held in the past that there is
no requirement of specific findings as to nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances. 14 2
Eventually, the supreme court realized that the absence of specific
factual findings resulted in uneven application of the death penalty and
undertook to regularize the sentencing procedure. 14 3
During the early 1990s, the court struggled with the obvious ten-
sions between the principles espoused in Rogers and Proffitt and the
practice upheld in Mason.
139. Id. at 130.
140. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
141. Id. at 251.
142. E.g., Mason v. State, 438 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1051 (1984). The supreme court wrote: "The trial judge need not have expressly ad-
dressed each non-statutory mitigating factor in rejecting the same, and we will not
disturb his judgment simply because appellant disagrees with the conclusions reached."
Id. at 380. The court did not seem to consider the absence of such express findings to
be an impediment to its appellate review.
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1. Specific Findings Required
In Campbell v. State,144 the court took a hard line against the
Mason-sanctioned practice of not specifically considering mitigating
factors in the sentencing order. Observing that "our state courts con-
tinue to experience difficulty in uniformly addressing mitigating cir-
cumstances," the court established the following guidelines to clarify
the issue:
When addressing mitigating circumstances, the sentencing court
must expressly evaluate in its written order each mitigating cir-
cumstance proposed by the defendant to determine whether it is
supported by the evidence and whether, in the case of nonstatutory
factors, it is truly of a mitigating nature. See Rogers v. State, 511
So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020 (1988). The
court must find as a mitigating circumstance each proposed factor
that is mitigating in nature and has been reasonably established by
the greater weight of the evidence: "A mitigating circumstance
need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the defendant. If
you are reasonably convinced that a mitigating circumstance exists,
you may consider it as established." Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) at
81. The court next must weigh the aggravating circumstances
against the mitigating and, in order to facilitate appellate review,
must expressly consider in its written order each established miti-
gating circumstance. Although the relative weight given each miti-
gating factor is within the province of the sentencing court, a miti-
gating factor once found cannot be dismissed as having no weight.
To be sustained, the trial court's final decision in the weighing pro-
cess must be supported by "sufficient competent evidence in the
record." Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327, 1331 (Fla. 1981).
Hopefully, use of these guidelines will promote the uniform appli-
cation of mitigating circumstances in reaching the individualized
decision required by law. 145
144. :571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990).
145. Id. at 419-20. The quotation is from the opinion on rehearing. In the origi-
nal opinion, the clause between the citation to Rogers and the quotation from the stan-
dard jury instructions stated: "The Court must find as a mitigating circumstance each
proposed factor that has been reasonably established by the evidence and is mitigating
in nature". 15 Fla. L. Weekly at S344. It also included a footnote, since deleted, say-
ing, "We note that where uncontroverted evidence of a mitigating factor has been
presented, a reasonable quantum of competent proof is required before the factor can
be said to have been established." Id. at n.5.
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Although the foregoing raises questions, as discussed in this arti-
cle, it represents a fresh start toward regularizing consideration of miti-
gation; thus improving the quality of appellate review in capital cases.
Further, it addresses an issue that has been the source of some criti-
cism in the past: the rejection of unrebutted mitigating evidence. 14 6
2. Specific Findings Not Required
In other cases, the court declined to reverse sentencing orders
which did not comply with Campbell. Further, although Campbell
seems to be dictated by Proffitt and Rogers, the court has refused to
apply it to cases where the sentencing order preceded the court's deci-
sion in Campbell.
In Floyd v. State,4" which was decided three months after Camp-
bell, the court upheld a sentencing order, entered prior to Campbell, in
which the trial judge apparently said only the following about the miti-
gating evidence: "[tihis court [sic] heard everything at the sentencing
hearing that the Defendant chose to present. This court [sic] now finds
that sufficient mitigating circumstances which would require a lesser
penalty do not exist.' 114 8
Similarly, in Bruno v. State, 49 the court upheld a death sentence,
entered prior to Campbell, where there were three statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances and no statutory mitigating circumstances. In that
case there was no consideration of nonstatutory mitigation. 10 Bruno
146. See Waters, Uncontroverted Mitigating Evidence in Florida Capital
Sentencings, 63 FLA. B.J. 11 (1989). Of course, the general rule is that uncontradicted
evidence must be accepted as proof of a contested issue. E.g. M. Stevens Dry Dock v.
G & J Inv. Corp., 506 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (citing cases). In the
past, the court had declined to apply this elementary principle to capital sentencing.
See, e.g., Pope v. State, 441 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 1983) (approving of trial court's rejec-
tion of unrebutted evidence that defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress syn-
drome as a result of service in Viet Nam).
147. 569 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1990).
148. Id. at 1233 (emphasis in original).
149. 574 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1991)
150. Id. at 83. The trial court rejected evidence that Mr. Bruno was "extremely"
disturbed and suffered "substantial" impairment of his ability to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law, but apparently did not consider the nonstatutory cir-
cumstances of less than extreme disturbance and less than substantial impairment. The
supreme court has acknowledged the existence of such nonstatutory circumstances. See
Cheshire v. State, 568 So.2d 908, 912 (1990) (error to fail to consider nonstatutory
mitigation). Bruno contains no mention of Cheshire.
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does not reflect the express evaluation of nonstatutory circumstances
required by Campbell.
In yet another case, Gilliam v. State,5l the court wrote:
Appellant's penultimate argument is that the sentencing order does
not reflect reasoned judgment because it fails to enumerate the
statutory mitigating factors on which he presented evidence. We
find the sentencing order sufficient. The order recites the statutory
aggravating circumstances that were found proved, and the reasons
supporting the findings. The order also recites the nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances that the court found proved. In view of
the trial judge's findings regarding nonstatutory mitigating circum-
stances, we can assume he followed his own instructions to the jury
in considering the statutory mitigating circumstances, despite the
fact that he did not enumerate them. As we noted in Johnson v.
Dugger, 520 So. 2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1988): "When read in its en-
tirety, the sentencing order, combined with the court's instructions
to the jury, indicates that the trial court gave adequate considera-
tion to the evidence presented." Appellant nevertheless argues that
our recent decision in Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla.
1990), issued after the order under review was rendered, requires a
different result. Campbell directs that "the sentencing court must
expressly evaluate in its written order each mitigating circumstance
proposed by the defendant to determine whether it is supported by
the evidence and whether, in the case of nonstatutory factors, it is
truly of a mitigating nature." Id. at 419 (footnote omitted). It is
unnecessary for us to reach the question whether this order com-
plies, because Campbell is not a fundamental change of law requir-
ing retroactive application. As we said in Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d
922, 929 (Fla. 1990), only "fundamental and constitutional law
changes which cast serious doubt on the veracity or integrity of the
original trial proceeding" - in effect, "jurisprudential upheavals"
- require retroactive application; "evolutionary refinements" do
not.152
Taken literally, Gilliam seems to stand for the proposition that, if the
judge has instructed the jury to consider mitigating factors, then it is to
be assumed that the trial court has correctly considered mitigating fac-
tors. This proposition is in stark contrast to the observations in Rogers
and Campbell that trial courts are often confused in how to go about
151. 582 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1991).
152. Id. at 612 (emphasis in original).
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considering mitigating evidence. 15 3
Another case which seems directly contrary to Campbell is Sochor
v. State. 54 Dennis Sochor was convicted of first degree murder and
kidnapping in the strangling death of a young woman he met at a bar
on New Year's Eve. The only eyewitness testified that Mr. Sochor
looked like a man "possessed" at the time of the murder, and several
experts testified to Mr. Sochor's psychiatric problems. 155 Finding four
aggravating circumstances' 56 and no mitigating circumstances, the trial
court sentenced him to death. The Florida Supreme Court struck one
of the aggravating circumstances' 57 but upheld the death sentence be-
cause the supreme court determined that to strike one aggravating fac-
tor where there were no mitigating factors was not a cause for re-
sentencing. 158
As an initial matter, it is impossible to square the statement in
Sochor that evidence of childhood abuse can be ignored'59 with the
statements in Campbell'6 that, as a matter of law, an abused child-
hood is a "valid" mitigating circumstance and in Rogers'.' that the
sentencer must, as a matter of law, consider all mitigating circum-
stances. It is also impossible to square with those authorities the hold-
153. The court's unwillingness to apply Campbell to Mr. Gilliam's sentence on
the basis of Witt is somewhat puzzling. Witt involved a bar against collateral chal-
lenges to convictions and sentences. It did not purport to limit claims on direct appeal.
In Gilliam the court did not note this distinction.
154. 580 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1991). EDITOR'S NOTE: Subsequent to the.comple-
tion of this article, the United States Supreme Court vacated Dennis Sochor's death
sentence and remanded the case for further action. Mr. Sochor's attorney was the au-
thor of this article and successfully argued a violation of Sochor's Eighth Amendment
rights. Readers should refer to Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992). Any further
reference to Sochor should be taken in light of the court's opinion.
155. Id. at 599.
156. Id. The four circumstances were: that Mr. Sochor was previously convicted
of a violent felony, that the killing occurred while he was engaged in the commission of
a felony, that the killing was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, and that the killing
was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of
moral or legal justification.
157. Id. at 603. The circumstance that the killing was committed in a cold, cal-
culated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification
was struck.
158. Id. at 604.
159. "Deciding whether such family history establishes mitigating circumstances
is within the trial court's discretion." Id.
160. 571 So.2d at 419 n.4.
161. 511 So.2d at 534.
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ing in Sochor that it is discretionary with the judge and jury whether
to consider in mitigation evidence of a psychiatric disorder. 162
3. Other Sentencing Order Issues
Campbell is in keeping with a general trend toward improving the
procedures governing sentencing orders. During the survey period, the
supreme court continued to require that sentencing orders be rendered
at the time of sentencing " ' although it has declined to apply this re-
quirement to "pipeline" cases. 64 In keeping with the trend toward im-
proving sentencing procedures, the court reduced a death sentence to
life imprisonment in a case where the trial court's sentencing order
contained no findings as to individual aggravating or mitigating
factors.' 68
D. Aggravating Circumstances and Mitigating Evidence
1. Aggravating Circumstances
a. Sentence of Imprisonment
Under section 921.141(5)(a), the jury and judge may consider in
aggravation that the murder was committed by a person under sen-
tence of imprisonment. Although a strict construction of the statute
would be that the circumstance was directed at prison murders, cases
have construed this circumstance to apply to sentencing alternatives or
variations in which the defendant was not actually incarcerated at the
162. Sochor, 580 So. 2d at 604.
163. The court established this requirement in Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d
833 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989).
164. See Stewart v. State, 558 So. 2d 416 (1990). In Christopher v. State, 583
So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1991), the court reduced a death sentence to life imprisonment on this
ground where the sentencing hearing occurred after Grossman was decided.
165. In Bouie v. State, 559 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1990), the trial court's sentencing
order apparently said only the following by way of consideration of sentencing factors:
"The court has considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented in
evidence in this cause and determines that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist,
and that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating
circumstances." Id. at 1116. The supreme court noted that the trial court's written
assessment of sentencing factors is necessary for meaningful appellate review: "A trial
judge's justifying a death sentence in writing provides 'the opportunity for meaningful
review' in this Court." Id.
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time of the murder.
In Haliburton v. State,' the evidence showed that Jerry
Haliburton committed a murder after being released from prison under
a program called "mandatory conditional release." This program (re-
ferred to as "MCR") involved release from prison after serving one's
term less allowable gain-time and other credits, with continuing super-
vision "subject to all statutes relating to parole."'1 7 The Florida Su-
preme Court upheld application of the imprisonment circumstance, by
analogy with previous cases upholding its application to parolees.'6 8
In Gunsby v. State, 69 the court extended the circumstance to
cover the time before the defendant actually began to serve his sen-
tence. In upholding Donald Gunsby's death sentence, the court wrote:
[T]he record clearly establishes that Gunsby had been sentenced to
incarceration but had not reported to jail as ordered and that a
warrant had been issued for his arrest. These circumstances justify
a finding that Gunsby was under a sentence of imprisonment at the
time of this offense. We reject the contention that there must be an
escape for this aggravating circumstance to apply, and we conclude
that this aggravating circumstance was properly found. See Songer
v. State, 544 So. 2d 1010 (Fla.1989)."'7
Haliburton and Gunsby were in keeping with a general trend
against strict construction of aggravating circumstances. As such, they
stand in marked contrast to Trotter v. State.17 In that case, the trial
court had applied the imprisonment circumstance where Melvin Trot-
ter committed a murder while released to a "community control" pro-
gram. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, writing:
Subsection 948.10(1), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that com-
munity control is "an alternative, community-based method to pun-
166. 561 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1990).
167. FLA. STAT. § 944.291 (1979).
168. Haliburton, 561 So. 2d at 252. The cases applying the circumstance to pa-
rolees stem from Aldridge v. State, 351 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 1977). Curiously, Mr. Al-
dridge did not contest this use of the circumstance, so the court was not called upon to
decide the propriety of its use.
169. 574 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 1991).
170. Id. at 1090. Mr. Songer "did not break out of prison but merely walked
away from a work-release job." 544 So. 2d at 1011. Gunsby certainly creates new law
if it holds that walking away is not escaping.
171. 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1990).
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ish an offender in lieu of incarceration." Moreover, we have held
that violation of probation is not an aggravating circumstance
probation is not equivalent to being under sentence of imprison-
ment, for the appellant was not incarcerated. Bolender v. State,
422 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1982), cert.denied, 461 U.S. 939 (1983); Fer-
guson v. State, 417 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1982); Peek v. State, 395 So.
2d 492 (Fla. 1980), cert.denied, 451 U.S. 964 (1981). Penal stat-
utes must be strictly construed in favor of the one against whom a
penalty is to be imposed. Reino v. State, 352 So. 2d 853 (Fla.
1977), receded from on other grounds, Perez v. State, 545 So. 2d
1357 (Fla. 1989). 171
b. Prior Violent Felony
Under section 921.141(5)(b) of the Florida Statutes, the sentenc-
ing jury and judge may consider as an aggravating circumstance that
the defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. For the first
eighteen years of this circumstance's existence, it was thought that it
did not apply to juvenile adjudications of delinquency for violent of-
fenses. But in 1990, the court suggested that it could apply to such
adjudications. In Campbell v. State,17 8 the court wrote, without further
discussion that the trial court "correctly found that Campbell was pre-
viously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence. He
cites no authority in support of his assertion that prior juvenile convic-
172. Id. at 694. Reino involved construction of a statute of limitation. Although
Trotter appears to be the first Florida case to apply the rule of strict construction to an
aggravating circumstance, the rule is hardly novel. Section 775.021(1), Florida Stat-
utes, sets out the rule for construing provisions of the Florida Criminal Code:
The provisions of this code and offenses defined by other statutes shall be
strictly construed; when the language is susceptible of differing construc-
tions, it shall be construed most favorably to the accused.
This principle, known as the "rule of lenity," is not merely a maxim of statutory con-
struction: it is rooted in fundamental principles of due process. Dunn v. United States,
442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979) (rule of lenity rooted in fundamental principles of due pro-
cess mandating that no individual be forced to speculate, at peril of indictment,
whether his conduct is prohibited. Thus, to ensure that a legislature speaks with special
clarity when marking the boundaries of criminal conduct, courts must decline to im-
pose punishment for actions that are not "plainly and unmistakably" proscribed). The
principle of strict construction of penal laws applies not only to interpretations of the
substantive ambit of criminal prohibitions, but also to the penalties they impose.
Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381 (1980).
173. 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990).
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tions cannot be considered in aggravation. ' 74 This somewhat cryptic
statement is remarkable because it is directly contrary to the principle
of strict construction of aggravating circumstances espoused seven days
later in Trotter. It is also contrary to indications in Young v. State,17 5
that it would be improper to consider the defendant's juvenile record.
In Young, the court held that there was no error in using a pre-sen-
tence investigation report where the trial court stated that it did not
rely on Mr. Young's juvenile record.1 76
Other recent cases involving this circumstance show uncertainty as
to its purpose and as to what evidence may be used to support it. For
example, in Stewart v. State,177 the court reiterated a prior interpreta-
tion that the purpose of the circumstance was to demonstrate violent
propensity: "Propensity to commit violent crimes surely must be a valid
consideration for the jury and the judge. 178 But violent propensity, per
se, is not an aggravating circumstance under the statute, and in Free-
man v. State,1 79 the court held it was improper for the prosecutor to
imply to the jury that the defendant was likely to commit future crimes
if not incarcerated. In Freeman, the court simply took no notice of
Stewart and Elledge.
Even more curious is the fact that Freeman overruled sub silentio
the portion of Elledge on which the court relied in Stewart. In Elledge,
the court had held admissible, as relevant to Mr. Elledge's propensity
to commit violent crimes, the testimony of the widow of a man he had
killed in the course of a prior violent felony. But in Freeman, the court
held that such testimony was impermissible under Booth v.
Maryland.'"0
On the other hand, the court wrote in Lucas v. State 81 "that
[tiestimony by the victims, or others, about prior crimes is admissible if
174. Id. at 418.
175. 579 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1991).
176. Id. at 725.
177. 558 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1990).
178. Id. at 419 (quoting Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998, 1001 (Fla. 1977)). In
Hallman v. State, 560 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1990) the supreme court suggested a purpose
the defense might have to present evidence regarding the facts of a prior violent felony,
writing that the jury could have concluded that the circumstance was "entitled to little
weight" given unrebutted evidence of the defendant's limited involvement in the prior
offense.
179. 563 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1990).
180. Id. at 75-76 (citing Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)).
181. 568 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1990).
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the defendant is given the opportunity to confront the witness. 1' 82 Lu-
cas cited, among other authorities, Rhodes v. State.'83 In Rhodes, the
court reached the odd conclusion that, although the confrontation
clause, applies to capital proceedings, the clause is not necessarily vio-
lated by the introduction of testimony founded on'hearsay provided by
persons whom the defendant cannot confront.'84 At the penalty phase
of Richard Rhodes' capital trial, the state produced the testimony of a
Nevada police captain. The trial court allowed the captain to testify
about his investigation of a violent felony committed by Mr. Rhodes,
and allowed him to play a tape of an interview with the victim of that
crime, who was* unable to travel to Florida to testify.185 The Florida
Supreme Court held that use of the tape violated the confrontation
clause, but ruled that the captain's testimony, manifestly based on
hearsay, was admissible because "the defendant [was] accorded a fair
opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements."' 186
c. Great Risk
Under section 921.141(5)(c), the jury may consider in aggravation
that the defendant "knowingly created a great risk of death to many
persons." The supreme court has in the past held that the circumstance
does not apply simply because bystanders are present at the time of the
murder.1 87 It has also held that the circumstance cannot be based on
mere possibilities. For instance, in White v. State,1 88 the defendant
committed six murders in a house. The trial court applied the great
risk circumstance, reasoning that anyone [such as a friend or delivery
person] coming to the house during the episode would have been in
danger. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that such specu-
lation could not support application of the circumstance.189
During the survey period, the court reached apparently contradic-
182. Id. at 21.
183. 547 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1989).
184. Id. at 1204.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1204-05. Rhodes is difficult to reconcile with Hitchcock v. State, 578
So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1990) in which the court upheld the exclusion, on hearsay grounds, of
the testimony of a defense witness at sentencing regarding interviews made during his
investigation of mitigation.
187. Kampff v. State, 371 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1979) (two bystanders present in
store when defendant shot ex-wife).
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tory results in two cases applying the circumstance. In Hallman v.
State,190 the evidence showed that Darrell Wayne Hallman engaged in
a gun battle with a security guard outside a bank which he had just
robbed. After shooting the guard, he hijacked an automobile, forcing
the driver to take him from the scene.' 9 ' The trial court applied the
great risk circumstance in sentencing Mr. Hallman, but the state su-
preme court disapproved of the finding:
Next Hallman attacks the finding that he knowingly created a
great risk of death to many persons. The trial court listed ten per-
sons who were in the area of the shoot-out and could have been
struck and remarked that the shoot-out occurred near a busy thor-
oughfare. Hallman argues that he and Hunick fired at each other
from close range and that none of the bullets was aimed in the
direction of a large number of people. At most, he maintains, there
was only the chance that a bystander would be struck by a stray
shot, and that such a danger is insufficient to support the aggravat-
ing circumstance.
Again, we agree with Hallman. We set out the standard for this
aggravating circumstance in Kampff v. State, 371 So. 2d 1007
(Fla. 1979). We said:
"Great risk" means not a mere possibility but a likeli-
hood or high probability. The great risk of death cre-
ated by the capital felon's actions must be to "many"
persons. By using the words "many" the legislature in-
dicated that a great risk of death to a small number of
people would not establish this aggravating
circumstance.
Id. at 1009-10. We have held that great risk of death to three peo-
ple was insufficient. Bello v. State, 547 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1989). The
state's reliance on Suarez v. State, 481 So. 2d 1201, 1209 (Fla.
1985), cert.denied, 476 U.S. 1178, 106 S. Ct. 2908, 90 L. Ed. 2d
994 (1986), is misplaced. In that case the defendant fired more
than a dozen shots in the area of a migrant labor camp, three per-
sons other than the victim were in the line of fire and his four
nearby accomplices ran the risk of death from return fire.
The trial judge referred to the presence of numerous people in the
bank, and passersby on busy U.S. 98 to support his finding. The
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evidence showed, however, that the seven persons in the bank ran
almost no risk of being struck, as they were behind partitions and
away from doors or windows and not in the line of fire. Five of the
witnesses outside the bank either saw or heard the shooting, but
only one of them was ever in the line of fire. It is true that there
were a number of passersby on U.S. 98, but of the eight shots only
one was definitely aimed in the direction of the highway and only
two others could have been. We do not believe that the possibility
that no more than three gunshots could have been fired toward a
busy highway is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Hallman
knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.1"2
The court was less indulgent in Van Poyck v. State,193 in which
the evidence showed that William Van Poyck and Frank Valdez, in an
unsuccessful attempt to free an inmate from a prison van, killed one
guard at close range, attempted to kill another at close range, and then,
in their flight from the scene fired numerous shots at the police cars in
pursuit, hitting three of them."' The Florida Supreme Court rejected
without discussion Mr. Van Poyck's argument against application of
the great risk circumstance. 9 5
On its face, Van Poyck seems at odds with Hallman. The evidence
recited in Van Poyck shows, at most, that several police officers were
endangered. It does not show a great risk to "many persons" as re-
quired by Hallman and Bello.
d. Felony Murder
Section 921.141(5)(d) provides for consideration as an aggravating
circumstance the fact that the murder was committed "while the de-
fendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or
an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to com-
mit, any robbery, sexual battery, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or air-
craft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a de-
structive device or bomb."1 96
In Holton v. State,9 ' the court seemed to expand this circum-
192. Id. at 225-26.
193. 564 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1990).
194. Id.
195. Id. In all, the court rejected fifteen penalty arguments without comment,
and discussed only one penalty issue at length on Mr. Van Poyck's appeal.
196. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(d) (1991).
197. 573 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1990).
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stance. The evidence at Rudolph Holton's trial showed that the dece-
dent was already dead at the time of the sexual union. 198 Therefore,
under prior case law, there was no sexual battery. Nevertheless, the
court upheld Mr. Holton's sexual battery conviction on the theory that
Mr. Holton may have thought that the woman was still alive. The
court extended this novel principle to the felony murder aggravating
circumstance, upholding its application to Mr. Holton. 1"
e. Avoiding Arrest
The sentencer may consider in aggravation that the murder "was
committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or
effecting an escape from custody."2 ' In some cases, the Florida Su-
preme Court has held the state to a high burden of proof and has
stricken the circumstance where it would otherwise arguably apply.2"'
At other times, though, under seemingly similar circumstances, it has
upheld the circumstance.02 At least where a law enforcement officer
has not been killed, the court will uphold the circumstance only where
there is "strong proof" that avoiding arrest by eliminating a witness
was the sole or dominant motive for the murder.20 3 During the survey
period, the supreme court did not undertake to further define the cir-
cumstance. But in Derrick v. State,2 4 the supreme court did discuss its
relationship to the premeditation circumstance.
In Derrick, Samuel Jason Derrick murdered Rama Sharma during
a robbery. He killed Mr. Sharma to "shut him up" when he started
screaming."05 In sentencing Mr. Derrick to death, the trial court em-ployed both the premeditation and the avoiding arrest circumstances.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(e) (1991).
201. E.g., Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 360 (Fla. 1988) (evidence insufficient
to prove circumstance even though victim was on phone with operator asking for the
police at the time she was shot); Perry v. State, 522 So. 2d 817, 820 (Fla. 1988) (no
direct evidence of motive; defendant may have merely panicked when committing
robbery).
202. E.g., Harmon v. State, 527 So. 2d 182, 188 (Fla. 1988) (defendant became
frightened when decedent spoke his name, indicating that decedent could identify him);
Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270, 276 (Fla. 1988) (circumstantial evidence of exis-
tence of witness elimination sufficient).
203. See, e.g., Perry, 522 So. 2d at 817.
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The Florida Supreme Court disapproved:
The trial judge found that the murder was cold, calculated, and
premeditated and that the murder was committed for the purpose
of avoiding arrest. Under the facts as the judge found them, it ap-
pears to this Court that it is inconsistent to find that both of these
factors apply. In finding that the murder was committed to prevent
lawful arrest, the judge relied on Derrick's confession that he had
to kill Sharma after Sharma recognized him. Yet, the judge also
found the murder to be cold, calculated and premeditated because
Derrick hid in the bushes with a knife waiting for Sharma and then
chased Sharma twenty feet after the original attack to finish killing
him. If Derrick did not decide to kill Sharma until Sharma recog-
nized him, then it seems unlikely that the facts would support the
finding of the heightened premeditation necessary to find the mur-
der was cold, calculated, and premeditated. 0 6
f Pecuniary Gain
The aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed for
pecuniary gain 20 7 usually arises where the murder occurs during a rob-
bery or burglary, in which case it is "merged" with the felony murder
circumstance, so that the two become a single circumstance. 08 In two
recent cases, the trial judges merged the pecuniary gain circumstance
with the premeditation circumstance. In Downs v. State,20 9 which in-
volved a contract murder, the trial court judge reasoned that the two
circumstances would have to be established in every such case, so that
they should be treated as one. 21 0 And, in Anderson v. State, 1 the
judge treated them as one where there was a prearranged design to
commit robbery and murder.21 2
206. Id.
207. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(f) (1991).
208. E.g. Bruno v. State, 574 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1991). The jury instructions do not
inform the jury of this merger doctrine, and the supreme court upheld the denial of a
requested jury instruction on the issue in Mendyk v. State, 545 So. 2d 846, 849 (Fla.
1989). Hence, juries consistently apply the circumstance in an incorrect manner.
209. 572 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1990).
210. Id. at 898 n.3.
211. 574 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1991).
212. Id. at 90 n.2.
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g. Hindering Law Enforcement
The law enforcement circumstance 213 also usually disappears from
consideration, being merged with the avoid arrest circumstance. 14
h. Heinousness
As noted in this article, the survey period saw no end to contro-
versy regarding the heinousness circumstance. In addition to addressing
or avoiding questions regarding jury instructions, the Florida Supreme
Court experimented with formulae for application of the circumstance.
In Porter v. State,21 the evidence showed that after threatening
his estranged lover, Evelyn Williams, George Porter, Jr. shot and killed
her in the hallway of her home early one morning. Mr. Porter then
threatened the woman's daughter, at which point the woman's new
lover, Walter Burrows, entered the room, struggled with Mr. Porter,
and forced him outside. Mr. Porter apparently shot Mr. Burrows in the
yard. The opinion discloses no further details about the shootings.1 6
After Mr. Porter plead guilty to two counts of first degree murder and
separate counts of armed burglary and aggravated assault, sentencing
proceedings were held before a jury, which recommended death
sentences in both murders. Finding, among other things, that the mur-
der of Ms. Williams was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, the
trial court sentenced Mr. Porter to death for that offense. 17 On appeal,
the Florida Supreme Court wrote, regarding the heinousness
circumstance:
Porter next argues that Williams' murder was not especially hei-
nous, atrocious, or cruel. In the seminal case of State v. Dixon, 283
So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943, 94 S. Ct. 1950, 40
L. Ed. 2d 295 (1974), the Court addressed the meaning of "espe-
cially heinous, atrocious or cruel":
It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely
wicked or shockingly evil; that atrocious means outra-
213. "The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise
of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws." FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (5)(g)
(1991).
214. E.g. Valle v. State, 581 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1991).
215. 564 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1990).
216. Id.
217. Id. The court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for the Burrows mur-
der, finding that the aggravating circumstances were merely "technical."
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geously wicked and vile; and, that cruel means designed
to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference
to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others. What
is intended to be included are those capital crimes
where the actual commission of the capital felony was
accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime
apart from the norm of capital felones - the con-
scienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily tor-
turous to the victim.
'We agree that the murder of Williams did not stand apart from
the norm of capital felonies, nor did it evince extraordinary cruelty.
*We see little distinction between this case and Amoros v. State,
.531 So. 2d 1256, 1261 (Fla. 1988), wherein the Court struck the
trial court's finding of especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel on a
finding that the murderer fired three shots into the victim at close
range. Moreover, this record is consistent with the hypothesis that
Porter's was a crime of passion, not a crime that was meant to be
deliberately and extraordinarily painful. The state has not met its
burden of proving this factor beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
trial court erred in finding to the contrary. 18
Similarly, in Cheshire v. State,119 the court wrote:
As his third issue, Cheshire argues that the trial court improperly
found the aggravating factor of heinous, atrocious or cruel. We
agree. The factor of heinous, atrocious or cruel is proper only in
torturous murders - those that evince extreme and outrageous de-
pravity as exemplified either by the desire to inflict a high degree
of pain or utter indifference to or enjoyment of the suffering of
another. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973). The physical
evidence simply does not support such a finding here. At best, we
can only conjecture as to the exact events of the murder. Since the
evidence at hand is entirely consistent with a quick murder com-
mitted in the heat of passion, we believe the state has failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the factor of heinous, atro-
cious or cruel existed. 20
From the foregoing, it would seem that the heinousness circum-
218. Id. at 1063 (emphasis in original).
219. 568 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1990).
220. Id. at 912.
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stance applies only where the murderer intended that the killing be de-
liberately and extraordinarily painful.2 1 But in Hitchcock v. State,""
the court reached an opposite conclusion. In 1977, a jury convicted
James Ernest Hitchcock of first degree murder based on evidence that
he had sexual intercourse with his brother's thirteen-year-old step-
daughter and then choked and beat her to death when she said she was
going to tell her mother.223 On habeas corpus review, the United States
Supreme Court held that the sentencing jury and judge had been im-
properly limited in the consideration of mitigating evidence. ' At re-
sentencing, the jury recommended imposition of the death sentence.
The trial court imposed that sentence, finding among other things, that
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. On appeal, the
Florida Supreme Court rejected Mr. Hitchcock's challenge to this
finding:
That Hitchcock might not have meant the killing to be unnecessa-
rily torturous does not mean that it actually was not unnecessarily
torturous and, therefore, not heinous, atrocious, or cruel. This ag-
gravator pertains more to the victim's perception of the circum-
stances than to the perpetrator's. Stano v. State, 460 So. 2d 890
(Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111 (1985). Hitchcock stated
that he kept "chokin' and chokin' " the victim, and hitting her,
both inside and outside the house, until she finally lost conscious-
ness. Fear and emotional strain can contribute to the heinousness
of a killing. Adams v. State, 412 So. 2d 850 (Fla.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 882 (1982). As Hitchcock concedes in his brief,
"[s]trangulations are nearly per se heinous." See Doyle v. State,
460 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1984); Adams; Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d
533 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923 (1976). The court did
not err in finding this murder to have been heinous, atrocious, or
cruel. 225
221. Porter and Cheshire are difficult to square with the many cases applying the
circumstance where the defendant has repeatedly stabbed, or has violently throttled,
the decedent in a berserk frenzy with little or no evidence of torturous intent. E.g.
Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990) (defendant repeatedly stabbed dece-
dent) and Rivera v. State, 561 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1990) (while under extreme distur-
bance defendant strangled decedent).
222. 578 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1990).
223. Hitchcock v. State, 413 So. 2d 741, 743 (Fla.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 960
(1982).
224. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987).
225. Hitchcock, 578 So. 2d at 692-93.
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Thus, in Hitchcock, the court wrote that torturous intent was not
necessary to application of the circumstance, without any mention of
Porter and Cheshire, which had emphasized the necessity of such an
intent. The tension between these cases is typical of the caselaw regard-
ing this circumstance. Hitchcock, Cheshire and Porter show that the
court is still far from finding uniform rules for its application.""
i. Premeditation
The premeditation circumstance22 7 was promulgated in 1979 in
apparent response to a controversy regarding whether the heinousness
circumstance applied where there was an "execution-type killing. 2 28
The Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the circumstance has
varied considerably from case to case. Commentator Jonathan Kennedy
has written that the decisions on the circumstance through 1987 re-
sulted in "a fully incoherent pattern." 29 The supreme court sought to
narrow. application of the circumstance in Rogers v. State,230 holding
that the "calculated" element required "heightened premeditation,"
meaning "a careful plan or prearranged design. 231 Cases during the
survey period reflect the tension between the narrowing construction in
Rogers and the court's previous tendency to read the circumstance
broadly.
i. Reloading or Rearming
P:rior to 1990, the Florida Supreme Court had held with middling
226. Two cases decided on the same day highlight the problem. In Sochor v.
State, 580 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1991), the supreme court focused only on the decedent's
state of mind: "The evidence supports the conclusion of horror and contemplation of
serious injury or death by the victim." But in McKinney v. State, 579 So. 2d 80 (Fla.
1991), the focus was on the defendant's state of mind: "The evidence does not show
that the defendant intended to torture the victim."
227. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(i),(1991).
228. For the history of the circumstance, see Kennedy and Barnard, supra note
77.
229. Jonathan Kennedy, Florida's "Cold, Calculated and Premeditated" Aggra-
vating Circumstance in Death Penalty Cases, 17 STET. L. REV. 47 (1987).
230. 511 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1987).
231. Id. at 533. Subsequently, the supreme court suggested in Porter v. State,
564 So. 2d 1060, 1063-64 (Fla. 1990) that the Constitution requires the narrowing
construction given in Rogers. But in Eutzy v. State, 541 So. 2d 1143, 1147 (Fla. 1989),
the court characterized the Rogers construction as "a mere evolutionary refinement in
the law," so as not to be applied retroactively.
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consistency that the premeditation circumstance may be established by
proof that the murderer rearmed himself or reloaded his weapon before
delivering the fatal wound.2 32 In two 1990 cases, the court refused to
expand, and then eliminated, this body of law.
In Campbell v. State,23 3 the evidence showed that James Campbell
went to a house with the intent of robbing the occupants, who were
apparently unknown to him. Sue Zann Bosler, who was in the bath-
room at that time, heard the doorbell ring and then heard her father,
Billy, grunting and groaning. When she came out, Mr. Campbell, who
had been stabbing the father, attacked and stabbed her. After he
stabbed Ms. Bosler, Mr. Campbell then resumed the attack on her fa-
ther, who thereafter died from his injuries.23' On appeal from Mr.
Campbell's conviction and death sentence, the supreme court disap-
proved of the use of the premeditation circumstance:
We disagree with the court's finding that the stabbing was commit-
ted in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner. The state ar-
gues that because Campbell stabbed Billy, then stopped when he
attacked Sue Zann, and then returned to stabbing Billy, he had
time to reflect upon and plan his resumed attack on Billy. See
Swafford v. State, 533 So.2d 270 (Fla.1988), cert. denied, 109
S.Ct. 1578 (1989) (cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating
circumstance present where defendant shot victim, reloaded, then
resumed shooting). This factor generally is reserved for cases show-
ing "a careful plan or prearranged design." Rogers v. State, 511
So.2d 526, 533 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020 (1988).
Campbell's actions took place over one continuous period of physi-
cal attack. His assault on Sue Zann provided him with no respite
during which he could reflect upon or plan his resumption of attack
on Billy, unlike the situation in Swafford wherein the act of reload-
ing the gun provided a break in the attack.211
Although one might wonder how reloading a weapon, without
more, shows "a careful plan or prearranged design," Farinas v.
State,2 36 rendered such speculation unnecessary. There, the court re-
jected the application of the premeditation circumstance where Alberto
Farinas had to unjam his pistol three times before firing the fatal bul-
232. See Kennedy, supra note 229, at 88-92.
233. 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 418.
236. 569 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1990).
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lets while his estranged lover lay helpless on the ground. The court re-
jected the state's reliance on cases involving reloading, and overruled
the reloading cases in a footnote:
The state's reliance upon Phillips v. State, 476 So. 194 (Fla.1985),
is misplaced. In Phillips, this Court held that because appellant
had to reload his revolver in order for all of the shots to be fired, he
was afforded ample time to contemplate his actions and choose to
kill his victim, and the record therefore amply supported the find-
ing that the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated. Our
decision in Phillips, however, was predicated on Herring v. State,
446 So.2d 1049 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 989 (1984). We re-
ceded from this portion of Herring in our decision in Rogers v.
State, 511 So.2d 526 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 733
(1988).237
ii. The Cold, Calculated Crime of Passion
Rogers did not purport to define the other elements of the circum-
stance ("cold," "premeditated," and "without a pretense of moral or
legal justification"). As the statute is written, the state should have to
prove these additional elements even where the murder was "calcu-
lated" as defined in Rogers.2 38 In subsequent cases, the court seems to
have missed this point and simply considered a showing of such a plan
or design sufficient to establish the circumstance without more.
It would stand to reason that a crime of passion would not satisfy
the "cold"2 ' element of the premeditation circumstance. Thus in
Mitchell v. State,24 0 the court wrote:
We recently defined the cold, calculated and premeditated factor
as requiring a careful plan or prearranged design. Rogers v. State,
511 So.2d 526 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 108 S.Ct.
733, 98 L.Ed.2d 681 (1988). The medical examiner testified that
the number of stab wounds and the force with which they were
delivered were consistent with a killing consummated by one in a
237. Id.
238. 511 So. 2d at 533.
239. Webster defines "in cold blood" as "without the excuse of passion; with
deliberation." WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 354 (Deluxe 2d
ed.)
240. 527 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1988).
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rage. A rage is inconsistent with the premeditated intent to kill
someone, and there was no other evidence of premeditation. Ac-
cordingly, we reverse the trial court on the finding that the murder
was cold, calculated and premeditated." 1
But in Porter v. State,2 "2 the supreme court upheld the application
of the circumstance to "a crime of passion." It may be remembered
from the discussion of the heinousness circumstance that, in Porter, the
supreme court struck down application of that circumstance because
the evidence was consistent with the theory that Porter's crime was one
of passion. However, notwithstanding this finding, the supreme court
upheld the application of the premeditation circumstance:
The Court has adopted the phrase "heightened premeditation" to
distinguish this aggravating circumstance from the premeditation
element of first-degree murder. See, e.g., Hamblen v. State, 527
So. 2d 800, 805 (Fla. 1988); Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 526, 533
(Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020, 108 S.Ct. 733, 98
L.Ed.2d 681 (1988). Heightened premeditation can be demon-
strated by the manner of the killing, but the evidence must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant planned or arranged
to commit murder before the crime began. Hamblen, 527 So.2d at
805; Rogers, 511 So.2d at 533. See, e.g., Koon v. State, 513 So.2d
1253 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 943, 108 S.Ct. 1124, 99
L.Ed.2d 284 (1988). Hamblen and Rogers show that heightened
premeditation does not apply when a perpetrator intends to commit
an armed robbery of a store but ends up killing the store clerk in
the process. Nor does it apply when a killing occurs during a fit of
rage because "rage is inconsistent with the premeditated intent to
kill someone," unless there is other evidence to prove heightened
premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt. Mitchell v. State, 527
So.2d 179, 182 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 960, 109 S.Ct. 404,
102 L.Ed.2d 392 (1988). This is not a case involving a sudden fit of
rage. Porter previously had threatened to kill Williams and her
daughter. He watched Williams' house for two days just before the
murders. Apparently he stole a gun from a friend just to kill Wil-
liams. Then he told another friend that she would be reading about
him in the newspaper. While Porter's motivation may have been
grounded in passion, it is clear that he contemplated this murder
241. Id. at 182; see also Thompson v. State, 565 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 1990).
242. 564 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1990). Porter and Thompson were decided the same
day, but make no mention of each other.
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well in advance.2 43
Thus, in Porter the court substituted one element of the circumstance,
"calculated", 2 ' for the entire circumstance.
iii. The Unreasonable Pretense
In Banda v. State, 5 the court interpreted the "without any pre-
tense of moral or legal justification" portion of the circumstance as
follows:
Florida law requires that, before a murder can be deemed cold,
calculated, and premeditated, it must be committed "without any
pretense of moral or legal justification." § 921.141(5)(i), Fla.Stat.
(1985). The state must prove this last element beyond a reasonable
doubt, in addition to the other elements of this particular aggravat-
ing factor. See Jent v. State, 408 So.2d 1024, 1032 (Fla.1981),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1111, 102 S.Ct. 2916, 73 L.Ed.2d 1322
(1982).
Our decisions in the past have established general contours for the
meaning of the word "pretense" as it applies to capital sentencings.
For instance, we have held that a "pretense" of moral or legal jus-
tification existed where the defendant consistently had made state-
ments that he had killed the victim only after the victim jumped at
him and where no other evidence existed to disprove this claim.
Cannady v. State, 427 So.2d 723, 730-31 (Fla.1983). We reached
this conclusion even though the accused himself, an obviously inter-
ested party, was the only source of this testimony.
On the other hand, we have upheld the trial court's finding that no
"pretense" existed where the defendant's statements were wholly
irreconcilable with the facts of the murder. Thus, we have upheld a
finding that no pretense existed where the accused said the victim
intended to kill him over a $15.00 debt, but where the evidence
showed that the victim had never been violent or threatening and
243. Id. at 1064.
244. In Hamblen v. State, 527 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1988), the supreme court quoted
at length from the portion of Rogers defining "calculated" as involving a prearranged
design or plan. Both Hamblen and Rogers involved killings during the course of rob-
beries. Koon v. State, 513 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1987), also did not involve a "crime of
passion". Mr. Koon killed a person who was going to testify against him in a counter-
feiting case. Hence, none of those cases involved any question regarding the "cold"
element.
245. 536 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1988).
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had been attacked by surprise and stabbed repeatedly. Williamson
v. State, 511 So.2d 289, 293 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, - U.S.
-, 108 S.Ct. 1098, 99 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988).
We conclude that, under the capital sentencing law of Florida, a
"pretense of justification" is any claim of justification or excuse
that, though insufficient to reduce the degree of homicide, never-
theless rebuts the otherwise cold and calculating nature of the
homicide.4 6
In two cases during the survey period, the supreme court upheld
application of the premeditation circumstance where the record showed
some claim of legal or moral justification of the offense.
In Pardo v. State,2 47 Manuel Pardo, Jr., a former police officer,
was charged with killing nine people over a four-month period. Mr.
Pardo admitted killing these persons but said he should avoid culpabil-
ity "because he believed all the victims to be drug dealers, who 'have
no right to life.' "28 The court affirmed application of the premedita-
tion circumstance without discussion of this claim of justification.
In Gunsby v. State,4 9 the evidence showed that a friend was hos-
pitalized after an altercation with an Iranian proprietor of a nearby
grocery store. Announcing that he was "tired of those damn Iranians
messing with the black," Donald Gunsby went to the grocery store with
a shotgun and killed the brother of the man who had hurt his friend.25 0
The supreme court rejected Mr. Gunsby's assertion that his delusion of
being a protector of the black community formed a pretense of moral
or legal justification so that the premeditation circumstance should not
apply:
Gunsby claims that the trial judge erred in finding that the murder
was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner
without any pretense of moral or legal justification. Gunsby asserts
that his delusion that he was a protector of the black community
helped form a pretense of justification which renders this aggravat-
ing factor inapplicable. We disagree. The record is clear that Gun-
sby himself was never harassed or threatened in any way by the
victim or by the victim's brother. In fact, the evidence reflects that
Gunsby's delusion seemed to be directed toward ridding his neigh-
246. Id. at 224-25.
247. 563 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1990).
248. Id. at 78.
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borhood of drug dealers. However, this murder was not predicated
upon the fact that the victim was a drug dealer. We find that there
exists no reasonable pretense of moral or legal justification under
the circumstances of this case. Further, we find that this record
clearly supports the heightened premeditation necessary to support
this aggravating circumstance.25'
In requiring that the pretense be reasonable, the court did not dis-
cuss the Banda definition of "pretense" as something alleged or be-
lieved on slight grounds; an unwarranted assumption.
iv. Slightly Heightened Premeditation
"Simple premeditation of the type necessary to support a convic-
tion for first-degree murder is not sufficient to sustain a finding that a
killing was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated man-
ner. ' 25'1 In Holton v. State,2 53 evidence showed that Rudolph Holton
bound and garrotted Katrina Grady with pieces of nylon cloth.25' One
might imagine that this method of killing would involve a level of cold-
ness and calculation sufficient to satisfy the premeditation circum-
stance, but the Florida Supreme Court disapproved of its application,
stating that the strangulation "could have been a spontaneous act in
response to the victim's refusal to participate in consensual sex."2 55
It would obviously be impossible to define the point at which "sim-
ple" premeditation becomes "heightened" such that the premeditation
circumstance applies. Several cases indicate that the premeditation
must have preceded the defendant's encounter with the decedent. The
supreme court has repeatedly held that Rogers requires that the de-
fendant "plan or arrange to commit murder before the crime be-
gins."2 58 In McKinney v. State,257 the supreme court rejected the trial
251. Id.
252. Holton v. State, 573 So. 2d 284, 292 (Fla. 1990). But see Valle v. State,
581 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1991), holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not bar retroac-
tive application of the circumstance because it "only reiterated" the premeditation of
first degree murder.
253. 573 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1990).
254. Id. at 292. Apparently the evidence showed that Ms. Grady was aware of
the strangulation.
255. Id.
256. McKinney v. State, 579 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1991); see also Hamblen v. State,
527 So.2d 800 (Fla.1988) (angered when robbery victim set off alarm, defendant
forced her into another room and shot her; error to find premeditation circumstance).
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court's application of the premeditation circumstance. The evidence
showed that Franz Patella stopped his car to ask Boris McKinney, a
stranger, for directions. Mr. McKinney then jumped into Mr. Patella's
car, hit him, and ordered him to drive to an overpass two blocks away.
The entire sequence "took only minutes."25 8 In striking the circum-
stance, the supreme court stated that there was no evidence that Mr.
McKinney "planned to commit any crime at all until the opportunity
presented itself. Since this crime occurred only through a chance en-
counter, the evidence does not rise to the level of 'heightened premedi-
tation' required by this circumstance. 259
McKinney and Holton, lead one to think that the premeditation
circumstance could not apply where the defendant kills a police officer
during a routine traffic stop lasting only a few minutes. Farinas adds
support to such a conclusion. There, the court held that evidence show-
ing the defendant abducted his estranged lover and shot and killed her
when she tried to escape even though it took him several moments to
unjam his gun was insufficient to support a conclusion of premedita-
tion.2 0 The supreme court thought otherwise in Valle v. State."'1 Upon
being stopped for a traffic violation, Manuel Valle told his companion
that he was going to waste the officer. He then walked over to the pa-
trol car and shot the officer.262 The trial court noted that "approxi-
mately 2 to 5 minutes [had] elapsed from the time the defendant left
Officer Pena's car to get the gun and slowly walk back to shoot and kill
Officer Pena.1'263 Without any mention of Rogers, the supreme court
breathed old life into new law by relying on the reloading cases of
Swafford and Phillips in upholding the trial court's finding.
j. Law Enforcement Officers and Public Officials
The remaining two aggravating circumstances allow consideration
of the decedent's status as a law enforcement officer2 64 or a public offi-
257. 579 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1991).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See Farinas v. State, 569 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1990).
261. 581 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1991). Although decided on the same day as McKinney,
Valle contains no mention of the principles set out there.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. "The victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in
the performance of his official duties." FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)0) (1991).
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cial. 65 The law enforcement officer circumstance has never been used
independently of the other law enforcement circumstances (avoiding
arrest and hindering law enforcement), 266 and the public official cir-
cumstance has apparently never been used.
2. Mitigating Evidence
Since the promulgation of Section 921.141, there has been consid-
erable litigation regarding the nature of mitigation and the concept of
"mitigating circumstances." As already noted, the consideration of mit-
igation was originally limited to the statutory mitigating circumstances.
The process by which the trial court is to determine the existence of
mitigation was not rationalized until Rogers and Campbell [observing
that "our state courts continue to experience difficulty in uniformly ad-
dressing mitigating circumstances"] and the supreme court has not al-
lowed jury instructions on various nonstatutory circumstances. As dis-
cussed above, the supreme court reached diametrically opposed results
in Nixon [sentence for other offenses not relevant to defendant's "char-
acter, prior record, or the circumstances of the crime]) and Jones [sen-
tence for other offense constituted factor that might cause jury to de-
cline to impose the death sentence]. Other cases during the survey
period show similar confusion about the mitigation process.
In Floyd v. State,267 the defendant unsuccessfully sought to argue
to the jury the absence of various aggravating circumstances as mitiga-
tion. The Florida Supreme Court, in upholding the trial court's ruling,
relied on the holding in Stewart v. State.268 In so ruling, the supreme
265. "The victim of the capital felony was an elected or appointed public official
engaged in the performance of appointed public official engaged in the performance of
his official duties if the motive for the capital felony was related, in whole or in part, to
the victim's official capacity." FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(k) (Supp. 1990).
266. Valle v. State, 581 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1991). Although this circumstance was
merged by the trial court with the other two law enforcement circumstances, the su-
preme court wrote that its retroactive application would not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause because it duplicated those circumstances.
267. 569 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1990).
268. 549 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3294 (1990). In Stew-
art, the court wrote:
The trial court properly rejected Stewart's confusing request that the jury
be instructed on all possible aggravating factors so that he could argue
that the absence of many of these factors was a reason for imposing a
lesser sentence. Florida Standard Jury Instructions state that the jury be
instructed only on those factors for which evidence has been presented.
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court ignored the fact that, in the past, it had used the absence of ag-
gravating circumstances in support of its decision to reverse a death
sentence, 2 9 and made no mention in Jones that mitigation consists of
anything that might support a life sentence. Since the court has
stressed that the death penalty is to be reserved for the least mitigated
and most aggravated of murders, ' 2 70 it stands to reason that absence of
aggravating circumstances will take a murder from the class of "most
aggravated" murders and, therefore, support a life sentence. In its sum-
mary discussion in Floyd, the supreme court does not seem to have
considered these matters.
In Campbell v. State,27 ' the supreme court introduced the notion
of "categories" of nonstatutory mitigation. Its nonexclusive list some-
what arbitrarily differentiates between "contribution to community or
society" (category 2) and "charitable or humanitarian deeds" (cate-
gory 5), and also differentiates between the preceding two and "poten-
tial for rehabilitation" (category 3). Furthermore, it does not list the
most powerful of all mitigating circumstances; that the killing was the
product of a heated domestic confrontation.272
Perhaps more important is the question of how the categories fit
into the equation resulting in the sentencing decision. Although the
Fla.Std.Jury Instr. (Crim.) 78 (1981).
Id. at 174.
269. Fitzpatrick v. State, 527 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1988) (defendant took hostages
and killed deputy who arrived and pointed gun at him; reversing death sentence, court
observed that "the aggravating circumstances of heinous, atrocious and cruel, and cold,
calculated and premeditated are conspicuously absent." Id. at 812).
270. Songer v. State, 544 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1989).
271. 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990).
272. Usually without recognizing this as a mitigating factor (the court typically
addresses it in the context of proportionality review), the court has repeatedly asserted
its importance. E.g., Blakely v. State, 561 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1990) ("'[T]his Court
[has] stated that when the murder is a result of a heated domestic confrontation, the
death penalty is not proportionally warranted.' Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 361
(Fla. 1988). We have expressly applied this proportionality review to reverse the death
penalty in a number of domestic cases. On the other hand, we have affirmed the death
sentence under express proportionality review where the defendant has been convicted
of a prior 'similar violent offense.' In the instant case, Blakely had committed no prior
similar crime. The killing resulted from an ongoing and heated domestic dispute and
was factually comparable to that in Ross v. State, 474 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1985),
wherein the husband bludgeoned the wife to death with a hammer or other blunt in-
strument. We reversed the death penalty there on proportionality grounds.") In Doug-
las v. State, 575 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1991), the court did (perhaps for the first time)
specifically refer to a domestic relationship as a mitigating circumstance.
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court often states that the sentencing decision is not to be reached by
merely counting the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 273 the
number of circumstances is often of great importance in appellate deci-
sions. For instance, the court will rarely uphold a death sentence where
there is only a single aggravating circumstance.27' Similarly, it will
rarely reverse a death sentence where there are no mitigating circum-
stances.2 71 In the eighteen cases in which death sentences were affirmed
on direct appeal, the supreme court approved of an average of just over
three aggravating circumstances per case. In those same eighteen cases,
there was an average of between one and two mitigating circumstances
[whether statutory or nonstatutory] found per case. Numbers do seem
to count for quite a bit.
The question of how the "categories" of mitigation count is of
much practical importance. How these "categories" fit into the sentenc-
ing calculus is open to question. On the one hand, a broad "category,"
such as category 2 ("contribution to community or society") may sub-
sume a variety of nonstatutory "circumstances" (such as "exemplary
work, military, family, or other record") which might count as several
"circumstances" but as only one "category." On the other hand, a sin-
gle "circumstance" (exemplary work record) may fit into two "catego-
ries" ("contribution to community or society" and "potential for reha-
bilitation"). Presumably further litigation will be needed to determine
how the "categories" are to be used.
273. E.g. White v. State, 403 So. 2d 331, 336 (Fla. 1981). The standard jury
instructions do not inform the jurors of this principle.
274. In 1990, the supreme court reversed all three death sentences to come
before it on direct appeal in which the trial court found only one aggravating circum-
stance. Morris v. State, 557 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1990), Thompson v. State, 565 So. 2d 1311
(Fla. 1990), Nibert v. State, 574 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1990). Section 921.141(2)(a)
speaks of a determination of whether "sufficient aggravating circumstances exist." FLA.
STAT. § 921.141(2)(a) (1991). Taken literally, the use of the plural should forbid a
death sentence where there is but one aggravating circumstance.
275. In 1990, the court upheld all eight death sentences to come before it on
direct appeal where the trial court found no mitigation. Reed v. State, 560 So. 2d 203
(Fla. 1990), Ventura v. State, 560 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1990), Haliburton v. State, 561 So.
2d 248 (Fla. 1990), Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060 (Fla.1990), Van Poyck v. State,
564 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1990), Floyd v. State, 569 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1990), Sanchez-
Velasco v. State, 570 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1990), and Lewis v. State, 572 So. 2d 908 (Fla.
1990). In three of these cases (Ventura, Floyd, and Sanchez- Velasco), the trial court
found only two aggravating circumstances.
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IV. APPELLATE REVIEW: CLOSE ENOUGH FOR GOVERNMENT
WORK?
An enduring theme of the United States Supreme Court's capital
cases is the idea of heightened due process."' In upholding Florida's
capital punishment statute in 1976, the Court emphasized the impor-
tance of full appellate review as a means of effectuating this princi-
ple.27 Since 1976, the Florida Supreme Court has experienced consid-
erable difficulty in trying to comply with the Eighth Amendment
requirement of appellate review.
A. Parker v. Dugger
The United States Supreme Court expressed puzzlement about the
Florida Supreme Court's procedure in review of death sentences in
Parker v. Dugger.278 At Robert Lacy Parker's capital sentencing pro-
ceeding for two murders, his attorney presented substantial statutory
and nonstatutory mitigating evidence. Apparently giving this evidence
some credit, the jury rendered life',erdicts for both crimes. Neverthe-
less, the trial court imposed a death sentence for one of the murders.
The sentencing order made no mention of nonstatutory circumstances,
but did include a statement that "[tlhere are no mitigating circum-
stances that outweigh the aggravating circumstances."27 9 On appeal,
the Florida Supreme Court struck two of the aggravating circum-
stances found by the trial court, but nevertheless affirmed the death
sentence on the ground that the trial court "found no mitigating cir-
cumstances to balance against the aggravating factors.
280
Eventually the case came to the Supreme Court on collateral re-
view. In writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor agreed with Mr.
276. "Where a defendant's life is at stake, the Court has been particularly sensi-
tive to insure that every safeguard is observed." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.'153 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (citing cases). "In reviewing death sentences, the Court has de-
manded even greater certainty that the jury's conclusions rested on proper grounds."
Mills v. Maryland, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 1866 (1988). See also Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685
F.2d 1227, 1253 (1lth Cir. 1982) ("reliability in the factfinding aspect of sentencing
has been a cornerstone of [the Supreme Court's death penalty decisions") and Beck v.
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1988) (same principles apply to guilt determination).
277. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
278. 111 S. Ct. 731 (1991).
279. Id.
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Parker that the Florida courts had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
failing to treat his mitigating evidence adequately. 81 Since much of the
mitigating evidence was uncontroverted, and since the trial court sen-
tenced Mr. Parker to life imprisonment for one of the murders, she
reasoned that the trial judge had necessarily found the existence of
some mitigating evidence."' Noting that the Florida Supreme Court
presents itself as a reviewing court rather than a reweighing court, Jus-
tice O'Connor stated that a purely reviewing court would have ordered
a new sentencing proceeding rather than weigh the mitigating evidence
against the diminished list of aggravating circumstances, and find it
lacking. 8 In the alternative, she reasoned that a reweighing court
would have reweighed the evidence or conducted a harmless error anal-
ysis based on the mitigating evidence found by the trial court, and
noted that the Florida Supreme Court had not done so because it re-
fused to recognize the existence of the mitigating evidence:
What the Florida Supreme Court could not do, but what it did,
was to ignore the evidence of mitigating circumstances in the rec-
ord and misread the trial judge's findings regarding mitigating cir-
cumstances, and affirm the sentence based on a mischaracterization
of the trial judge's findings. 84
Reinforcing the importance of full appellate review in Florida's
capital sentencing scheme, the Court found that the state supreme
court had failed in its duty, stating:
The Florida Supreme Court did not conduct an independent review
here. In fact, there is a sense in which the court did not review
Parker's sentence at all.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Parker's death sentence
neither based on a review of the individual record in this case nor
in reliance on the trial judge's findings based on that record, but in
reliance on some other nonexistent findings.2 80
281. Parker, 111 S. Ct. at 759.
282. Id. at 736-38.
283. Id. at 738.
284. Id. at 739.
285. Id. at 739-40. The comment that "there is a sense in which the court did
not review Parker's sentence at all" can apply with equal force to other Florida capital
decisions. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 572 So. 2d 908, 912 (Fla. 1990), in which the court
conducted no independent review, writing only that the trial court's findings were "sup-
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Thus, while holding that the Florida Supreme Court had failed to
act as either a reviewing court or a reweighing court, the Court indi-
cated that the state system of appellate review had failed to comport
with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment.
B. Reweighing
As noted in Parker, the Florida Supreme Court has declined to
engage in the appellate reweighing of aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances contemplated in Proffitt. 86 During the survey period, the
supreme court reaffirmed its position by stating, in Freeman v. State,
"[t]he trial judge carefully weighed the aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances and concluded that death was the appropriate penalty. It is
not this Court's function to reweigh these circumstances. ' '287
C. Procedural Obstacles to Appellate Review
More generally, Proffitt contains the notion of consistency in reso-
lution of the merits of issues on appeal . 88 In keeping with the principle
of full appellate review in capital cases; the general rule in this country
is to limit the use of technical obstacles to appellate review in capital
cases."89 Florida, however, has fostered the application of the contem-
poraneous objection rules290 and other procedural obstacles to appellate
review, although this policy has not been without inconsistency, as
shown by recent decisions.
In Floyd v. State,2 91 the supreme court held that even though the
ported by the record and we find no error."
286. See Atkins v. State, 497 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1986); Smith v. State, 407 So.
2d 894 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982).
287. Freeman, 563 So. 2d at 77.
288. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242.
289. 41 C.J.S., Homicide § 414, nn. 23-28.
290. Florida actually has several codified contemporaneous objection rules. The
ones that usually apply to criminal cases are section 90.104, Florida Statutes (pertain-
ing to evidentiary objections), and Rule 3.390 (d) and (e), Florida Rules of Criminal
procedure (pertaining to jury instructions). Various other rules and statutes (such as
Rules 3.600, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure pertaining to motions for new trial
and Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, pertaining to recording of
court proceedings, and section 90.107, Florida Statutes, pertaining to limiting instruc-
tions) also bear on preservation issues, as does a confused and sometimes contradictory
body of ever-evolving case law.
291. 569 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1990).
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trial court erred by refusing to grant the defendant's cause challenge to
a juror named Hendry, an obvious lesson is that, to preserve such an
issue for appeal, one should exhaust peremptory challenges, request ad-
ditional peremptory challenges, and have such a request denied by the
trial court.2 92
However, in Trotter v. State,2 93 when Melvin Trotter's attorney
did exactly that in his capital trial, the Florida Supreme Court held
that the issue was not preserved for review:
Where a defendant seeks reversal based on a claim that he was
wrongfully forced to exhaust his peremptory challenges, he initially
must identify a specific juror whom he otherwise would have struck
peremptorily. This juror must be an individual who actually sat on
the jury and whom the defendant either challenged for cause or
attempted to challenge peremptorily or otherwise objected to after
his peremptory challenges had been exhausted. The defendant can-
not stand by silently while an objectionable juror is seated and
then, if the verdict is adverse, obtain a new trial.2""
The purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule is to prevent
the defense from raising for the first time on appeal matters that were
not presented to the trial court. 95 It would appear that this purpose
292. Id. One might say that in Floyd the court confused the logically distinct
issues of preservation for appellate review and demonstration of prejudice. The court
obviously reached the merits of the issue of whether the trial court erred by denying
the cause challenge. Strictly speaking, it held that the defense failed to show that it
was prejudiced by running out of peremptory challenges because it did not show that
an objectionable person remained on the jury. See Hill, 477 So. 2d at 556.
293. 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1990).
294. 1d. at 693.
295. Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 701 (Fla.'1978). In Castor, defense counsel did
not object to an incomplete re-instruction to the jury on manslaughter. The court
wrote:
As a general matter, a reviewing court will not consider points raised for
the first time on appeal. Dorminey v. State, 314 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1975).
Where the alleged error is giving or failing to give a particular jury in-
struction, we have invariably required the assertion of a timely objection.
Febre v. State, 30 So. 2d 367 (1947); see Williams v. State, 285 So. 2d 13
(Fla. 1973). The requirement of a contemporaneous objection is based on
practical necessity and basic fairness in the operation of a judicial system.
It places the trial judge on notice that error may have been committed,
and provides him an opportunity to correct it at an early stage of the pro-
ceedings. Delay and an unnecessary use of the appellate process result
from a failure to cure early that which must be cured eventually.
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would be satisfied where the trial court directly rules on the merits of
the issue that is later advanced on appeal. However, in Nixon v.
State,296 the supreme court held unpreserved an issue directly ruled on
by the trial court. At the end of the prosecutor's argument to the jury
in the guilt phase of his trial, Mr. Nixon's attorney moved for a mis-
trial arguing that the prosecutor had made an improper "Golden Rule"
argument, noting that "at this time to instruct the jury to disregard it
would be to no avail." '297 Although defense counsel had made no objec-
tion at the time of the challenged remark, the trial court treated the
motion as an objection and ruled that the prosecutor's argument was
not improper. On appeal, Mr. Nixon argued that his counsel's motion
for a mistrial had preserved the issue for appeal under State v. Cum-
bie.298 Rejecting this argument, the supreme court stated:
Id. at 703.
To meet the objectives of any contemporaneous objection rule, an objection must be
sufficiently specific both to apprise the trial judge of the putative error and to preserve
the issue for intelligent review on appeal. See Rivers v. State, 307 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 316 So. 2d 382 (1975); York v. State, 232 So. 2d 767
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
296. 572 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1990).
297. Id. A "Golden Rule" argument is one that invites jurors to imagine them-
selves in the place of one of the parties (or, in a criminal case, in the place of the
victim). Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 1985) (such argu-
ment has been universally condemned by the courts). In Nixon, the prosecutor, in a
somewhat confused discussion of his role in the litigation and of the emotions generated
by the facts of the case, told the jury that he had "an obligation to make you feel just a
little bit, just a little bit, of what [the decedent] felt because, otherwise, sometimes I
think it's easy to forget that." 572 So. 2d at 1340.
298. 380 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1980). In Cumbie, the supreme court ruled that a
motion for mistrial made after the jury retired to deliberate did not preserve for appeal
an issue of improper prosecutorial argument, writing:
Clark requires that a motion for mistrial be made "at the time the im-
proper comment is made." In the present case, to have met this require-
ment, we hold that it would have been sufficient if Cumbie had moved for
mistrial at some point during closing argument or, at the latest, at the
conclusion of the prosecutor's closing argument. To avoid interruption in
the continuity of the closing argument and more particularly to afford de-
fendant [sic] an opportunity to evaluate the prejudicial nature of the ob-
jectionable comments in the context of the total closing argument, we do
not impose a strict rule requiring that a motion for mistrial be made in the
next breath following the objection to the remark. Here, Cumbie objected
to the prosecutor's comment, and the trial court sustained the objection
and instructed the jury to disregard this remark. If Cumbie felt that the
judge's admonition was inadequate, he should have informed the judge of
1422 [Vol. 16
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We do not construe Cumbie to obviate the need for a contempora-
neous objection. The requirement of a contemporaneous objection
is based on practical necessity and basic fairness in the operation of
the judicial system. A contemporaneous objection places the trial
judge on notice that an error may have been committed and thus,
provides the opportunity to correct the error at an early stage of
the proceedings. Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla.1978).
While the motion for mistrial'may be made as late as the end of
the closing argument, a timely objection must be made in order to
allow curative instructions or admonishment to counsel. As noted
by defense counsel'in this case, in many instances a curative in-
struction at the end of closing argument would be of no avail. Ac-
cordingly, defense counsel's motion for mistrial at the end of clos-
ing argument, absent a contemporaneous objection, was insufficient
to preserve this claim under our decision in Cumbie. Even if the
issue were properly preserved, we agree with the trial court that
taken in context the comments complained of did not amount to a
Golden Rule argument.299
The supreme court's reliance on Castor is somewhat questionable,
since Castor merely stands for the proposition that one cannot raise on
appeal arguments that one did not make in the trial court. It would
seem that one would be in compliance with Castor where the trial court
rules on the merits of one's objection. In Nixon, the trial judge did rule
on the merits and found the prosecutor's argument unobjectionable.
Given this ruling, there is no likelihood that the trial court would have
corrected the matter by giving a, curative instruction, so that a request
for such an instruction would have been useless under Simpson v.
State3 00 Thus, the underlying premise of Nixon (that the trial court
was not afforded the opportunity to remedy the situation) is invalid
since the trial court would .not have remedied the situation.
Moreover, the court in Nixon made no mention of the fact that a
this fact at the time of his objection or, at the latest, at the end of the
prosecutor's closing argument. The judge then may have been able to give
additional curative instructions which may have remedied Cumbie's objec-
tion. The motion for mistrial in the present case, made after jury instruc-
tions and retirement of the jury for deliberation, however, came too late to
preserve Cumbie's objection for appeal.
Id. at 1033-34.
299. Nixon, 572 So. 2d at 1341.
300. 418 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1982).
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month earlier, in Occhicone v. State,"' it had not found a procedural
bar where the trial court had refused to rule on the merits of an issue
on the ground of procedural default. At Dominick Occhicone's trial,
the state introduced evidence that he had been uncooperative when a
deputy had tried to swab his hands for an atomic absorption test.302
The trial court denied counsel's objection to this testimony as untimely
because counsel had not objected at a previous bench conference con-
cerning the deputy's testimony. Defense counsel subsequently objected
when the prosecutor referred to the testimony in final argument. With-
out addressing the apparent procedural bar, the court directly reached
the merits and held the prosecutor's argument proper. 3
D. Counsel
From the foregoing, the Florida Supreme Court is not entirely
consistent in the application of procedural bars to appellate review.
Even if the court applied the bars with absolute consistency, the result
would be inconsistent application of the law and hence of the death
penalty. Contemporaneous objection rules do not discriminate between
meritorious and nonmeritorious claims, but only between good and bad
lawyering. It is the defendant with the bad lawyer rather than the de-
fendant with the bad case whose conviction and sentence are affirmed.
One obvious solution to this uneven application of the law would be to
relax technical bars to appellate review. In Sochor v. State,31 " the su-
preme court specifically refused to do so. Another solution would be to
raise the quality of counsel. The history of Florida capital litigation
reflects a general inadequacy of counsel in capital cases. Over the years
virtually every decision affirming a death sentence has revealed one or
more substantial legal issues not preserved for appeal. 30 5 Yet Florida
301. 570 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1990).
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. 580 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1991).
305. Most of the decisions affirming a death sentence on direct appeal in 1990
show some major issue not preserved for appeal. Reed v. State, 560 So. 2d 203 (Fla.
1990) (Booth issue); Ventura v. State, 560 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1990) (neither appellate
challenge to death sentence raised in trial court); Pardo v. State, 563 So. 2d 77 (Fla.
1990) (failure to move to sever counts); Freeman v. State, 563 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1990)
(improper testimony and argument; jury instruction); Floyd v. State, 569 So. 2d 1225
(Fla. 1990) (jury selection issues and collateral crimes evidence); Holton v. State, 573
So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1990) (prosecutorial argument); Occhicone v. State, 570 So. 2d 902
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has not adopted, and does not seem inclined to adopt, any minimum
standards for counsel in capital cases. 00 Nevertheless, two recent cases
address questions involving the adequacy of counsel in post-conviction
proceedings.
Rerneta v. State,307 involved the compensation of counsel in execu-
tive clemency proceedings. Section 925.035(4), Florida Statutes pro-
vides for the appointment of counsel to represent indigent death row
inmates in such proceedings and allows for compensation "not to ex-
ceed $1,000" in attorney's fees and costs. When a circuit court
awarded $3,000 in attorney's fees (based on a rate of $60 per hour)
and $622.78 in costs to Daniel Remeta's clemency attorney, the state
sought certiorari review in the district court of appeal. That court held
that the award violated the statute. 0 8 Mr. Remeta thereafter obtained
discretionary review in the supreme court which upheld the original
award.309 The supreme court stated that the statutory right to counsel
in clemency proceedings "necessarily carries with it the right to have
effective assistance of counsel."31 0 Noting that it had previously spotted
a "link between compensation and the quality of representation," '311 the
(Fla. 1990) (jury instruction); Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1990)
(prosecutorial argument).
306. Guideline 5.1 of the ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PER-
FORMANCE: OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES sets out minimum qualifications for
counsel and co-counsel in capital cases. Lead counsel should have: a minimum of five
years of experience in criminal defense; prior experience as lead counsel in no fewer
than nine jury trials of serious and complex cases which were tried to completion; prior
experience as lead counsel or co-counsel in at least one case in which the death penalty
was sought; and familiarity with and experience in the utilization of expert witnesses
and evidence, including, but not limited to, psychiatric and forensic evidence; and
should have attended and successfully completed, within the past year, a training or
educational program focussing on the trial of cases in which the death penalty is
sought. Co-counsel should have: at least three years of litigation experience in criminal
defense; and prior experience as lead counsel or co-counsel in no fewer than three jury
trials of serious and complex cases which were tried to completion, at least two of
which were trials in which the charge was murder, or, alternatively, at least one of the
three jury trials was for murder and one was for another felony; and should have within
the past year completed at least one training or educational program focussing on the
trial of cases in which the death penalty is sought.
307. 559 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1990).
308. Id. at 1134.
309. Id. at 1136.
310. Id. at 113.5.
311. This "link" was observed in Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109
(Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987) (holding unconstitutional fee cap for
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court wrote that fair compensation of counsel was the "only way to
ensure effective representation and give effect to the right to counsel in
these death penalty clemency proceedings. 31 2
Two weeks after the decision was rendered in Remeta, the su-
preme court addressed a claim of ineffectiveness of post-conviction
counsel in Lambrix v. State.3"3 Cary Lambrix asserted in an unsuccess-
ful motion to vacate his murder conviction and death sentence, that the
attorney who had represented him in a prior collateral proceeding had
failed to provide effective assistance of counsel."1 4 The supreme court
affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to vacate. The court
stated that Mr. Lambrix had failed to demonstrate ineffectiveness
under the test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington.31 5 However, it
specifically left open the question of whether there is a right to effective
assistance of counsel in collateral relief proceedings.
E. Relief
What relief should the court give if it finds the evidence insuffi-
cient as to a particular aggravating circumstance? The Florida Su-
preme Court has not established any set procedure. To the contrary, it
has adopted radically different approaches from case to case.
An example of the court's confused approach was its decision to
reverse Thomas Trotter's death sentence on the ground that the sen-
tence of imprisonment circumstance had been improperly applied.3 6  In
its initial decision, the court ordered a judge resentencing.31 7 But- on
rehearing, the court ordered a jury resentencing, with no explanation
for the change in the relief granted.318
Two decisions rendered on the same day further muddy the wa-
ters. In Capehart v. State,3 1 9 the court affirmed Gregory Capehart's
death sentence even though the trial court had improperly relied on the
premeditation circumstance in justifying the death sentence, 320 writing:
appointed counsel in capital cases).
312. Remeta, 559 So. 2d at 1135.
313. 559 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 1990).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 1138 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
316. See Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1990).
317. Trotter, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S18.
318. 576 So. 2d at 694.
319. 583 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1991).
320. In addition to the premeditation circumstance, the trial court found three
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Having determined one aggravating circumstance was erroneously
considered by the trial judge, we must determine whether this error
was harmless. The record before us reflects three valid aggravating
circumstances and one nonstatutory mitigating circumstance. Hav-
ing carefully scrutinized the record in this case, we are persuaded
beyond a reasonable doubt that even without the aggravating cir-
cumstance of cold, calculated, and premeditated murder, the trial
court still would have found that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating evidence. Thus, the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Holton, 573 So.2d at 293.
We therefore affirm the sentence of death. 2
The supreme court gave no explanation for how it arrived at the con-
clusion that the trial court would have sentenced Mr. Capehart to
death without the premeditation circumstance. Curiouser still is the
court's failure to give any consideration to the effect that improper use
of the circumstance might have had on the jury. Although the judge
rejected most of Mr. Capehart's mitigating evidence, there is no reason
to think that the jury did. One additional vote for life would have re-
sulted in a life verdict, which could scarcely be overridden, given the
substantial amount of mitigating evidence presented to the jury.
Capehart is difficult to reconcile with Omelus v. State.322 At
Ulrick Omelus's sentencing proceeding after his conviction for acting
as a principal in a contract murder, the state argued three aggravating
circumstances: the pecuniary gain, premeditation, and heinousness cir-
cumstances. The trial court did not find the heinousness circumstance,
but did apply the other two in sentencing Mr. Omelus to death pursu-
ant to the jury's eight-to-four recommendation. The trial court found as
a mitigating circumstance that the co-defendant, who actually commit-
ted the murder, was sentenced to life imprisonment. The supreme court
found that the heinousness circumstance could not apply to Mr. Ome-
lus,132 and reversed the sentence for a jury resentencing, stating:
other aggravating circumstances (prior conviction of violent felony, engaged in sexual
battery at time of murder, and especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel) and one mitigat-
ing circumstance ("Defendant is a poor black man exploding in anger over his frustra-
tion due to the ills of a discriminatory society heaped upon him"), rejecting various
other nonstatutory mental mitigating evidence. The jury recommended a death sen-
tence by a vote of seven to five.
321. Id. at 1015.
322. 584 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1991).
323. Although the evidence apparently showed that the killing itself would qual-
ify for application of the circumstance, the evidence did not show that Mr. Omelus
1992] 1427
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Since the trial judge correctly did not include heinous, atrocious, or
cruel as a factor in imposing the death sentence, the question that
must be resolved in our harmless error analysis is whether the error
in allowing this factor to be presented and considered by the jury
requires a new sentencing proceeding. We find it difficult to con-
sider the hypothetical of whether the trial court's sentence would
have been an appropriate jury override if the jury had not received
the argument on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel factor and had
recommended a life sentence. Further, because the issue is not in
this record, the parties have not argued the propriety of a jury
override in the briefs or at oral argument. We conclude -that it is
not appropriate for us to attempt to address that question in this
case under these circumstances. Although the circumstances of a
contract killing ordinarily justify the imposition of the death sen-
tence, we are unable to affirm the death sentence in this case be-
cause, given the state's emphasis on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel
factor during the sentencing phase before the jury, the fact that the
trial court found one mitigating factor, and the fact that the jury
recommended the death sentence by an eight-to-four vote, we must
conclude that this error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
under the standard set forth in DiGuilio.3 24
Omelus, on the other hand, is difficult to square with Herring v.
State.326 In 1981, Ted Herring was charged with first degree murder of
a convenience store clerk. The trial court followed the jury's eight-to-
four recommendation of a death sentence, notwithstanding evidence of
Mr. Herring's troubled childhood, psychological problems, learning dis-
abilities, and low IQ. There was no evidence that he intended to kill the
clerk prior to the robbery, but the trial court used the premeditation
circumstance in sentencing him to death,' 26 and the supreme court af-
firmed. Three years later, in Rogers,327 the court specifically disap-
proved of the use of the circumstance in Mr. Herring's case. Accord-
ingly, Mr. Herring argued on post-conviction that, under Rogers, his
sentence was illegal. The supreme court rejected his claim:
intended that the co-defendant inflict a high degree of pain.
324. Id. at 567.
325. 580 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1991).
326. In all, the trial court found four aggravating circumstances and two miti-
gating circumstances.
327. The court wrote in Rogers: "Since we conclude that 'calculation' consists of
a careful plan or prearranged design, we recede from our holding in Herring v. State
[cit.], to the extent it dealt with this question." 511 So. 2d at 533.
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While the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating factor no
longer applies to the circumstances in Herring, we find that this is
not a change that requires a new sentencing hearing in this case.
None of the facts and circumstances that were before the jury re-
garding how Herring committed the murder are changed. If the
aggravating circumstance of a "conviction of a prior crime of vio-
lence" had been eliminated, that would have changed the facts and
circumstances before the jury.
The evidence before the jury established that Herring shot the
clerk once in the head and again after the clerk fell to the floor and
that the second shot was to prevent the clerk from being a witness
against him. Herring I at 1057. Given the other aggravating and
mitigating factors that went into the weighing process in the sen-
tencing phase of this case, we, find that the result of the weighing
process would not have been different had this aggravating circum-
stance not been articulated as a factor in the sentencing. We find
that the elimination of this factor, under the circumstances of this
case, does not .compromise the weighing process of either the judge
or jury. See Hill v. State, 515 So.2d 176 (Fla.1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 993 (1988).328
Capehart, Omelus, and Herring reflect completely different ap-
proaches to the issue. Under Capehart, the court looked only at the
effect of the aggravating circumstance on the judge's sentencing deci-
sion, without regard to its possible effect on the jury. In Omelus, how-
ever, the court did look to the potential effect on the jury, even though
the evidence would have been the same without the circumstance. But,
in Herring, the court held that striking the circumstance could not have
affected the verdict where the striking did not affect the evidence. 29
F. Proportionality.
In Proffitt, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of pro-
portionality review as a means of limiting arbitrary application of the
death penalty in Florida. The Florida Supreme Court has not adopted
a precise procedure for the conduct of proportionality review, and its
cases are sometimes difficult to reconcile with one another, as shown by
the cases of Earnest Fitzpatrick and James Ernest Hitchcock.
328. Herring, 580 So. 2d at 138.
329. See also Jones v. State, 569 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1990) (new jury sentencing
ordered where striking of heinousness circumstance would result in exclusion of evi-
dence of sexual abuse on corpse).
19921 1429
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In Fitzpatrick v. State,330 the court reversed Mr. Fitzpatrick's
death sentence where the trial judge had followed a jury recommenda-
tion of death. The court specifically wrote that it was reweighing ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances and that it was reversing solely
because it believed that, in comparison to other cases involving the im-
position of the death penalty, capital punishment was unwarranted in
this case.13 1
Both cases relied upon in Fitzpatrick involved life verdicts. Hence,
one would safely assume from Fitzpatrick that one could rely on life
verdict cases in making a proportionality argument. However, in Hitch-
cock v. State,3 32 the supreme court disapproved of reliance on life ver-
dict cases in making a proportionality argument:
We also disagree with Hitchcock's claim that his death sentence is
disproportionate. The court conscientiously weighed the aggravat-
ing circumstances against the mitigating evidence and concluded
that death was warranted. The cases Hitchcock relies on are distin-
guishable, being primarily jury override cases, e.g., Holsworth v.
State, 522 So.2d 348 (Fla.1988); Welty v. State, 402 So.2d 1159
(Fla.1981), cases dealing with domestic disputes, e.g., Garron v.
State, 528 So.2d 353 (Fla.1988); Wilson v. State, 493 So.2d 1019
(Fla.1986), and cases with few valid aggravating circumstances
and considerable mitigating evidence, e.g., Songer v. State, 544
So.2d 1010 (Fla.1989). On the circumstances of this case, and in
comparison with other cases, we find Hitchcock's sentence of death
proportionate to his crime. E.g., Tompkins; Doyle; Adams.3 '
V. FINAL NOTE
As noted in the foregoing discussion, there are many capital
crimes issues which will continue to be hotly argued in the years to
come. This will be especially true if the Florida Supreme Court contin-
ues its frequent pattern of ignoring its own precedents.
330. 527 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1988).
331. See Ferry v. State, 507 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1987); Amazon v. State, 487 So.
2d 8 (Fla.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 914 (1986).
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Crime and Punishment? Judges' Gavels Become the
Latest Weapon in the War on Drugs*
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1973 President Richard Nixon declared a "world war" on
drugs.' This war has resulted in several changes in the criminal justice
system which have largely come from the executive and legislative
branches.2 These executive and legislative changes have been predomi-
nately concerned with law enforcement and punishment.' Recently,
however, the judiciary has made some changes of its own. 4
* The author thanks Judge Robert J. Fogan, Michael Rocque, Randi Burger,
Judge Stanley Goldstein, and Tim Murray. Special thanks to Stuart Maclver; words
can not express my appreciation for everything he has done.
1. Symposium, The War on Drugs: In Search of A Breakthrough A-3 (Steven
Wisotsky & Robert C. Levine, eds., 1986).
2. I'd. at A-3-A-12.
3. Id.
4. See generally The Drugging of the Courts: How Sick Is the Patient and What
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The Eleventh6 and Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Courts6 of Florida
have recently created comprehensive pre-trial intervention programs to
provide defendants with an alternative to incarceration.7 To date, these
programs, enacted through what have been named "Drug Courts,"
have been effective in reducing the large number of cases crowding
court dockets and consuming a tremendous amount of resources. 8
This article outlines and evaluates the Drug Court programs by
comparing their reported results with official criminal justice statistics.
This article also discusses some of the problems that these programs
have encountered and what the future holds. The purpose is to expose
an innovative approach to handling drug cases in the courts in a cost
efficient and effective way. The analysis includes scientific data con-
cerning addiction as disease as well as the merits of these programs and
a conclusion as to why they are vital to criminal law.
Although the Dade and Broward programs are similar, there are
some differences. Where possible, this article discusses both of these
programs together and explores their differences when necessary.
Is the Cure? 73 JUDICATURE 314 (April-May 1990)("An edited version of the panel
presentation at the mid-year meeting of the [American Judicature Society] in Los An-
geles on February 10, 1990") [hereinafter The Drugging of the Courts]; Editorial, The
Courts and the "War on Drugs" 73 JUDICATURE 236 (Feb-March 1990) [hereinafter
The Courts and the War on Drugs].
5. FLA. STAT. § 26.32 (1991)(Dade County, Florida).
6. Id. § 26.362 (Broward County, Florida).
7. The Drugging of the Courts, supra note 4, at 316-17; The Courts and the
"War on Drugs," supra note 4, at 288; Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Dade County, Flor-
ida & Metro-Dade County Government, Strategies for Action: Combating Drug and
Alcohol Abuse in Dade County I (unpublished, undated pamphlet, on file with the
Dade County Office of Substance Abuse Control) [hereinafter Strategies for Action];
Metro-Dade Department of Human Resources, Office of Rehabilitative Services, Di-
version and Treatment Program: An Overview 1-2 (May 25,1991) (unpublished pam-
phlet, on file with the Dade County Office of Substance Abuse Control) [hereinafter
Diversion and Treatment Program: An Overview]; Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Brow-
ard County, Florida, Drug Court Program, (unpublished, non-paginated pamphlet, on
file with Judicial Projects Administrator, Broward County Courthouse) [hereinafter
Drug Court Program].
8. Herbert M. Klein, Associate Chief Judge, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Dade
County Florida, Strategies for Action: Combating Drug and Alcohol Abuse in Dade
County-An Update, June 1990 2-3 (June 1990) (unpublished pamphlet, on file with
the Dade County Office of Substance Abuse Control) [hereinafter Update 1990]; Elev-
enth Judicial Circuit, Dade County, Florida, Drug Court: April 1, 1991 (April 1, 1991)
[hereinafter Drug Court: April 1, 1991].
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In order to clearly understand the enormous stress placed upon the
criminal justice system and , hence, the need for the Drug Court pro-
grams, it is necessary to be aware of the growing number of people
entering the criminal justice system as drug offenders in Florida and
nationally. The figures presented to illuminate the scope of the problem
which the courts face in dealing with the war on drugs in the United
States.
Sixty percent of the drugs produced throughout the world are con-
sumed in the United states which represents only six percent of the
world's population. 9 Throughout the last decade, the United States has
moved steadily towards tougher enforcement policies.'" In the eighties,
President Reagan brought several government agencies into the war on
drugs, including the IRS, CIA, and United States Navy." By 1989,
President Bush had expanded the scope of the drug war by pledging to
remove the narcotics consumer to reduce the demand for drugs,
thereby making the United States a less desirable market for interna-
tional drug smugglers.12
The Florida criminal justice system felt the immediate impact of
President Bush's new policy:13
Leading a statewide campaign against small time abusers is Brow-
ard County Sheriff Nick Navarro by his use of "sweeps"-massive
arrests of dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of people for possession
or purchase of small quantities of drugs. Navarro's extreme stance
9. Sandi R. Murphy, Drug Diplomacy and the Supply Side Strategy: A Survey
of United States Practice, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1260 n.2 (1990) (citing, Presiden-
tial Certifications Regarding international Narcotics Control: Hearing and Markup
Before the Sub-committee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on For-
eign Affairs, House of Rep. on H.R. 4162 H.J. Res. 491, 493, 495, 497 and 499, 100th
Cong. 2d Sess. 200 (1988) (statement of Rep. Peter H. Kostmayer)).
10. See Symposium, supra note 1, at A-4-AI2.
11. Id. at A-4-A10.
12. Owen Ullman & Ellen Warren, Bush Vows Billions In Drug War President
Targets Demand, Suppliers, MIAMI HERALD, September 6, 1989, at IA. This article
reviewed a speech delivered by President Bush from the Whitehouse during which he
displayed a bag of crack. "Targeting both demand and supply, Bush promised an 'ag-
gressive attack from every angle.'" Id. (quoting speech from Oval Office, Sept. 5,
1989).
13. More Cells, Treatment Programs Needed Along With Drug Arrests, SUN-
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• is putting pressure on other parts of the criminal justice system. 4
Systemic impact occurred on a national level as well. 5 While drug vio-
lation arrests, including sale, manufacture, possession and purchase,
were down fourteen percent in 1990, as compared to 1989, the figures
indicate that there was a seventy percent increase for such arrests since
1980.16 During 1990, the majority (68.4 percent) of these arrests were
for possession.'"
The result of the increase in drug arrests has been a strain on both
the courts and prisons.' 8 "Demand-side policy . . . [has resulted in] a
skyrocketing prison population that places a burden on the prison sys-
tem . . . [because of only] a rhetorical commitment to . . . prevention,
education and treatment."' 19
Similar figures exist for the Florida prison system.20 From July,
1986 to April, 1989, the average monthly admissions to Florida prisons
for drug violations increased from 380 to 1122 persons, an increase of
295 percent.2' Furthermore, between 1980 and 1990 the Florida prison
population grew from 19,722 to 42,733.2 During this period, the per-
centage of inmates' incarcerated for drug violations rose from 8.2 per-
cent in 1980 to 36.1 percent in 1990.23 Finally, "during this decade of
dramatic change" '24 the number of "recidivists" 25 escalated from 22.6
14. Id.
15. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNI-
FORM CRIME REPORT FOR THE UNITED STATES, 173 (1990).
16. Id.
17. Id.; see Michael E. Young, S. Florida Drug War Bogs Down: Dealers Be-
come Shrewd as Prices Take a Tumble, SUN-SENTINEL, April 12, 1992, at I B (Figures
recently released from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement show that the ma-
jority of drug arrests in the State of Florida were also for possession. Of the 72,785
drug arrests for all of Florida in 1991, 52,619 were for possession while only 20,566
were for sale of narcotics).
18. Courts and the "War on Drugs, " supra note 4, at 236; More Cells, Treat-
ment Programs Needed , supra note 13, at 18A.
19. Murphy, supra note 9, at 1308.
20. See generally FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ANNUAL REPORT
1989/1990 (Dec. 15, 1990) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT].
21. Bureau of Planning, Research & Statistics, Florida Department of Correc-
tions, Prison Admissions and Release Trends, June 10, 1991 (non-paginated leaflet, on
file with Florida Department of Corrections, Bureau of Planning Research and
Development).
22. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 30.
23. Id. at 32.
24. Id. at 31.
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percent of the prison population in 1980 to 42.7 percent by 1990.6
Simply put, the numbers indicate a drastic increase in prison popula-
tions due to drug violations.7
Initially, these statistics may suggest that enforcement policies are
having a positive effect. However, a negative aspect of increasing prison
populations is the cost which is now astronomical.2 8 During the time
from 1989 to 1990, the Florida Department of Corrections spent an
average of $39.73 per inmate, per day.29 The result was an average
annual cost of over $14,000 per inmate, per year, for all Florida pris-
ons.3" A recent update for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1991 shows
that the per diem rate had increased to $40.02 resulting in a total of
$14,607.03 per inmate per year.3 1 A significant amount of this money
could be saved, if the legislature and the courts would view addicts as
victims of a disease.
III. ADDICTION AS A DISEASE
On March 30, 1981, John W. Hinckley, Jr. attempted to assassi-
nate President Ronald Reagan. 32 At trial, Hinckley admitted he in-
tended to kill the President; nonetheless, because he was suffering from
a disease, he never spent a single day in prison. 38 Criminal laws protect
those who are not responsible for their acts if they do not have the
25. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (6th ed. 1990) (A habitual criminal; a
criminal repeater.).
26. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 32.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 66.
29. Id. Of that figure, $31.45 was spent on operations (housing, guards, food,
etc.), $7.15 was spent on health services and $1.12 for education. Id. The yearly totals
per inmate are $11,479.25, $2,609.75 and $408.08 respectively, for a grand total of
$14,497.08. Id.
30. The per diem rate of $39.73 multiplied by 365 days computes to $14,500.45
per inmate, per year.
31. Florida Department of Corrections, Summary of Selective Financial Data for
the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1991 (June 30, 1991) (unpublished, non-paginated
leaflet, on file with the Florida Department of Corrections, Bureau of Planning Re-
search and Statistics) [hereinafter Summary of Selective Financial Data].
32. United States v. Hinckley, No. 81-306 (D. D.C., 1982); see PETER W. Low
ET AL., THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.: A CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DE-
FENSE 22-30 (1986). There was no question, based on expert testimony, that Hinckley
was suffering from a psychological disorder. The focus of the trial, however, was the
severity of Hinckley's condition. Id.
33. Low ET AL., supra note 32, at 22-30.
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ability to control their actions or make "rational choices." 3 People like
Hinckley who suffer from certain disorders are "afforded ' 35 a recog-
nized defense within the law, because "criminal punishment is inappro-
priate unless the defendant can be blamed for the offense . . .3"
Drug dependency is a psychiatric disorder and is listed in the Di-
agnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R).3"
Dependency and abuse disorders are characterized in the DSM-III-R
by "continued use of . . .psychoactive substance[s] despite . . .[vari-
ous deleterious effects on one's health, employment and social life and]
... the development of withdrawal symptoms following cessation of,
or a reduction in use . . ."-3 A psychoactive substance is a mind or
mood altering substance (chemical) such as stimulants, depressants,
tranquilizers, and anti-depressants.39 The DSM-III-R includes in its list
of psychoactive substances cocaine, cannabis and various other con-
trolled substances and narcotics. 0 The drug addict, as a criminal de-
fendant, certainly fits the DSM-III-R definition as someone who risks
arrest, loss of occupation and societal stigma, just to get high."1
Drug and alcohol addiction can come in two forms. 2 An individ-
ual may develop a physiological dependence where the body actually
incorporates the drug into the person's system creating "tolerance ' '" 3
and eventually, withdrawal-type conditions." There is also a "psycho-
logical dependence '4 5 which may not involve a physiological addiction.
Rather, users develop a habit of using a drug or alcohol on a regular
34. Id. at 4. See generally Emily Campbell, The Psychopath and the Definition
of "Mental Disease or Defect" Under the Model Penal Code Test of Insanity: A Ques-
tion of Psychology or A Question of Law? 69 NEB. L. REV. 190 (1990) (discussing the
applicability and standards of the insanity defense); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.
SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 4.1(b) (1986).
35. LOW ET AL., supra note 32, at 4.
36. Id. at 3 (emphasis in the original).
37. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MAN-
UAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 165 (3d ed. rev. 1987)[hereinafter DSM-III-R].
38. Id.
39. ROBERT JEAN CAMPBELL, M.D., PSYCHIATRIC DICTIONARY 498 (5th ed.
1981).
40. DSM-III-R, supra note 37, at 169.
41. Id. at 165; see supra text accompanying note 37.
42. HAROLD E. DOWEIKO, CONCEPTS OF CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY 210-12
(1990).
43. Id. at 210.
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basis because they "need" ' "6 the drug to relax, have fun, or to cope with
daily living."7
Once a person becomes addicted to a substance, the disease of ad-
diction takes over and the addict begins to live life for the next high.4 8
Everything an addict does is in contemplation of when, how and where
the drugs can be obtained. 9 "As the disease of addiction progresses;
the individual comes to center his or her life around continued use of
the chemical . . .. No price is too high, nor is any behavior unthink-
able . ..."50
'Whether physiological or psychological, experts agree that addic-
tion is a disease. The disease of addiction is characterized by "compul-
sion. '"51 According to Dr. G. Douglas Talbott,' 2 "the alcohol and drug
addict is a disaster waiting to happen. They only need abuse to trigger
the disease." 5 The compulsion begins as a chemical reaction in the
brain whereby euphoria producing chemicals (naturally produced by
the brain) are released creating an intense, pleasurable sensation. 4 A
person then becomes addicted by attempting to recreate this sensation
by using successively larger doses.5 5 For the addict, there is no control
over drug use because the brain chemicals that create the euphoric sen-
sation also control behavior.56 The presence of these chemicals is an
abnormality that is inherited through one's genes. 5 For this reason,
drug addiction, as well as alcoholism, is considered "a biochemical-ge-
46. DOWEIKO, supra note 42, at 211.
47. Id. at 211-12.
48. Id. at 167.
49. Id. at 166-67 (citing NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVICE OFFICE. INC.,
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS 11 (1982)).
50. DoWEIKO, supra note 42, at 167.
51. Id. at 167; see also EDWIN M. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS: DEVIANT
BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC POLICY: ABORTION, HOMOSEXUALITY AND DRUG ADDICTION
122 (1965).
52. Dr. G. Douglas Talbott, M.D., F.A.C.P.; Program Director, Georgia's Dis-
abled Doctors Program; Director, Ridgeview Institute Alcohol & Drug Program;
Clinical Associate Professor, Emory Medical School.
53. G. Douglas Talbott, M.D., F.A.C.P., Alcoholism Is A Disease! 143 (unpub-
lished, undated report on file with NOVA LAW REVIEW). Although this report is pri-
marily about the disease of alcoholism, there are several relevant issues about drug
addiction as well.
54. DoWEIKO, supra note 42, at 62.
55. Id. at 211.
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netic disease." 8 Generally, suffering from this disease will not result in
community sympathy. 59
However, society does tolerate the recreational use of some
psychoactive substances such as alcohol. 60 Indeed, being addicted to
certain chemicals like caffeine and nicotine is also considered to be
"normal. ' 61 However, society draws the line at addiction when it is a
result of illicit substance abuse or the overindulgence of accepted
chemicals. 62 Society rebuffs these addicts as non-productive eyesores
that litter the "Norman Rockwell" images of our towns and cities.63
"The very passivity and unproductiveness characteristic of most addicts
are strongly disapproved of in the dynamic, work oriented American
society." '64
This perception of the addict is represented in law and public pol-
icy as the federal government seeks to wage war on drugs and drug
users. 5 This societal attitude of disdain toward addicts is beginning to
show in congressional treatment of civil liberties.66
In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans With Disabilities Act
(ADA) to protect employees from employer discrimination based on an
employee's disability or handicap.6" While the United States Senate in-
cluded narcotics abuse, drug addiction and alcoholism in the list of pro-
tected disabilities, 8 the law expressly excludes those addicted to "con-
trolled substances' '69 such as cocaine unless the employee is enrolled in
58. Id.
59. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDEN-
TITY 143 (1963); SCHUR, supra note 51, at 162.
60. DSM-III-R, supra note 37, at 165.
61. id.
62. Id.
63. SCHUR, supra note 51, at 162.
64. Id.
65. Gaylord Shaw, Bush Maps New Target In Drug War Plan Targets Demand,
Seeks New Aid for NYC, NEWSDAY, Jan. 23, 1990, at 15; see infra text accompanying
note 70.
66. See Frank Greve & Matthew Purdy, Even First Time Offenders Would Feel
Pinch, MIAMI HERALD, September 6, 1988; see infra text accompanying note 70.
67. The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
68. Bruce McLanahan, Who is "Disabled," in COMPLIANCE WITH THE AMERI-
CANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: A SATELLITE PROGRAM, 714 PRACTICING LAW INSTI-
TUTE. CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 33, at 39 (citing S.
REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989)).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 § 101(6)(A) (1990) (substances controlled under 21
U.S.C. § 812 (1990)).
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a treatment program and has ceased use of the substance.70 This is an
excellent example of how the addict is received by society.
If one is addicted, but not to illicit narcotics, that addiction is
treated by the Federal Government, at a minimum, as a disability for a
limited purpose. 1 Although, the ADA's purpose is the protection of the
basic civil liberty to be free'of discrimination by an employer,7" the
ADA is one example of how public policy rejects the illicit narcotics
addict. "They are perceived as failing to use available opportunity for
advancement in the various approved runways of society ... , they re-
present failures in the motivational schemes of society."7 3
Because the drug addict is, at most, a societal outcast, an undesir-
able, laws like the ADA and zealous "demand-side" enforcement poli-
cies will, under the cover of a national public hysteria (e.g., the drug
war), quickly cast civiI liberties aside.7 4 There are those who call for an
"all out" drug war in which "civil liberties must necessarily be dimin-
ished . . . ."I However, this response is as irrational as it is frighten-
ing, for it is born out of a desire to preserve a "small town ' 76 image
created' in delusions of grandeur inspired by Hollywood and
Disneyworld.77
"Although the United States has a history of commitment to indi-
vidual liberties, our nation is not immune to incidents of crisis born
hysteria which have impacted adversely upon civil liberties."78 Once an
individual is branded with the stigma of drug abuser, the criminal jus-
tice system seeks to attach the "scarlet letter of guilt"7 9 upon that per-
70. Id. § 101(b).
71. Mclanahan, supra note 68, at 35.
72. Id.
73. GOFFMAN, supra note 59, at 144.
74. See Paul R. Joseph, Civil Liberties in the Crucible: An Essay On AIDS and
the Future of Freedom in America, 12 NOVA L. REV. 1083, 1096-99 (1988). Professor
Joseph expressed that this article was written-in such a fashion so as to provide a
perspective of the future of civil liberties in general as applicable to all facets of law,
not just the dilemma of AIDS. Interview with Paul R. Joseph, Professor of law, Nova
University Center for the Study of Law, Fort Lauderdale, Florida (Dec. 17, 1991); see
The Drugging of the Courts, supra note 4, at 314; see supra text accompanying note
73.
75. Murphy, supra note 9, at 1308.
76. Joseph, supra note 74, at 1085.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1083; see supra text accompanying note 70.
79. Low ET AL., supra note 32, at 3.
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son. The "majority"80 then strips the individual of "the benefits of com-
munity membership"81 rendering the individual a "non-member,""
"outcast," 8 or convict.84
Even though these labels exact a high price on the individual, it is
the community that pays the price of addiction because incarceration
costs are very high.8 5 One solution is to have addiction established and
accepted by the courts as a disease. The next task is to recognize this
disease as a defense to the crimes of possession and purchase of
narcotics.
IV. ADDICTION AS A DEFENSE
Historically, in spite of the revolution in medical and scientific
knowledge, the courts' acceptance of addiction as a disease has been
limited, at best.86 Long before the declared war on drugs, the United
States Supreme Court dealt with the issue of addiction in Robinson v.
California."7
In Robinson, the Court held that addiction is a disease, and to
punish a person for having a disease "in light of contemporary human
knowledge . . . would doubtless be universally thought to be an inflic-
tion of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and




84. See generally, Paul R. Joseph, "Our Town" or "Twin Peaks": The Dark
Side of Community, VI Focus ON LAW STUDIES 5 (1990) (discussing how the commu-
nity, by influence of majority vote, can easily transform the most inalienable of rights
into mere privileges).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
86. See, e.g. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (court held
that congressional intent in enacting criminal sanctions for drug possession did not ex-
clude addicts). See generally STANTON PEELE, THE DISEASING OF AMERICA: ADDIC-
TION TREATMENT OUT OF CONTROL (1989) (refuting the concept of addiction as a
disease).
87. 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding a California statute making it a crime to be a
drug addict (punishable by incarceration) unconstitutional as it violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution). California later enacted a compre-
hensive set of statutes that officially recognized addiction as a disease to the effect that
successful completion of rehabilitation program results in the exoneration of the de-
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Fourteenth Amendments." ' In his concurrence, Justice Douglas com-
pared the "disease" of drug addiction to insanity8 "
However, in 1968 the Court clearly distinguished addiction as a
non-offense as opposed to a defense to other crimes.9 In Powell v.
Texas, the Court affirmed the conviction of a man for being publicly
drunk despite that he was an alcoholic with an uncontrollable urge to
drink and get drunk.91 Today, state courts adhere to the rule in Powell,
recognizing addiction as a disease and providing treatment for addicts
who commit crimes, but refusing to recognize addiction as a defense to
criminal activity.92
The Florida Fifth District Court of appeal has followed suit in a
controversial decision. 93 In Johnson v. State, the court upheld the con-
viction of a woman for delivery of a controlled substance to a minor 4
via the umbilical cord after her baby died following a live birth.9 5 In
88. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666. The Court went on to state, "'of course it is
generally conceded that a narcotic addict . . . is in a state of physical and mental
illness.' " Id. at 667 n.8 (quoting brief for appellee-the Sate of California); see also
Lindner v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1951), where the Court stated that narcotics
addicts "are diseased and proper subjects for medical treatment." Id. at 18; Morris
Ploscowe, Methods of Treatment of Drug Addiction, in ESSAYS IN CRIMINAL SCIENCE
357 (Gerhard O.W. Mueller ed., 1961).
89. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 668 (Douglas, J., concurring).
90. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
91. Id. at 541-44. The Texas statute was not declared unconstitutional and the
court distinguished this case from Robinson because the Texas law did not make being
an alcoholic illegal. Id. at 532. The court reasoned that while the defendant may have
an "involuntary compulsion" to drink, he did not have such an urge to be drunk in
public. Id. at 534.
92. See Santone v. State, 371 S.E.2d 428 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (evidence of co-
caine addiction inadmissable in cocaine trafficking case); Goldsmith v. State, 252
S.E.2d 657 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (defense of involuntary addiction denied for possession
of fraudulently obtained prescription drugs); Franklin v. United States, 339 A.2d 398
(D.C. Cir. 1975)(defense of lack of capacity due to addiction denied); Gorham v.
United States, 339 A.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1975)(defense of being an automaton as a
result of addiction denied); Smith v. State, 219 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 1974)(court distin-
guished the crime of possession from the status of being an addict and affirmed a pos-
session of heroin conviction); People v. Davis, 306 N.E.2d 787 (N.Y. 1973)(sentence
for personal possession of heroin and a needle not cruel and unusual punishment); Peo-
ple v. Bell, 290 N.E.2d 214 (III. 1972) (refusal by trial court to admit expert testimony
on addiction was harmless error as it would not exonerate the defendant).
93. Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
94. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(1)(c) (1991).
95. Johnson, 578 So. 2d 419. But see State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (conviction of mother for child abuse pursuant to section
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doing so, the court sent a strong message that drug use is intolerable.
The combined message of the Whitehouse, police, prosecutors and the
courts to date has been clear. This nation has "zero-tolerance. '96 for
drugs and drug offenders whether or not they are addicts.17
V. THE DRUG COURT PROGRAM
A. The Need For Change
Second chances are rarely given to the drug offender 9 8 If one is
gifted athlete with marketable skill, but 'also a drug addict, that person
may be protected by the same society that otherwise enforces a strict
policy against drug use.9" For those who are not gifted athletically and
do not have a monetary value measured in six figures or greater, there
is prison. 00 Perhaps, once in prison, the convict may receive drug treat-
ment."' However, the chances of receiving treatment are not very good
in Florida prisons.10 2
In Florida prisons bed space is limited, sentences don't last long
827.04(1) of the Florida Statutes for poisoning her fetus by ingesting crack-cocaine
while pregnant was reversed because the statute did not contemplate fetus abuse). The
Gethers case is distinguishable on two grounds. First, the infant in Johnson, died after
being born alive and second, the court in Gethers did not find legislative intent to reach
the defendant, while in Johnson, the court did find such intent. Id. at 420.
96. "Zero-tolerance" is a seizure policy begun by the United States in 1988
whereby U.S. Customs, Coast Guard, and other law enforcement agencies seized per-
sonal property (yachts, cars etc.) if even minuscule amounts of controlled substances
where discovered there-in. See Howard B. Thorsen, The Coast Guard, Zero Tolerance
and the Drug War, MIAMI HERALD, July 10, 1988, at 6C.
97. See Greve & Purdy, supra note 66, at 9A (discussing plan revealed by Presi-
dent Bush in Sept. 5, 1988 speech to attack the "demand" for drugs); see supra text
accompanying note 91.
98. Jean Dubail, Prison Crowding Shortens Inmate Drug Treatment, SUN-SEN-
TINEL, Aug. 22, 1989, at IA (discussing the case of an individual who begged a Brow-
ard County Judge for treatment).
99. See generally SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, For The Record, 106 (Jon Scher ed.,
Dec. 23, 1991). Dexter Manly was banned for life from the National Football League
after several infractions of the leagues cocaine policy. Id. The lifetime ban only lasted
one year after which Manly returned only to violate the rules a fourth time. Id. Manly
has since retired from football and vows to win his battle with cocaine addiction. Id.
100. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 38 (inmate profiles reveal that approxi-
mately 62.4 percent of those in prison were unemployed at the time of their arrest).
101. Id. at 18.:
102. Dubail, supra note 98, at 4A.
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enough for treatment to be effective,1"3 and "drugs and alcohol are
plentiful behind bars. Treatment is not."" 4 Any available treatment is
usually ineffective because of the prevalence of drugs in the prisons.10 5
The bottom line is "Florida Prisons are a breeding ground for
addiction."'0 6
A significant factor in the lack of drug treatment is overcrowd-
ing."7 As offenders get sent to prison in large numbers, a shortage in
bed space results. 0 8 This in turn creates the need for the early release
of not just drug offenders, but those charged with more serious
crimes. 0 19 The conflict here is significant and problematic. The commu-
nity cries out for tougher laws and longer prison sentences for drug
offenders, but as soon as those policies go into effect, the system cannot
handle the influx of new inmates, which actually results in shorter
prison sentences."10 As a result, those inmates who do get placed into
drug treatment are rarely in prison and prison treatment programs long
enough for the treatment to be effective."' Compounding the problem,
is the drug availability in prisons. 2
Furthermore, increased police enforcement that crowds the prisons
also puts a strain on the courts." 3 Between 1980 and 1989, drug cases
in the federal courts rose 270 percent." 4 A similar pattern was noted in
state criminal courts. 1 5 The result is that drug cases have begun to
103. Id.
104. Patrick May, Treatment Is A Must if Convicts Are To Shake Drug Habit,
MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 8, 1991, at IA.
105. Id. at IA-6A.
106. Id.; see also Associated Press, Prisoners Pass Around "Buck," MIAMI HER-
ALD, Aug. 14, 1990, at 4B ("Buck" is homemade grain alcohol that is popular among
Florida's incarcerated)[hereinafter Prisoners Pass Around "Buck"]; Herald Capital
Bureau, Guards Accused In Drug Case: Probe Uncovers Prison Smuggling, MIAMI
HERALD, Aug. 25, 1990, at 3B (Guards at several prisons and jails throughout Florida
were charged with smuggling drugs into the facilities for sale to the in-
mates) [hereinafter Guards Accused In Drug Case].
107. Dubail, supra note 98, at IA, 4A.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.; see also N. Gary Holten & Roger Handberg, Florida's Sentencing
Guidelines: Surviving-But Just Barely, 73 JUDICATURE 259, 263 (Feb.-Mar. 1990).
111. Dubail, supra note 98, at 4A.
112. May, supra note 104, at 6A; Prisoners Pass Around "Buck," supra note
106, at 4B; Guards Accused In Drug Case, supra note 106, at 3B.
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absorb much of the courts' money, resources, and personnel to the det-
riment of other types of cases.11
In response, some states have set up "drug courts,"' 1 7 redirecting
court dockets to relieve the system of felony narcotics cases. 1 ' How-
ever, creating a separate courtroom with separate judges is not enough,
as this type of system inevitably becomes a convenient docket clearing
tool, which results in less attention paid to the defendant and his or her
needs.119 There must be more to the administration of justice than a
quick resolution of cases.1 20 "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without un-
derstanding." '121 In order to provide an efficient method of handling
cases with understanding, it has been suggested that courts should de-
part from their "traditional passive '  method of resolving cases and
start "search[ing] for creative ways to alleviate the drug crisis through
their social service role.' ' 23
Florida's Eleventh Judicial Circuit124 and the Seventeenth Judicial
Circuit 125 have endeavored to perform that "social service role" and
have begun to attack the demand-side of the drug crisis with "under-
standing."' 28 Dade and Broward County have each begun their own
116. The Drugging of the Courts, supra note 4, at 316.
117. Id. at 314-315 (For example, Indiana, Michigan and New Jersey have re-
ported large numbers of drug cases on their dockets.).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 315.
120. The Drugging of the Courts, supra note 4, at 314.
121. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing)(holding that evidence obtained through an illegal wire-tap was admissible); see
also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n et al, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)(holding
that compelling government interest outweighed the employees' privacy rights in up-
holding the constitutionality of drug testing for rail-road employees). In his dissent,
Chief Justice Marshall warned: "Precisely because the need for action against the drug
scourge is manifest, the need for vigilance against unconstitutional excess is great." Id.
at 635 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting); see also The Drugging of the Courts, supra note 4,
at 314 (quoting Brandeis' opinion in Olmstead); On the issue of drug testing, see gen-
erally Paul R. Joseph, Fourth Amendment Implications of Public Sector Work Place
Drug Testing, 11 NOVA L. REV. 605 (1987).
122. Courts and the "War on Drugs", supra note 4, at 236.
123. ld; The Drugging of the Courts, supra note 4, at 316.
124. In and for Dade County, Florida, under the supervision of Associate Chief
Judge Herbert M. Klein.
125. In and for Broward County, Florida under the supervision of the Criminal
Division's Administrative Judge, Mark Speizer.
126. The Drugging of the Courts, supra note 4, at 316-317; The Courts and the
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"Drug Court" programs which exist for the benefit of those who come
before the bench, as opposed to sending them to prison in mass.127
Prison is certainly not the cure for the disease of drug addiction.
While several thousand people enter the Florida prison system every
year at a tremendous cost per inmate,,it is probable that close to half of
these people will return to prison unless, by good fortune, they happen
to receive and complete treatment programs. 28
Treatment is available through the Drug Court programs at a
much lower cost and a much higher success rate as compared to prison.
The Drug Court Programs of Dade and Broward County provide an
effective solution. While there may not be a perfect solution or cure to
drug addiction, one thing is certain, prison is not the solution. Consider
whether society wants to support the notion of jailing the disabled or
the diseased. Is there justification, for example, in making the disease
of cancer or AIDS illegal?
Granted, being an addict is not illegal in Florida, nor anywhere
else for that matter.2 9 However, to be in'possession of cocaine, if one is
an addict, is as involuntary as the disease of addiction itself.' It is not
logical to concede that addiction-is a disease of compulsion but not to
concede the compulsion itself. After all, one cannot be an addict if one
does not use drugs. Furthermore, one cannot use drugs if one does not
purchase and possess them. It is time that we move forward as a soci-
ety and accept the addict as a sick person and treat him or her with the
same compassion that we would have for the victim of any other
disease.
"War on Drugs," supra note 4, at. 288; Diversion and Treatment Program: An Over-
view, supra note 7, at 1-2; Strategies for Action, supra note 7, at 1-3; Drug Court
Program, supra note 7.
127. Diversion and Treatment Program: An Overview, supra note 7; In re Crea-
tion of A Drug Court Division Within the Criminal Division, ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
No. 111-91-E-1, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida (June
27, 1991)[hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. lI1-91-E-1]; In re Diversion and
Treatment Program; Costs and Assessment, ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. 90-9, Elev-
enth Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, Miami Review (April 27,
1990)[hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. 90-9]; In re creation of Section CF in
the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court and Type of Cases to be Heard, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE ORDER No. 89-9, Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida,
Miami Review (June 15, 1989)[hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. 89-9].
128. See supra text accompanying notes 22-30.
129. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); see supra text accompanying
note 90.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
19921 1445
433
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
The alternative, is to digress and become the ultimate police state
in which the government destroys all expectations of privacy in an at-
tempt to eradicate crime. 8' The State of Florida has already prose-
cuted and convicted one mother for poisoning her fetus via the umbili-
cal cord as a result of drug use during pregnancy.1 2 Will we next seek
to prosecute people for possession of narcotics simply for testing posi-
tive for drug use through blood and urine samples?' 33
B. Background
In 1988, officials in the Dade County government noted that of the
120,000 people incarcerated in the Dade County Jail system, sixty per-
cent were repeat offenders. 34 These statistics are similar for the Brow-
ard County Jail which has experienced a 336 percent increase in popu-
lation over the past ten years despite a decreasing crime rate. 35
Furthermore, it was discovered that over eighty percent of those ar-
rested for felonies were, at the time of arrest, "under the influence
of" 36 or tested positive for drugs "other than alcohol.' 3 7
Armed with this information, Gerald T. Wetherington, Chief
Judge of the Eleventh Circuit and Joaquin G. Avino, Dade County
Manager, made a proposal to Justice Raymond Ehrlich, Chief Justice
of the Florida Supreme Court.' This proposal suggested an "innova-
tive approach to attacking" the run away drug problem.3 9 As a result,
131. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that using an
electronic listening device to gather incriminating evidence without a warrant was a
violation of a privacy expectation). Cf Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
132. Johnson, 578 So. 2d 419.
133. 1 use the pronoun "we" for we ratify such governmental policy through the
election process. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S: 757 (1966) (holding that a
warrantless intrusion into the body to get blood samples did not offend the Constitution
because the task was routine and performed by a medical professional using standard
procedures; also, evidence of the crime of drunk driving was rapidly diminishing as the
blood alcohol content lessens over time).
134. Strategies for Action, supra note 7, at 1.
135. Jonathon King, Pinning Down A Solution to Crack, SUN-SENTINEL, Sun-
shine Magazine, Oct. 21, 1991, at 7.
136. Strategies for Action, supra note 7, at 1.
137. Id.; The percentage of inmates in the Florida State Prison system who ad-
mitted to illicit drug use was 52.2 percent for the year 1989-90. ANNUAL REPORT.
supra note 20, at 47; see also May, supra note 104, at 6A.
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the Florida Supreme Court appointed Judge Herbert M. Klein to de-
velop and coordinate anti-drug abuse programs in Dade County.14 °
Thus, in an unprecedented move by Florida's judiciary, the Drug Court
was born.a4 ,
C. Administrative Orders
Pursuant to the Florida State Rules of Court, the chief judge of a
judicial circuit may make rulings as to the assignment of judges,142 the
use of courtrooms and docket size,14 and promulgate "administrative
orders"144 to facilitate any, function of the chief judge's office. 45 All
administrative orders must be approved by the Florida Supreme
Court." 6 By using the authority vested in the chief judge, administra-
tive orders were promulgated creating the Drug Court Programs that
now exist in both Dade and Broward County. 47
Judge Klein concedes that the. creation and.operation of these pro-
grams places judges in a "more activist role."1 48 However, under the
traditional passive role of the court, the system, remains unchanged
with the exception that, as statistics show, more peoplego to prison.1 49
As long as people perceive judges as possessing authority, they should
use that authority in a constructive manner to achieve positive goals
that help the community in which they preside by developing creative
solutions to problems, such as drug addiction and high recidivism
rates.150 It was this judicial activism that lead to the administrative
140. Herbert M. Klein, AssociateChief Judge, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Strate-
gies for Action: Combating Drug and Alcohol Abuse in Dade County An Update, I
(June 1990)(unpublished pamphlet, on file with Dade County Office of Substance
Abuse) [hereinafter Update 1990].
141. Strategies for Action, supra note 7, at "Executive.Summary."
142. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. No. 2.050(b)(4).
143. Id. 2.050(b)(7).
144. Id. 2.020(c) (administrative order defined as a "directive" used to facilitate
administrative needs and "court affairs").
145. Id. 2.050(b)(2).
146. Id. 2.050(e).
147. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. 89-9, supra note 127; ADMINISTRATIVE OR-
DER No. 1I1-91-E-1, supra note 127.
148. The Drugging of the Courts., supra note 4, at 316.
149. ANNUAL REPORT. supra note 20, at 30; Strategies for Action, supra note 7,
at 1.
150. The Drugging of the Courts, supra note 4, at 316-17.
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orders that are the foundation of the Drug Court Program.15 1
Dade County's administrative order became effective on June 19,
1989, and the program has been operating since that date.15 ' The
Broward County program was established on July 1, 1991 using Dade
County's program as a model.15
The effect of these administrative orders has been to transfer all
first time felony defendants within the respective circuits charged with
possession1 54 or purchase 55 of cocaine into one courtroom where they
have an opportunity to receive drug treatment.1 56 More significant,
however, is the fact that these orders break with national judicial prac-
tice of non-recognition of addiction as a defense to felony purchase and
possession of cocaine for first time offenders.157 In effect, these courts
have taken "judicial notice" 158 of drug addiction as a disease with an
emphasis on treatment. "There have been no trials in the Drug Court
since its inception, as the goal is not to try cases, but to connect defend-
ants with realistic meaningful treatment."1 59
Providing defendants with alternatives to incarceration, such as
drug treatment, is consistent with Florida's pretrial intervention (PTI)
statute .11o PTI is available to non-violent felony offenders (third degree
felonies) and upon successful completion of a PTI program, a defend-
ant may have the case dismissed "without prejudice" 61 by the state
attorney.6 2 Furthermore, pursuant to Florida law, the trial judge may
refer any defendant to drug treatment "in lieu of or in addition to final
adjudication, imposition of any penalty or sentence, or any similar
151. Id.
152. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. 89-9, supra note 127.
153. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. I1I-91-E-1, supra note 127.
154. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(1)(f) (1991).
155. § 893.13(1)(a)(1).
156. The Drugging of the Courts, supra note 4, at 317.
157. See ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. 89-9, supra note 127; ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER No. 111-91-E-1, supra note 127 (defendants charged with sale, manufacture,
delivery, or distribution are not "qualified" to enter the program).
158. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, (6th ed. 1990) ("[Jludicial notice [is] [tihe act
by which a court . . . recognize[s] the existence and truth of certain facts. ... ); see
FLA. STAT. §§ 90.202-205 (1991).
159. Drug Court: April 1, 1991, supra note 8.
160. FLA. STAT. § 948.08 (1991)(Pretrial intervention program).
161. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1179 (6th ed. 1990)(dismissal "without
prejudice" means the prosecutor does not waive the right to initiate the prosecution at
a later date).
162. FLA. STAT. § 948.08 (1991)(Pretrial intervention program).
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By enacting the PTI statute, the legislature expressly intended
that those defendants who could avoid prison by being rehabilitated,
should be treated as other than criminal. 4 However, the ever increas-
ing numbers of drug offenders sent to Florida prisons indicate that
judges do not seem to be exercising this discretionary power very
often. " " Statistics show that drug possession convictions accounted for
the second highest number of inmates in Florida prisons by 1990, while
those convicted of selling drugs were the highest.'
In order to combat this problem, both the Broward County Order
and Dade County Order "stress the addictive rather than the criminal
nature of the offense ... , "I In fact, on April 27, 1990 Dade County
updated its program to include a provision for "client" contributions to
rehabilitation cost.' 68 In so doing, the court stated that "The Eleventh
Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, in conjunction with the State
Attorney and Public Defender, has recognized addiction as a treatable
disease ... .1"6 With these programs, a new era of judicial activism
was born. 1
70
D. Admission Criteria and Treatment Techniques
In order to get into the Drug Court program, a person must be
arrested for felony possession or purchase of cocaine.' 7' When a de-
163. FLA. STAT. § 397.12 (1991)(reference to drug treatment program).
164. § 397.10 (legislative intent). The statute provides, in relevant part:
It is the intent of the Legislature to provide in a meaningful alternative to
criminal imprisonment for individuals capable of rehabilitation as useful
citizens through techniques generally not available in state or federal
prison systems . . . . It is further the intent of the Legislature to en-
courage trial judges to use their discretion to refer persons to a state li-
censed drug rehabilitation program in lieu of, or in addition to, imposition
of criminal penalties.
id.
165. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 31.
166. Id.
167. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. 90-9, supra note 127; ADMINISTRATIVE OR-
DER No. 11-91-E-1, supra note 127.
168. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No., 90-9 supra note 127 (which is also provided
for under Florida Law. FLA. STAT. § 948.09 (1991) (Payment for cost of supervision
and rehabilitation).
169. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. 90-9, supra note 127.
170. The Drugging of the Courts, supra note 4, at 316.
171. Interview with Michael Rocque, Assistant Public Defender, Seventeenth Ju-
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fendant is brought into court and is a first offender, the judge will ex-
plain to the person how the program works and gives the defendant a
choice of either going to trial on the charges and risking conviction, or
entering the program as probation for one year. 172 If the defendant pre-
fers trial, he or she is risking a possible five to fifteen years in prison.173
Broward County allows a defendant up to sixty-six days from the
date of arrest to make the election to enter the program or go to
trial.17 ' Upon electing to enter the program, a defendant must enter a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere to the charges against him or her. 17
At this point, the defendant is released on his or her own recogni-
zance.1 76 In order to participate, the defendant must not have a record
of any other felony convictions including charges on which adjudication
was withheld. 77
Dade County's program is slightly different in this regard. Defend-
ants coming before Drug Court Judge Stanley Goldstein 7 8 do not have
to enter a plea. 119 Depending upon the circumstances, Judge Goldstein
may allow a defendant with a prior felony record to get into the pro-
gram.1 80 This is made possible by an "understanding" that exists be-
tween the very cooperative State Attorney, Janet Reno, and Judge
Goldstein in which both parties agree to get as many people as possible
the help that they need to get away from drugs.1 81 Judge Goldstein's
dicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida, in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida (Nov. 12,
1991)(Mr. Rocque is also an adjunct Professor of Law, Nova University Center for the
Study of Law); see FLA. STAT. § 893.13(1)(a)(1) (1991)(purchase of cocaine-a sec-
ond degree felony); FLA. STAT. § 893.13(l)(f) (1991) (possession of cocaine-a third
degree felony).
172. Interview with Michael Rocque, supra note 171.
173. FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(c), (d) (1991) (Penalties). According to Rocque,
upon conviction usually receives up to twenty-two months in prison under the sentenc-
ing guidelines. Interview with Michael Rocque, supra note 163; see FLA, STAT. §
921.187(1)(b) (1991) (Disposition and sentencing; alternatives; restitution).
174. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. III-91-E-1, supra note 127.
175. Id.
176. Interview with Michael Rocque, supra, note 171.
177. Id.
178. Judge Goldstein was appointed to preside over the Dade County Drug
Court by Judge Klein and Judge Wetherington after a brief tenure in D.U.1 Court.
Patrick May, Judge Puts Heart Into Drug Court: 61-Year-Old Jurist is Tough,
Tender, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 21, 1991, at 2B.
179. Telephone Interview with Judge Stanley Goldstein, Eleventh Judicial Cir-
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only requirement is that the defendant make an effort to "get off" of
cocaine.1"' He adds that he "never met an addict yet that didn't want
to get off it.' 18
3
Once a defendant elects to enter the program in either Dade or
Broward County, the Probation Department supervises the participant/
client along with State licensed treatment programs. 8 " Failing to com-
ply with the program rules (or getting re-arrested) will, in the Judge's
discretion, result in: a) restarting the program, b) going to the county
jail for more intensive "in-house" treatment, or c) a removal from the
program completely which results in a transfer to another criminal di-
vision for prosecution of the original charges. 8 5 The program consists
of three phases and lasts one year. 86 Since the structure of the Dade
and Broward programs is essentially the same, 87 thus, the following
discussion of each phase applies to both with various differences high-
lighted where necessary.
Phase I is the most innovative phase of the program. Participants
are assessed as to their amenability to treatment and, at their option
and consent, are given acupuncture treatments. 8 The purpose of acu-
puncture is to relax the addict and curb the desire for drugs.'89 The
182. Metromagazine: Strategies For Action (MDTV 34 television broadcast,
July 1990,, videotape on file with Dade County Office of Substance Abuse Con-
trol)[hereinafter Metromagazine].
183. Id.
184. Drug Court Program, supra note 7; see also ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No.
111-91-E-1, supra note 127; Diversion and Treatment Program: An Overview supra
note 7, at 1.
185. Drug Court Program, supra note 7; Strategies For Action, supra note 7, at
2; see also A Clean and Sober Look at Drug Court, COUNTY LINE, Nov./Dec. 1991, at
1; Kathleern Kernicky, Betting on Pins and Needles: Drug Users Hope Acupuncture Is
End For Addiction, SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 8, 1991, at IB, 5B.
186. Drug Court Program, supra note 7; Strategies For Action, supra note 7, at
2; Diversion and Treatment Program: An overview, supra note 7, at 1.
187. Telephone Interview with Judge Robert J. Fogan, Drug Court, Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida (Nov. 19, 1991).
188. Diversion and Treatment Program: An Overview, supra note 7, at 5; Strate-
gies For Action, supra note 7, at 2; Drug Court Program, supra note 7.
189. William F. Moriarty, Jr. & Janet Konefal, Ph.D., C.A., Innovative Sub-
stance Abuse Treatment Options for Criminal Justice Populations That Include Acu-
puncture Detoxification As A Part of An Overall Treatment Program 3 (presented at
American Correctional Congress, San Diego, Cal. Aug. 1990)(unpublished, on file with
the Dade County Office of Substance Abuse); Diversion and Treatment Program: An
Overview, supra note 7, at 1; Kernickey, supra note 185, at 5B; see also Patrick May,
Drug Court Specializes in Second Chances, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 20, 1990, at 2B;
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acupuncture causes a release of chemicals in the brain that calm the
client making, him or her more amenable to treatment. 190 Acupuncture
is also available for those clients who spend time in jail.' 9' In fact,
"they have become model prisoners where they were once quite a
handful."' 9
The idea to use acupuncture came from a field visit to New
York.'93 Dr. Michael Smith, Director of New York's Lincoln Center
Acupuncture Clinic, has had success for over fifteen years using acu-
puncture to assist heroin addicts in their attempts at rehabilitation. 94
As a result, both Dade and Broward County have incorporated acu-
puncture into their programs.' 95 In fact, Judge Goldstein credits the
success of the Dade County program to the acupuncture treatment
technique. 96
In addition to acupuncture, Phase I also consists of urinalysis on a
daily basis as well as several group and individual counseling ses-
sions."' Phase I in Dade County usually lasts twelve days while in
Broward it last three weeks; however, no client moves to Phase II until
counselors, probation officers and the judges are satisfied with the cli-
ent's performance. 19 8
Once in Phase II, acupuncture treatments are still required (for
those who opted for them), but in decreasing number.' 99 This phase
concentrates on the more "conventional" methods of drug treatment
such as counseling and stress management. 00 Urinalysis takes place
King, supra note 135, at 7.
190. Kernickey, supra note 185, at 5B.
191. Update 1990, supra note 8, at 1-2; Strategies for Action, supra note 7, at 2.
The jail or "in-house" treatment is more intensive than the probation program with
evaluations every thirty days which may result in an early release to the probation
program if clients progress so warrants. Id.
192. Telephone Interview with Judge Stanley Goldstein, supra note 179.
193. Id.
194. Moriarty & Konefal, supra note 189, at 3.
195. Diversion and Treatment Program: An Overview, supra note 7, at 1; Up-
date 1990, supra note 8, at 3; Drug Court Program, supra note 7.
196. May, supra note 178, at 2B.
197. Diversion and Treatment Program: An Overview, supra note 7, at 5; Drug
Court Program, supra note 7.
198. Diversion and Treatment Program: An Overview, supra note 7, at 5; Drug
Court Program, supra note 7.
199. Diversion and Treatment Program: An Overview, supra note 7, at 8 (Phase
1I in Dade lasts approximately fourteen weeks); Drug Court Program, supra note 7.
200. Diversion and Treatment Program: An Overview, supra note 7, at 8; Drug
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three times a week, and the client's probation officer is kept informed
of the results and the client's attendance at all group sessions and indi-
vidual counseling appointments.2 ' Each participant must make per-
sonal appearances before the judge at predetermined dates in order to
keep the court informed of the participant's progress. 2  When the
judge is satisfied that an individual has successfully completed Phase
II; the individual may move into Phase III of the program. 03
Phase III is the "after care" phase of the program during which
acupuncture is available on request, but mandatory urinalysis contin-
ues.210 Once a client begins Phase III, he or she begins to receive voca-
tional training, high school General Equivelency Diploma education,
and where possible, job placement.20 5
Along with education and training, this phase emphasizes stress
management and "becoming a responsible adult. ' 206 Clients continue
to meet with counselors and attend weekly group meetings which lasts
for approximately twenty-six weeks in Broward County.20 7 If the judge
is satisfied that a client has not broken any the program's rules, has
consistently tested negative for drugs, and has a perfect attendance rec-
ord at all meetings and court appointments, the client may graduate.20 8
Upon graduation from the Dade County program, the charges
against the defendant are dropped via nolle prosequi20 9 by the state
attorney.2 10 The court will also clear the defendant's arrest record.21
Court Program, supra note 7.
201. Diversion and Treatment Program: An Overview, supra note 7, at 8; Drug
Court Program, supra note 7.
202. Telephone Interview with Judge Stanley Goldstein, supra note 179; Tele-
phone Interview with Judge Robert J. Fogan, supra note 187.
203. Diversion and Treatment Program: An Overview, supra note 7, at 8-11;
Drug Court Program, supra note 7.
204. Diversion and Treatment Program: An Overview, supra note 7, at 8-11;
Drug Court Program, supra note 7.
205. Diversion and Treatment Program: An Overview, supra note 7, at 8-11;
Update 1990, supra note 8, at 4, Strategies For Action, supra note 7, at 3. Miami
Dade Community College has been instrumental in setting up Phase III in Dade
County. Id.
206. Update 1990, supra note 8, at 4.
207. Drug Court Program, supra note 7; Diversion and Treatment Program: An
Overview, supra note 7, at 9 (Phase III in Dade last approximately thirty six weeks).
208. Diversion and Treatment Program: An Overview, supra note 7, at 11; Drug
Court Program, supra note 7.
209. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.3(c)
(1985)(nolle prosequi is a decision made by the prosecutor not to prosecute).
210. Telephone Interview with Judge Stanley Goldstein, supra note 179; Drug
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Comparatively, graduation from the Broward County Program is
not quite as rewarding as graduation from the Dade County Drug
Court Program. Upon graduating from the Broward County program,
a defendant's arrest records are sealed but the case against him or her
is not dismissed.212 Broward County State Attorney Michael Satz will
not nolle prose the case.21 Rather, the defendant receives a withheld
adjudication status as to the original charges which is not as significant
as a dismissal.2"
V1. PROGRAM RESULTS, COSTS AND FUNDING
The Drug Court is an example of the judiciary taking an active
role in the communities over which it presides. These judicially cre-
ated215 programs are helping the victims of drug abuse while at the
same time saving money and prison space for those who truly deserve
it, such as drug smugglers and dealers. The Dade and Broward County
Drug Court Programs are a small but very correct step toward the ju-
diciary becoming active in the community with respect to the adminis-
tration of justice.
The Broward County program began in July of 1991 and is still in
its early stages.216 As a result, no one has graduated the year long pro-
gram and a clear determination of success or failure is not yet possi-
ble.217 However, the prognosis is very good according to Judge Fogan,
who presides over the Drug Court by appointment.1 8 In fact, statistics
show that as of September 1991, 181 persons entered into the Broward
program while only seven persons dropped out or were removed. 1
Court April 1, 1991, supra note 8.
211. Telephone Interview with Judge Stanley Goldstein, supra note 179; May,
supra note 184, at 2B; Metromagazine, supra note 182.
212. Telephone Interview with Robert J. Fogan, supra note 187.
213. King, supra note 135, at 35.
214. Telephone interview with Judge Robert J. Fogan, supra note 187.
215. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. 89-9, supra note 127; ADMINISTRATIVE OR-
DER No. I11-91-E-1, supra note 127.
216. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. III-91-E-I, supra note 127.
217. Interview with Michael Rocque, supra note 171.
218. Telephone Interview with Judge Robert J. Fogan, supra note 187; see AD-
MINISTRATIVE ORDER No. III-91-E-1, supra note 127 (Judge Fogan was specifically
named in the order to preside over the Broward Drug Court).
219. Drug Court Program, supra note 7; Updated statistics have been compiled
through March, 1992. However, there are new categories which are now measured
making it impossible to calculate the success rate of the Broward County program in a
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Thus, there currently is a ninety-six percent success rate over the first
three months.
In contrast, the Dade County program has been operating for over
two years and its success can more accurately be measured.2 0 Accord-
ing to a recent update by the Dade County Office of Substance Abuse,
over 4000,persons have entered the Dade-County program while only
ten.percent have been re-arrested.221 In other words, the Dade County
program has a success rate of ninety percent. 2 As a result of this suc-
cess, State Attorney Janet Reno is attempting to establish a similar
program for defendants charged with driving under the influence of
alcohol.223
Funding, for the Dade County Drug Court comes from the Dade
County General Fund as well as Traffic Court revenues.224 Most re-
cently, funds have been collected from participants pursuant to the ad-
mini*strative order mentioned above. 2 1 The Dade County Office of Sub-
stance Abuse estimates the cost at approximately $500 per year, per
client which is paid from the sources just mentioned.226
The Broward County Drug Court is funded primarily by the
Broward County Sheriff's Office which has committed approximately
one million dollars from the Sheriff's Forfeiture Fund to the program
over the next three years.227 Moreover, funding for Broward County's
fashion similar to that of the first three months. It is noted, however, that there have
been no probation revocations since the program began in July, 1991. Drug Court
Treatment Program (April 13, 1992) (unpublished, non-paginated leaflet on file with
the Judicial Projects Administrator, Broward County Courthouse, Broward County,
Florida).
220. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. 89-9, supra note 127.
221. Drug Court: April 1, 1991, supra note 8.
222. ABC's. World News. Tonight with Peter Jennings: American Agenda (ABC
Television Broadcast, Mar. 24, 1992) (reporting that the Dade County success rate has
improved to 97 percent).
223. Marilyn Adams, Plan to Keep Drunk Drivers Out of Jail, MIAMI HERALD,
Dec. 16, 1991, at IB (citing a high repeat offender rate and jail overcrowding, Reno
anticipates similar success with the D.U.I. program). Just prior to the publication of
this article, plans to create the D.U.I. program in Dade County were dropped due to
information from similar pilot programs which indicated that success was not probable.
Telephone: Interview with Janet Reno, State Attorney, Dade County, Florida (Feb. 6,
1992).
224. Strategies for Action, supra note 7, at 5; Update 1990, supra note 8, at 2-3.
225. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. 90-9, supra note 127 (fees are based on abil-
ity to pay via a sliding scale).
226. Drug Court April 1, 1991, supra note 8.
227. Drug Court Program, supra note 7; Sheriff Navarro fully supports the Drug
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program comes from three additional sources: the Broward County
General Fund, the Broward County Commission on Substance Abuse
and jail population fines.228 Currently, other sources of funding are be-
ing investigated including possible state and federal grants.229
Because no one has completed the Broward County program, an
accurate yearly cost cannot be determined.2 13 However, Judge Fogan is
confident that the cost will be similar to the Dade County program's
cost and will be cheaper than sending defendants to prison or jail. 31
One estimate puts the Broward County program cost at $800 per year,
per client, as opposed to approximately $20,000 for a one year sentence
in the Broward County Jail2"2 or a state prison, which costs over
$14,000 per person, per year.233 Furthermore, the recidivism rate for
prison is almost fifty percent as compared to ten percent for Drug
Court which indicates that taxpayers are paying to incarcerate many of
the same people time and time again.23 4
This program enables a defendant to stay in the community and "con-
tribute to the tax base instead of deplet[ing] it. '"235
The Florida prison system has its own comprehensive treatment
program known as the "Tier Program. "236 The Tier Program is a four
Court program but considers it unfortunate that most people with drug problems get
arrested before they get help. Sheriff Nick Navarro, Phi Alpha Delta International
Law Fraternity Speakers' Forum, Address Before Nova Law Center Student Body
(Jan. 29, 1992).
228. Broward County Operating Budget, Dep't Health and Safety, Alcohol and
Drug Abuse Division, 7-9 (1992) (on file with Broward Alcohol Rehabilitation Center,
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida) (these sources have contributed unequal dollar amounts with
the largest coming from the Broward County General Fund). Jail population fines are
federal fines charged against the county for exceeding population limitations within the
county jail as prescribed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See FLA. STAT. §
951.23 (5)(a) (1991).
229. Drug Court Program, supra note 7.
230. Telephone Interview with Judge Robert J. Fogan, supra note 187.
231. Id.
232. Naftali Bendavid, New Drug Court Offers Alternative to Prison, MIAMI
HERALD, July 2, 1991, at 2BR.
233. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 66; Summary of Selected Financial
Data, supra note 31.
234. Id.; Drug Court April 1, 1991, supra note 8.
235. Metromagazine, supra note 182.
236. See G. Abbas Darabi, Substance Abuse Program, Tier Programs Outcome
Evaluation: A Recommitment Study (July 1991)(unpublished, on file with Florida De-
partment of Corrections, Bureau of Planning Research and Statistics); see also Dubail,
supra note 98, at 4A.
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phase (tier) drug treatment program that is run by the Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections and is available to prisoners in various prisons
throughout Florida.3 According to a recent study of the Tier Pro-
gram's effectiveness, of the inmates who go through the Tier Program,
twenty-six percent return to prison after an average of only nine
months in the community. 8 The return rate for inmates who did not
participate in this program is thirty-six percent after being out of
prison for over a year." This study was based on 2646 inmates who
left prison after participating in the program.2"" It is important to note
the fact that of those inmates who participated, only fifty-six percent
completed the program.2
11
Furthermore, statistics also reveal that the average Tier Program
participant did not have a high school diploma, yet there is no mention
of General Equivelency Diploma training for participants which is
available through the Drug Court program.2 4 The report suggests that
the Tier Program seems to be having an effect on the Florida Prison
system's forty-three percent prison recidivism rate.243 The figures do
not compare, however, to the success of the Drug Court Programs.
What the Tier Program statistics do not show is the availability of
that program to inmates. Increased enforcement has lead to prison
overcrowding, early releases and bed shortages. 4 With fewer beds
available and more offenders coming in, those in need of treatment will
only return again and again.24 5 Also, these problems will be aggravated
further by recent cuts in Florida's 1992 budget.240 The result is that
those in need of treatment will not be able to get it. Instead, those
suffering from the disease of addiction will be branded convicted felons
and released to the streets, drug addiction intact, without education,
employment or.the means to obtain either. The result is re-arrest and
237. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 18; Dubail, supra note 98, at 4A. See
generally Darabi, supra note 236.
238. Darabi, supra note 236, at 6, 9.




243. Darabi, supra note 236, at 13.
244. Dubail, supra note 98, at 4A.
245. King, supra note 135, at 34; May, supra note 104, at IA, 6A.
246. What the Legislature Did, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 13, 1991, at 33A (Florida
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another prison sentence. This is cruel, but becoming usual, punishment.
Punishing victims of drug addiction is not justice. Nor is such pun-
ishment cheap. For the cost of sending one person to prison for a year,
approximately thirty people can enter the Drug Court Program for a
year. If those thirty people went to prison, between eight and fourteen
of them would return to prison. If those thirty people went through the
Drug Court Program, approximately three would return to court. 217
VII. HURDLES; PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
The only opponent the Dade County Drug Court Program had
when it was first proposed was the Dade County Public Defender's Of-
fice.148 Defense attorneys representing their clients' best interests saw a
year of intrusive procedures that would be a hassle to go through in-
stead of the usual probation and time served available through a plea
bargain.2 ' 9 However, Judge Goldstein soon convinced defense attorneys
that getting their clients into treatment and out of the criminal justice
system was in the best interests of their clients.2 50
Similarly, attorneys resisted the Broward County Drug Court Pro-
gram as well.251 As the most significant opponent, there was (and still
is) State Attorney Michael Satz. 25 2 "Mr. Satz does not put cocaine
cases on diversion. '"253 Although Michael Satz eventually agreed to im-
plement the program, he will not authorize the nolle prose of cases for
the future graduates of the Broward County Drug Court Program as
does Dade State Attorney Janet Reno.2 5
The incentive for defendants of having their cases dismissed via
nolle prose is a key element of Dade County's success With the pro-
gram.2"5 "The fact that most now opt for the program tells Goldstein
that clearing their records and getting help for their addiction is too
247. See supra text accompanying notes 219-23.
248. Telephone Interview with Judge Stanley Goldstein, supra note 179.
249. Id.; May, supra note 189, at 2B; King, supra note 135, at 34.
250. Telephone Interview with Judge Stanley Goldstein, supra note 179.
251. Telephone Interview with Judge Robert J. Fogan, supra note 187; King,
supra note 135, at 35.
252. King, supra note 135, at 35.
253. Id. Diversion is a term that is used synonymously with pre-trial interven-
tion. Interview with Michael Rocque, supra note 171.
254. Telephone Interview with Judge Robert J. Fogan, supra note 187;
Bendavid, supra note 232, at 2BR; King, supra note 135, at 35.
255. May, supra note 189, at 2B.
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tempting to pass up."256 However, Judge Fogan cannot offer the same
incentive to defendants in Broward County. 5 7 A withheld adjudication
on a criminal charge in a state court "means the same thing as a con-
viction to federal government agencies which means people can't serve
in the military, get civil service jobs, and are repeat offenders for the
purposes of federal sentencing. They are second class citizens to the
federal government."" 8 Florida's statute permitting a trial judge to
withhold adjudication2" on a criminal charge is considered a conviction
by the federal courts for sentencing purposes.260 "Fogan worries that
this [refusal by the State Attorney to dismiss the cases against gradu-
ates] will remove a crucial incentive for drug users to sign up for the
program because most first time offenders get probation anyway, with-
out the hassle of attending treatment sessions."21
Another hurdle that the Broward County Program currently faces
involves cases in which defendants are charged with possession or
purchase of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school.26"  The sentence for
such a crime carries a minimum mandatory sentence of three years in
prison without parole. 6 In several cases throughout 1990 and 1991,
256. Id.
257. Telephone Interview with Judge Robert J. Fogan, supra note 187;
Bendavid, supra note 232, at 2BR; King, supra note 135, at 35.
258. Telephone Interview with Judge Robert J. Fogan, supra note 187; see 10
U.S.C. § 504 (1990)(Persons not qualified) (persons convicted of a felony are disquali-
fied from service with the armed forces); see also Department of the Army, Personnel
Procurement, Regular Army and Army Reserve Enlistment Program 38 ARMY REG.
601-210, Ch. 4 § III subsec. 4-13(c) (1991) (other adverse disposition) (previous en-
rollment in a PTI program or record expungement may disqualify an enlistee as if
convicted of a felony).
259. FLA. STAT. § 921.187(b)(1).(1991)(Disposition and sentencing; alternatives;
restitution).
260. See United States v. Jones, 910 F.2d 760 (11 th Cir. 1990)(withheld adjudi-
cation in a state court considered conviction for career criminal sentencing purposes);
Chong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 890 F.2d 284 (1 th Cir. 1989)(de-
portation of Defendant affirmed because withheld adjudication and probation for drug
possession considered a conviction); United States v. Grinkiewics, 873 F.2d 253 (1 1th
Cir. 1989)(Defendant considered to be a convicted felon under federal firearms statute
even though state court withheld adjudication); United States v. Bruscantini, 761 F.2d
640 (Ilth Cir. 1985)(withheld adjudication in state court considered conviction even
though Defendant plead nolo contendere).
261. Bendavid, supra note 232, at 2BR.
262. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(e)(1) (1991); Telephone Interview with Judge Robert
J. Fogan, supra note 187; Interview with Michael Rocque, supra note 171.
263. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(e)(1) (1991).
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Broward County circuit judges have sentenced defendants charged with
school zone offenses to probation and treatment, only to have the cases
remanded back to the circuit court for resentencing in accordance with
the mandatory minimum as a result of appeals by the State
Attorney.2"'
Unlike Judge Fogan, Judge Goldstein does not have this problem
in Dade County based upon his "agreement" with State Attorney Janet
Reno. 2 " Judge Goldstein simply places all first offenders in the pro-
gram and the State does not appeal. 2" Judge Fogan refers to State
Attorney Reno as "enlightened. '"217
In Broward County no such agreement with the State Attorney
exists.2 68 According to Judge Mark Speizer, Administrative Judge of
Broward's Criminal Division and Drug Court Program organizer, "the
success of the Drug Court requires the cooperation of the D.A."' "
Judge Speizer also points out that the Dade County program is a "true
diversion or PTI program" while the Broward program is in effect
"merely a condition of probation. 270 In the future, Judge Fogan hopes
to have the discretion to dismiss the cases of defendants who success-
fully complete the Drug Court Program." 1 However, in order for this
to occur, the current PTI statute must be amended. 72 That statute
gives the state attorney the discretion to go forward with the prosecu-
264. See State v. Bernadin, 591 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State
v. Kalogeras, 587 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Greisdorf, 587 So.
2d 1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Scates, 585 So. 2d 385 (Fla 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1991); State v. Baxter, 581 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); see
also Tom Davidson, Man Must Serve Three Year Term, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 22,
1991, at 5B. But see State v. Regan, 564 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1990)(court affirmed downward departure to probation due to unreasonable conduct of
arresting officer who lured Defendant closer to school). Judge Fogan has recently de-
clared section 893.13(e)(1) unconstitutional. See State v. Williams, No. 91-
8361CFIOA (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 1991)(order granting motion to dismiss).
265. Telephone Interview with Judge Stanley Goldstein, supra note 179.
266. Id.
267. Telephone Interview with Judge Robert J. Fogan, supra note 187.
268. Id.
269. Telephone Interview with Judge Mark Speizer, Administrative Judge,
Criminal Division, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida (Nov. 14,
1991).
270. Id.
271. Telephone interview with Judge Robert J. Fogan, supra note 187; Interview
with Michael Rocque, supra note 171.
272. Telephone Interview with Judge Robert J. Fogan, supra note 187; Interview
with Michael Rocque, supra note 171.
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tion or to drop the charges. 7 In order to amend the statute, Judge
Fogan has enlisted the aid of various professionals, such as law profes-
sors, who have engaged in a letter writing campaign in order to gain
support from Florida lawmakers. 7 Clearing this hurdle will give Judge
Fogan the discretion he needs to make the Broward County program as
successful as the program in Dade County. 75
The success that Dade County has experienced with the Drug
Court Program has lead other cities throughout the nation to try the
program as well .27  However, in the face of this success, the programs
in Dade and Broward County are facing what is perhaps the greatest
hurdle--survival. Although both Florida Attorney General Robert A.
Butterworth and Florida Governor Lawton Chiles have expressed their
approval of the programs, there may be trouble ahead.27 Even though
there are current ongoing investigations concerning funding2 78 the
273. FLA. STAT. § 948.08 (1991).
274. Telephone Interview with Judge Robert J, Fogan, supra note 187; Letter
from Judge Robert J. Fogan, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida to
Steven J. Wisotsky, Professor of Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law
(Oct. 24, 1991)(on file with Judge Fogan at the Broward County Courthouse, Broward
County, Florida); Letter from Steven Wisotsky, Professor of Law, Nova University
Center for the Study of Law to Rep. Bill Clark, Florida House of Representatives
(Dec. 26, 1991)(on file with Judge Fogan at the Broward County Courthouse, Broward
County, Florida); Letter from Randi Burger, Judicial Projects Administrator, Seven-
teenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida to Ms. Susan Bisby, House Criminal
Justice Committee, Florida House of Representatives (Oct. 18, 1991)(on file with
Judge Fogan at the Broward County Courthouse, Broward County, Florida); Letter
from M. Thomas Adkins, Jr., Criminal Justice Lobbyist to Judge Robert J. Fogan,
Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida (Dec. 27, 1991).
275. Telephone Interview with Janet Reno, supra note 223; Telephone Interview
with Judge Stanley Goldstein; supra note 179 (neither Reno, nor Judge Goldstein sup-
port the proposed change of the PTI statute because they believe that discretion to
nolle prose a case should rest with the prosecution).
276. May, supra note 189, at 2B (comments from officials in Nevada and Ohio
who have initiated similar programs); Drug Court April 1, 1991, supra note 8.
277. Letter from Lawton Chiles, Governor, Florida State to Judge Robert J.
Fogan, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida (June 18, 1991)(on file
with Judge Fogan at the Broward County Courthouse, Broward County, Florida); Let-
ter from Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Florida State to Judge Robert J.
Fogan, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida (July 22, 1991)(on file
with Judge Fogan at the Broward County Courthouse, Broward County, Florida.
278. Strategies For Action, supra note 7, at 5; Drug Court April 1, 1991, supra
note 8; Drug Court Program, supra note 7.
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Drug Court program may come to a swift halt if funding sources can-
not be obtained.279
VIII. CONCLUSION
In 1764, it was written that in order to be effective, "there must be
a proper proportion between crimes and punishment."2 ' In other
words, the punishment must fit the crime. Therefore, if one is arrested
for the crime of possession of illegal substances as a direct and involun-
tary result of suffering from the disease of addiction, the best and most
fitting "punishment" would be the treatment of the underlying disease
as opposed to punishing the possession crime which is merely a
symptom.
This question is, perhaps, best left to the courts. It follows that if
the courts must make law through precedent, then they must also act
in other ways that effect the communities in which they sit. For the
criminal defendant, a court may be the only thing that stands between
that defendant and liberty (and sometimes life). Given this power,
judges should take an active role in their communities.
The crime is possession of narcotics caused by the disease of drug
addiction. For too long, the courts have been focusing on the addict
instead of the addiction, incarcerating the diseased instead of arresting
the disease. To do so, the courts must become active in their communi-
ties so that more Drug Court Programs can be set up. In an era when
spending too much money makes little sense, the Drug Court is a finan-
cial as well as a human remedy.
Drug Court is not a cure for the ills of the world, and it cannot
provide an answer to the nation's nightmare with drugs. However, what
it can, and does, do is end the nightmare of addiction in a cost effective
way for those who are willing to try to make it work. So far, about
ninety percent have been so willing.
Michael E. Coviello
279. Metromagazine, supra note 182.
280. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 62 (Henry Paolucci
trans., Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing Co.,inc., 1963) (1764).
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In Booth v. Maryland,1 the United States Supreme Court decided
that evidence relating to a victim's character and the extent of harm
caused to the victim's family and community was inadmissible to deter-
1. 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled in part by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct.
2597 (1991) (overruling Booth as to a victim's character and the extent of harm to the
victim's family and community).
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mine whether a defendant convicted of a capital crime should be put to
death. The majority in Booth, while empathizing with the grief of a
victim's family, recognized the potential danger such evidence has on a
jury to sentence defendants to death based on such arbitrary factors as
what kind of person the victim was and the unforeseeable harm the
victim's death had on others. The Court held that the Eighth Amend-
ment2 required a per se rule against victim impact evidence because it
could lead to the imposition of death for "arbitrary and capricious"
reasons which are not relevant to the defendant's blameworthiness.3
Subsequently, the Court applied the same reasoning to prevent prose-
cutors from presenting similar victim impact evidence in South Caro-
lina v. Gathers.4
However, in Payne v. Tennessee,5 under the lead of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Court overruled Gathers and Booth, and determined
that victim impact evidence was relevant and necessary to assess the
defendant's "moral culpability and blameworthiness."' In effect, the
Court held that victims' families and prosecutors should be able to tell
the jury at sentencing that defendants deserve the death penalty be-
cause their victim was "a religious man and registered voter,"7 or the
victim's family "received over one thousand sympathy cards, some from
total strangers. "8
Payne v. Tennessee is significant for a number of reasons. First,
considering the current conservative judiciary, the return of victim im-
pact statements bodes ill for opponents of capital punishment; the re-
sult is the potential for a significant rise in the number of death
sentences. Second, Payne creates the risk that capital sentencing will
turn into "a kind of 'moral postmortem' on the relative worth of the
deceased," 9 and, strategically, defendants may be compelled to wage
their own offensive against the presumed good name of the victim, set-
2. The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
3. Booth, 482 U.S. at 503.
4. 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597
(1991).
5. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
6. Id. at 2608.
7. State v. Gathers, 369 S.E.2d 140, 144 (S.C. 1988).
8. Booth, 482 U.S. at 499, n.3.
9. Mark Hansen, Limiting Death Row Appeals - Final Justice, 78 A.B.A. J.
64, 67 (1992) (quoting unnamed experts and death-penalty litigators).
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ting the stage for a drawn out mini-trial into the victim's character.
Finally, defendants may be sentenced to death over life imprisonment
based primarily on the relative social worth and popularity of their vic-
tims and juries may be swayed to impose death based on the eloquence
of family members' and their testimonials of grief rather than the de-
fendant's character and the circumstances of the crime.
This Comment analyses the arguments of the Court in Payne and
concludes that the Court decided Payne wrongly because evidence re-
lating to a victim's character and the extent of harm to the victim's
family is legally irrelevant and creates an impermissible risk of impos-
ing the death sentence in an "arbitrary and capricious" fashion.10 Fur-
thermore, this Comment explores an alternative view of Payne and sug-
gests that the Court could have avoided overruling the sound holdings
in Booth and Gathers by affirming the Tennessee Supreme Court's
death sentence based on the relevant evidence directly relating to the
"circumstances of the crime""1 and under harmless error analysis. Ad-
ditionally, this Comment will review relevant Florida case law devel-
oped since Booth and Gathers and discuss the effect Payne has had on
Florida's standard of review for use of victim impact statements at a
capital trial.
II. PA YNE V. TENNESSEE
A. Facts
On Saturday, June 27, 1987, Pervis Payne ("Payne") visited the
upstairs apartment of his girlfriend with the expectation of her return
from her mother's home in Arkansas." Finding her not home, Payne
returned several times throughout the day, and on one visit left his
overnight bag in the hall. In between visits, Payne spent much of the
day drinking beer and injecting cocaine with a friend while driving
around town.
Later that afternoon, Payne returned to the apartment and, find-
ing his girlfriend not home, went across the hall to the apartment of
28-yea:r-old Charisse Christopher and her two young children, two-
year-old daughter Lacie and three-year-old son Nicholas.13 Desiring
10. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 503.
11. Id. at 507 n.10.
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sex, Payne became violent after Charisse thwarted his advances, and a
struggle ensued. Using a butcher knife from the kitchen, Payne bru-
tally attacked the family and murdered Charisse and Lacie - Charisse
died as a result of eighty-four wounds to the abdomen, arms, and
hands, while Lacie sustained mortal wounds to the chest, head, abdo-
men, and back. Miraculously, Nicholas survived despite numerous
wounds that penetrated his entire body.
During the struggle, the neighbor in the apartment below called
the police after hearing screams from the Christopher apartment.14 As
the first officer arrived, Payne was descending the stairs covered with
blood. Payne first stated to the officer that he was the "complainant"
and then suddenly struck the officer with his overnight bag and fled. He
was arrested a day later hiding. in a friend's attic, claiming: "Man, I
ain't killed no woman." 15
B. Procedural Background
The Tennessee trial court convicted Payne on two counts of first
degree murder for Charisse and Lacie, and one count of assault with
attempt to commit murder in the first degree for Nicholas. 6 During
the sentencing phase of the trial, Payne presented the testimony of four
witnesses in an effort to mitigate punishment.' 7 Payne's parents testi-
fied that Payne was a "good son" with no prior criminal or arrest rec-
ord or "history with alcohol or drug abuse"; Payne's girlfriend testified
that she met Payne at church and that he was "a very caring person"
who "devoted much time and attention to her three children" and be-
lieved he was incapable of having committed such crimes; and Dr. Hus-
ton, who testified as an expert in "criminal court evaluation work,"
stated that Payne was "'mentally handicapped'" based on IQ test
scores and was "the most polite person he had ever met."18
The State presented the testimony of Charisse's mother who de-
scribed how Nicholas had been traumatized by the loss of his mother
and sister. 19 During closing argument, the prosecutor, arguing for the
14. Id.
15. Payne, I1I S. Ct. at 2602.
16. Id. at 2601,
17. Id. at 2602. Payne's mother, father, and girlfriend, and Dr. John T. Huston,
a clinical psychologist, all testified on Payne's behalf. Id.
18. Id. at 2602-2603.
19. Payne, Il1 S. Ct. at 2603. Charisse's mother testified:
[Nicholas] cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why she
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death penalty, spoke of the character of the victims and the continuing
effects their murder had on Nicholas and the families involved.20
doesn't come home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to me
many times during the week and asks me, Grandma, do you miss my
Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I'm worried about Lacie.
Id.
20. Id. During closing argument and rebuttal, the prosecutor stated:
But we do know that Nicholas was alive. And Nicholas was in the
same room. Nicholas was still conscious. His eyes were open. He re-
sponded to the paramedics. He was able to follow their directions. He was
able to hold his intestines in as he was carried to the ambulance. So he
knew what happened to his mother and baby sister.
There is nothing you can do to ease the pain of any of the families
involved in this case. There is nothing you can do to ease the pain of Ber-
nice or Carl Payne, and that's a tragedy. There is nothing you can do
basically to ease the pain of Mr. and Mrs. Zvolanek, and that's a tragedy.
They will have to live with it the rest of their lives. There obviously is
nothing you can do for Charisse or Lacie Jo. But there is something you
can do for Nicholas.
Somewhere down the road Nicholas is going to grow up, hopefully.
He's going to want to know what happened. And he is going to know what
happened to his baby sister and his mother. He is going to want to know
what type of justice was done. He is going to want to know what hap-
pened. With your verdict, you will provide the answer ....
You saw the videotape this morning. You saw what Nicholas Christo-
pher will carry in his mind forever. When you talk about cruel, when you
talk about atrocious, and when you talk about heinous, that picture will
always come into your mind, probably throughout the rest of your lives
No one will ever know about Lacie Jo because she never had the
chance to grow up. Her life was taken from her at the age of two years
old. So, no there won't be a high school principal to talk about Lacie Jo
Christopher, and there won't be anybody there to take her to her high
school prom. And there won't be anybody there-there won't be his
mother there or Nicholas' mother there to kiss him at night. His mother
will never kiss him goodnight or pat him as he goes off to bed, or hold him
and sing him a lullaby.
[Petitioner's attorney] wants you to think about a good reputation,
people who love the defendant and things about him. He doesn't want you
to think about the people who love Charisse Christopher, her mother and
daddy who loved her. The people who loved little Lacie Jo, the grandpar-
ents who are, still here. The brother who mourns for her every single day
:and wants to know where his best little playmate is. He doesn't have any-
body to watch cartoons with him, a little one. These are the things that go
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The jury sentenced Payne to death on each count of murder.21
Payne appealed, contending that the grandmother's testimony and the
prosecutor's closing argument were constitutionally impermissible and
conflicted directly with the Supreme Court's holdings in Booth22 and
Gathers,23 respectively. The majority in both cases24 held that the in-
clusion of victim impact statements at capital sentencing created an
unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the death penalty in an
"arbitrary and capricious" manner in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.25
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld Payne's
conviction and death sentence, stating that the grandmother's testi-
mony, while "'technically irrelevant,'. . . did not create a constitution-
ally unacceptable risk of an arbitrary imposition of the death penalty,
and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' "26 The Tennessee Su-
Id.
21. Id. at 2601. Payne was sentenced also to 30 years for the assault with at-
tempt to commit murder on Nicholas Christopher. Id.
22. The trial court in Booth convicted the defendant on two counts of first degree
murder and sentenced him to die for the stabbing death of one of his victims. Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 501 (1987), overruled in part by Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S.
Ct. 2597 (1991). The Court held that the Maryland statute requiring a victim impact
statement (describing the emotional impact on the victims' family, the character of the
victims, and the family members' opinion on the crimes and character of the accused)
in a presentence report used by the jury during the sentencing phase of a capital mur-
der trial, violated the defendant's Eighth Amendment rights. Id. at 498-509.
23. In Gathers, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced
to death for beating and stabbing a victim to death in a park. Gathers v. South Caro-
lina, 490 U.S. 805, 807-808 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597
(1991). During sentencing, the prosecutor presented no evidence other than comments
about the victim's character as "'a religious man and a registered voter.' " Id. at 810
(quoting State v. Gathers, 369 S.E.2d 140, 144 (S.C. 1988)). The Court reasoned that
statements about a victim's character posed the same risk of arbitrary sentencing
whether the source is the victim's family or the prosecutor; therefore, the Court held
that evidence of victim character presented by the prosecution during capital sentenc-
ing violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 810-812.
24. In Booth, Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, which Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens joined. Booth, 482 U.S. at 497. In Gathers,
Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices White, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 805-806. Justice White filed a
brief concurring opinion where he stated that unless Booth was to be overruled, he
would join the majority. Id. at 812 (White, J. concurring).
25. Booth, 482 U.S. at 503-509; Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810-812.
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preme court reasoned further that the prosecutor's comments concern-
ing the victims' personal characteristics and the emotional harm to the
families involved were "'relevant to [Payne's] personal responsibility
and moral guilt'" and not prejudicial under harmless error analysis.2 1
C. United States Supreme Court Opinion
1. Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,28 began the
Payne opinion by attacking what the Court believed were the two main
premises underlying the holdings in Booth and Gathers: (1) evidence
relating to a victim's character or the effect of the crime on a victim's
family does not reflect on a victim's "blameworthiness" and (2) only
evidence that is relevant to "blameworthiness" is permissible at the
sentencing phase of a capital trial.2  The Court, nonetheless, claimed
that "an assessment of harm caused by a defendant" has always been
of relevant concern throughout the history of the criminal law, and al-
though the principles that shape punishments to fit crimes have varied,
the sentencing authority has always possessed great latitude in consid-
ering relevant evidence."0 Along these lines, the Court argued that
merely because victim impact statements are "of recent origin, this fact
hardly renders [them] . ..unconstitutional.""
The Court next explained that the Booth majority simply misread
27. Id.
28. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Souter joined. Payne, Il1 S. Ct. at 2601. Jus-
tice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices White and Kennedy joined.
Id. at 2611 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion, in
part 11 of which Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined. Id. at 2613 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). Justice Souter filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kennedy joined. Id.
at 2614 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Marshall and Stevens both filed dissenting
opinions, in which Justice Blackmun joined. Payne, I1l S. Ct. at 2619, 2625 (Mar-
shall, Stevens, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
29. Id. at 2605. Evidence about the victim and victim's family were "factors
about which the defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant to the decision to
kill," Booth, 482 U.S. at 505; therefore, this evidence has no bearing on the "blame-
worthiness of a particular defendant." Id. at 504.
30. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605-2606.
31. Id. at 2606; see, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (upholding the
constitutionality of a Florida notice-of-alibi rule, similar to recent enactments by at
least 15 other states).
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the holding in Woodson v. North Carolina,32 the principal case on
which the majority relied. 3 The Court asserted that Woodson only ad-
dressed the issue that mitigating evidence about the defendant's life
and character must not be excluded during the sentencing phase of a
capital trial3 4 because such evidence necessarily shows the defendant as
"'a uniquely individual human being.' "35 "The language quoted from
Woodson in the Booth opinion was not intended to describe a class of
evidence that could not be received, but a class of evidence which must
be received." 36 Therefore, this "misreading of precedent in Booth has
. ..unfairly weighted the scales in a capital trial"37 in favor of the
defendant and at the expense of the victim, the victim's family, and the
community. This argument presumes that a capital trial is a level play-
ing field where each side has equal resources and stakes in the out-
come. However, nothing could be further from the truth: the defendant
is fighting for his life against the state and all it potentially limitless
resources in a criminal prosecution.
The Court also addressed the concerns of the Booth majority that
admitting evidence of the victim's character during the sentencing
phase would create a mini-trial on the victim's character and divert the
attention of the jury away from the defendant and the circumstances of
32. 428 U.S 280 (1976).
33. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2606-2607.
34. Id. at 2607. Woodson asserted that "in capital cases the fundamental respect
for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the
character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular
offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death." Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (emphasis added).
35. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2606-2607 (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 504 (quoting
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304)). The Court in Woodson held that a North Carolina
mandatory death penalty statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
because:
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character
and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular
offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of
death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from
the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons convicted of a des-
ignated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members
of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of
the penalty of death.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
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the crime.38 In addition, the Court considered the Booth majority's ar-
gument that juries would dole out the death penalty based on the com-
parative worth of the individual to the community.39
The Court first explained that while risk of a mini-trial exists,
such evidence about the victim's character is likely to be before the
jury during the guilt phase regardless, and "for tactical reasons, it
might not be prudent for the defense to rebut victim impact evidence
... "40 Second, evidence of a victim's character is not offered to show
"comparative judgments" of a victim's worth to society,"' but is
'designed to show instead each victim's 'uniqueness as an individual
human being,' whatever the jury might think the loss to the community
resulting from his death might be."'42 While this reasoning may explain
the purpose of victim impact evidence, it fails to address the obvious
issue: the effect such evidence has on a jury. Common sense and logic
about human nature dictates that a jury would be less inclined to dole
out harsh punishment if, for example, the victim was a convicted felon
as opposed to a priest.
Due to the Court's inherent criterion in both the Booth and Gath-
ers decisions, the Payne majority expressly overruled the holdings in
Booth and Gathers because the extent of harm to the victim, the vic-
tim's family or community is necessary "to assess meaningfully the de-
38. Id. The Booth majority noted:
[T]he defendant presumably would be permitted to put on evidence that
the victim was of dubious moral character, was unpopular, or was ostra-
cized from his family. The prospect of a 'mini-trial' on the victim's charac-
ter is more than simply unappealing; it could well distract the sentencing
jury from its constitutionally required task-determining whether the
death penalty is appropriate in light of the background and record of the
accused and the particular circumstances of the crime.
Booth, 482 U.S. at 507.
39. Payne, I Il S. Ct. at 2607; see also id. at 2620, 2626 (Marshall and Stevens,
JJ., dissenting). The Booth Court stressed that there exists no "justification for permit-
ting [imposition of the death penalty] . . . to turn on the perception that the victim
was a sterling member of the community rather than someone of questionable charac-
ter." Booth, 482 U.S. at 506. In footnote eight, the Court provided: "We are troubled
by the implication that defendants whose victims were assets to their community are
more deserving of punishment than those whose victims are perceived to be less worthy.
Of course, our system of justice does not tolerate such distinctions." Id. at 506 n.8.
40. Payne, 11l S. Ct. at 2607. The Court borrows the Booth majority's opinion
that raises the question of "the strategic risks of attacking the victim's character before
the jury" during the sentencing phase of the trial. Booth, 482 U.S. at 507.
41. Payne, 11l S. Ct. at 2607.
42. Id. (emphasis in the original).
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fendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness. 14 3 The Court argued
that proscribing victim impact statements that relate to the extent of
harm to a murdered victim's family and community "deprive[s] the
State of the full moral force of its evidence and may prevent the jury
from having before it all the information necessary to determine the
proper punishment for a first-degree murder."" Thus, the Court agreed
with the Supreme Court of Tennessee that the testimony of Nicholas'
grandmother and the closing comments by the prosecutor illustrated
the extent of the harm caused by Payne, and "that there is nothing
unfair about allowing the jury to bear in mind that harm at the same
time as it considers the mitigating evidence introduced by the
defendant. '45
The Court further justified the introduction of victim impact evi-
dence by asserting the high deference afforded the states in matters
relating to crimes against state law, punishments, and procedures.46 In
spite of the holding in Booth, the Court noted, without any justifica-
tion, that victim impact statements serve a "legitimate purpose" of the
states, 7 and do not lead to an arbitrary imposition of the death penalty
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.48
In explaining its criticism of Booth and Gathers and enumerating
43. Id. at 2608. In a separate footnote, the limitations to the scope of Payne's
overruling of Booth and Gathers states that:
Our holding today is limited to . . .evidence and argument relating to the
victim and the impact of the victim's death on the victim's family ....
Booth also held that the admission of a victim's family members' charac-
terizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropri-
ate sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. No evidence of the latter
sort was presented at the trial in this case.
Id. at 2611 n.2.
44. Id. at 2608.
45. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609.
46. Id. at 2607-2608.
47. Id. at 2608; see also Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting). Justice
White stated:
[T]he State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evi-
dence which the defendant is entitled to put in, see, e.g., Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), by reminding the sentencer that just as
the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an
individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular
to his family.
Id.
48. Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2608.
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an apparent new standard for stare decisis, 9 the Court explained that
while stare decisis is the "preferred course,"50 it is less so in "constitu-
tional cases" and in matters "involving procedural and evidentiary
rules" where reliance interests are not at their "acme." 51 The Court
intimated that merely because Booth and Gathers were decided by
"the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents challenging the basic
underpinnings of those decisions,"52 future 5-4 decisions of the Court
are ripe for reconsideration and review. The Court attempted to rebut
the dissenters' arguments about stare decisis by citing reference to
thirty-three cases overruled in whole or part during the last twenty
terms of the Court."3
2. Concurring Opinions
Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Souter each filed concurring opin-
ions in Payne5 and raised their own distinct arguments in favor of vic-
tim impact statements in capital offense trials and for overruling Booth
and Gathers.5 5 Specifically, Justice O'Connor argued that the states are
49. See, e.g., David 0. Stewart, Four Spirited Dissenters, 77 A.B.A. J. 40
(1991).
50. Payne, Il1 S. Ct. at 2609. "Stare decisis ...promotes the evenhanded,
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process."
Id. (emphasis original).
51. Id. at 2610. The Court clarified that stare decisis is not "an inexorable com-
mand," especially in constitutional cases where "'correction through legislative action
is practically impossible' " (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,
407 (19:32) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); furthermore, "[c]onsiderations in favor of stare
decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance
interests are involved .... " Payne, 11l S. Ct. at 2610 (emphasis original).
52. Id. at 2610-2611.
53. Id. at 2610-2611 n.l. However, the Court failed to note that "the average
age of the overruled precedents in those cases was 40 years, while Payne overruled a 2-
year-old precedent." Stewart, supra note 49, at 41.
54. In Booth, Justice White filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined. Booth, 482 U.S. at 515 (White, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White and O'Connor joined. Id. at 519 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
In Gathers, Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 812 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). Justice Scalia filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 823 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
55. Id. at 2611-2619 (O'Connor, Scalia, and Souter, JJ., concurring).
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free to justly determine whether victim impact statements should be
allowed as relevant evidence in a sentencing proceeding to show the
extent of harm to the victim's family and community. 56 Juries should
be allowed to see " 'a quick glimpse' " of the character of victims to
remind them of their uniqueness as human beings.57
Starting with the premise that victim impact statements are "po-
tentially relevant, '58 Justice O'Connor asserted that the Eighth
Amendment narrowly limits punishments which are " 'either inherently
cruel or which so offend the moral consensus of this society as to be
deemed 'cruel and unusual.' "59 Victim impact statements, therefore,
do not implicate Eighth Amendment protection primarily because soci-
etal consensus advocates their use, given the recent rise in victim im-
pact legislation.6"
Also, according to the concurrence, due process under the Four-
teenth Amendment affords defendants "appropriate relief" against the
threat of arbitrary sentencing. 61 Furthermore, the statements brought
before the jury in Payne did not violate due process because Charisse's
mother's "brief statement did not inflame their passions more than did
the facts of the crime,' '62 nor did the prosecutor's comments, as the
jury had already seen a videotape of the murder scene.63
In contrast, Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, reiterated his
fundamental opposition to the Court's previous pronouncement that de-
fendants are constitutionally entitled to introduce all relevant mitigat-
ing evidence during sentencing for a capital offense.6 However,'Justice
Scalia went a step further by stating that even if this precedent did not
exist or was overruled, 5 he would still affirm Payne because the Eighth
56. Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2611 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57. Id. (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2611-2612 (quoting South Carolina v. Gathers; 490 U.S. 805, 821
(1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
60. Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2612. However, Justice O'Connor pointed out that vic-
tim impact statements can be excluded and are subject to appellate review when they




64. See id. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring).
65. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 876-877 (1982) (state statute
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Amendment provides adequate latitude for society to decide "what is a
crime and what constitutes aggravation and mitigation of a crime." 66
Evidently, Justice Scalia sees no inherent problem in a capital sentenc-
ing proceeding where the defendant is prohibited by state law to pre-
sent mitigating evidence but the state is permitted to introduce victim
impact evidence.
-Justice Scalia also advanced his own views on stare decisis. He
began by quoting dissenting Justice Marshall's own writings on the
subject: " '[Stare decisis] is not 'an imprisonment of reason.' "67 By
declaring that Booth "defied reason" and "harms our criminal justice
system and is egregiously wrong,"6 8 Justice Scalia concluded his opin-
ion with a claim that Booth itself defied the principles underlying stare
decisis:
A decision of this Court [i.e., Booth] which, while not overruling a
prior holding, nonetheless announces a novel rule, contrary to long
and unchallenged practice, and pronounces it to be the Law of the
Land-such a decision, no less than an explicit overruling, should
be approached with great caution. It was, I suggest, Booth, and not
today's decision, that compromised the fundamental values under-
lying the doctrine of stare decisis."
Likewise, while not one of the original "spirited" dissenters in
Booth and Gathers,0 Justice Souter concurred with the majority by
arguing that Booth and Gathers were properly overruled because the
Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar against victim impact state-
66. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring). Presumably, Justice
Scalia does not put much stock in the majority's argument that victim impact state-
ments are necessary for a fair and balanced proceeding. See id. at 2607 (the exclusion
of victim impact evidence has "unfairly weighted the scales in a capital trial").
67. Id. at 2613 (quoting from Guardians Assn. v. Civil Service Comm'n of New
York City, 463 U.S. 582, 618 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States
v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 249 (1955) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2614 (emphasis original). The concurrence explained that stare decisis
"is merely the application to judicial precedents of a more general principle that the
settled practices and expectations of a democratic society should generally not be dis-
turbed by the courts. It is hard to have a genuine regard for stare decisis without
honoring that more general principle as well." Id. at 2613-2614 (emphasis original).
70. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy,
O'Connor, and Scalia, JJ., dissenting); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 497 (1987)
(Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, Scalia, and White, JJ., dissenting).
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ments.7' Justice Souter noted that a victim's uniqueness necessarily in-
cludes a group of people close to the victim who are harmed as a result
of the murderer's criminal act, and it is that foreseeability that makes
their harm morally relevant to punishment.72 He further echoed the
fear of the majority that excluding such evidence would create an un-
balanced proceeding, given the defendant's right to present all relevant
mitigating evidence. 78
Justice Souter asserted that Booth was decided wrongly not
merely on constitutional grounds, but on the basis that it created an
"unworkable standard" for admissibility of relevant evidence and un-
dermined "individualized sentencing" for capital defendants. 7' The
concurrence explained that evidence relating to a victim's character
and the emotional harm to the victim's family, in most cases, will be
brought out during the guilt phase of the trial and, consequently, al-
ready will be in the minds of the jury during sentencing. 75 In fact, by
strictly adhering to Booth, courts would be compelled to exclude such
evidence as irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, thereby depriving jurors
of "details of context" and requiring states to impanel a new sentencing
jury."6 This result is an impractical evidentiary barrier and an unwar-
ranted imposition on the states. 77 However, this analysis by Justice
Souter undermines his argument: if a victim's character and the emo-
tional harm to the victim's family is already in the minds of the jury
during sentencing, why does it bear repeating through testimony from
the victim's family or the prosecutor? In fact, the repititioned cumula-
tive effect is what creates the impermissible risk of an arbitrary or ca-
pricious sentencing.
For Justice Souter, this "unresolved tension between evidentiary
standards ' 78 at the guilt and sentencing phase provided "'special justi-
fication' "1 to thwart stare decisis and overrule precedent: "Booth
promises more than it can deliver" which is "a sentencing determina-
71. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2614 (Souter, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 2615.
73. Id. at 2616; see also Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting).
74. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2616 (Souter, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 2617.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2618.
79. Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2618 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Arizona v. Rum-
sey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
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tion free from the consideration of facts unknown to the defendant and
irrelevant to his decision to kill."8 With contorted logic, Justice Souter
concluded by arguing that Booth, not Payne, "create[s] a risk of arbi-
trary results."81
3. Dissenting Opinions
Justice Marshall, in his last opinion as a Supreme Court Justice,
dissented from the majority in Payne by arguing primarily the principle
of stare decisis. Justice Marshall harshly criticized the present Court's
"staggering" and "radical" approach to subverting constitutional pre-
cedent: "Power, not reason, is the new currency of this Court's deci-
sionmaking." 2 "The majority today sends a clear signal that scores of
established constitutional liberties are now ripe for reconsideration,
thereby inviting the very type of open defiance of our precedents that
the majority rewards in this case."8" By exposing the Court's true moti-
vation behind Payne, Justice Marshall stated that Booth and Gathers
were overruled not because of flawed principles, but merely because the
Court's membership has changed since they were decided. "
Justice Marshall argued that the majority failed to present "the
type of' extraordinary showing that this court has historically demanded
80. Id. at 2618.
81. id.
82. Id. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall is, of course, refer-
ring to the recent changes in the Court's personnel which has resulted in a staunchly
conservative Supreme Court with Chief Justice Rehnquist at the helm as its primary
driving force. See Marcia Coyle, Complete Control: In 1990-'91, Rehnquist Was at the
Helm of a Solidly Conservative Supreme Court, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19, 1991, at SI.
The recent appointment of conservative Justice Clarence Thomas to the Supreme
Court only accentuates Justice Marshall's concern. But see Fred Strasser and Marcia
Coyle, Still Searching for the Real Clarence Thomas, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 30, 1991, at
26 (Clarence Thomas' endorsement of Justice Marshall's views on stare decisis in
Payne and his comments that: "You simply cannot, because you have the votes, begin
to change the rules.").
83. Payne, Il1 S. Ct. at 2619 (referring to the Supreme Court of Tennessee's
blatant rejection of the Booth and Gathers precedents); see State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d
10, 18-19 (Tenn. 1990).
84. Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting). After Booth was de-
cided in 1987, Justice Powell resigned from the Court and was replaced by Justice
Kennedy. After Gathers was decided in 1989, Justice Brennan resigned in 1990 and
was replaced by Justice Souter. Since Payne, Justice Marshall has resigned and Clar-
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before overruling one of its precedents."8 Citing the traditional bases
that justify overturning precedent,86 Justice Marshall concluded that
the majority not only failed to provide such bases, but illustrated "its
radical assertion that it need not even try. ''87
Justice Marshall ended his dissent by foreshadowing the demise of
numerous cases decided by a 5-4 margin,88 predicting that the Court's
"short-sided strategy for effecting change in the constitutional order"89
"invites state actors to renew the very policies deemed unconstitutional
in the hope that this Court may now reverse course." 90 The result, ac-
cording to Justice Marshall, undermines the authority and stature of
the Court. He closed with the following remarks:
Today's decision charts an unmistakable course. If the majority's
radical reconstruction of the rules for overturning this Court's deci-
sions is to be taken at face value. . . then the overruling of Booth
and Gathers is but a preview of an even broader and more far
reaching assault upon this Court's precedents. Cast aside today are
those condemned to face society's ultimate penalty. Tomorrow's
victims may be minorities, women, or the indigent. Inevitably, this
campaign to resurrect yesterday's 'spirited dissents' will squander
the authority and the legitimacy of this Court as a protector of the
powerless. 91
Unwavering in his last stand, Justice Marshall ended his notable and
distinguished service with the notion that Payne represents a "looking
glass" through which the future direction of a predominately conserva-
tive United States Supreme Court can be predicted.92 Only time will
reveal whether his dire foreshadowings come true.
85. Id. at 2621.
86. Id. at 2621-2622. The traditional bases are: (1) "advent of 'subsequent
changes or development in the law' that undermines a decision's rationale" id. at 2621
(quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)); (2) "the need
'to bring [a decision] into agreement with experience and facts newly ascertained,'" id.
at 2621-2622 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)); and (3) "a showing that a particular precedent has become
a 'detriment to coherence and consistency in the law.'" Id. at 2622 (quoting Patterson,
491 U.S. at 173).
87. Payne, IIl S. Ct. at 2621 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 2624.
89. Id. at 2625.
90. Id. at 2624.
91. Id. at 2625.
92. Coyle, supra note 82, at SI, col. 2.
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In contrast, Justice Stevens' five part dissent concentrated less on
stare decisis than on the majority's flawed. reasoning and lack of judi-
cial precedent. 9 3 First, Justice Stevens traced a line of decisions which
supported the holdings of Booth and Gathers, and inherently discred-
ited the, use of victim impact statements in death penalty. cases due to
the risk;of arbi trary sentencing and irrelevance. 94
Next,, Justice Stevens ;responded to the Court's contention that the
liberal introduction. of mitigating evidence for the defendant, creates a
"significantly imbalanced sentencing procedure" by explaining that it is
based on ant inaccurate conclusion -and premise. This argument is a
classic non sequitur: The victim is not on trial; her character, whether
good or bad, cannot therefore constitute either an aggravating or miti-
gating circumstance."96 The concurrence pointed out that whereas the
defendant is allowed to introduce all relevant mitigating evidence dur-
ing sentencing," the state may rebut that evidence directly, without the
introduciion of ir'relevant evidence, i.e., victim impact statements, and
may "designate any~relevant conduct to be an 'aggravating factor." 96
Additionally, Justice Stevens' correctly reminds the majority that a
criminal prosecution is not premised on an "even-handed balance" be-
tween the state and'the defendant; the Constitution protects individual
rights and limits the disproportionate power of the state, 97 and, accord-
ingly, rules of evidence are more favorable to the defendant.9"
Also, Justice, Stevens pointed tothe two fatal flaws with victim
impact statements as they :pertain to the Eighth Amendment. First, evi-:
dence ts ;to a victim's character which is not-foreseen by the defendant
is irrelevant to " 'personal responsibility and moral guilt.' "9 Second,
victim impact statements lead. to inconsistent punishments and unbri-
93. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2625-2631 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. See id. at' 2625-2627; see, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983)
(death penalty punishment requires determination of "character of the individualand
circumstances of the crime");'Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (Eighth
Amendment requires consideration of individual defendant's character and circun-
stances of crime in capital sentencing); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)
(in a death penalty case, the "punishment must be tailored to ... [the defendant's]
personal responsibility and moral guilt").
95. Payne, Il1 S. Ct. at 2627 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis original).
96. Id. at 2627.
97. Id.
98. Id.; see, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 404(a),
99. Payne, 11l S. Ct. at 2628 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Enmund v. Flor-
ida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
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died discretion because the quality and quantity of the evidence can
only be ascertained after the crime has been committed. 100
To justify laws that inherently take into account victim character
as a mandatory factor, Justice Stevens distinguished between legislative
determinations and judicial sentencing: statutes which take into ac-
count victim character act as notice to a defendant,101 whereas general
sentencing cannot foresee the character of every conceivable victim. 02
Additionally, allowing the sentencer to consider a wide range of evi-
dence' 13 excludes victim impact evidence because, much like the threat
of a mini-trial on the victim's character ,104 it "distracts the sentencer
from the proper focus of sentencing and encourages reliance on emo-
tion and other arbitrary factors [which] necessarily prejudices the
defendant."' 05
However, while Justice Stevens conceded that much of the victim
impact evidence would have been properly admitted during the guilt
phase of Payne, and that the jury had sufficient evidence to justify a
verdict of death, the primary concern of the justices should be in cases
where victim impact statements will make a difference in the verdict. 0
In addition, Justice Stevens rebutted the proposition of the majority
that victims require evidence to show they are unique human beings; he
stated that such a notion is obvious and a jury does not need to be
reminded of that fact during a capital sentencing phase. 107 Further-
more, victim impact evidence to show unique character leads to risks of
imposition of the death penalty based on the victim's perceived social
worth. 0 8
100. Id.
101. See id. (explaining that there exists a rational correlation between moral
culpability and foreseeable consequence). For instance, the imposition of the death pen-
alty for assassinating the President or Vice President is consistent with the Eighth
Amendment because the statutory provision supplies the criminal with notice, i.e., fore-
seeability. Id. at 2628 n.2.
102. See id. at 2628. "[T]he majority cites no authority for the suggestion that
unforeseeable and indirect harms to a victim's family are properly considered as aggra-
vating evidence on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 2628-2629.
103. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2629 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 507.
105. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2629 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 2630.
107. Id. at 2631.
108. Id. ("Such proof risks decisions based on the same invidious motives as a
prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty if a victim is white but to accept a plea
bargain if the victim is black.")
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Obviously disturbed by the Court's lack of judicial restraint, Jus-
tice Stevens concluded by pointing out that the majority's decision rests
on "the current popularity of capital punishment" and "the political
strength of the victims' rights movement,"' 10 and that these factors
were predominant in the Court's decision to grant certiorari, rather
than the Tennessee Supreme Court's rationale. 10
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Politics of Victims' Rights
Before analyzing the Court's decision in Payne, a brief discussion
into the background, evolution and objectives of the victims' rights
movement is appropriate. This section will illustrate that the justices
who decided to allow the use of victim impact statements at death pen-
alty sentencing failed to concern themselves with these germane issues.
Since the 1960's, the victims' rights movement has grown rapidly,
undergoing both numerous changes and shifts of focus. These transfor-
mations have ranged from compensation programs concentrating on
victim restitution, to a more dynamic role involving direct victim par-
ticipation in sentencing."' A byproduct of the victims' rights movement
has been the victim rights statement: a statement outlining the impact
of crime on a victim and a victim's family, and which typically is in-
cluded :in a pre-sentencing report that is either statutorily mandated or
recommended by the court.11 Currently, a large majority of the states
have enacted some form of victim impact statement legislation. 11 3 A
109. Id.
110. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2631 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court, thwarted in
its earlier attempts to overrule Booth in Gathers and Ohio v. Huertas, 59 U.S.L.W.
1176 (U.S., May 14, 1991), granted certiorari in Payne; however, because the petitions
did not raise the constitutional issues, the Court ordered the petitioners to brief and
argue whether Booth and Gathers should be overruled. Coyle, supra note 82, at S1.
11. See Maureen McLeod, Victim Participation at Sentencing, 22 CRIM. L.
BULL. 501, 502 (1986).
112. Victim impact statements (oral or written) potentially provide information
about the circumstances of the crime, the victim's identity and character, the extent of
the harm caused to the victim and the victim's family, and an opinion as to an appro-
priate punishment for the defendant. Phillip A. Talbert, The Relevance of Victim Im-
pact Statements to the Criminal Sentencing Decision, 36 UCLA L. REV. 199, 200-211
(1988).
113. See id. As of 1988, thirty-eight states had enacted victim impact statements
legislation. Id. at 200 n.12.
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few states, like Florida, have gone a step further by amending their
state constitutions providing a victim's right to be heard under constitu-
tional dimensions. 114
However, the use of victim impact statements has raised critical
concerns. One important criticism has centered on the objectives be-
hind the use of victim impact statements, and whether those objectives
are being achieved. Whether the objective is satisfactory victim retribu-
tion,11 enhanced efficiency or effectiveness of the criminal justice sys-
tem,' 16 or successful criminal deterrence, incapacitation or rehabilita-
tion,117 there exists considerable doubt and lack of consensus. among
practitioners and scholars as to whether these ends are being achieved.
For instance, judges and prosecutors have shown a reluctance to use
victim impact statements or direct victim participation - reasons rang-
ing from inconvenience or a belief that victim participation will not be
helpful,118 to fear of liability in a civil action." 9 In addition, legal
scholars continue to debate the legal relevance of victim impact state-
114. See infra p. 42 and note 172; see also Patrick B. Calcutt, Comment, The
Victims' Rights Act of 1988, The Florida Constitution, and the New Struggle for
Victims' Rights, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 811 (1988); Debra Cassens Moss, New Tack
for Victims' Rights, 74 A.B.A.J. 32 (1.988) (constitutional amendments have been im-
plemented in Florida, Arizona, Delaware and Rhode Island but not without criticism
from defense attorneys and prosecutors).
115. See Talbert, supra note 112, at 211 (referring to the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986), where Congress
delineated the four purposes of sentencing: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation); see, e.g., Richard S; Murphy, The Significance of Victim Harm: Booth
v. Maryland and the Philosophy of Punishment in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1303, 1306-1309 (1988). Arguably, "the retribution theory of punishment, as
properly understood, focuses on what the defendant deserves, not, what would benefit
society . . . [and] the Supreme Court's decision in Booth . . . is completely consistent
with and in fact required by the retributivist model of punishment." Id.
116. See McLeod, supra note 111, at 505. System efficiency means minimal re-
sistance to process a maximum number of criminal cases; system effectiveness refers to
a more just sentence if the victim participates. Id.
117. See Talbert, supra note 112, at 215-219. Deterrence discourages potential
criminals from committing crimes and punished criminals from repeating crimes; inca-
pacitation removes criminals from society due to future dangerousness; and rehabilita-
tion reforms criminals and modifies their behavior. Id.
118. See McLeod, supra note 111, at 507.
119. See Moss, supra note 114, at 32. Florida State Rep. Hamilton Upchurch on
the impending constitutional amendment for victims' rights in Florida, and the poten-
tial that victims could sue prosecutors for infringing their constitutional rights stated:
"Can you imagine a prosecutor having to contact and consult with the victim at every
juncture?". Id.
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ments at criminal sentencing,' 2" the constitutional issues that are conse-
quently implicated,""' and the underlying motives behind the victim im-
pact movement.' 22 While it is difficult to deny that victims' rights is
good politics, it is also equally difficult to prove that victims' rights
legislation has achieved its promised goals. 2
Apparently, the six justices comprising the majority in Payne did
not feel that this lack of consensus and debate on the utility of victim
impact statements bore mentioning, or perhaps they were uninformed
on the subject. The majority, while recognizing that victim impact
statements are a new phenomenon, 24 avoided the issue of whether they
120. See, e.g., Eric S. Newman, Note, Eighth Amendment-Prosecutorial Com-
ment Regarding the Victim's Personal Qualities Should Not Be Permitted at the Sen-
tencing Phase of a Capital Trial. South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989),
80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1236, 1248-1255 (1990) ("We cannot begin to draw
lines with regard to appropriate punishment in capital cases based on subjective deter-
minations of the worth of the victim."). But see, e.g., Jackson R. Sharman, I11, Recent
Developments-Constitutional Law: Victim Impact Statements and the Eighth
Amendment-Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987), 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 583, 584-86 (1988) (explaining extent of harm is irrelevant during the guilt
stage of the trial, but extent of harm and the victim's character is relevant during the
sentencing stage to show the gravity of the criminal act).
121. See Jonathan Willmott, Victim Characteristics and Equal Protection for
the Lives of Allk An Alternative Analysis of Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v.
Gathers and a Proposed Standard for The Admission of Victim Characteristics in
Sentencing, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1045, 1057-1071 (1990) (classifying citizens based on
their character to deprive them of life, liberty or property violates the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Note, supra note 120, at 1248 (commenting by
a prosecutor on a victim's character violates the Eighth Amendment because the jury
may impose death based on the victim's character and not the defendant's culpability).
122. Some argue that revenge and retaliation are legitimate and intelligent goals
at the root of victims' rights. See, e.g., George Will, The Value of Punishment, NEws-
WEEK, May 24, 1982, at 92 ("The element of retribution - vengeance, if you will -
does not make punishment cruel and unusual, it makes it intelligible."); Murphy, supra
note 115, at 1333 (utilitarian theories of punishment, such as vengeance to avoid vigi-
lantism and mob violence, while debatable as an appropriate reason for punishment,
nonetheless are constitutionally valid). But see Lynn N. Henderson, The Wrongs of
Victim Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 994-995 (1985) (vengeance connotes a level of
depravity equal to the criminal act and is "uncivilized").
123. See, e.g., Robert Elias, The Symbolic Politics of Victim Compensation, 8
VICTIMOLOGY 213 (1983) (victim compensation has only strengthened police control
and has failed to achieve its goals of crime control and improving cooperation with law
enforcement).
124. Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2606 (1991). Given the level of the
legal debate over victim impact statements and their effects on juries, an enlightened
majority opinion might have addressed some of these concerns by recognizing a need
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actually promote any constructive social purpose such as victim satis-
faction or participation by victims in the criminal justice process. 12
Justice Scalia charged that the decision in Booth "conflicts with a pub-
lic sense of justice keen enough that it has found voice in a nationwide
'victims' rights' movement," without commenting on the merits of the
movement. 126 Justice O'Connor came closest to recognizing the lack of
consensus on the use of victim impact statements by pointing to "con-
siderable confusion in the lower courts" regarding the breadth of the
holding in Booth. 27 Moreover, the justices who decided to overrule
Booth and Gathers did so without any apparent concern whether victim
impact statements accomplished the objectives set out by their
proponents.
B. Victim Impact Statements and the Death Penalty
The Court in Payne specifically rejected the holdings in Booth and
Gathers that evidence of a victim's character and the extent of harm
suffered by the victim's family, presented through either direct testi-
mony of the victim's family or by the prosecutor, is inadmissible at the
sentencing phase of a capital trial. 12 8 This discussion will analyze the
issues of admissability of victim character, and address the relevance
and constitutional flaws in the majority's reasoning.
1. Victim Character
The Payne decision rested on the principle that evidence of the
victim's character is relevant to the victim's " 'uniqueness as a human
being' ",129 which is necessary to avoid "turning the victim into a 'face-
for further empirical studies.
125. Victim impact statements "are simply another form or method of informing
the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question, evi-
dence of a general type long considered by sentencing authorities." Id. at 2608.
126. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's religion, if you will, appears to
be the will of the people and justice by the public, irrespective of individual constitu-
tional freedoms.
127. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 S. Ct. 805, 813 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall criticized the majority's reliance on Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Gathers over the prosecutorial use of the victim's character by reminding them that the
confusion created by Booth was the issue that was specifically decided in Gathers.
Payne, 11l S. Ct. at 2622 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609-2611.
129. Id. at 2606-2607 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
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less stranger at the penalty phase of a capital trial'. . .. 13o The ma-
jority argued that just as the defendant is able to present all relevant
mitigating evidence of the defendant's character, fairness dictates that
the victim be given the same opportunity.' 31
Relevance in evidentiary procedure has been defined as "any evi-
dence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable." ' Using this definition, the character of the murdered vic-
tim is irrelevant as to the issue of a defendant's guilt - that is,
whether he committed the act. 133 But the question raised by Payne is
whether this same evidence should be relevant to determine whether a
defendant, who has already been adjudicated guilty, should be put to
death. The Payne majority has expanded the scope of relevancy for
punishment to include victim character and, in the process, has re-
placed the stricter concept of legal relevance with a more flexible con-
cept of general relevance. General relevance is open-ended and without
practical limitation, and can encompass a wide array of factors without
consideration as to their prejudicial effect. Legal relevance, on the
other hand, requires more stringent legal reasoning and sufficient pro-
bative value, and conditions admissibility of evidence based on relative
probative weight verses prejudicial effect.13 Moreover, the Court's as-
sertions that victim character is relevant to determine the imposition of
the death penalty employs the broader concept of relevancy without
regard for probative and prejudicial considerations. 35
The majority's position also raises evidentiary and constitutional
dilemmas. First, the introduction of victim character invites the pros-
pect of a mini-trial where the defendant may cross-examine character
witnesses for the victim or present extrinsic witnesses to rebut the testi-
mony of the same character witnesses.136 Consequently, the defendant
may also call witnesses to impeach the credibility of the victim's vari-
(1976)).
130. Id. at 2608 (quoting Gathers, 490 U.S. at 821 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
131. Id.
132. FED. R. EvID. 401 advisory committee's note.
133. But see Payne, I11 S. Ct. al 2628 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (statutory excep-
tion for public officials where defendant has been given notice).
134. See FED. R. EvID. 401 advisory committee's notes.
135. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2628-2630 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. See id. at 2607. There is nothing in the majority's opinion that indicates the
defendant would be prohibited from conducting such a "mini-trial"; the Court merely
pointed out that it might not be tactically beneficial to the defendant's case. Id.
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ous character witnesses.13 7 Not only does the prospect of a mini-trial
raise concerns of judicial economy, 13 8 it also shifts the focus of the jury
during sentencing from the defendant and the circumstances of the
crime, to the victim and his character - neither of which is on trial. 139
While in certain contexts a victim's character is relevant to a defend-
ant's criminal culpability, i.e., when the victim's character is an ele-
ment of the crime, generally such evidence risks exclusion on grounds
of "unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury. "1 '0
Second, and more importantly, evidence as to the victim's charac-
ter admitted during the sentencing phase of a capital trial violates the
Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment
because it creates an impermissible risk that the jury might impose the
penalty of death for reasons other than the culpability of the offense
and the character of the defendant.' For instance, family members
who testify are frequently upset and highly agitated, and erupt in
courtroom outbursts. These displays of emotion by a victim's family
and the resulting jury empathy creates the impermissible risk that ju-
ries will sentence a defendant to death based on an emotional reaction
rather than the character of the defendant and the circumstances of the
crime.
Third, admission of victim character evidence permits the sen-
tencer to impose the death penalty based on the comparative social
worth of citizens." 2 This disturbing notion that a defendant who
murders a sterling member of society as opposed to a reprobate should
be more deserving of the death penalty is unwarranted and shocking by
implication."' Furthermore, this elitist view of social worth is in direct
137. See FED. R. EvID. 608-609, 613.
138. See FED. R. EvID. 102 ("These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration . . .[and] elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay . ) (em-
phasis added).
139. See Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2627 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
140. FED. R. EvID. 403 (evidence which is unfairly prejudicial is excluded pri-
marily because it tends to result in improper decisions based on emotion).
141. See Payne, 11l S. Ct. at 2627 (Stevens, J., dissenting); U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
142. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2631 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Evidence offered
to prove . . .[differences in character and reputation] can only be intended to identify
some victims as more worthy of protection than others."). The majority replies to Jus-
tice Stevens' dissent by stating the empty conclusion that "victim impact evidence is
not offered to encourage comparative judgments of this kind." Id. at 2607.
143. Justice Stevens points out that if a defendant accused of murdering a store
clerk attempted to introduce evidence that the clerk had an immoral character, such
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conflict with equality under the law. The equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that the law protect each person
equally, regardless of a person's perceived character.144 Therefore, it is
not surprising that the majority left unanswered the methods for quan-
tifying and qualifying the effect to be given victim character evidence.
The majority's attempt to discount fears that evidence of a vic-
tim's character does not create the risk that juries are more likely to
sentence, defendants to death based on the social worth of victims and
the loss suffered by the community is sheer sophistry. Quite simply, the
Court and the concurring justices failed to give credence to such an
obvious risk which common sense, logic, and human experience dic-
tates. One inevitable conclusion can be drawn: the present Supreme
Court is blindly motivated by a solidly conservative political agenda
which advocates a "tough on crime" stance and espouses victims'
rights, irrespective of constitutional liberties.145
2. Extent of Harm
The majority opinion in Payne held that evidence of the extent of
harm to the victim and the victim's family is relevant to determine a
defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness, and that states
may properly admit such evidence as necessary to determine whether a
defendant should be sentenced to death. 46 Accordingly, it would logi-
cally follow that an assessment of the extent of harm to the victim's
family and the community is a necessary prerequisite to determine the
evidence would be excluded on the grounds of irrelevance; however, "[e]venhanded jus-
tice requires the same constraint be imposed on the advocate of the death penalty."
Payne, III S. Ct. at 2625 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."). For example, if a defendant is given a lighter sentence for killing victims with
character type A as opposed to victims with character type B, victims with character
type A are afforded less protection under the law. See Willmott, supra note 121, at
1058 n.60.
145. Similar sentiments have been recently expressed more eloquently by a cur-
rent prisoner residing on Pennsylvania's Death Row: "Where the issue of the death
penalty is concerned, law follows politics, and conservatives won the sociopolitical bat-
tles of the 1980's on the basis of an agenda which included a ringing endorsement of
capital punishment. The venerated principle of stare decisis meant little in the politi-
cally charged judicial arena." Mumia Abu-Jamal, Teetering on the Brink: Between
Death and Life, 100 YALE LI. 993, 999 (1991).
146. Payne, II1 S. Ct. at 2608.
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proper punishment for a criminal defendant,'" even when the defend-
ant had no pre-knowledge of the uniqueness of the victim nor contem-
plated the consequences of his act.'"
In so holding, the majority in Payne failed to make an important
distinction between two kinds of harm that may result from a criminal
act of a defendant: physical and emotional. Certainly a criminal de-
fendant should be held accountable for all physical and emotional harm
that may befall the victim as a result of a criminal act. Also, it is the
ultimate harm to that victim - death - for which a murderer may
potentially suffer the ultimate penalty - the death sentence. But
Payne proposes to go a step further by making a criminal defendant
accountable for the emotional harm suffered by the family of the vic-
tim. In essence, the majority believes that the death sentence may be
imposed based on evidence of the infliction of emotional distress to a
third party. 149
Practical and fair limits on culpability, or liability, for emotional
147. Id. at 2605.
148. Id. at 2615 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter, in an effort to justify
allowing extent of harm evidence to be included at sentencing to show the defendant's
culpability argued:
[Elvery defendant knows, if endowed with the mental competence for
criminal responsibility, that the life he will take by his homicidal behavior
is that of a unique person, like himself, and that the person to be killed
probably has close associates, "survivors," who will suffer harms and depri-
vations from the victim's death . . . . [Tlhey know that their victims are
not valueless fungibles, and just as defendants appreciate the web of rela-
tionships and dependencies in which they live, they know that their victims
are not human islands, but individuals with parents or children, spouses or
friends or dependents.
Id. However, as Justice Stevens explained, "[tihe fact that each of us is unique is a
proposition so obvious that it surely requires no evidentiary support." Id. at 2631 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). If a defendant can be saddled with this foreknowledge of the vic-
tim's uniqueness as a human being to show the defendant's culpability, certainly a
competent jury is capable of the same, that all victims are unique humans.
Additionally, Justice Souter leaves us with more questions than answers. May a
friend or dependent of a victim testify as to emotional harm suffered during capital
sentencing? May a lover? May a homosexual lover? Are we to assume that all victims
have "survivors" that are qualified to testify? What are those qualifications? Who
would not be allowed to testify? Could an abused spouse testify at sentencing as to a
her husband's (the victim) bad character?
149. See Jeffrey Stoner, Comment, Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual
Punishment-Eighth Amendment Prohibits Introduction of Victim Impact Evidence
at Sentencing Phase of Capital Murder Trial-Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529
(1987): Another View, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 1175, 1185 (1988).
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harm to third parties have been spelled out in a different but compara-
ble context. Simply put, in a civil context, the Restatement of Torts
section 46 recognizes limits on liability for outrageous acts - like mur-
der - that cause severe emotional distress to third parties, even if the
third party is a member of the victim's family. 150 The limitations on
liability for emotional distress to third parties in tort is analogous to the
extent of emotional harm to members of a victim's family in the crimi-
nal context; out of "practical necessity" there must be a limit on the
number of people who could recover from suffering emotional distress
as a result of an outrageous act, even when the act was murder.151
However, under Payne, evidence of third party emotional distress that
is insufficient for monetary damages in civil proceedings may be admit-
ted in criminal proceedings to put a person to death. Thus, it seems
from the majority's position that any person, however remote, who
might conceivably have suffered harm as a result of the murder of a
victim, could testify as to the extent of their harm at the capital sen-
tencing of a defendant.
Furthermore, victim impact evidence which relates the extent of
emotional harm to the victim's family violates the Eighth Amendment's
150. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); see, e.g., Koontz v.
Keller, 3 N.E.2d 694 (Ohio Ct. App. 1936) (denying recovery for intentional infliction
of emotional distress from defendant upon plaintiffs discovery of sister's murdered
body).
For instance, if A murders B, B's family, C, cannot recover for severe emotional
distress unless C witnessed the murder, see, e.g., Calliari v. Sugar, 435 A.2d 139 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1980) (denying plaintiffs relief for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress after buying home from defendant and finding defendant's murdered
wife buried in the back yard) or, in some jurisdictions, only if A had knowledge of the
presence of C. See, e.g., Taylor v. Vallelunga, 339 P.2d 910 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)
(victim's daughter denied recovery after witnessing brutal beating of her father by de-
fendant because the defendant did not know the victim's daughter was witnessing the
beating).
151. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment 1 (1965)
("Practical necessity [requires] ... drawing the line somewhere since the number of
persons who may suffer emotional distress at the news of the assassination of a presi-
dent is virtually unlimited . . . .") with interview comments made by the Tennessee
Attorney General Charles Burson who argued Payne before the Court:
The point of our position is that the death of some person may have a
greater societal impact. We used the example of a homeless person and the
President - that homeless person's life as a matter of sanctity and worth
is worth as much as the President's life, but the harm that is inflicted upon
society, it's clear, in dislocation of that society, is much greater.
Review of 1991 Supreme Court Term, (C-SPAN television broadcast, July 20, 1991).
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proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.152 This proposition
is based on established judicial precedent that the discretion of the jury
in imposing the ultimate penalty of death "must be suitably directed
and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capri-
cious action"'153 and must be "an individualized determination based on
the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime.11 54
By introducing evidence of the extent of emotional harm to the victim's
family, the state creates a constitutionally impermissible risk that the
jury's discretion will be unduly swayed by sympathy for the victim's
family and loss to the community. The majority in Payne, however,
ignored judicial precedent and the inherent risk that victim impact
statements leads to arbitrary and capricious sentencing of death.
C. Alternative View of Payne v. Tennessee
Throughout the Payne majority opinion and concurring opinions is
the notion that Booth and Gathers went too far in creating a per se
Eighth Amendment prohibition against the use of victim impact state-
ments at capital sentencing.' 55 This section discusses how Payne should
have been decided without overruling Booth and Gathers based on
Booth's built-in caveat and harmless error. 156
The Booth majority recognized that there existed cases where the
information contained in a victim impact statement would be relevant
and permissible in the proper context: "Our disapproval of victim im-
pact statements at the sentencing phase of a capital case does not
mean, however, that this type of information will never be relevant in
any context. Similar types of information may well be admissible be-
cause they relate directly to the circumstances of the crime."'1 57 While
152. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987), overruled in part by
Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
153. E.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
154. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983).
155. Payne, 11I S. Ct. at 2608-2609 (misreading of Woodson precedent); id. at
2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[P]ossibility that this evidence may in some cases be
unduly inflammatory does not justify a prophylactic, constitutionally based rule that
this evidence should never be admitted."); id. at 2614 (Scalia, J., concurring) (claiming
Booth "compromised the fundamental values underlying the doctrine of stare decisis");
id. at 2614 (Souter, J., concurring) (lack of legal tradition for excluding a crime's
effects on its victims).
156. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 507-508 n.10.
157. Id. It was specifically this language that prompted Justices O'Connor and
Souter to criticize Booth because they believed it caused "considerable confusion in the
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there have been numerous writings on the meaning of this footnote in
Booth,lee it appears that the facts in Payne fall neatly within this built-
in caveat exception.
When the defendant, Payne, murdered Charisse and Lacie, and
attempted to murder Nicholas, he did so with the knowledge that Lacie
and Nicholas were Charisse's children.1"9 In addition, Nicholas was an
intended victim who miraculously survived. 160 Any evidence as to the
extent of physical or emotional harm suffered by Nicholas was relevant
and should have been admitted at the sentencing phase under Booth
because that type of information "relates directly to the circumstances
of the crime." 61 Therefore, evidence as to the extent of harm suffered
by Nicholas, communicated to the court through his grandmother, was
relevant to Payne's moral culpability and blameworthiness. However,
even if prejudicial to the defendant, the extent of Nicholas' harm
should have been permitted because it directly related to the gruesome
facts surrounding the crime. In contrast, the prosecutor's closing com-
ments during sentencing did not pass the Booth exception. The prose-
cutor's closing comments that related to the impact of harm suffered by
Charisse's parents and Payne's parents, and statements about the per-
sonal character of Charisse and Lacie, 162 were irrelevant and impermis-
sible under Booth because they did not directly relate to the circum-
stances of the crime and Payne had no pre-knowledge of their
lower courts about the precise scope of its holding", Gathers v. South Carolina, 490
U.S. 805, 813 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), and created "an unworkable standard
of constitutional relevance .... " Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2616 (Souter, J., concurring).
158. See, e.g., Willmot, supra note 121, at 1071-1076. One can only surmise the
kind of case to which the majority in Booth was referring, but a classic example would
be that of a defendant who murders a victim in the presence of another person for the
sole purpose of causing that person severe emotional distress. But this scenario would
be the exception rather than the rule.
159. See State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tenn. 1990). Payne testified: "And
she [Charisse] was watching my movement in the kitchen, like she-I had saw her. It
had been almost a year off and on in the back yard because her kids had played with
Bobbie's kids. And I had seen her before." Id.
160. Id. at 12.
161. Booth, 482 U.S. at 507 n.10. For example, Payne had pre-knowledge about
the victim's family, namely Nicholas; Payne knew that Nicholas was witnessing his act
of violence and any reasonable person would know that to brutally murder a young
boy's mother and little sister in his presence would cause extensive harm.
162. See Payne, I l1 S. Ct. at 2603 (quoting from State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10
(1990), " '[t]here is nothing you can do to ease the pain of any of the families involved
in this case. There is nothing you can do . . . for Charisse and Lacie Jo.' ").
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Additionally, the majority failed to take the opportunity to specify
whether harmless error could be applied to the impermissible use of
victim impact statements. Harmless error analysis in constitutional is-
sues first requires that the Court determine whether harmless error
analysis applies,164 and then whether the error committed was harm-
less.165 The Supreme Court of Tennessee hesitantly applied harmless
error analysis in affirming Payne's convictions and sentence of death 66
primarily because Booth and Gathers failed to specify whether harm-
less error would apply in capital cases where victim impact statements
were introduced. Recognizing this shortcoming in Booth, Justice Ste-
vens properly stated what the majority's position in Payne should have
been:
In the case before us today, much of what might be characterized
as victim impact evidence was properly admitted during the guilt
phase of the trial and, given the horrible character of this crime,
may have been sufficient to justify the Tennessee Supreme Court's
conclusion that the error was harmless because the jury would nec-
essarily have imposed the death sentence even absent the error.
The fact that a good deal of such evidence is routinely and properly
brought to the attention of the jury merely indicates that the rule
of Booth may not affect the outcome of many cases.'67
Thus, the majority in Payne unnecessarily overruled Booth and
Gathers, by ignoring the exception in Booth for evidence directly relat-
ing to the circumstances of the crime, and failing to affirm the Tennes-
see Supreme Court's use of harmless error analysis to victim impact
163. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 507-508 n.10.
164. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The Chapman rule essen-
tially states that not all constitutional errors in a criminal trial require automatic rever-
sal of a conviction, and it is the responsibility of the United States Supreme Court to
determine what constitutional violations should receive harmless error analysis. See id.
at 20-21 (when constitutional rights are violated "it is our responsibility to protect by
fashioning the necessary rule"). To date, the Court has denied harmless error to only
two violations: the right to counsel and an impartial judge. Id.; see also Arizona v.
Fulminante, Ill S. Ct. 1246 (1991) (overruling previous precedent which held that
harmless error could never be applied to coerced confessions).
165. The Court must determine whether the evidence obtained by constitutional
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
166. See State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (Tenn. 1990) (stating "we think"
victim impact statements are subject to harmless error analysis).
167. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2630 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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statements. Consequently, the Payne majority has directly undermined
the Court's authority and laid the groundwork for future overruling of
the Court's precedents. 168
IV. FLORIDA CASE LAW AND VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS
This section will briefly review a chronological sampling of the
Florida Supreme Court's treatment of the use of victim impact state-
ments during the sentencing phase of a capital trial before and after
the Supreme Court decided Booth, and since Payne. This section will
conclude by speculating how Payne might affect future court decisions
and constitutional protection afforded defendants facing the death pen-
alty in Florida.
A. Before Booth
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Booth, the Florida legis-
lature in 1984 amended its previous victims' rights legislation by al-
lowing the victim's next of kin, during sentencing in a homicide case, to
testify as to the extent of harm caused by the victim's death, including
social, psychological, or physical harm. 69 Moreover, victim impact
statements in pre-sentence reports that described the victim's charac-
ter, the extent of harm to the victim's family, and the victim's opinion
as to an appropriate punishment were routinely utilized by sentencing
168. See id. at 2625 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
169. See FLA. STAT. § 921.143 (1991). The statute states:
(1) At the sentencing hearing, and prior to the imposition of sentence upon
any defendant who has been convicted of any felony or who has pleaded
guilty or nolo contendere to any crime, including a criminal violation of a
provision of chapter 316, the sentencing court shall permit the victim of
the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced, or the next of kin if
the victim has died from causes related to the crime, to:
(a) Appear before the sentencing court for the purpose of making a state-
ment under oath for the record; or
(b) Submit a written statement under oath to the office of the state attor-
ney, which statement shall be filed with the sentencing court.
(2) The state attorney or any assistant state attorney shall advise all vic-
tims or, when appropriate, their next of kin that statements, whether oral
or written, shall relate solely to the facts of the case and the extent of any
harm, including social, psychological, or physical harm, financial losses,
and loss of earnings directly or indirectly resulting from the crime for
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authorities in capital and non-capital cases. 170 Subsequently, Florida
became one of a small number of states17 1 to amend its state constitu-
tion to elevate the rights of victims to constitutional proportions.172
B. After Booth
The first case that came before the Florida Supreme Court, and
the first case in the country to vacate a death sentence pursuant to
Booth, was Patterson v. State.7 3 The defendant, Patterson, was con-
victed of first degree murder and sentenced to death.' 7' At the sentenc-
ing hearing, the victim's niece testified about the effect the murder had
on the victim's children and expressed her opinion that the defendant
should die.175 In vacating the death sentence and remanding for a new
sentencing hearing on the grounds that Booth prohibited such evidence,
the Florida Supreme Court appeared uncertain as to the precise limits
of Booth or whether harmless error analysis was applicable: "Allowing
this type of evidence appears to be reversible error in view of the
United States Supreme Court decision in Booth . . . .
This uncertainty was soon dispelled four months later in the water-
shed case of Grossman v. State. 77 In Grossman, the defendant was
convicted of murdering a state wildlife officer and sentenced to
death.178 On appeal, the defendant argued that permitting the victim's
family members to testify to the judge during sentencing was in viola-
tion of Booth and reversible error.7 9 The Supreme Court of Florida
170. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 473 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
171. See Moss, supra note 114, at 32.
172. The amendment reads:
Victims of crime or their lawful representatives, including the next of kin
of homicide victims, are entitled to the right to be informed, to be present,
and to be heard when relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal proceed-
ings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with constitutional
rights of the accused.
FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 16(b). The amendment was approved overwhelmingly by the vot-
ers of Florida by a 9 to 1 margin. See Comment, supra note 114, at 812 n.4.
173. 513 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 1987); see also Talbert, supra note 112, at 227
n. 125.
174. Patterson, 513 So. 2d at 1258.
175. Id. at 1263.
176. Id. (emphasis added); see also Booth, 482 U.S. at 496.
177. 525 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1988).
178. Id. at 835.
179. Id. at 836. The following is an example of the testimony from the father of
1494 [Vol. 16
482
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss3/18
1992] Koller 1495
affirmed the sentence on the basis that the defendant failed to object to
the introduction'of the victim impact statement at trial.180 By narrowly
interpreting Booth, the court explained that "nothing in the Booth
opinion . . . suggests that it should be retroactively applied to the cases
in which victim impact evidence has been received without objec-
tion."'' Additionally, the Supreme Court of Florida distinguished the
two cases on the basis that the defendant in Booth was sentenced by a
jury pursuant to Maryland law, whereas in the present case, the de-
fendant was sentenced by a judge pursuant to case law after giving
great weight to the jury's recommendation of death.'82
Grossman illustrates the Florida Supreme Court's uneasiness with
Booth's broad holding. In lengthy dicta, the court ventured into a com-
prehensive analysis of judicial precedent for harmless error analysis,18 3
and concluded that since Booth could be read to hold that not all vic-
tim impact statements might promote an arbitrary or capricious impo-
sition of death by a jury, impermissible victim impact evidence would
in the future be subject to harmless error analysis on a case-by-case
basis. 164 The court went on to establish a standard for review of victim
impact statements presented during a capital case. First, the defendant
must object to the victim impact evidence when introduced during sen-
tencing phase.' 5 Second, the jury should not hear victim impact evi-
the victim:
I think he's shattered our family. This girl [victim] was kind of the center
of our family. It's like taking my heart out. It will hurt me the rest of my
life. We have all seen a psychiatrist or psychologist at least twice including
my other two children. My personal feeling is that he should receive the
death penalty.
Id. at 842-843 n.6.
180. Id. at 842.
181, Id.
182. Grossman, 525 So. 2d at 845. To justify the distinction, the court stated
that "[i]f the mere fact that the trial judge (the sentencer in Florida) is exposed to
such a victim impact report is sufficient to render the error per se reversible, all death
penalties in Florida are potentially subject to automatic reversal." Id. at 842-843 n.6.
Additionally, "judges are routinely exposed to inadmissible or irrelevant evidence but
are disciplined by the demand of the office to block out information which is not rele-
vant to the matter at hand." Id. at 846 n.9.
183. See id. at 842-844.
184. Id. at 844-845. In so holding, the Court invalidated the provisions of section
921.143 of the Florida Statutes because it violated Booth insofar as it allowed victim
impact statements to serve, in effect, as an aggravating factor in death sentencing. Id.
at 842; see also FLA. STAT § 921.143 (1991) (still in effect as unchanged).
185. Grossman, 525 So. 2d at 842.
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dence at sentencing.' 86 And, finally, the appellate review court may ap-
ply harmless error analysis on a case-by-case basis. 187
This new standard for reviewing capital cases where victim impact
evidence has been introduced was put to its first test later that same
year in two cases. In Preston v. State, the Florida Supreme Court re-
fused to vacate a death sentence because the defendant failed to object
to the introduction of comments made by the prosecutor during sen-
tencing regarding the character of the victim and her relationship to
her family and friends. 18 Next, in LeCroy v. State, the Supreme Court
of Florida affirmed a death sentence over objections by the defendant
that the introduction of victim impact statements by the victim's family
unduly influenced the sentencer.' 8 9 The majority pointed out that the
jury did not hear the evidence, and the trial judge, who erred in al-
lowing the testimony over objection, did so without the benefit of Booth
and Grossman, and did not use the statements to determine punish-
ment.190 Therefore, the trial judge committed harmless error.19'
The following year, the Florida Supreme Court was again con-
fronted with victim impact statements in Jackson v. Dugger.'92 In
Jackson, the defendant, who was convicted for the murder of a police
officer and sentenced to death, argued that the testimony of a fellow
officer during the penalty phase of the trial was unduly prejudicial and
specifically prohibited under Booth. 93 The testimony provided the jury,
over objection, with information about the slain officer's good character
and the impact the officer's death had on the community and the other
officers on the force." The court agreed, vacated the sentence, and
remanded for a new sentencing proceeding on the grounds that the evi-
dence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 95
Since Jackson, the Florida Supreme Court has had to rule on the
use of victim impact statements in an increasing number of direct and
186. id.
187. Id. at 844-845.
188. 531 So. 2d 154, 160 (Fla. 1988).
189. 533 So. 2d 750, 755 (Fla. 1988).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 547 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1989).
193. Id. at 1198.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1198-1199. The court believed that the evidence had been offered
expressly to inflame the passions of the jury and "was designed to induce a fear for
public safety and to elicit sympathy for the victim." Id. at 1199.
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postconviction appeals. For example, in Reed v. State, the defendant
was procedurally precluded from claiming relief for failing to object to
the introduction of the statements;' 96 and in Freeman v. State, the
court held that the testimony of a woman, married to a victim mur-
dered by the defendant in a previous conviction, constituted harmless
error.1 97 Also, in Jennings v. State, the Florida Supreme Court denied
a defendant's petition for habeas corpus based on statements made by
the victim's father and school principal during sentencing that "on the
day she was killed the child was going to be narrator at her school play
because she had learned to read faster than her classmates." '98 The
court stated that the statements were not so prejudicial to require re-
versal under Booth.199
C. Payne and Beyond
Since the Court decided Payne, the Florida Supreme Court re-
cently has had occasion to restate and apply Payne's holding in two
capital cases. In Hodges v. State, the court recognized Payne's recent
overruling of Booth and Gathers, but held that the statements com-
plained of by the defendant were not the type of victim impact evidence
that is still prohibited by Booth."' In Owen v. State,20 the court ap-
plied harmless error to statements made by the victim's father, in spite
of the court's recognition that Payne allowed the use of some types of
victim impact evidence.
In light of Payne, Florida's victims' rights constitutional amend-
ment"" and criminal statutes203 are virtually unrestricted with regard
to the use of victim impact statements during the sentencing phase of a
capital trial. With the exception of statements expressing an opinion as
to an appropriate punishment for the defendant, the victim's family 0 "
196. 560 So. 2d 203, 207 (Fla. 1990) (stating in dicta, even in the event of an
objection, the evidence was harmless error).
197. 563 So. 2d 73, 75-76 (Fla. 1990).
198. 16 Fla. L. Weekly S452 (Fla. June 13, 1991).
199. Id.
200. 17 Fla. L. Weekly S74 (Fla. Jan. 23, 1992) (allowing testimony about the
victim's prosecuting the defendant for indecent exposure, and the victim's sister's
breaking down while testifying).
201. 17 Fla. L. Weekly S71 (Fla. Jan. 23, 1992).
202. FLA. CONST. art. I § 16(b).
203. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 921.143 (1991).
204. In addition to the victim's family, apparently anyone who was so closely
1992] 1497
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is now free to give evidence relating the victim's character and the ex-
tent of harm to the victim's family and the community, subject only to
due process restrictions. In effect, future cases like Patterson and Jack-
son will be affirmed, unless the evidence introduced is so prejudicial
and inflammatory that the court decides that the death sentence vio-
lated a defendant's due process rights. The result means less protection
for the criminal defendant against the imposition of the death penalty
in Florida. Also, juries in Florida, in recommending sentencing, poten-
tially will be swayed by sympathy for the emotional loss and suffering
of the victim's family, friends, and the loss to the community based on
their subjective view of the social worth of the victim.
V. CONCLUSION
In essence, Booth and Gathers placed limitations on the use of
victim impact statements by creating an exception for death penalty
cases under the Eighth Amendment. The majority in both cases
strongly believed that consideration of the gravity and finality of the
death sentence compelled the conclusion that the use of highly emo-
tional and prejudicial testimony from victim's families and prosecutors
about the victim's character and extent of harm to the community cre-
ated a palpable and impermissible risk that juries would be unduly and
unfairly swayed. The Booth and Gathers majorities based their fears on
what common sense and logic tells us about human nature when con-
fronted with the grief and emotional pain of others.
However, the Court in Payne, in overruling Booth and Gathers,
ignored this rational and cogent approach by incorrectly reasoning that
the victim's character and extent of harm to the victim's family did not
create an impermissible risk that the jury might, based on sympathy
and emotion for the victim and the victim's family, impose death in an
arbitrary and capricious manner. Instead, the Court relied on a faulty
concept of evidentiary relevance and a severely narrow view of Eighth
Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishments. In so
doing, the Payne majority trivialized stare decisis by providing no cred-
ible justification for overturning judicial precedent. Furthermore, the
Court set the stage for drawn out morality plays in which the victim's
character takes center stage with the net effect that death sentences
related to the victim that they suffered harm is entitled to testify as to the extent of
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will be handed down based on the comparative social worth of victims
and their popularity in the community.
As of this writing, Florida currently has 325 persons on death row
and ranks third among states with death row inmates;2"5 Payne has the
potential to substantially increase that number. Criminal defendants
who face the death penalty in our state courts will have their fates
decided by arbitrary and irrelevant factors inherent in victim impact
statements, instead of the character of the defendant and the circum-
stances of the crime.
Michael P. Koller
205. Martin E. Marty, Death Penalty: What story will we tell about it?, THE
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 19, 1992, at CI.
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Harmelin v. Michigan: Effective Application of Anti-
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I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional American concept of criminal sentencing is that
prisons exist for rehabilitation and release as much as for incarcera-
tion.1 However, in recent years Congress and state legislatures have
enacted a series of stringent anti-drug laws, which have largely aban-
doned the concept of rehabilitating prisoners2 and instead, focused on
keeping inmates locked up for longer periods of time.'
1. Michael A. Kroll, The Prison Experiment: A Circular History, S. Exposure,
Winter 1978, at 6. See generally Kurt Anderson, What Are Prisons For?, TIME, Sept.
13, 1982, at 38.
2. Michael Isikoff and Tracy Thompson, Getting Too Tough on Drugs; Draco-
nian Sentences Hurt Small Offenders More Than Kingpins, THE WASHINGTON POST,
November 4, 1990, at Cl.
3. Brief for Respondent at 2, Harmelin v. Michigan, Ill S. Ct. 2680 (1991)
(No. 89-7272) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. Since the complete revision of the
federal sentencing system in 1984, sentences are no longer rehabilitative in nature and
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Legislatures are reacting to an ever-increasing spiral of drug traf-
fic, drug abuse and drug-related crime4 by instituting these harsh pen-
alties in an attempt to thwart drug activity. 5 The result of this "war-
on-drugs legislation" is an overwhelmed court system and staggering
increases in the nation's prison population.6 Since 1986, average jail
time served in federal drug cases is fifty-eight months, an increase of
151 percent.7
One weapon used in this war-on-drugs is the mandatory life sen-
tence without opportunity of parole, commonly called "life without pa-
role".8 A mandatory life sentence without parole is the "penultimate
penalty", meaning a convict will spend the rest of his natural life be-
hind bars.9 The recent development and current prevalence of life with-
out parole is due to the fact that it addresses legislative policies under-
lying criminal penalties.' 0 Legislators mandate these life sentences
without parole hoping the penalty will not only prevent the offender
from injuring others, but also act as a societal deterrent."
Unfortunately these "life without parole sentences" without parole
do not produce the desired results and often lead to injustice. Perhaps
the most persuasive argument against mandatory life sentences is one
of fairness.' 2 While many Americans were unhappy with lenient
parole has been eliminated in favor of determinate sentences. Id.
4. Ruth Marcus, Life in Prison For Cocaine Possession?; High Court Weighing
Strict Michigan Law, THE WASHINGTON POST, November 5, 1990, at Al. Fifty seven
percent of a national sample of males arrested in 1989 for homicide tested positive for
illegal drugs. National Institute of Justice, 1989 Drug Use Forecasting Annual Report
June, 1990. The comparable statistics for assault, robbery and weapons arrests were
55, 73, and 63 percent, respectively. Id. In Michigan, in 1988, 68 percent of a sample
of male arrestees and 81 percent of a sample of female arrestees tested positive for
illegal drugs. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2706 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
5. Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 7.
6. Isikoff and Thompson, supra note 2, at Cl.
7. Dennis Cauchon, The Scales of Justice May be Tipped Unfairly, USA To-
DAY, June 24, 1991, at A8.
8. Wright, Life-Without-Parole: An Alternative To Death Or Not Much Of A
Life At All?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 529 (1990).
9. Id.
10. See People v. Lemble, 303 N.W.2d 191 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
11. Id.
12. Concerned that mandatory minimum sentences, which already affect about
one-third of federal sentences are unfair, judges in several federal circuits have joined
in formal protests against this type of sentencing. See Sturgess, Mandatory Sentences
Draw Increased Fire; Judges, Families Join Fight Against Minimum Guidelines, THE
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judges, mandatory life imprisonment was viewed as the panacea of
anti-drug legislation. No longer would the judge's discretion be the sole
determinate of a criminal's punishment. Rather each drug offender
would receive a harsh, but equal treatment. On the contrary,
mandatory life sentences have failed to treat all criminals the same.13
One reason for this inequity is due to the prosecutors' authority to dic-
tate a criminal's penalty by their choice of charges filed. 1 ' In Harme-
lin's case, for instance, had prosecutors filed charges against him in
federal court, rather than in state court, he would be facing a much
more lenient sentence.
Another inequity in this anti-drug legislation is the frequency by
which large-scale drug traffickers evade these mandatory sentences. It
is ironic that drug kingpins, the targets of these anti-drug laws, have
been given lesser sentences for providing law enforcement with infor-
mation regarding their drug ring." In 1988, the House Judiciary Sub-
committee on Crime learned of a drug kingpin who was released from
custody for providing law enforcement with the names of twelve lower-
level dealers.1 6 All twelve lower-level dealers received mandatory
sentences. 7
In a recent decision, Harmelin v. Michigan,8 the Supreme Court
considered the scope of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishments against the imposition of a mandatory life
sentence without parole for a nonviolent first offense of possession of
672 grams of cocaine. 9 The Court held that "mandatory [life] penal-
ties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional
sense."'20 Accordingly, this decision sharply limits the holding in Solem
v. Helm,2 a 1983 Supreme Court case which incorporated the notion
that criminal sentences should be proportional to the crime.22
RECORDER, May 7, 1991 at 1.






18. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2701.
21. 463 U.S. 277 (1983)( holding the defendant's sentence was significantly dis-
proportionate to the crime, and therefore was prohibited by the Eight Amendment).
22. Marcus, supra note 4, at Al.
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Traditionally, the Eighth Amendment"3 has regulated the mode of
punishment, as well as the length of a sentence.2" This Comment ex-
plores whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and un-
usual punishments limits the authority of legislatures to prescribe these
mandatory life sentences without the possibility for parole. The answer
to this issue has both social and legal impacts.25 As a matter of social
policy, this issue poses questions about the purpose of our prison sys-
tem, the role, if any, of rehabilitation and the degree to which individ-
ual moral culpability and mitigating circumstances should be taken
into account during sentencing. 6 As a question of law, this issue sheds
light on the scope of cruel and unusual punishments under the eighth
amendment and the meaning of the proportionality principle as defined
in Solem.17
This Comment's central thesis is that Harmelin was wrongly de-
cided for three reasons: 1) prior Supreme Court precedent firmly estab-
lishes that the power of legislatures to set criminal sentences is subject
to an Eighth Amendment proportionality review;2 8 2) mandatory life
sentences without parole should be subject to the individualized sen-
tencing prevalent in capital cases,29 and 3) Harmelin's sentence of life
in prison without parole was disproportionate to the crime."
This Comment will be divided into five sections. Following this in-
troduction, section II provides an historical analysis of eighth amend-
ment jurisprudence. Specifically, this section interprets the eighth
amendment as incorporating a principle of proportionality of punish-
ments. It then examines the evolution of the individualized sentencing
doctrine adopted in capital cases. Next, section III reviews the Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Harmelin v. Michigan.31 Section IV
addresses the flaws in the Michigan statute under which Harmelin re-
23. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
24. Solem, 463 U.S. at 284.
25. Marcus, supra, note 4, at Al.
26. Id.
27. Id.; Solem, 463 U.S. at 277.
28. E.g., id.
29. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (death penalty does not
violate Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment); Woodson v. North
California, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
30. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2719 (White, J., dissenting).
31. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
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ceived life in prison without parole, and applies the Solem proportional-
ity factors 2 to the facts in Harmelin to demonstrate how the case was
wrongly decided. Finally, Section V concludes by stressing the detri-
mental effects caused by the recent trend of mandatory minimum
sentences in anti-drug legislation illustrated by the Michigan statute3
which was upheld in Harmelin.
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Legislatures have the power to define crimes and to establish pun-
ishment.3 4 However, no penalty is per se constitutional.35 Legislative
power is subject to judicial review to ensure that the punishment passes
constitutional muster.3 The judicial role of enforcing the cruel and un-
usual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment "'cannot be evaded
by invoking the obvious truth that the legislature has the power to pre-
scribe punishments for crimes. That is precisely the reason the clause
appears in the Bill of Rights.' "31 Consequently, in order to pass consti-
tutional muster a punishment must fall within the scope of proportion-
ality which has evolved along with the Eighth Amendment. 8
A. The Scope of Proportionality Under the Eighth Amendment
The principle that a punishment must be proportionate to the
crime has deep roots that stem back as far as the Magna Carta, which
established the right against excessive "amercements" or fines.3 9 Chap-
ter twenty of the Magna Carta provided that "a free man shall not be
amerced for a trivial offense, except in accordance with the degree of
the offense."'
The principle of proportionality also appeared in the English Bill
32. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-93 (1983).
33. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.7403 (West 1980).
34. Brief in Support of Petitioner at 12, Harmelin v. Michigan, I II S. Ct. 2680
(1991) (No. 89-7272) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
35. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (noting that a single
day in prison may be unconstitutional).
36. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290.
37. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 12 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 268 (1972) (Brennan, J. concurring)).
38. See, e.g., Solem, 463 U.S. at 277; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962); United States v. Weems, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
39. Solem, 463 U.S. at 284 n.18.
40. A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA TEXT AND COMMENTARY 40 (1964).
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of Rights of 1689 as "a longstanding principle of English law that the
punishment . . . should not be, by reason of its excessive length or se-
verity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged".4 The framers
of the Eighth Amendment repeated nearly verbatim the cruel and un-
usual punishment clause referenced in the English Bill of Rights of
1689.42 Thus, as a result, some historians conclude that American colo-
nists sought protection of the same liberties enjoyed by English citi-
zens.'" The Eighth Amendment ensures that: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted."" Despite the fact that the reference to "cruel and un-
usual" punishment is less specific than the reference to "excessive bail"
and "excessive fines", the Supreme Court has concluded that the
amendment was designed to impose "parallel limitations" on bails,
fines and other punishments.45
The concept of proportionality is well entrenched in this country's
eighth amendment jurisprudence.' 6 In United States v. Weems,"7 the
Supreme Court first articulated the notion that proportionality was "a
precept of justice that [the] punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to [the] offense."' 8 Applying this principle, the Court
held that a fifteen year sentence of hard labor in chains was a dispro-
41. RICHARD L. PERRY, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 236 (Am Bar Found.,1959).
Another historian who believes English law includes disproportionality is Granucci. See
Anthony F. Granucci, 'Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted'.- The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969).
42. Solem, 463 U.S. at 285 n.10.
43. See Perry, supra note 41, at 234-38. Following independence, a number of
state constitutions adopted the notion that the punishment must fit the crime. See, e.g.,
PA. CONST. at § 38 (1776) (calling for a review of its penal system to make "punish-
ments in some cases less sanguinary and in general more proportionate to the crime");
S.C. CONST. at § XL (1776) (supporting a reformation to make punishments "more
proportionate to the crime"); see Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties
Union and the ACLU of Michigan in Support of Petitioner at 12, Harmelin v. Michi-
gan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (No. 89-7272) [hereinafter ACLU Brief for Petitioner].
44. US. CONST. amend. VIII.
45. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). The Supreme Court has
noted that it would be illogical if the lesser punishment of a fine and the greater pun-
ishment of death were both subject to proportionality analysis, while the intermediate
punishment of imprisonment was not. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289 (1983).
46. Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 11, Harmelin v. Michigan,
Ill S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (No. 89-7272) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae for Peti-
tioner] (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 (1983)).
47. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
48. Id. at 367 n.14.
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portionate penalty for falsifying public documents. 9 Part of the Court's
concern was unquestionably based on the mode of punishment, which
bordered on the torturous"0 as well as the length of the punishment. 51
The Court in Weems maintained that even though it had not deter-
mined the exact scope of the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual
punishments clause; the Eighth Amendment did include the require-
ment that the penalty be proportionate to the crime."
More than fifty years later, the Court reached a similar conclusion
in Robinson v. California.5" The defendant in Robinson was a drug
addict who was convicted under a California statute which classified
drug addiction as a misdemeanor.54 The Court stated that "imprison-
ment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is
either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be considered in the
abstract. Even one day in prison would be cruel and unusual punish-
ment for the crime of having a common cold."155 The Court reasoned
that allowing a sickness to be made a crime and permitting sick people
to be punished for being sick would be a violation of the eighth amend-
ment."' Accordingly, the Robinson Court further incorporated the prin-
ciple of proportionality into Eighth Amendment jurisprudence."
Following Robinson, the question of proportionality arose in a se-
ries of Eighth Amendment challenges involving capital punishment.5 8
In Coker v. Georgia,59 a plurality of the Court held that the death
penalty was an excessive punishment for the crime of rape."0 Similarly,
in Enmund v. Florida,"1 the Court held that felony murder does not
49. Id. at 367.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Weems, 217 U.S. at 380-81.
53. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
54. Id. at 660 n.1.
55. Id. at 667.
56. Id. at 666.
57. Additionally, Robinson established the application of the Eighth Amend-
ment's cruel and unusual punishment clause to the states. Id. at 675.
58. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (capital punishment im-
posed for the crime of murder cannot be viewed as invariably disproportionate to the
severity of that crime); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (the penalty of death
imposed on three defendants, one for murder, and two for rape, violated the eighth
amendments' prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment).
59. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
60. Id. at 592 n.4.
61. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
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trigger the death penalty unless the state provesbeyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant intended the murder in addition to the under-
lying felony.62
In the past eighty years, the one significant exception to propor-
tionality in sentencing was Rummel v. Estelle.6 The Rummel Court
rejected the eighth amendment challenge of a Texas recidivist sen-
tenced to life imprisonment for his third felony conviction." The Court,
however, did not entirely reject the proportionality principle.15 To the
contrary, the Rummel majority averred that "a proportionality princi-
ple would . . . come into play . . . if a legislature made overtime park-
ing a felony punishable by life imprisonment." 6
Undoubtedly, the hypothetical chosen by the Rummel majority
was intended as an "extreme example".67 Nevertheless, since the Court
maintained that some prison sentences could be constitutionally exces-
sive, it would be illogical to conclude that "the length of the sentence
actually imposed [is] purely a matter of legislative prerogative." '68 The
critical question, then, is what criteria to use in determining when leg-
islators have exceeded their constitutional limits in mandating prison
sentencing guidelines. Unfortunately, Rummel offers no such criteria or
assistance in the determination of this matter.
Three years later in Solem v. Helm, the Supreme Court enumer-
ated objective factors to be considered in reviewing the proportionality
of sentences.69 In Solem, the defendant was convicted of attempting to
cash a "no account" check, his seventh conviction of a non-violent fel-
ony. Under South Dakota law he was treated as a recidivist and sen-
tenced to life imprisonment without parole.70
62. Id. at 799. Between the decisions in Robinson and Enmund a number of
Supreme Court decisions referred to'the fact that disproportionate punishment violates
the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982) (per
curiam); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
664, 667 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171-72 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell and Stevens, JJ.).
63. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 274, n.ll.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274.
69. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
70. Id. at 281-83. The South Dakota recidivist statute provided that when a de-
fendant had been convicted of at least three prior convictions in addition to the princi-
pal felony, then the sentence for the principal felony should be enhanced to a maximum
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The Solem Court distinguished Rummel by reasoning that a sen-
tence under the South Dakota statute was significantly different than
the sentence upheld in Rummel since it precluded all possibility of pa-
role. 71 The Court invoked a comparative test employing objective crite-
ria in determining that the sentence of life without parole was not com-
mensurate with Helm's crimes.1  The Court's objective criteria
included consideration of the gravity of the offense and the harshness of
the penalty, the sentence imposed by the same jurisdiction for other
crimes, and the sentence imposed by other jurisdictions for the same
offense. 73 Because the crimes were nonviolent, and the Court found the
punishment to be substantially more severe than would be imposed in
nearly all other jurisdictions, it declared the sentence in violation of the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. 74
The Court in Solem specified that its holding should not mandate
appellate review of all prison sentences since courts were obligated to
grant substantial deference to legislative judgment and trial court deci-
sions when assessing proportionality. 7 However, such deference should
not eliminate judicial scrutiny of those cases where a sentence may be
so disproportionate as to raise a valid Eighth Amendment claim.78 Fur-
thermore, such scrutiny should incorporate the objective factors out-
lined by the Court to determine whether a punishment is excessive in
relation to the crime." Through the use of these objective factors the
Court further entrenched the principle of proportionality in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence since this proportionality principle acts as a
constitutional limit on the mode and length of criminal sentences. 78
Thus, the criminal penalties assessed by state legislatures cannot be
excessive or arbitrarily imposed, but rather, the punishment must com-
port with this proportionality principle.7
penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Id. at 281.
71. Id. at 302-03.
72. Id. at 291-92.
73. Id. at 290-92.
74. Solem, 463 U.S. at 300.
75. Id. at 290 n.16.
76. Id. at 290.
77. Id. at 291 n.17.
78. Id. at 284.
79. Solem, 463 U.S. at 284.
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B. The Evolution of Individualized Sentencing
Throughout the Supreme Court's holdings in a series of capital
cases the Court has established a constitutional doctrine requiring indi-
vidualized sentencing. 0 This doctrine requires the sentencer to consider
relevant mitigating circumstances of the offense and the offender before
sentencing a defendant to the death penalty.8 Although individual
sentences have been exclusively applied to capital cases, the reasoning
for adopting such a doctrine is applicable to mandatory life sentences
without opportunity for parole.82 Since a defendant could spend the rest
of his life in prison without any opportunity for reconsideration, the
sentencing authority should be able to consider relevant mitigation cir-
cumstances. 83 Thus, an overview of some of the important Supreme
Court cases highlights the philosophy that offenders who commit the
same crime should not always receive the same punishment, without
the consideration of relevant mitigating evidence.
Society distinguishes between those who are culpable while com-
mitting a crime and those who are not. 4 In Lockett v. Ohio, the de-
fendant faced the death penalty for helping to plan an armed robbery
and waiting outside in the car when a store owner was killed.8 5 The
Supreme Court reversed the death sentence imposed by the Ohio Su-
preme Court and held that the concept of individualized sentences in
criminal cases has long been accepted in America. 6 The Court con-
cluded that in order to pass constitutional muster a death penalty stat-
ute must not preclude the consideration of relevant mitigating factors.8 7
Therefore, since the Ohio statute did not take into consideration
whether the offender intended to cause the death of the victim it was
80. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
81. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (defendant is entitled to jury in-
struction which may include mitigating evidence such as mental retardation which the
jury may consider when determining whether to impose the death penalty); Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 597-609 (1978) (plurality opinion) (considering defendant's char-
acteristics, his record and circumstances of the offense).
82. Brief of Amici Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 42-43.
83. Id.
84. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 626.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 605 n.13. The Lockett opinion expressly left open the application of
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incompatible with the Eighth Amendment.88
Similarly, in Woodson v. North Carolina, the defendant faced
capital punishment for first-degree murder. 9 The Supreme Court de-
clared the North Carolina statute90 unconstitutional since it failed to
provide for the consideration of relevant aspects of the character and
record of the defendant.91 In support of its holding the Court quoted
Justice Black's statement made over twenty-seven years earlier that
" '[t]he belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal cate-
gory calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life
and habits of a particular offender.' "92
More than ten years later, in Sumner v. Shuman,93 the Supreme
Court faced the question of whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits a
statute which sentences an inmate who commits murder while already
serving a sentence of life imprisonment without parole to the death
penalty.9 ' The Court held that, even given these aggravating circum-
stances, the Eighth Amendment did not allow a departure from the
requirement of individualized sentencing.9" Consequently, this sentenc-
ing doctrine requires that the sentencing authority consider, as a miti-
gating factor, any aspect of the defendant's character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense.9"
III. HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN: AN OVERVIEW
A. Facts and Procedural History
The issue of whether a mandatory sentence of life imprisohmeInt
without parole violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruIel
and unusual punishment was recently decided by the Supreme Court in
Harmelin v. Michigan.9 In Harmelin, the defendant, a forty-two year
old man with no prior criminal record was pulled over for failing to
88. Id. at 608.
89. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1975) (imposing a mandatory death sen-
tence for first degree murder).
91. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
92. Id. at 296-97 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).
93. 482 U.S. 66 (1987).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 73-76.
96. Id. at 70-76.
97. III S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
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stop at a red light.9 8 Harmelin voluntarily revealed to the police officer
that he was carrying a gun and produced a permit to carry a concealed
weapon. Nevertheless, the police subsequently searched his person and
impounded his vehicle. 99 The search of his person revealed marijuana
cigarettes, assorted pills, ten small packets of cocaine, 100 three vials of
cocaine and a telephone pager. The search of the impounded vehicle
revealed a travel bag containing $2900 in cash, 672.5 grams of co-
caine'0 1 and a coded address book. Harmelin was charged and con-
victed of possession of 650 or more grams of cocaine,10 2 and possession
of a firearm during the commission of a felony. a03 He was sentenced by
the Oakland County Circuit Court to a mandatory life term of impris-
onment without possibly of parole.'04
On appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals, Harmelin argued
that his mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amend-
ment.' 05 Additionally, he claimed the sentence was unconstitutional
since the sentencing judge was required to impose it regardless of the
particular circumstances of his case.' 6 The Michigan Court of Appeals
eventually affirmed his conviction' 017 and the Michigan Supreme Court
98. People v. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d 75, 77-78 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
99. Id.
100. Id. One such packet was analyzed and found to contain 0.14 grams of a
mixture containing cocaine. Id.
101. Approximately one and one-half pounds.
102. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d at 75-76; see MicH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §
333.7403(l)(i) (West 1980).
103. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d at 77; see MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.227(b)
(West 1991).
104. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d at 77; see also MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §
333.7403(2)(a)(i) (West 1980)(provides a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for
possession of 650 grams or more of "any mixture containing [a schedule 2] controlled
substance"); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.7214(a)(iv) (West 1980)(defines cocaine
as a schedule 2 controlled substance); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 791.234(4) (West
1982) (allows for eligibility of parole after ten years in prison, except for convictions of
first-degree murder or "a major controlled substance offense"); MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. § 791.233b[1](b) (West 1982) (defines "major controlled substance offense" as a
violation of section 333.7403). See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 3-4, Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991)
(No. 89-7272).
105. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 5-6.
106. Id.
107. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d at 75. Harmelin also argued on appeal that his con-
viction must be reversed since the evidence against him was obtained as a result of an
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denied leave to appeal.1"8 Harmelin subsequently filed a petition for
writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court which was
granted."°9
B. The Supreme Court's Holding and Rationale
In a five-four decision, the Supreme Court upheld Harmelin's sen-
tence holding that this case did not deserve the individualized sentenc-
ing usually reserved for capital cases."' The Harmelin decision sug-
gests that a mandatory life sentence without parole might be
unconstitutional for some crimes, but the Court was split on where it
would draw the line beyond where a sentence would violate the Eighth
Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment."' The Harmelin deci-
sion sharply limits the holding in Solem, which only eight years earlier,
had established that the Eighth Amendment required an element of
proportionality in criminal sentencing." 2 Justice Scalia, in the only
portion of his lead opinion adopted by the majority, stated that only in
capital punishment cases has the Court interpreted the Eighth Amend-
ment to require individualized sentencing." 3 The Court held that be-
cause of the qualitative differences between death and all other punish-
ments, consideration of the defendant's circumstances and the
appropriateness of the penalty should not be extended outside the capi-
tal context." '
The majority, in affirming the Michigan Court of Appeals deci-
sion, conducted an in-depth analysis of the Eighth Amendment's his-
tory and cases interpreting the cruel and unusual punishments
unconstitutional search and that he had been deprived effective assistance of counsel.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 4. The Michigan Court of Appeals agreed and
reversed his conviction, stating that the evidence against him was obtained from an
unconstitutional search. Id. However, in an order dated March 9, 1989, the Michigan
Court of Appeals vacated that judgment. Id. In an opinion (on reconsideration) dated
April 18, 1989, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Harmelin's conviction. Id. at
6.
108. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 6.
109. Harmelin v. Michigan, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990).
110. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
111. Id.
112. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1973).
113. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2702; see Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
114. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2702.
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clause."' The majority concluded that the Eighth Amendment does not
provide for judicial inquiry to determine if a noncapital sentence is pro-
portionate to the offense. 11 Rather, the Eighth Amendment was pri-
marily intended as a check on legislators' ability to authorize particular
methods of punishment. 1 7 Furthermore, the majority argued that the
length of the sentence, however, is purely a matter of legislative prerog-
ative."' 8 Moreover, the majority averred that the proportionality princi-
ple is merely an invitation for judges to impose their own subjective
values 9 Contrary to Solem, the majority rejected the use of objective
criteria to determine whether a penalty is disproportionate and stated
that Solem, which decreed a "general principle of proportionality", 20
should be overruled.12 '
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, along with Justices
O'Connor and Souter, agreed that individualized sentencing should not
be extended to noncapital cases.122 However, Kennedy insisted on the
continued adherence to the narrow proportionality principle, which as-
sures that the punishment fit the crime, identified in Solem. 1 3 The con-
currence looked to the first prong of the Solem proportionality criteria,
the gravity of the offense and the severity of the punishment, and deter-
mined that Harmelin's crime was severe enough to justify the penalty
of life imprisonment without parole.12 Kennedy concluded that in light
of the severity of Harmelin's crime, his sentence was "within the con-
stitutional boundaries established by our prior decisions. '1125 Kennedy
asserted that the Solem analysis of proportionality need not be further
pursued since the Constitution only forbids sentences that are grossly
disproportionate to the crime. 26 Consequently, the two other criteria
115. Id. at 2684-96; see, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), Hutto v.
Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982), Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
116. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2684-96.
117: Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2687.
120. Solem, 463 U.S. at 288.
121. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2696-99.
122. Id. at 2703 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 2707.
124. Id. at 2705, 2706.
125. Id. at 2706; see Solem, 463 U.S. at 277; Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 263
(1980), Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 263 (1980), Hutto v. Finney 437 U.S. 678,
685 (1978) (dicta).
126. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2707 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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listed in Solem; the comparison of the punishment to the punishments
for other crimes within the same jurisdiction, and the comparison of
other jurisdiction's punishment of the same crime, "are appropriate
only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime
committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross
disproportionality." 127
The dissenting Justices, White, Blackmun, Stevens and Mar-
shall, 123 argued that this approach was nearly as bad as overruling So-
lem.1 9 "While Justice Scalia seeks to deliver a swift death sentence to
Solem, Justice Kennedy prefers to eviscerate it, leaving only an empty
shell. 1 30 The dissent concluded that a comparative analysis, like the
one used in Solem, is the only way to determine if a sentence is dispro-
portionate to the offense.131 Applying the Solem criteria to the present
case, the dissent attacked Harmelin's sentence as too harsh: "Mere pos-
session of drugs - even in such a large quantity - is not so serious an
offense that it will always warrant, much less mandate, life imprison-
ment without possibility of parole." '32
IV. HARMELIN'S MANDATORY LIFE SENTENCE WITHOUT
PAROLE: AN ANALYSIS
A. Lack of Individualized Sentencing and Other Flaws in the
Michigan Statute
Because of the unique nature of the death penalty, the Supreme
Court has applied individualized sentences to capital cases. 133 However,
like the death penalty, mandatory life imprisonment without parole
"treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely
individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated
mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty . , 134
An analysis of prison sentences frequently involves a comparison
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2719 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall filed a separate dis-
senting opinion arguing that capital punishment is always unconstitutional. Id.
129. Id. at 2714 (White, J., dissenting).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2716.
133. E.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
134. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
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of factors which because of complex parole and sentence reduction pro-
visions do not lend themselves to an exact quantitative review."3 5 How-
ever, many sentencing alternatives such as the possibility of parole,
which normally interfere with the application of the Eighth Amend-
ment's cruel and unusual punishment clause to routine prison sentences
do not exist in Harmelin.13 6 In fact, a number of the factors used by
the Supreme Court to distinguish between capital and noncapital cases
-including the availability of probation, parole, and work furloughs- are
not available under the Michigan statute by which Harmelin was con-
victed.137 Consequently, the individualized sentencing doctrine should
be applied not only to capital cases, but also to mandatory life
sentences without the opportunity for parole like the one imposed in
Harmelin.138
The Michigan legislature, in an effort to curtail a steady increase
in drug related crime and drug abuse in Michigan, passed a bill in
1980 increasing the penalties for possession of certain controlled sub-
stances. 139 This Michigan statute under which Harmelin was convicted
mandates life imprisonment without parole to everyone convicted of
possessing any mixture of 650 grams or more containing cocaine. 14 0
Life imprisonment is imposed regardless of the circumstances of the
offense.1 41 This inflexible statute neither distinguishes between varying
levels of individual culpability nor does it consider a defendant's prior
criminal record. 42 Consequently, a drug kingpin with an extensive
criminal record is treated exactly the same as a minor participant who
is a first time offender.143 Additionally, the Michigan statute draws no
135. Brief of Amici Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 8, (citing Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980)).
136. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 24.
137. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
333.7403(1)(i) (West 1980).
138. Brief of Amicus Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 42-43; see also
United States v. Perez, 685 F. Supp. 990, 1002 (W.D. Tex. 1988). In Perez, the court
stated: "[T]hat the defendant's ability to inform the Court of circumstances and fac-
tors should not be determined by whether the defendant faces a maximum punishment
of death, a life sentence, or a lesser term of incarceration." Id. at 1002.
139. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7403 (WEST 1980).
140. Id.
141. Brief of Amici Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 52.
142. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 5.
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distinction based on the purity of the mixture. " " Thus, a person con-
victed of possessing one gram of cocaine mixed with 649 grams of
sugar would be subjected to mandatory life without parole.1 45
There. is no dispute that many drug dealers and users commit vio-
lent crimes.' 46 Additionally, many drug users die from overdoses or
give birth to drug addicted babies.147 Indeed, all drug dealers share the
responsibility for these atrocities, and should be punished accord-
ingly. 4 But to treat as killers every drug dealer and his "mules of
transport" is nothing more than mass hysteria."19 Such reasoning op-
poses legal principles and a series of Supreme Court Cases restricting
the death penalty to those who kill intentionally or by deliberately cre-
ating a grave risk to human life.1
5 0
Drug dealers do not deserve to be punished as severely as murder-
ers, unless they commit violent crimes.' 5 ' "Intentionally killing is
worlds apart, in terms of certainty of harm and moral culpability, from
acting as one of many suppliers selling drugs in a mass marketplace of
buyers, most of whom use drugs with knowledge of the risks."' 52 Fur-
thermore, such harsh penalties for drug activity do not accomplish their
goal of ridding the streets of dealers and deterring others from drug
involvement. 53
The Michigan legislature's attempt to deter drug trafficking by
targeting the higher echelon drug dealers has been criticized as unsuc-
cessful.3 4 In fact, the people actually being sentenced to life imprison-
ment are the "mules of transport".'55 While the real drug kingpins are
often given lesser sentences in the federal system for divulging key in-
formation to the government, the couriers, who conceivably lack access
to valuable information and are unable to offer information end up
144. Brief of Amici Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 9.
145. See Michigan v. Lemble, 303 N.W.2d 191 (Mich. 1981).





150. See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts(Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1976).
151. Taylor, supra note 146, at 25.
152. Id.
153. Id. Every year thousands of youths are drawn to the drug trade despite the
dangers of being killed by competitors or punished by harsh criminal sanctions. Id.
154. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 10.
155. Marcus, supra note 4, at Al.
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serving mandatory life imprisonment without parole. The Michigan
Oakland County Circuit Court, summed up these problems with the
Michigan statute: 156
Having carefully considered this statute, I have come to the conclu-
sion that this law is the product of emotion, not reason. Politicians,
known as legislators, in an effort to respond to community pressure
and frustration over a very serious drug problem, rushed to a sim-
ple formula, in search of a solution - essentially throwing away the
key for life for any and all individuals who shall possess more than
650 grams of cocaine. However mindlessly throwing away the key
will neither deter such crime, nor promote justice. Quite the oppo-
site, bad laws, such as the one at issue here, promote disrespect
Every thinking person must know that there are many second de-
gree murderers, rapists, kidnappers, and other violent offenders
more dangerous to the public welfare than many people who pos-
sess over 650 grams of cocaine, Yet the law does not mandate a
natural life sentence for each and every such violent criminal. Why
then should it do so for the drug possessor? This is not to say that
select drug possessors or dealers should not be sent away for natu-
ral life; it is simply to say that it makes no sense to mandate such a
sentence for this offense and not to do so for many more dangerous
offenders. This law has done nothing to ameliorate the bad condi-
tions that exist in the State of Michigan with respect to the posses-
sion and distribution of illegal drugs. 57
Unlike the rapists, murderers, kidnappers and other violent crimi-
nal offenders referenced to by the Oakland County Circuit Court, the
Michigan statute requires that upon conviction, sentencing judges and
parole authorities are not to consider mitigating circumstances. 1 8
However, deference to legislative power does not preclude unreasonable
sentences from constitutional scrutiny.'6 9 In fact, the Supreme Court
has dictated that the level of judicial scrutiny must intensify as the
156. Because of the problems with the Michigan statute, Judge Lippitt of the
Oakland County Circuit Court disqualified himself from adjudicating, People v. Mar-
tin, No. 86-74706, slip op. (Oakland Co. Cir. August 20, 1987), a case similar to
Harmelin. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 11.
157. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34 at 11-12 (quoting Martin, No. 86-74706,
slip op. at 3, 4).
158. Id.
159. Brief of Amici Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 10.
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penalty increases and as the discretionary range of sentences nar-
rows.16 0 Consequently, an eighth amendment challenge for the penalty
of life in prison without parole should focus on whether the mandatory
life sentence is proportionate to the crime for which the defendant was
convicted.161
B. Under the Solem Analysis Harmelin's Sentence is
Disproportionate
Contrary to the majority's assertion, the So/em analysis has
proved eminently workable."' The probability that Solem would "flood
the appellate courts with cases in which . . . arbitrary lines must be
drawn" has not resulted.' In the eight years since the decision, only a
handful of sentences have been declared unconstitutional under the So-
lem standard. 164 In fact many courts have proven that they are "capa-
ble of applying the Eighth Amendment to disproportionate noncapital
sentences with a high degree of sensitivity to principles of federalism
and state autonomy."' 6 5 When properly applied, So/em is consistent
with these principles since it affords deference to legislatures' authority
to set punishments for crimes, as well as to judges when sentencing
convicted criminals.'66
The Solem Court listed three workable factors for the courts to
consider when evaluating the constitutionality of a criminal sentence.16 7
160. Id; see, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
161. Brief of Amici Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 12.
162. Harmelin v. Michigan, Ill S. Ct. 2680, 2696-97, 2712 (1991) (White, J.,
dissenting).
163. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 315 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
164. Harmelin, Ill S. Ct. at 2713 n.2. There have been only four cases cited
since Solem in which sentences have been reversed on the basis of a proportionality
review. See Ashley v. State, 538 So. 2d 1181 (Miss. 1989) (reaching a similar holding
for a defendant who burglarized a home to get four dollars to repay a grocer for food
eaten in the store); Clowers v. State, 522 So. 2d 762 (Miss. 1988) (trial court had
discretion to reduce a fifteen year sentence without parole for a defendant who uttered
a forged check); State v. Gilham, 549 N.E.2d 555 (Ohio 1988). Additionally, in
Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944 (Nev. 1989), the court looked to both state and
federal constitutions before striking a life sentence without parole imposed on an ado-
lescent who killed and then robbed a person who had repeatedly molested him.
165. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 306 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); see
also Thiess v. State Board, 387 F. Supp. 1038, 1042 (Md. 1974).
166. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290.
167. Id. at 290-94.
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First, the court should weigh the gravity of the offense and the harsh-
ness of the penalty. 168 Second, the court should compare the sentences
imposed in the state for other crimes.169 Third, the court should com-
pare how other states treat the same offense.170
Through the incorporation of these objective factors Solem invokes
an Eighth Amendment review of sentencing that reflects constitutional
values and that works well in practice since it gives courts a standard
against which to measure punishments. 17 1 Therefore, there is no need
to reexamine these factors or overrule Solem.172 Undoubtedly, Harme-
lin was one of the situations in which the Solem standards needed to be
applied because the punishment of life imprisonment without parole
was too severe given the crime committed and the defendant's lack of a
previous record. 7
Application of the Solem factors to the sentence in Harmelin
reveals that the punishment is unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment.7 4 The first of the Solem factors requires a court to re-
view the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty.1 75 In
an evaluation of the gravity of the offense, a court should consider "the
harm caused or threatened to the victim or society," based on such
things as the degree of violence involved in the crime as well as "the
absolute magnitude of the crime," and "the culpability of the of-
fender". " 6 The magnitude of Harmelin's offense includes the consider-
ation of the ever increasing threat of illegal drugs in America. 7 There
is no dispute that drugs pose serious societal problems.17 8 In fact, Presi-
dent George Bush considers the "war" on drugs America's top
priority.' 79




171. ACLU Brief for Petitioner, supra note 43, at 16.
172. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2714 (White, J., dissenting).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2719.
175. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
176. Id. at 292-93.
177. Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 5.
178. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2716 (White, J., dissenting).
179. Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 19-20. The federal government will
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as possessed by Harmelin, should not automatically warrant life impris-
onment without parole. 18 0 Like crimes of violence, such as murder, rape
and kidnapping, Harmelin's penalty for a drug offense should be tem-
pered by discretionary and individualized sentencing because factors
such as culpability, past criminal record and other mitigating circum-
stances need to be considered to ensure a fair penalty.1 8'
To pass constitutional muster, a punishment should be tailored to
a defendant's personal responsibility and moral culpability.' 82 Ameri-
can courts consider a defendant's intention, and his moral guilt, to be
crucial "to the degree of his criminal culpability."'' 83 However, in
Harmelin, the sentencing judge was not allowed to consider that
Harmelin had no criminal record; he cooperated with police upon his
arrest; he had not displayed any viciousness, and he did not demon-
strate an inability to reform.' Since Michigan does not have a death
penalty, Harmelin's sentence is the most severe punishment Michigan
can levy for any offense, including first degree murder. 8 Mr. Harme-
lin will now spend the rest of his life, and ultimately die, in a Michigan
prison."' Thus, not to take into account the particular facts of his of-
fense, or his personal history and characteristics, is a gross miscarriage
of justice. 187
Justice Kennedy's argument for the majority that the harsh pen-
alty is appropriate given the subsidiary effects of drug use is without
merit. 88 Even though the collateral effects of cocaine are severe, they
are similar to those that result from the misuse of other legal sub-
stances.18 It would be inconceivable for a state to sentence a person
who possesses large amounts of alcohol to mandatory life imprisonment
without parole, because of the tangentiil effects which might eventu-
ally be traced to the alcohol.' 0 Likewise, it is ridiculous to uphold
Harmelin's sentence because of the collateral effects which might indi-
180. Id.
181. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 16.
182. See Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
183. E.g., Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986), (Stevens, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975)).
184. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 14.
185. Harmelin, Il1 S. Ct. at 2718 (White, J., dissenting).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2718-19.
188. Id. at 2717.
189. Id. at 4856.
190. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2717.
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rectly ensue from the drugs he possessed.19' "'Unfortunately, grave
evils such as the narcotics traffic can too easily cause threats to our
basic liberties by making attractive the adoption of constitutionally for-
bidden shortcuts that might suppress and blot out more quickly the
unpopular and dangerous conduct.' "'19 Amazingly, this is precisely the
approach adopted by the Court. 193
Addressing the second factor of Solem requires evaluating the
sentences imposed for other crimes in Michigan.194 Only two other
crimes in Michigan carry a mandatory penalty such as the one Harme-
lin received: the manufacture or sale of more than 650 grams of a
Schedule 1 or 2 drug' 95 and, first degree murder. 196 Thus, Michigan
has equated the severity of first degree murder with the possession or
sale of 650 or more grams of cocaine. 97 Of particular interest in the
application of the second Solem factor is Michigan's sentencing scheme
for murder, since it punishes only cold blooded murderers with a
mandatory life sentence in prison without parole.1 98 The particular cir-
cumstances of the homicide narrow the penalty to those who are the
most morally reprehensible.' 99
In Harmelin's case, however, the Michigan statute required the
state to prove only that he knowingly possessed over 650 grams of a
substance containing cocaine.1°° The State is not required to prove that
Harmelin had an intention to kill,2 ' or that a death occurred because
of Harmelin's actions.20 2 By contrast, second degree murder, kidnap-
ping, and hostage-taking by prisoners do not carry such a harsh
mandatory sentence as the one Harmelin received, although they do
191. Id. at 2716.
192. Id. at 2717 (quoting Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 427 (1970)
(Black, J., dissenting)).
193. Id.
194. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 (1983).
195. MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.7401 (West 1980).
196. MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.316 (West 1991).
197. Brief of Amici Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 16.
198. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 40; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.316 (West 1991).
199. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 40. Only first-degree murderers are
considered so morally depraved as to have forfeited their right to live in society forever.
Id.
200. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7401 (West 1980).
201. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 40.
202. Id. Nor is any proof required that Harmelin even had a reckless disregard
for human life. Id.
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provide for the possibility of a life sentence in the exercise of judicial
discretion.2 0 3
This classification for sentencing purposes of Harmelin's offense as
equivalent to first-degree murder and more serious than second-degree
murder is irrational °.20 The severity of harm associated with a drug
possession offense cannot logically be considered, in all cases, to exceed
intentional homicides.20 5 It is ironic that had Harmelin panicked at the
traffic stop, unpremeditatedly shot and killed the police officer, ridded
himself of the cocaine, and then been arrested, he could have been sub-
ject to a lesser sentence up to life.2 6 Such a difference in penalties
exemplifies the disproportionate punishment since Harmelin "has been
treated in the same manner as, or more severely than, criminals who
have committed far more serious crimes. 207
The third criteria under the Solem proportionality test is a com-
parison of the sentence imposed for commission of the same offense in
other jurisdictions.20 8 No other jurisdiction imposes so harsh a punish-
ment as Michigan for possession of the amount of drugs in the present
case.209 Only Alabama imposes a similar punishment, and then only
when a defendant possesses ten kilograms or more of cocaine.2 10 If
Harmelin had been convicted in Alabama, he would have been subject
to a five year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for the of-
fense of' possession of 500 grams to one kilogram of cocaine. '
In fact, in the United States, only Michigan imposes a mandatory
life sentence without parole for possession of cocaine, regardless of
other relevant mitigating circumstances." 2 Only a few states including
Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, Nevada,
203. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.31, 750.349, 750.349(a) (West 1982).
Michigan law allows a prisoner "under sentence for life or for a term of years" to be
eligible for parole after ten years. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 791.234(4) (West 1982).
204. Brief of Amici Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 17.
205. Id. at 18.
206. Id. On a sentence calling for any term of years Harmelin would be eligible
for disciplinary credits which means that the minimum sentence could not exceed his
life expectancy. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 800.33(5) (West 1982); Brief of
Amici Curiae for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 18-19.
207. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 299 (1983).
208. Id. at 291-92.
209. Harmelin, Ill S. Ct. at 2718 (White, J., dissenting).
210. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-231(2)(d) (Supp. 1990).
211. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 42; see ALA. CODE § 13A-12-
231(2)(b) (Supp. 1990).
212. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 25.
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Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Texas authorize a possible
life sentence for first offenders.218 These states, however, do not pre-
clude the possibility of parole, nor the exercise of discretion by the sen-
tencing judge.214
Even under federal law, if a first offender possessed the same
amount of cocaine as Harmelin, the maximum prison sentence would
be a term of not less than five or more than forty years.21 5 Under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines, with all relevant enhancements, a
defendant in a similar situation as Harmelin, would expect to receive a
sentence that "would barely exceed ten years. ' 21 6 Moreover, under
Rule thirty five of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the gov-
ernment reserves the right to move for a reduction of a defendant's
sentence under the mandatory minimum of the Sentencing Guidelines
if the defendant has provided substantial assistance to the govern-
ment.2" The state of Michigan has no similar provision. 218
Based on the foregoing, it is obvious that Michigan's mandatory
life imprisonment without parole for the possession of 650 grams or
more of a substance containing cocaine is out of sync with both federal
law and the laws of other states. 219 Therefore, "[iut appears that
[Harmelin] was treated more severely than he would have been in any
other State. '220 The fact that no other jurisdiction mandates such a
harsh penalty for Harmelin's offense establishes "the degree of national
consensus [that the Supreme] Court has previously thought sufficient to
label a particular punishment cruel and unusual. 22
Application of the Solem criteria to Harmelin's situation reveals
213. Id. at 26.
214. Id.
215. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 46, at 28-29.
Under federal law the only possibility of a mandatory sentence of life without parole is
under Title 21 U.S.C. section 848, the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute. A con-
viction under this statute requires a person to be an organizer, supervisor, or manager
of five or more people; commit a continuing series of violations; derive substantial re-
sources from the activities; and the organization must have grossed at least ten million
dollars per year, or distributed at least 150 kilograms of cocaine. Id.
216. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2718 (White, J., dissenting); see also United States
Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, § 2Dl.1 (1990).
217. FED. R. CRIM P. 35; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 46.
218. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 46.
219. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2718-19 (White, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 2719.
221. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 371 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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the Michigan statute is unconstitutional.222 The statutorily imposed
mandatory life sentence without parole for possession of 650 or more
grams of cocaine is disproportionate to the offense and thus, violates
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments.22
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Harmelin profoundly displays
the new boldness of a solidly conservative court which seems deter-
mined to subvert individual rights.22' The Justices' concern over the
threat of drugs in society influenced them to uphold a Michigan law
imposing a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole for
possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine.22 5 Consequently, by up-
holding such an excessive sentence the Court has likened drug posses-
sion as the moral equivalent of first-degree murder.226
Although stiff anti-drug laws have emotional appeal, they fre-
quently do not produce the results expected by legislators., Practi-
cally speaking, harsh sentences for drug offenses send some non-violent
drug dealers to prison for longer terms than murderers, rapists and
armed robbers.2 28 Therefore, if the eighth amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment is to retain any vitality, such grossly dis-
proportionate treatment must be outlawed.229
Unfortunately, the majority in Harmelin largely abandoned the
ancient notion that the punishment must fit the crime.2s ° In doing so,
the Court sharply limited the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishments. 21 Thus, the Court incorrectly gave a consti-
tutional stamp of approval to the increasingly popular tactic of impos-
222. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2719 (White, J., dissenting).
223. Id.
224. Savage, Justices Uphold Victims' Rights, 'Cruel' Penalties, THE Los AN-
GELES TIMES, June 28, 1991, § A at 1.
225. Marcus, High Court Upholds Life Sentence in Drug Case; Mandatory
Michigan Penalty Imposed for Possession of 1 Pounds of Cocaine, THE WASHING-
TON POST, June 28, 1991, § A at 16.
226. Taylor, supra note 146, at 25.
227. Id.
228. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 36.
229. Taylor, supra note 146, at 25.
230. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2638.
231. Id. at 2714 (White, J., dissenting).
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ing mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for drug offenses with-
out consideration of mitigating circumstances or judicial discretion. 232
Louise S. McAlpin
232. Marcus, supra note 225, at § A at 16.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Confronted with the growing problem of crowded dockets, federal
courts have enacted and imposed a variety of rules and sanctions
designed to discourage abuse of the judicial process.1 In the interests of
justice, federal courts, pursuant to their inherent power,2 may award
attorney's fees to a party when his opponent has acted in "bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." 3 Consequently, the
question of who should bear the brunt of those fees is likely to be an
issue in every lawsuit, large or small. Litigants would like to shift the
costs of their counsel to the opponent if possible, but under the Ameri-
can Rule, ("Rule") this generally cannot be accomplished.4 The Rule
1. See generally David W. Pollack, Comment, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on
Attorney's who Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 U. CHi L. REV. 619 (1977).
2. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973). The inherent power of the federal courts
"is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situa-
tion." Spargue v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939).
3. Hall, 412 U.S. at 4-5.
4. See Joan Chipser, Note, Attorney's fees and the Federal Bad Faith Excep-
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provides that a prevailing party must bear his own attorney's fees and
cannot have them taxed against the loser.5 The Rule precludes a court,
without statutory authorization, from engaging in fee shifting as part of
the merits of the award.6 However, a litigant who abuses the judicial
process,' or acts in "obdurate obstinacy" may be faced with paying for
his adversary's attorney's fees. 9 The federal courts have long possessed
this inherent power to award attorney's fees as a sanction for bad faith
conduct.' 0
Nevertheless, most litigants point to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or a statute when the issue of sanctions is raised." However,
the authority to impose monetary sanctions pursuant to the inherent
power is older, deeper and broader than any other formal doctrine."2 It
has long been accepted that "[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily
result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institutions,"
powers "which cannot be dispensed with in a court because they are
necessary to the exercise of all others."' 3 These powers are regulated
tion, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 319, 320 (1977). The American Rule states that attorney's fees
are not ordinarily recoverable as costs or damages in the absence of a statute authoriz-
ing the award of fees or an agreement between the parties providing for fees. See Aly-
eska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). Compare with
the "English Rule," where as early as 1275 the law courts of England were authorized
to award counsel fees to a successful plaintiff. Statute of Glouster, 1278, 6 Edw. 1, c. 1
(this statute mentioned only the cost of a writ purchased, but was liberally construed to
include attorney's fees).
5. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247.
6. Id. at 260; see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2140 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
7. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1978).
8. Id.
9. F.D. Rich Co. Inc. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Co., Inc., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974).
10. Hall, 412 U.S. at 5; see also Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens'
Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 562 n.6 (1986); Hutto, 437 U.S. at 689 n.14;
Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258-59; F.D. Rich Co., 417 U.S. at 119; Newman v. Piggie Park
Enter. Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.4 (1968) (per curiam); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369
U.S. 527 (1962).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; Long, When Winning Isn't Enough: Boards of Contract
Appeals and Monetary Sanctions for Frivolous and Bad Faith Conduct in Administra-
tive Litigation, 27-50-10 ARMY. LAW. 37, 38 (1990).
12. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980); Aly-
eska, 421 U.S. at 258-59 (holding inter alia, that federal courts may impose attorney's
fees pursuant to their inherent power when an attorney acts in bad faith, even though
the American Rule says otherwise).
13. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); see also Road-
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not by any rules or statutes, but by the inherent authority "vested in
courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve orderly and expedi-
tious disposition of cases."1 4 Thus, the inherent power is necessary to
permit the courts to function and preserve its authority. 5
In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc,' 6 the United States Supreme Court,
during its 1990 term, specifically addressed one issue: Whether a fed-
eral court sitting in diversity, can utilize its inherent power to assess
attorney's fees as a sanction for a party's bad-faith conduct." The Su-
preme Court held that federal courts sitting in diversity can impose
sanctions pursuant to their inherent power despite the existence of fed-
eral rules and statutes which prescribe equal sanctions.' 8 Such a ruling
however, can easily lead to inconsistent results among the federal
courts and undermine congress' goal of uniformity throughout the fed-
eral system.
Part two of this Comment reviews the procedural history and facts
of Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 9 part three examines the scope and de-
velopment of the courts' inherent power beginning from its inception, to
the "American rule" prohibiting substantive fee shifting and the bad
faith exception; part four reviews and analyzes the Supreme Court's
holding, and reasoning; and part five discusses the possible implications
and inconsistent results that Chambers might cause.
II. FACTS AND THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF CHAMBERS V.
NASCO, INC.
On August 9, 1983, Chambers and his corporation, Calcasieu Tel-
evision and Radio ("CTR"), entered into a purchase agreement to sell
KPLC-TV to NASCO, Inc. ("NASCO").20 The agreement was never
way, 447 U.S. at 764 (inherent powers of federal courts are those which are necessary
to the exercise of all others (citing United States v. Hudson, I I U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34
(1812)).
14. Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S 626, 630-31 (1962).
15. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 785, 819-820
(Scalia, .1., concurring).
16. Ill S. Ct. 2123 (1991).
17. Id. at 2128. At the Fifth Circuit, this case was known as NASCO, Inc. v.
Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1990), affig NASCO, Inc.
v Calcasieu Television and Radio, 124 F.R.D. 120 (W.D. La. 1989); NASCO, Inc. v.
Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D. La. 1985).
18. Chambers, III S. Ct. at 2128.
19. Id. at 2123.
20. NASCO, 623 F. Supp. at 1373. Chambers was the sole shareholder and di-
15291992]
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recorded in the Calcasieu and Jefferson Davis Parishes where the
properties were located.2 However, by late August Chambers had
changed his mind and in September, he informed NASCO that he
would not file the necessary documents.22 On Friday, October 14,
NASCO's counsel informed counsel for Chambers that it would file
suit the following Monday seeking specific performance of the agree-
ment, as well as a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to prevent the
alienation or encumbrance of the properties.23
On Sunday, October 16, the day before NASCO would file suit,
Chambers and his attorney knowingly and deliberately took advantage
of the notice given by NASCO, and set in motion an illegal and fraud-
ulent scheme.2" The pair conspired to deprive NASCO of a judicial
determination of its rights by attempting to place the properties at is-
sue beyond the district court's jurisdiction by using the Louisiana Pub-
lic Records Doctrine. 25 To this end, Chambers and his counsel formed
rector of (CTR) which operated a television station in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Id.
21. Id. at 1373-74. The failure to record the purchase agreement in the respec-
tive counties would later be used by Chambers as a means to deprive the district court
of its~jurisdiction. See NASCO, Inc., 124 F.RD. at 125.
22. NASCO, 623 F. Supp. at 1373-74. The purchase agreement required
NASCO and CTR to use their best efforts in obtaining the requisite approval of the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") for the transfer of the station's license.
Id. Furthermore, the Agreement obligated both parties to file the necessary documents
with the FCC no later than September 23, 1983. Id.
23. Id. at 1376. The suit was filed the following Monday in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. Id. at 1375. Notice was given to
the defendants Chambers and CTR pursuant to the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 65(b) and Rule 11 (now Rule 10) of the local rules of the court which
are designed to give a defendant in a temporary restraining order application notice of
the hearing and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 1376.
24. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 125.
25. Id. The Louisiana Public Records Doctrine states that contracts affecting im-
movable property must be recorded in order to affect third parties. Dallas v. Farring-
ton, 490 So. 2d 265, 269 (La. 1986). The Public Records doctrine is essentially a nega-
tive doctrine declaring what is not recorded is not effective, except between the parties,
and a third party in purchasing immovable property is entitled to rely on the absence
from the public records of any unrecorded interest in the property. Id.; see also Phillips
v. Parker, 483 So. 2d 972 (La. 1986).
Because the purchase agreement had never been recorded, Chambers and his
counsel determined that if the properties were sold to a third party, and these deeds
were recorded before the issuance of the temporary restraining order, the district court
would lack jurisdiction over the properties. NASCO, 623 F. Supp. at 1381. Thus,
NASCO would be deprived of a judicial determination of its rights to specific perform-
ance, and Chambers could maintain possession of his station. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D.
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a trust, appointing Chambers' sister as the trustee and naming Cham-
bers' three adult children as the beneficiaries.2 6 Despite knowledge that
the land on which the television station and the associated properties
were located was to be sold to NASCO under the purchase agreement,
Chambers directed CTR to execute duplicate warranty deeds to the
trustee: for consideration of $1.4 million.2 7 The deeds were recorded
early Monday morning, before NASCO's counsel appeared in the dis-
trict court to file the complaint and seek the TRO.18 Despite the dis-
trict court's questioning at the TRO hearing concerning the possibility
that CTR was negotiating to sell the properties to a third party, Cham-
bers' counsel made no mention of the recordation of the deeds earlier
that day.29 The next morning, after the TRO had been issued, Cham-
bers' attorney notified the District Court of the recordation of the deeds
the day before, and admitted to intentionally withholding this informa-
tion from the court.
The following week the district court granted a preliminary in-
junction against Chambers and CTR, and entered a second TRO di-
rected against the trustee to prevent her from selling, transferring or in
any way encumbering the CTR properties."0 Within the next week,
Chambers' attorneys prepared a leaseback agreement from the trustee
to CTR, so that CTR could remain in possession of the properties and
continue to operate the station.31 At the second TRO hearing, the dis-
trict court was unaware of the leaseback agreement, but warned
Chambers and his attorney that their conduct had been unethical and
at 125.
26. NASCO, 623 F. Supp. at 1376.
27. Id. Chambers phoned his sister, Baker, and informed her of the creation of
the trust and that it was his desire that she act as trustee; however, he did not inform
her of the duplicate deeds, which had been executed, or that the trust was undercapi-
talized. Id. In fact, the assets never exceeded $1,000 which was insufficient to meet the
$17,735 monthly payment by the trust. Id. at 1378 Nonetheless, Chambers and his
counsel were not concerned since Chambers had absolute control of the trustee. Id.
28. Id. at 1376. The deeds had not been signed by the trustee, none of the con-
sideration had been paid and CTR continued in undisturbed possession, despite the
recordation of the deeds. Id.
29. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 126. Also, the district court judge was unaware
that Chambers' attorney had tape recorded certain conferences which had been con-
ducted over the phone. Id. at 126 n.8.
30. Id.
31. Id. The trustee had no knowledge of the lease or its terms, did not take part
in the negotiations, and simply signed and returned the lease to Chambers. Id.
19921 1531
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that no such act should be repeated in the future. 2
Chambers subsequently entered a series of groundless motions,
charges and pleadings aimed at delaying the judicial process and de-
priving NASCO of its rights under the purchase agreement."3 After the
district court found that the motions were all filed "in absolute bad
faith;" that the charges were "deliberate untruths and fabrications,"
plainly "improbable and unrealistic;" and that the pleadings were
"simply part of a sordid scheme of deliberate misuse of the judicial
process," further warnings were issued.3' Finally, on the eve of trial,
Chambers stipulated that the purchase agreement was valid and en-
forceable, and that he had breached the agreement by failing to file the
necessary documents with the Federal Communications Commission
32. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 127. Despite this reprimand, Chambers' abuse
of the judicial process continued. Id. In November 1983, Chambers refused to allow
NASCO to inspect CTR's corporate records in direct contravention of the standing
preliminary injunction. Id. The resulting contempt proceedings, NASCO, Inc. v. Calca-
sieu Television and Radio, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 115 (W.D. La. 1985), vindicated
NASCO's rights, but at the cost of much expense, delay, and waste of resources. This
was compounded by Chambers' attorney's prosecution of two separate and independent
appeals which were dismissed by the appellate court. NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Televi-
sion and Radio, Inc., 757 F.2d 157, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1985).
33. NASCO, Inc. 124 F.R.D. at 127. Two motions for summary judgment were
filed by counsel on behalf of Chambers; a third motion for summary judgment followed
by a motion to strike were filed on behalf of the trustee; and, a motion for a protective
order and clarification were filed on behalf of Chambers. Id. at 127-28. Next, Cham-
bers through his attorney filed baseless charges and counterclaims against NASCO
alleging fraud, harassment, interference with TV station operation, spreading of misin-
formation and public disapproval of the sale. Id. Also, alleged were unnamed breaches
of the purchase agreement by NASCO and NASCO's disregard for a non-existent oral
agreement with Chambers. Pointless new issues were injected: NASCO's conduct of its
FCC ascertainment survey; its ability to pay the purchase price; and its plans for the
future management and commitment to the community interest. Id. Needless deposi-
tions of the bank officials, who were to finance the purchase, were noticed by Cham-
bers' counsel and depositions of the NASCO board of directors were taken. The district
court noted that throughout the course of the proceedings, Chambers, (CTR) and his
counsel sought, and sometimes received, continuances of trial dates, extensions of dead-
lines and deferment of scheduled discovery. Id. at 127-28. Pretrial and status confer-
ences were held where several motions in preparation for a trial on the merits were
ruled upon. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 127-28. However, a motion to recuse the trial
judge for bias and prejudice by Chambers was denied. A writ of mandamus to compel
disqualification of the judge was also filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit on behalf of Chambers; however, this was also denied. Id. Nonetheless, trial on
the merits was again delayed.
34. Id. at 128.
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("FCC"). 3 At trial, the only defense presented was the Public Records
Doctrine. 6
Between the trial on the merits and the entry of the district court's
judgment against Chambers, he continued to use every ruse possible to
evade performance of the purchase agreement."' Chambers, without
notifying NASCO, sought permission from the FCC to construct a new
transmission tower for the station and to relocate the transmission fa-
cilities to that site. 38 Only after NASCO threatened further contempt
sanctions and informal intervention did Chambers withdraw his appli-
cation from the FCC. The district court then entered judgment on the
merits, in NASCO's favor, 9 finding that the trustee did not qualify as a
third party purchaser under the Public Records Doctrine."'
However, Chambers' adamant tactics did not end here."1 During
the pendency of his appeal, Chambers caused CTR officials to lodge
formal opposition with the FCC against its approval of the transfer of
the station license. 2 NASCO sought contempt sanctions for a third
35. Id. The district court noted that at this point there was no clearer indication
that all of the previously asserted affirmative defenses, counterclaims, pleadings, mo-
tions and opposition prosecuted so vehemently by the defendants were untruths and
distortions, absolutely devoid of any substantive merit. Id.
36. Id. The district court stated that in any event, this defense was manufactured
as part of the "initial fraud". Id.
37. Id. at 128-29.
38. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 129. Chambers' goal in relocating the facilities
was to render the Purchase Agreement meaningless, since by moving the facilities, the
tower sites would no longer be covered by the Purchase Agreement. Id.
39. NASCO, Inc., 623 F. Supp. at 1385. The district court found that the trans-
fer of the properties to the trust was a simulated sale, and that the deeds purporting to
convey the properties were "null, void, and of no effect." Id.
40. Id. The court found that at the recordation of the deeds, the trustee had no
knowledge of the value, extent, location of the properties, the purchase price, and
whether the sale had ever taken place. Id. Under Louisiana law, a party interposed by
the seller for the sole purpose of raising the Public Records Doctrine as a shield cannot
be considered a valid third party purchaser. See Burns v. Jolley, 95 So. 648 (La. 1923);
First Nat'l Bank of Ruston v. Mercer, 448 So. 2d 1369 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
41. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 129. Following judgment on the merits, Cham-
bers moved the district court to stay its judgment pending his contemplated appeal.
Having found the purchase agreement legal, valid and enforceable, and the rejection of
the Public Records doctrine defense, the district court refused "absolutely" to grant the
stay. li. Chambers nonetheless, petitioned the fifth circuit as well as the Supreme
Court, to stay the district court's merits; however, this petition was likewise denied. In
re Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc. and G. Russell Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., No.
A-611 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1986) (order denying stay of judgment).
42. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 129.
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time, until the court intervened and caused the opposition to be with-
drawn.4 3 Despite the court's judgment on the merits and numerous in-
terventions, Chambers continued his refusal to close the sale of the tel-
evision station, forcing NASCO to seek judicial assistance once again
to correct the abuses."
Following oral argument on Chambers' appeal from the district
court's judgment, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled and
found the appeal frivolous.45 The court imposed appellate sanctions in
the form of attorney's fees and double costs, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 38, and remanded the case to the district court
with instructions to determine whether further sanctions should be im-
posed for the manner in which the litigation had been conducted.4"
On remand, NASCO moved for appropriate sanctions, invoking
the district court's inherent power, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,
and 28 U.S.C. section 1927.7 In considering the sanctions, the district
court first considered Rule 11.48 The district court noted the alleged
43. Id.
44. Id. During the pendency of the appeal to the fifth circuit, a dispute arose
between Chambers and NASCO over the station's equipment to be transferred under
the Purchase Agreement. NASCO Inc. v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, 894 F.2d
696, 700 (5th Cir. 1990). During the hearing regarding this dispute, Chambers and
CTR removed all of the disputed equipment, thereby violating the orders of the district
court. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 129. At the hearing, a CTR official testified that
the disputed assets were not owned by CTR, but leased from another Chambers corpo-
ration. The trial court concluded that the leases were "nothing more than instruments
of deception." Id.
45. See NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 122 n.4.
46. NASCO, Inc., 894 F.2d at 700. Rule 38 states that "[i]f a court of appeals
shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages, and single or
double costs to the appellee." FED. R. App. P. 38.
47. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 123.
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 1H. As amended in 1983, this rule provides:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record. . . . The signa-
ture of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the
signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry
it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. . ..
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction. . ..
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sanctionable conduct was that Chambers' had: "(1) attempted to de-
prive this Court of jurisdiction by acts of fraud, nearly of all which
were performed outside the confines of this Court, (2) filed false and
frivolous pleadings, and (3) attempted, by other tactics of delay, op-
pression, harassment and massive expense to reduce [NASCO] to ex-
hausted compliance.""9 The court noted that the acts alleged under
"(1)" and "(3)" could not be considered under Rule 11 as they did not
involve the certification of documents.50 Similarly, the conduct under
"(2)," the falsification of the assertions knowingly and deliberately
made by Chambers, did not become apparent until after the trial of the
merits. 51 Thus, because there was no evidence in the record establishing
the falsity of these allegations, sanctions could not have been assessed
at the time the papers were filed. 52 The court, accordingly found sanc-
tioning under Rule I 1 to be insufficient. 53 Likewise, 28 U.S.C. section
1927 was deemed inadequate to sanction Chambers' acts since the stat-
ute only applied to attorneys.54 However, the court turned to its inher-
ent power and imposed upon Chambers sanctions amounting to approx-
imately one million dollars in attorney's fees and costs incurred by
NASCO 5 In assessing the sanctions, the district court noted that
id.




53. Id. The court noted that the acts alleged under "(1)" and "(3)" could not be
considered under Rule II as they did not involve the certification of documents. Id.
Similarly, the conduct under "(2)," the falsification of the assertions knowingly and
deliberately made by Chambers did not become apparent until after the trial of the
merits. Thus, because there was no evidence in the record establishing the falsity of
these allegations, sanctions could not have been assessed at the time the papers were
filed. id.
54. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 139. "Any attorney . . . who so multiplies the
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorney's fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct." 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988).
The district court found the sanctionable conduct, alleged by NASCO, outside the
reach of section 1927 for several reasons: (I) only sanctionable acts against attorney's
could be considered; (2) the statute is not broad enough to cover acts which degrade
the judicial system (referring to the attempt to deprive the court of jurisdiction, fraud,
misleading and lying to the court, and surreptitiously taping conversations with the
court); and (3) the statue only provides for excess costs and expenses and attorney's
fees. See NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 139.
55. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 139. The court noted that if it finds that fraud
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Chambers knew throughout the proceedings that NASCO had a valid
contract, that he hired counsel to find a defense and arbitrarily refused
to perform, forcing NASCO to bring its suit for specific performance.56
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's sanctions, rejecting Chambers' argument that a federal
court sitting in diversity cannot look to the court's inherent power, but
must look to state law. 57
Subsequently, because of the importance of the issues presented,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 5 The Court held
that a federal court's inherent power to impose sanctions for bad faith
conduct is not displaced by the 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the various sanc-
tioning provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that
even though some of the sanctionable conduct was covered by the stat-
utes and the federal rules, the court could nonetheless rely on its inher-
ent power. 59 Furthermore, federal courts sitting in diversity can assess
attorney's fees as a sanction pursuant to their inherent power even
though state law does not recognize a bad faith exception to the gen-
eral rule against fee shifting. 60 The Court reasoned that since the impo-
sition of attorney's fees pursuant to the inherent power solely vindi-
cated the abuses of process, fee shifting was a procedural and not
substantive matter. 60 Thus, the Court found that choice of law concerns
were not implicated.62
Through its broad analysis of the inherent power, the Court par-
tially sanctioned Chambers for his bad faith in the substance of the
dispute, something which the Supreme Court has never clearly sanc-
tioned. In doing so, the Court also displaced many other well estab-
has been practiced upon it, or that "the very temple of justice has been defiled," the
entire cost of the proceedings could justly be assessed against the guilty party. Id.; see
Spargue v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939); see also Universal Oil Prod.
Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-
Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245 (1944).
56. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 143.
57. Nasco, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696 (5th Cir.
1990). The court likewise found that neither 28 U.S.C. section 1927, nor Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11 limits a court's inherent power to sanction bad faith conduct
"when the parties conduct is not within the reach of the rule or the statute." Id. at 702-
03.
58. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 38 (1990).
59. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., I11 S. Ct. 2123 (1991).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2138.
62. Id. at 2137-38.
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lished congressionally created statutes and rules in favor of a concept
which is amorphous and lacks workable standards.
III. BACKGROUND LAW: THE AMERICAN RULE AND THE BAD
FAITH EXCEPTION
It has long been established that courts have an inherent power-a
power vested in the courts upon their creation, 3 and not derived from
any statute.64 Inherent powers have repeatedly been used to manage a
court's docket, and to regulate the conduct of the members of its bar."
Courts have also relied on this power to impose many types of sanctions
upon those who abuse the judicial process," including the assessment
of attorney's fees.6 7 Even though the American Rule prohibits fee shift-
ing in most cases,6 8 when a party has acted in bad faith, federal courts
may award such fees pursuant to their inherent equitable powers.6 9 The
inherent powers concept has often been characterized as "nebulous,"
and with "shadowy" bounds.70 Notwithstanding this observation, some
federal courts have implemented the inherent powers in three general
modes.7"
63. See Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924); Ex parte
Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
204, 227 (1821).
64. Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962); United States v.
Hudson, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
65. Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985).
66. Id.; e.g., Link, 370 U.S. at 629-30 (federal courts have the power to dismiss a
case for failure to prosecute). Also, some commentators have noted that courts occa-
sionally have disbarred, suspended or reprimanded an attorney for abuse of the judicial
process. See e.g., Michael Scott Cooper, Comment, Financial Penalties Imposed Di-
rectly Against Attorneys in Litigation Without Resort to the Contempt Power, 26
UCLA 1L. REV. 855, 856 (1979). Courts have even used their inherent powers to de-
clare attorneys absent from docket call "ready for trial," even though this could lead to
the entry of a default judgment. See e.g., Williams v. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc.,
728 F.2d 730, 732 (5th Cir. 1984).
67. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973).
68. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975).
The American Rule provides that a prevailing party must bear his own attorney's fees
and cannot have them taxed against the loser. Id. at 247.
69. Id. at 258-59; see also Hall, 412 U.S. at 5; Newman v. Piggie Park Enter.,
Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.4 (1968) (per curiam).
70. See R. RODES, K. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLA-
TIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 179 n.466 (1981).
71. Eash, 757 F.2d at 562.
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The first use of inherent powers springs from the congressional
creation of the lower federal courts, which vested theses lower courts
with the judicial powers pursuant to Article III of the United States
Constitution. 72 These inherent powers are grounded in the separation of
powers concept, because to deny this power "and yet to conceive of
courts is a self-contradiction. ' 73 The second use of inherent powers re-
gards those powers which are necessary only in the practical sense of
being useful. 4 This use of inherent power contemplates a court's use of
its power to provide it with appropriate instruments required for the
performance of its duties." The third use of inherent powers stems
from those powers that are sometimes said to arise from powers which
are " 'necessary to the exercise of all others.' "76 These powers have
historically been viewed as "essential to the administration of jus-
tice,"' 77 and "absolutely essential" to the judiciary system .7  Because
this form of inherent power emanates from absolute necessity, the
Court has noted that though this authority "may be regulated within
limits not precisely defined," it can "neither be abrogated nor rendered
practically inoperative.1 79
It is this third form of inherent power which grants a federal court
the power to control admission to its bar and discipline attorneys who
appear before it.80 Similarly, this is the basis of a court's power to pun-
72. Id. This use of inherent power encompasses a very narrow range of authority
involving activities, which are fundamental to a court as a constitutional tribunal; to
divest a court of its command within this sphere is equivalent to rendering the terms
"court" and "judicial power" meaningless. ld.; see U.S. CONST. art. III; Levin & Am-
sterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule Making. A Problem of Constitutional
Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 30-32 (1958).
73. Eash, 757 F.2d at 565. See Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over
Procedure in Criminal Contempts in '7nferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separa-
tion of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV, 1010, 1023 (1924).
74. Eash, 757 F.2d at 563.
75. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920). An example of this use of the
court's inherent powers is (where matters are very unfamiliar to the court such as com-
plex business or scientific matters) when the court supplies itself with an auditor to aid
in its decision making, or appoints "persons unconnected with the court to aid judges in
the performance of specific judicial duties." Id. at 312.
76. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (quoting Unites States v.
Hudson, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)). In Roadway, the Supreme Court termed
the contempt sanction "the most prominent" of the inherent powers. Id. at 764.
77. Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 65.
78. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1959).
79. Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 66.
80. See Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824).
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ish for contempt;81 the power which allows a federal court to vacate its
own judgment upon proof that fraud has been committed upon it,82 and
sanction a litigant for bad faith conduct. 83 However, because of their
amorphous nature, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint
and discretion.8 ' The ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for con-
duct which abuses the judicial process is a primary aspect of this
discretion.85
In 1796, the Supreme Court first held that attorney's fees are not
recoverable as damages by a prevailing party. 6 This doctrine has come
to be known as the "American Rule" because it is considered a unique
part of the American legal system.87 This doctrine has consistently
been observed, 8 in spite of the repeated criticism, 89 and is followed in
all federal and some state courts. 90
Although the American Rule is the principal rule of law in the
81. Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 510.
82. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 11I S. Ct. 2123, 2132 (1991); see Hazel-Atlas
Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1943). The historic equity power to
set aside fraudulent judgments is necessary to the integrity of the courts, for "tamper-
ing with the administration of justice in [this] manner. . . involves far more than in-
jury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the institution set up to protect and
safeguard the public." Id. at 245-46.
83. Roadway, 447 U.S. at 765-67; see also Link, 370 U.S. at 629-30.
84. Id. at 764.
85. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2133.
86. Acrambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
87. See Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the
Courts, 122 .U.PA. L. REV. 636, 637 (1974).
88. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975);
Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2133.
89. See, e.g., Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the
Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REV. 792 (1966). The adoption of the English rule (the
English rule generally allows a meritorious litigant to recover attorney's fees from his
adversary) in the United States has been advocated because the chance of recovering
attorney's fees from a losing opponent can create a strong incentive to take on a meri-
torious case without considering the client's ability to pay . Id. at 798. These advocates
also stress that a successful party is never fully compensated because such a party must
pay attorney's fees, which may be equal to, or greater, than the total recovery in the
suit. See Calvin A. Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation? 49
IOWA L. REV. 75, 84 (1963).
90. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. 240; Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v Maier Brewing
Corp, 386 U.S. 714 (1967); Campbell v. Maze, 339 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1976); Strickland
v. Williams, 218 S.E.2d 8 (Ga. 1975); Austin Paving Co. v. Cimarron Constr., Inc.,
511 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Pelican Printing Co. v. Pecot, 216 So. 2d 153
(La. Ct. App. 1968).
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federal courts, numerous exceptions have been created. Congress has
provided a vast collection of statutes that provide for fee shifting which
are tailored to advance important legislative policies and encourage pri-
vate litigation.9 1 Furthermore, Congress has also provided for the re-
covery of attorney's fees in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.9 2
Even though in Sociate Internacional v. Rogers,93 the Supreme Court
stated that where misconduct is sanctionable under the federal rules
there is no need for the court to invoke its inherent powers, 9 certain
abusive behavior is simply not covered by the rules.95
The federal courts have used their inherent equitable powers to
fashion three accepted exceptions to the American Rule. 6 Of the three
91. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1976); The Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)
(1976); The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976); The Equal Access to Jus-
tice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976), 5 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. IV 1980).
92. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (failure to make discovery); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)
(protective orders). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 26(g), and 37 represent some
of the enforcement power to punish discovery and judicial abuses. GREGORY P. JOSEPH,
SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 382 (1989). See generally, FED.
R. Civ. P. 11, 26(b), (g) advisory committee's notes (1983).
93. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
94. Id. at 207. The Court noted that:
[W]hether a court has power to dismiss a complaint because of non-
compliance with a production order depends exclusively upon Rule 37,
which addresses itself with particularity to the consequences of a failure to
make discovery by listing a variety of remedies which a court may employ
as well as by authorizing any order which is 'just.'. . . Reliance upon ...
inherent power can only obscure analysis of the problem before us.
Id.
95. See JOSEPH, supra note 92, at 383.
96. Alyeska, 421 U.S. 240 at 257-259. In addition to the bad faith exception, the
court's have recognized two other exceptions:
(a) Under the "common fund" exception attorney's fees are awarded
when the claimant has created, increased, or protected a fund or right
through their litigation which will directly benefit others; the shifting of
fees in this scenario is not punitive as in the bad-faith situation, but
designed to prevent unjust enrichment. Spargue v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307
U.S. 161, 164-66 (1939).
(b) Under the "prior litigation" exception a court may assess attor-
ney's fees as a sanction for the willful disobedience of a court order.
Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718. This exception is applied when a person is
required, due to the wrongful act of another (i.e., as where a defendant's
breach of contract causes plaintiff to breach its contract with a third
party) to protect his interests by bringing or defending a lawsuit against a
third party. See generally, Joan Chipser, Note, Attorney's Fees and the
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judicially created exceptions to the American rule, the bad faith excep-
tion is considered the most versatile" due to its punitive underlying
rationale. 8 The essential element in triggering an award of sanctions
under the bad faith exception is the existence of bad faith on the of-
fender"s behalf.99 In fact, when an exception to the American Rule is
granted, a finding of some blameworthy conduct is necessary to the
imposition of inherent power sanctions. °00 The inherent authority to
levy fees against a party who has litigated in bad faith emanates from
the traditional equitable powers of the courts' 10 ' and has been reaf-
firmed as an inherent supervisory power on numerous occasions. 102
However, as much as the bad faith exception to the American Rule
seems to be purely compensatory, 103 it is not, since the imposition of a
sanction does not depend on who prevails, but on how the parties con-
duct themselves during the litigation.'
One cannot deny that all of the exceptions to the American rule
serve a compensatory function as they recompense a party for actual
Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 319, 322 (1977).
97. Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorney's Fees for Abuses of the Judicial System,
61 N.C.L. REV. 613, 630 (1983).
98. See Hall, 412 U.S. at 5; see also Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp.,
663 F.2d 178, 180 (1980).
99. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. at 765-66 (1980); Alyeska, 421
U.S. at 258-59; Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d
451, 455 (7th Cir. (1987); Lipsig, 663 F.2d at 180.
100. Roadway, 447 U.S. at 765. See MALLOR, supra note 97, at 620 (stating
that when the blameworthy conduct consists of some abuse of the judicial process, the
exceptions may compensate the individual injured by the abuse, but the interest which
is exonerated is the preservation of judicial authority and resources).
101. Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 245. The courts of equity in the United States
were created by the Judiciary Act of 1789, and given the power possessed by the Eng-
lish chancery courts at the time the United States Constitution was adopted. Act of
September 27, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73; Fountain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 Haw.) 369,
384 (1854) (since the equity courts in England possessed discretionary power to award
attorney's fees for bad faith conduct, these same powers were seized by the United
States federal equity courts upon their creation). See generally Guardian Trust Co.v.
Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233, 241-46 (8th Cir. 1928), rev'd on other grounds, 281
U.S. 1 (1930). Included in this equitable authority was the power to deter frivolous
litigation, to punish for abuse of the judicial system and to avoid injustice to litigants.
See Note, supra note 96, at 323-24. As these goals epitomize the underlying rational of
the federal bad faith exception, they are clearly within a court's equity powers. Hall,
412 U.S. at 5.
102. E.g., Roadway, 447 U.S. at 765; Alyeska, 421 U.S. 240, 259.
103. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691 n.17 (1978).
104. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 2132, 2137 (1991).
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and out of pocket costs.""5 However, the imposition of sanctions under
the bad faith exception actually serves a dual purpose."' A fee
awarded under the court's inherent power upon a finding of bad faith
not only makes the prevailing party whole for expenses caused by his
opponent's obstinacy, but also vindicates judicial authority without hav-
ing to resort to sanctions available for contempt. 10 7 Therefore, any
compensatory effect the bad faith exception results in is subordinate or
ancillary to other policies which compensate some litigants but not
others for their expenses in bringing lawsuits.'
The bad faith exception consists primarily of bad faith which pre-
cedes or induces litigation, 0 9 and bad faith which occurs during litiga-
tion. 1 Both instances of bad faith can encompass three varieties of
misconduct which amount to abuse of the judicial system: obdurate or
obstinate conduct which causes legal action;"' substantive bad faith in
propounding a frivolous claim, counterclaim, or defense; 1 2 and vexa-
tious conduct during the course of litigation." 3
Bad faith which precedes or induces litigation arises when a de-
105. See MALLOR, supra note 97, at 619-620.
106. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 639 n.14.
107. id.
108. Id.
109. Hall, 412 U.S. at 15. Heucker v. Milburn, 538 F.2d 1241, 1245 n.9 (6th
Cir. 1976); see also Browning Debentures Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d
1078, 1088 (2d Cir. 1979).
110. Hall, 412 U.S. at 15.
111. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 689 n.14; Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962);
Lewis v. Texaco, Inc., 418 F. Supp 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d
598, 606. (5th Cir. 1974).
112. See, e.g., Roadway, 447 U.S. 752; Alyeska, 421 U.S. 240; F.D. Rich Co.
Inc. v. United States ex rel Indus. Trial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974) (supporting
the power to sanction for the assertion of a substantive bad faith claim). Ellingson v.
Burlington N., Inc., 653 F.2d 1327, 1331-32 (9th Cir. 1981) (frivolous appeal). But see
Nemroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 348 (2d Cir. 1980); Health-Chem Corp. v. Hyman,
523 F. Supp. 27, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
113. Roadway, 447 U.S. at 764-66 (this aspect of the bad faith exception pro-
tects the orderly administration of the legal process). Many courts which impose sanc-
tions pursuant to their inherent power fail to specify the detail of the power, or use this
generic term to describe several distinguishable branches of this power. Eash, 757 F.2d
at 561-62. Consequently, vigorous litigation in an area of the law, which is unsettled,
should not be equated with "obduracy, wantonness, or vexatiousness." Adams v. Carl-
son, 521 F.2d 168, 170 (7th Cir. 1975). However, such litigation practices in matters
which are relatively settled may constitute abuses of the judicial system and add up to
the entry of sanctions on a punitive basis. id.
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fendant, without any valid justification, refuses to recognize the clear
legal right of the plaintiff, and forces the plaintiff to bring a lawsuit to
enforce his rights."" In this situation fee shifting occurs due to the un-
fairness imposed on a party, who should have freely enjoyed his rights,
but had to pay the cost of litigation to do so.115 The gravamen of a.
party's obstinacy is the consumption of private and judicial resources,
and as the Supreme Court stated in Hutto v. Finney, such an award
"vindicates the . . . Court's authority over a recalcitrant litigant,"
while sending the message that, protracted litigation will not be
tolerated."'
Several cases demonstrate how a party's pre-litigation conduct can
lead to the imposition of attorney's fees where an opponent refuses to
recognize a valid right. In Vaughan v. Atkinson, the Supreme Court
awarded attorney's fees in a suit brought by a seaman for his em-
ployer's failure to respond to a claim for maintenance and cure." 7 The
Court awarded the seaman attorney's fees under the rubric of compen-
satory damages."" However, the Court stressed that the employer's
callous attitude in not even making an investigation into the claim
forced the seaman to hire counsel to enforce his rights." 9
Similarly, in Bell v. School Board,20 . the defendant school board
had not integrated despite the fact that nine years had passed since the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education.'2' The
school board had resisted the transfer of black students by creating
complicated transfer procedures applied only to blacks. 22 In granting
injunctive relief, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals focused on the
long pattern of evasion and obstruction practiced by the school
board. 2' The court noted that the award of fees was based on the de-
114. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15.(1973); see, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369
U.S. 527 (1962).
115. See Comment, note 87, at 660-61.
116. Hutto, 437 U.S. 678, 691 (the defendant's obstinacy was found in their
failure to remedy constitutional violations which had been found earlier in the
proceedings).
117. 369 U.S. 527, 528 (1967).
118. Id. at 530.
119. Id. at 530-31; see also Lewis, 418 F. Supp. at 28 (the court noted that
Texaco's unjustified and unsupported refusal to pay knowing of its obligation "was
sheer recalcitrance and an act of bad faith" on its part).
120. 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963).
121. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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fendant's long continued pattern of evasion, and the defendants refusal
to take initiative and by interposing administrative obstacles to thwart
the plaintiff's valid rights.""
In 1974, NAACP v. Allen 25 illustrated another application of the
bad faith exception to non-litigation conduct. In Allen, a finding of bad
faith was based on the fact that in the thirty-seven year existence of
the Alabama Trooper organization, not one black had ever been a
trooper, but had only been employed by the Department in a non-merit
system. 26 The court awarded attorney's fees since it was more than
apparent that the Department understood that its acts were unconstitu-
tional, but it continued to maintain a defense in the lawsuit which
amounted to unreasonable and obdurate conduct.
12 7
Subsequently, in 1975 the Supreme Court decided Alyeska Pipe-
line Service Co. v. Wilderness Society. 28 In Alyeska, environmental
groups sued the Secretary of the Interior in an attempt to prevent the
issuance of permits to the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company for the
construction of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline. 129 With the merits of the
litigation settled,130 the Court addressed whether Alyeska could be re-
quired to pay one-half of the environmental group's award due to the
group having performed the functions of a private attorney general.' 31
The Supreme Court held that a court, pursuant to its inherent power,
may assess attorney's fees as a sanction when "the losing party has
'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive rea-
sons.' "132 However, this language does not necessarily embrace the
reasoning of Bell or Allen.13 3 Awarding attorney's fees for bad faith
124. Id.
125. 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affid, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
Plaintiffs brought suit against the Alabama Department of Public of Safety and the
Alabama Personnel Department under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging the unconstitu-
tional exclusion of blacks from employment in the Public Safety Department. Id. at
705. The court awarded the plaintiffs attorney's fees under the bad faith exception to
the American rule. Id. at 707-10.
126. Id. at 708.
127. Id.
128. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
129. Id. at 241.
130. Id. at 244-245. Congress had enacted legislation which amended the Min-
eral Leasing Act allowing the granting of the permits sought by Alyeska. Id. at 244.
131. Id. at 246.
132. Id. at 258-59 (quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel Indus. Lumber
Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)).
133. See Bell, 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963); Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703; see also,
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conduct causing the original dispute must be distinguished from an
award of fees for bad faith which unjustifiably opposes a clear claim.""
A fee award in the later instance protects the judicial system against
unwarranted expenditures of its resources, whereas an award in the for-
mer situation punishes a party for his role in the substance of the dis-
pute. 35 Although such an award falls within a court's equitable pow-
ers, this can present a confusing overlap when a party is also awarded
punitive damages.' 36
The Supreme Court has not explicitly read the bad faith exception
to include bad faith conduct causing the original dispute' until the
Chambers decision. 3 8 However, Supreme Court cases and other lower
federal court cases do suggest that some form of misconduct beyond a
determination of fault in the facts that give rise to the cause of action
is required for an award of fees under the bad faith exception.' 39 Some
commentators suggest that such an expansion of the court's inherent
powers under the bad faith exception could lead to fee shifting in the
ordinary tort or contract case in which the only bad faith is in the
cause of action itself.'40
MALLOR, supra note 97, at 634.
134. See MALLOR, supra note 97, at 634-35.
135. Id. at 635 (suggesting that such an award is tantamount to an award of
punitive damages); see Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 599-600 (3d Cir.
1976).
136. See Hon. James L. Oakes, Introduction: A Brief Glance at Attorney's After
Alyeska, 2 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 169, 175-76 (1979).
137. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier, 385 U.S. 714, 719 (1967) (hold-
ing that the defendant's deliberate violation of a trademark did not fall within any of
the judicially created exceptions of the American Rule); see also Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 183-84 (1976) (rejecting that the mere determination of fact against a
party did not prove the threshold of conduct for which a penalty would be justified).
138. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc, Ill S. Ct. 2132, 2138 (1991) (stating that
it did not impose sanctions for Chambers' breach of contract, but for the fraud he
perpetrated on the court). However, the dissent believes the Court appears to have
disclaimed that its holding does reach this aspect of pre-litigation conduct. Id. at 2147
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2138 nn. 16-17.
139. See, e.g., Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1072 (1979) (defendant's non-litigation conduct was "intolerable"; however, there
was no showing of bad faith in defending the suit); Straub, 540 F.2d at 599-60 (revers-
ing an award of attorney's fees in a lOb-5 action when bad faith existed solely in the
acts which gave rise to the cause of action).
140. See MALLOR, supra note 97, at 636 (suggesting deterrence to such conduct
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Another theory under which courts have awarded attorney's fees is
when a party's conduct during the course of litigation results in need-
less expenditures. This corollary of the bad faith exception focuses on a
party's abuse of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.141 Because the
procedural rules and practices provide an unlimited opportunity for de-
lay and harassment, several reasons have been suggested as to why
judges seem more willing to make a finding of bad faith on an objective
basis when procedural abuses are alleged. 42 First, judges are in a posi-
tion to observe a party's procedural moves first hand.143 Second, as
judges are versed in procedural matters, they can easily compare a
party's procedural maneuvers to the norm in order to determine if they
are propounding needless litigation. 44 Also, since the principles which
govern the procedural rules in the federal courts are usually much
clearer than in certain areas of substantive law, procedural abuses are
monitored easier.145
Finally, the "substantive" bad faith exception to the American
rule is designed to compensate, punish, and deter the harm done to
courts and private parties by the assertion of frivolous claims. 46 Theo-
retically, this corollary of the bad faith exception was intended to de-
crease the amount of groundless litigation since a party who asserts a
groundless claim, counterclaim, or defense may be accountable for the
share of litigation attributable to litigating the bad faith claim, 1' 7 or for
the entire cost if bad faith pervades the entire lawsuit. 1 4 However,
some have criticized the American Rule saying it not only fails to deter
such litigation, but encourages claims which are not even colorable.'4 9
141. Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 182 (D.C. Cir.
1980); see also Browning Debentures Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078,
1088-89 (2d Cir. 1979).




146. Browning, 560 F..2d at 1088; see Comment, Nemroff v. Abelson, Bad Faith,
and Awards of Attorney's Fees, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 468, 481-83 (1979) (application of
this branch is similar to the tort of malicious prosecution.); GLENN EUGENE DAVIS,
Prevailing Defendant Fee Awards in Civil Rights Litigation: A Growing Threat to
Private Enforcement, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 75, 111 (1982).
147. Lipsig, 663 F.2d at 181 n.21; Browning, 569 F.2d at 1088-89.
148. See Ellingson, 653 F.2d 1327 (awarding attorney's fees for defense of main
action and frivolous appeal).
149. See EHRENZWEIG, supra note 87, at 797. Courts have noted that in order
for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the courts' inherent power, there must be
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A review of case law illustrates that although courts apply objective
standards for the bad faith exception to a party's pre-litigation conduct,
much more is required to establish a party's bad faith assertion of a
substantive claim or defense.'
In Ellingson v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,'51 the plaintiff was
found to have abused the judicial process and to have harassed the de-
fendants. 152 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the plain-
tiff's bad faith was based in his filing of a new suit, which was
grounded on "sham" pleadings containing false allegations, and which
had been resolved against him over twenty years earlier.'53 However,
subsequent case law suggests that if a claim was colorable when initi-
ated, it might not be found to have been brought in bad faith. 54 In
Nemroff v. Abelson,5" the Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned
an award of attorney's fees imposed on the plaintiff for having filed a
lawsuit consisting largely of inadmissable and irrelevant evidence.' 56
The court stated that a claim is colorable, for purposes of bad faith,
when it has some legal and factual support, considered in light of the
reasonable belief of the individual making the claim. 157 Furthermore,
the court noted that the test is "whether a reasonable attorney could
have concluded that the facts supporting the claim might be estab-
lished, not whether such facts actually had been established."158
In contrast, the court in Miracle Mile Associates v. City of Roch-
clear evidence that the challenged actions were entirely without color and made for
reasons of harassment, delay or other improper purposes; see, e.g., Adams, 521 F.2d
168.
150. Browning, 569 F.2d at 1087-88 (a substantive claim brought in bad faith
must be entirely with out color, based on an objective bases, and brought with improper
purposes, which is a subjective analysis); see also Autorama Corp. v. Stewart, 802 F.2d
1284, 1287 (10th Cir. 1986).
151. 653 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1981).
152. Id. at 1331-32.
153. Id. T court also imposed fees on the plaintiff for his prosecution of a
groundless appeal stating that "a frivolous lawsuit does not become meritorious when
appealed." Id. at 1332.
154. See, e.g., Lipsig, 663 F.2d at 181; Nemroff, 620 F.2d at 348; Browning, 560
F.2d at 1088.
155. 469 F. Supp 630, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), af/'d in part, rev'd in part, 620
F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980).
156. Nemroffv. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980).
157. Id. at 348.
158. Id. (emphasis in original).
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ester'159 awarded attorney's fees to the defendants' based on a finding
that the plaintiffs' claim was frivolous and made in bad faith. 160 On
appeal, the court reversed the award, rejecting a contention that the
plaintiff's bad faith was shown because of the weaker merits of the
current case than the merits of previous cases brought under the same
theory where recovery was barred. 6'
It follows that the application of the substantive bad faith excep-
tion requires an objective determination as to whether a reasonable at-
torney had any legal or factual support for making the claim.' 2 If the
claim is found to have support, it could not have been made in bad
faith. If the claim lacked support, a court must then determine if the
litigant had an improper purpose. 6 3 In addition, the substantive bad
faith exception requires more than a showing that a party did not pre-
vail on the merits of a claim, defense or position." 4
Because the objective determination is often difficult to establish,
the standard usually is exercised in the most extreme circumstances.' 65
Some indicia of substantive bad faith recognized by federal courts in-
clude claims or defenses advanced which "were meritless, that counsel
knew or should have known this . . . and that the motive for filing was
for an improper purpose, such as harassment."' 66 Furthermore, sub-
stantive bad faith can even be inferred from a particular set of facts. 67
159. 617 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980).
160. Id. at 19. The plaintiff, lessees and developers of a proposed shopping area,
brought an antitrust action against the city, city officials and a commercial competitor,
but these plaintiffs had brought a similar action on the same theory and lost. Id. at 20.
161. Id. at 21.
162. Nemroff, 620 F.2d at 348.
163. Browning, 560 F.2d at 1088 (harassment and delay are improper purposes).
164. See JOSEPH, supra note 92, at 389.
165. Health-Chem Corp. v. Hyman, 523 F. Supp. 27, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
166. Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers Local No. 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1375
(6th Cir. 1987).
167. Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1512 (10th Cir. 1987).
Examples of when substantive bad faith has been inferred:
(a) Under the threat of numerous depositions. See Browning, 560 F.2d at 1089; In
re Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 989 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1108 (1988).
(b) When filing actions plainly barred by res judicata or other preclusion doc-
trines. See Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1437 (10th Cir. 1986); Di Silvestro
v. United States, 767 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 862 (1985).
(c) When allowing a bankruptcy appeal to the district court "to atrophy for more
than nine months [after a brief was due], failing to properly respond to a court order
[to support their appeal or face dismissal], and then failing to respond to a motion to
dismiss." In re AOV Indus., 798 F.2d 491, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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However, the mere length of litigation, 68 and the loss on the merits has
been held inadequate to demonstrate sanctionable bad faith conduct."'
Not surprisingly, the standard against which a substantive bad
faith exception is found is very high.170 There must be "clear evidence"
that the challenged actions are without color and are taken for reasons
of harassment or delay or for other improper purposes.1 7' Several
courts have indicated that this rigorous standard is necessary to ensure
that plaintiffs with meritorious or colorable, but novel, claims are not
deterred from bringing suit.172 Without such a standard, those with
meritorious claims may be deterred in their access to the judicial sys-
tem while those who know, because of their improper motives, that a
suit is impermissible, continue to abuse the judicial process and its
resources.'173
An increasing number of state statutes and court rules which per-
mit or require fee-shifting in specific instances have essentially done
away with the American Rule. 74 This trend questions the ability that a
federal court sitting in diversity has to impose a fee award pursuant to
its inherent power, 75 since a court may characterize a fee-shifting pro-
vision as either substantive or procedural. 76 In Alyeska, 77 after the
Court discussed the American rule and the bad faith exception, it
noted that when a federal court sits in a diversity case, a different situ-
(d) Engaging in dilatory tactics during discovery and courtroom proceedings, fail-
ing to meel scheduled deadlines, and misleading the court. Lipsig, 663 F.2d at 181-82.
168. Templeman v. Chris Craft Corp., 770 F.2d 245, 250 (1st Cir), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1021 (1985) (admiralty setting).
169. Autorama, 802 F.2d at 1288.
170. Adams, 521 F.2d at 170.
171. Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 80 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 818 (1983); accord Autorama, 802 F.2d at 1287-88; Eastway Constr. Corp. v.
City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985).
172. Nemroff, 620 F.2d at 349-50; Browning, 560 F.2d at 1088.
173. See MALLOR, supra note 97, at 642.
174. Note, State Attorney fee shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the
American Rule?, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 323 (1984). The survey revealed
1,974 attorney fee-shifting statutes in the code of 50 states.
175. See JOSEPH, supra note 92, at 376.
176. Jeffrey A. Parness, Choices About Attorney Fee Shifting Laws: Further
Substance/Procedure Problems Under Erie and Elsewhere, 49 U. PITT. L. REv. 393,
414 (1988). Attorney fee-shifting statues may be classified into two groups: (1) proce-
dural or general litigation statutes which discourage abuse of the judicial process; (2)
non-procedural statutes which seek to protect certain parties. Id.
177. 421 U.S. 250, 259 n.31 (1975).
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ation occurs.17 8 In footnote thirty-one, the Court stated that " 'in an
ordinary diversity case where the state law does not run counter to a
valid federal statute or rule of court, . . . state law denying the right to
attorney's fees or giving a right thereto, which reflects a substantial
policy of the state, should be followed.' "179
However, some federal courts in diversity settings have misinter-
preted this language and have applied this limitation not only to fee
shifting rules that embody a substantive policy of the state, but to pro-
cedural fee-shifting laws as well.180 These courts have held that even
though federal courts can use their inherent powers to assess attorney's
fees as a sanction in some cases, they cannot do so in a diversity setting
unless applicable state laws recognize a bad faith exception to the
American rule prohibiting fee shifting."" Tryforos v. Icarian Dev.
Co.,"' represents one instance where a federal court sitting as a state
court erroneously applied a state procedural fee-shifting law. In this
case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered section forty-one
of the Illinois Civil Practice Act,18 and denied a request for attorney's
fees. 8 ' However, the court's denial was not based on a determination
178. Id.
179. Id. (quoting 6 J. MOORE, Federal Practice 54.77 [2] pp. 1712-13 (2d ed.
1974)). The Court considered only the situation in which state law might permit attor-
neys' fees while a federal court would not and concluded that such an award would be
permissible in a diversity action when necessary to effectuate a substantial policy of the
state. Id.
180. See PARNESS, supra, note 176. (contending that state laws on attorney's fees
which are procedural in nature are inapplicable in diversity cases). The author notes
that lower federal courts which sit as state courts should not utilize footnote thirty-one
as authority for applying all state fee shifting laws, but must distinguish between sub-
stantive and procedural provisions. Id.
181. See Tryforos v. Icarian Dev. Co., 518 F.2d 1258, 1265 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied sub nom. Mantana v. Tryforos. 423 U.S. 1091 (1976); Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc.,
629 F.2d 764, 773 (2d Cir. 1980).
182. 518 F.2d 1258.
183. ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 110 § 41 (1973) provided:
Allegations and denials, made without reasonable cause and good
faith, and found to be untrue, shall subject the party pleading them to the
payment of reasonable expenses, actually incurred, by the other party by
reason of the untrue pleading, together with a reasonable attorney's fee, to
be summarily taxed by the court at trial.
id.
With recent amendments, the Illinois law now conforms to Rule II of the Federal rules
of Civil Procedure. See ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 110 § 2-611 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
184. Tryforos, 518 F.2d at 1265-66.
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that section forty-one was procedural and therefore inapplicable in fed-
eral court. The court drew no distinction between state fee shifting laws
which do and do not reflect a substantial policy of the state.1"' Rather,
the court held that the lower court's findings did not indicate that the
suit was brought in bad faith, and thus the conduct did not fall within
the ambit of section forty-one.186 The court rejected that the lower
court's award was nonetheless supportable under the exception to the
American Rule, relying on footnote 31 in Alyeska. 8 7 Lower federal
courts should not interpret footnote thirty-one as authority for applying
procedural fee shifting laws in a diversity context, but should interpret
footnote thirty-one as requiring deference only to state substantive law.
As previously discussed, federal courts are interpreting footnote
thirty-one as requiring application of all state fee shifting provisions in
diversity cases, whether procedural or substantive. Furthermore, fed-
eral courts are also excluding the federal procedural common law
which allows fee shifting in those rare cases, such as the bad faith
exception. 188
Historically, Erie broadly commanded federal courts sitting in di-
versity cases to apply state substantive law and federal procedural
law. 89 After the 1945 case of Guaranty Trust Company. v. York,19
the Supreme Court required federal courts in diversity cases to use
state law if application of federal laws would significantly affect the
outcome of the litigation.1 91 Then, in 1965 the Supreme Court decided
Hanna v. Plumer192 and held that where no federal rule controls and
choice of law analysis is necessary, the outcome determination test as
established in Guaranty Trust Co. "cannot be read without reference
to the twin aims of the Erie rule-discouragement of forum shopping
and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." 1 93
Some federal courts in diversity cases have failed to undertake the
necessary Erie analysis in determining whether application of a court's
inherent power to tax fees for bad faith conduct is a matter of substan-
185. Id. at 1266-67.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1256 n.27.
188. See PARNESS, supra note 176, at 415 n.117.
189. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
190. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
191. Id. at 109.
192. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
193. Id. at 468.
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tive or procedural law.1 94 Such an analysis requires consideration of the
twin aims of Erie, as well as thoughtful deliberation on the character of
the misconduct for which a court is sanctioning a party. The misread-
ing of footnote thirty-one infringes upon the power of a federal court to
regulate procedure in federal courts. Furthermore, relying on footnote
thirty-one for the proposition that where a state does not recognize a
bad faith exception to the American Rule, federal courts may not in-
voke a federal common law exception is erroneous. Although federal
courts are limited to using state substantive law in diversity settings,
use of its inherent powers to vindicate abuses of the judicial system is
essentially procedural in nature. Thus, by implication, federal courts
using their inherent powers to engage in fee shifting under the bad
faith exception can circumvent this limitation. Additionally, in a diver-
sity context, the bad faith exception merely regulates the manner in
which substantive rights are enforced in federal courts, and has no out-
come determination implications. 1 5 This necessarily makes fee shifting
procedural so that state substantive law cannot prevent fee shifting. Fi-
nally, the federal interest in curtailing misconduct in federal courts
through sanctions, such as the bad faith exception to the American
Rule, does not contravene with the policy of states adhering to a differ-
ent rule. 196 Thus, federal courts hearing state law claims should only
apply state substantive fee-shifting laws, otherwise, federal procedural
law controls.
IV. THE CHAMBERS COURT'S OPINION
A. The Majority Opinion
The Chambers9 " case presented the Supreme Court with the op-
portunity to continue shaping the scope of federal courts' inherent pow-
ers in sanctioning a litigant for bad faith conduct. The court granted
certiorari, and Justice White, writing for the five member majority,
194. See PARNESS, supra text accompanying note 176.
195. NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696, 705-
06 (5th Cir. 1990). Under circumstance where a federal court is assessing fees as a
means to vindicate judicial abuses or in an effort to control the litigation, the exercise
of inherent power does not encourage forum shopping or inequitable administration of
the laws. Id.
196. See PARNESS, supra, note 176 at 415 n.117.
197. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991).
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concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in assessing
NASCO's attorney's fees to Chambers for his bad faith conduct.' 98
The Court began it discussion by noting that federal courts have
the inherent power to manage and control their own proceedings and
the conduct of those who appear before them.'99 Outlining the scope of
the inherent power, the Court also noted that this power allows a fed-
eral court to vacate its own judgment upon a finding that fraud has
been perpetrated on the court.2"' The majority stated that although the
American Rule prohibits fee shifting in most cases, federal courts have
created exceptions to this in narrowly defined circumstances. 20' The
majority's analysis of the exceptions resulted in a determination that
when a party acts in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons, a court may assess attorney's fees against them by use of their
inherent powers . 2 The Court reasoned that when a party practices
fraud upon the court,203 or delays or disrupts the litigation or inhibits
the enforcement of a court order,20' the imposition of sanctions serves
the dual purposes of vindicating judicial authority and making the pre-
vailing party whole for expenses caused by his opponents obstinacy.20 5
Chambers' claimed that the sanctioning scheme of the federal
statutes and rules displaced the inherent power to sanction a litigant
198. Id. at 2128 (Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Conner, JJ.,
joined).
199. Id. at 2132 (referring to United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32,
34 (1812)); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980); Link v. Wa-
bash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204,
227 (1821).
200. Chambers, 111 S. Ct at 2132. A federal court has the power to control
admission to its bar and discipline attorneys who appear before it. See Ex Parte Burr,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824). Also, a federal court has the power to punish for
contempt. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 798
(1987). Quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944),
the Chambers Court noted that this "'historic power of equity to set aside fraudulently
begotten judgments is necessary to the integrity of the courts, for tampering with the
administration of justice in [this] manner. . .involves far more than an injury to a
single litigant. It is a wrong against the institution .... . Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at
2132.
201. Chambers, III S. Ct. at 2132-33.
202. Id. (citing F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417
U.S. 116, 129 (1974) and Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973)).
203. Chambers, III S. Ct. at 2133 (citing Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root
Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946)).
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for bad faith conduct.2 °6 In addressing Chambers' claim, the opinion
considered five factors in determining whether any basis existed for
holding that the inherent powers to sanction for bad faith conduct are
displaced by the scheme of the federal statutes and rules.20 7
First, the Court took into account that the inherent power extends
to a full range of litigation abuses, whereas the other sanctioning provi-
sions only reaches specific individuals or acts. 208 Thus, the inherent
power must continue to fill the gaps of the statutes and rules.20 9 Sec-
ond, the majority considered the different standards under which sanc-
tions may be imposed. The Court noted that the exceptions to the
American Rule limit a court's inherent power to engage in fee shifting
to instances where a litigant has engaged in bad faith conduct or willful
disobedience of a court order.210 Conversely, many of the other sanc-
tioning schemes allow imposing sanctions for conduct which merely
fails to meet a reasonableness standard." Consequently, the majority
reasoned risk would be limited when courts invoke their inherent power
to deter the advocacy of litigants attempting to vindicate federal
rights. 212
Third, the majority conceded that the exercise of inherent powers
could be limited by Congress since the lower federal courts were cre-
ated by acts of congress. 21 3 However, the majority refused to acknowl-
edge that Congress intended to depart from so well an established prin-
ciple,21' the existence and scope of which has been reaffirmed since the
206. Id. at 2134. Chambers argued that 28 U.S.C. section 1927, and the many
sanctioning mechanisms in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reveals a legislative
intent to obviate or foreclose resort to the inherent powers. Id. at 2131-32.
207. Id. at 2134-35.




212. Id. at 2134 n. 11. For example, Rule II imposes an objective standard of a
reasonable inquiry which does not require any bad faith findings. Id. at 2134. Rule I I
was amended in 1983 because its subjective bad faith standard was difficult to estab-
lish, and courts were reluctant to invoke it. See Advisory committee notes on the 1983
amendment to Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. app. 575-76. Thus, to the extent that the risk in
"chill[ing] the advocacy of litigants attempting to vindicate federal rights," exists when
invoking the inherent power, this risk occurs no less than when a court invokes Rule 11.
Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2134 n.l1.
213. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2134.
214. Id. (citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcello, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982)); Aly-
eska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 (determining that
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most recent amendments to Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. section 1927.215
Fourth, the majority considered the .Advisory Committee Notes on the
1983 Amendment to Rule 11. These notes stated that the Rule
"build[s] upon and expand[s] the equitable doctrine permitting the
court to award. . .attorney's fees to a litigant whose opponent acts in
bad faith in instituting or conducting litigation."2 6 Thus, the majority
reasoned that Rule 11 does not alter the authority a federal court has
to manage abuses under its inherent authority. 17
Lastly, the majority considered case law involving the federal rules
and the inherent powers. In Link v. Wabash Railroad Company,' 8 the
Supreme Court recognized that a federal court has the inherent power
to dismiss a case sue sponte for failure to prosecute, despite the lan-
guage of Rule 41(b) appearing to require a motion from a party. 19 In
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,22 the Court remanded for considera-
tion of sanctions under both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3721 and
the court's inherent authority after determining that 28 U.S.C. § 1927
would riot allow the assessment of fees.222 Based on these cases, the
Court held that the inherent power can still be invoked even if rules
exist which sanction the same conduct.223
The majority concluded that nothing ratified the presumption that
the federal rules and statutes displace or obviate reliance on a court's
inherent power to impose attorney's fees as a sanction for bad faith
"Congress ha[d] not repudiated the judicially fashioned exceptions" to fee shifting,
which were based in the inherent powers of the courts).
215. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2134; see also FED. R. Civ, P. 11 advisory commit-
tee's notes (1983).
216. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2134-35.
217. Id. at 2135 (citing Zaldivar v. Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830 (9th Cir.
1986)).
218. 370 U.S. 626, 630-32 (1962).
219. Chambers, Ill S. Ct. at 2135. The Court noted that it would require a
much more lucid demonstration of reason than rule 41(b) to accept that it was in-
tended to abrogate the inherent powers of the court (citing Link, 370 U.S. at 630-32);
see FED. IR,. Civ. P. 41(b).
220. 447 U.S. 752, 755 (1980).
221. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 provides for an order compelling discov-
ery and the failure to answer, or an evasive answer, to such an order may be grounds
for an award of expenses for the motion, and/or ground for sanctions. FED. R. Civ. P.
37.
222. Roadway, 447 U.S. at 767.
223. Chambers, Ill S. Ct. at 2135.
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conduct.22 However, the Court reasoned that ordinarily when the con-
duct at issue could be sanctioned under the rules, rather than the inher-
ent power, reliance should be placed in the rules.2 5 Thus, "when
neither the statutes nor the rules are up to the task, the court may rely
on [its] inherent power. '"226
The Court then addressed whether there was any abuse of discre-
tion in resorting to the inherent power. The majority conceded that the
district court could have used Rule 11 and some of the other rules to
sanction Chambers for his misconduct .2 2  Even though much of Cham-
bers conduct was beyond the reach of Rule 11, section 1927, and many
of the other sanctioning provisions, his conduct throughout the suit
evinced bad faith; the conduct which the rules covered was intertwined
with conduct that only the inherent powers could address.228 Also, hav-
ing to resort to the rules for certain violations before applying the in-
herent power would only have created extensive satellite litigation,
which is contrary to the aim of the rules. 2 9
After finding no abuse of discretion in relying on the inherent
power, the Court examined whether a district court, sitting in diversity,
could impose attorney's fees in a state which does not recognize the bad
faith exception to the American Rule.230 The Court referred to footnote
thirty-one in Alyeska,23' and interpreted the limitation on federal
courts sitting in diversity to apply only to fee shifting laws which em-
bodies a substantive state policy and does not limit federal procedural
laws. 23 2 Only where a conflict exists among state and federal substan-
tive laws does the Erie problem arise. 33 The Court found neither of the
twin aims of Erie implicated by sanctioning Chambers for his disobedi-
224. Id. The Court's conclusion was in light of the fact that the conduct at issue
was not covered by the other sanctioning provisions. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2136.
227. Id.
228. Chambers, 11l S. Ct. at 2136.
229. Id.; see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes on the amend-
ment to Rule 11 (1983).
230. Chambers, Ill S. Ct. at 2136. For example, as a general rule, attorney's
fees are not allowed to a successful litigant in Louisiana except where authorized by
statute or contract. Rutherford v. Impson, 366 So. 2d 944, 947 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
231. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247.
232. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2136. A state statute which permits a prevailing
party in certain types of suits to recover attorney's fees may embody a substantive state
policy. See People of Sioux County v. National Surety Co., 276 U.S. 238 (1928).
233. Chambers, I1l S. Ct. at 2137.
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ence of court orders and his attempt to defraud the court. 234 The award
of attorney's fees is akin to a remedial fine for civil contempt since it
vindicates a courts authority over a recalcitrant litigant. The majority
viewed the impositions of attorney's fees as a sanction for Chambers'
fraud on the court, and his bad faith toward his adversary and the
court throughout the proceedings. 235 Thus, it reasoned the inherent
power to tax fees for this conduct could not be subservient to the state's
policy without transgressing the limits of Erie,236 Guarantee Trust
Company,237 and Hanna,3 ' since "fee shifting in this instance was
matter of vindicating judicial authority," which is procedural, and not
a substantive remedy.239 Thus, the Court agreed with the appellate
court that the inherent power to assess fees in response to punishing for
abuse of the judicial process was a procedural response well within the
powers set forth in Erie,2 40 and not substantive.
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia, in a separate opinion, dissented primarily because
of his disagreement with the majority's characterization of the scope of
the inherent powers.241 Justice Scalia did not agree that the inherent
power to sanction a litigant reaches conduct "beyond the court's con-
fines regardless of whether such obedience interfered with the conduct
of the trial. 24 2
Justice Kennedy's dissent was joined by Justice Souter and Chief
Justice Rehnquist.243 Justice Kennedy and the dissenters accepted that
234. Id. The Court noted that the imposition of sanctions under the bad faith
exception depends not on which party wins the lawsuit, but on the parties' conduct
during the course of the litigation; thus, the Court found that the exception does not
lead to forum shopping. Id. The Court also found it was not inequitable to apply the
exception to citizens and noncitizens, since a party has the ability to determine whether
sanctions will be assessed by acting accordingly. Id.
235. Id. at 2138.
236. 304 U.S. at 64
237. 326 U.S. at 99.
238. 380 U.S. at 468.
239. Id. at 2138; see NASCO, Inc., 894 F.2d at 705.
240. 304 U.S. at 64.
241. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2141 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
242. Id. Justice Scalia was referring to what he believed the district court ap-
peared to have sanctioned Chambers for his flagrant bad faith breach of contract. Id.
243. Chambers, I11 S. Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, Souter, Ji., and Rehnquist, C.J.,
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Chambers engaged in sanctionable conduct. However, they did not
agree that the inherent powers could be invoked without first resorting
to the federal rules and statutes.2" Furthermore, they opposed using
the inherent power to sanction Chambers for his bad faith breach of
contract. 45 Justice Kennedy stated that the American Rule recognizes
that Congress has defined and provided more than adequate rules and
statutes which enable the federal courts to curtail abuses. 2" It was also
argued that by allowing federal courts to exercise their inherent power
even when rules exist which sanction the same conduct, the Court is
treating the inherent powers as the norm and the legislative basis of
authority as the exception." 7 The reasoning of the dissent was that the
exercise of inherent power to sanction a bad faith litigant stems from
that power which is necessary to permit the courts to function.248 Thus,
the dissents' position was that inherent powers should only be exercised
when congressional powers fail to protect the process of the court and
that there is no need to use the inherent powers if a rule or statute
provides a basis for sanctions.24 9
Justice Kennedy criticized the majority for ignoring prior prece-
dent and misreading others. He noted that in prior cases, federal courts
could not invoke their inherent power when a rule existed which cov-
ered the same conduct.25° He argued that the majority's reliance on
dissenting).
244. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 2141-42. For example, a district court can sanction a party and/or his
attorney for a baseless discovery request. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g). A district court can
award expenses and/or contempt damages when a party presents an affidavit in a sum-
mary judgment motion in bad faith, or for purposes of delay. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(g). A
district court can punish contempt of its authority by fine or imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. §
401 (1988). A district court can award costs, expenses, and attorney's fees against
attorneys who multiply proceeding vexatiously. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988).
247. Id. at 2142-43.
248. Chambers, Ill S. Ct. at 2143. Of the three possible bases of inherent
power, the dissent is referring to the power necessary to preserve the authority of the
court; "[TIhose which are necessary to the exercise of all others." Id. (quoting Road-
way Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980)).
249. Id. at 2141.
250. Id. at 2143. In Societe Int'l Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerci-
ales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207 (1958), the Court held that the power to dis-
miss a complaint due to noncompliance with a production order depends solely on Rule
37. In Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988), the Court held
a federal court could not employ its inherent power to bypass the harmless error in-
quiry prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a).
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Roadway and Link were misplaced.2"1 He also observed that in Road-
way, the decision did not even discuss the relation between Rule 37 and
the inherent powers,23 2 while in Link, the issue centered on the permis-
sive language in Rule 41(b).2 53 Consequently, the dissent explained
that since Federal Rules 11 and 26(g) are cast in mandatory terms,
they require the imposition of sanctions when litigants violate the certi-
fication. standards.2"" The dissent urged that these standards give a liti-
gant notice of the proscribed conduct and make review for misuse of
discretion possible.2 55 Furthermore, the dissent stated that the major-
ity's bad faith standard fails to inform litigants as to what is required
and therefore violates the mandates of due process.2 6
The dissent observed that by resorting to the inherent power when-
ever conduct sanctionable under the rules is intertwined with conduct
only sanctionable by inherent power, severe consequences would fol-
low.257 Such consequences are: federal courts would be encouraged to
find bad faith conduct and eliminate the need to rely on specific textual
provisions; the uncertain development of the meaning and scope of ex-
press sanctioning provisions; and the defeat of Congress' goal in the
enactment of the Federal Rules- uniformity in the federal courts.2 58
Justice Kennedy suggested that the district court could have relied
upon many. other sources of authority to award attorney's fees for the
abuse of its process.2"9
251. Chambers, Ill S. Ct. at 2143.
252. Id. at 2144. The majority cited Roadway for the proposition that the inher-
ent power of a court can be invoked even if procedural rules exist which sanction the
same conduct. Id. at 2135 (citing Roadway, where the Court remanded for a consider-
ation of sanctions under both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 and the inherent
power); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. at 752, 767 (1980).
253. Chambers, Ill S. Ct. at 2144 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Link held that
neither the permissive language of Rule 41(b) nor its policy abrogated the inherent
power of a court to dismiss a case sua sponte. Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626,
630 (1962).
254. Id. at 2144-45. Justice Kennedy thereby concluded that the rules them-
selves dispose of the idea that they may be discarded in the discretion of a court. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 2145.
257. Id.
258. Chambers, Ill S. Ct. at 2146-47.
259. Id. at 2146-47. Justice Kennedy observed that Rule II could have been
used as a basis for all of the sanctions imposed. Id. at 2146. Furthermore, Rule 16(f)
could have sanctioned Chambers for his intentional pretrial delays which enables a
court to award attorney's fees when a party fails to participate in certain pretrial pro-
ceedings in good faith; Rule 26(g) could have been used to sanction Chambers for his
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Finally, the dissent urged that the Court's opinion would result in
an expansion of the power of federal courts. Although the majority
stated that the district court imposed sanctions for the fraud Chambers
perpetrated on the court and his abuse of process, the dissent believed
that Chambers was sanctioned in part, for his bad faith breach of con-
tract.2 60 The dissent stated that a district court cannot sanction pre-
litigation conduct pursuant to its inherent authority,261 possibly imply-
ing that a district court simply has less power here. The Court's inher-
ent powers extend only to rectify abuses of the judicial process, and do
not reach awarding damages for violations of substantive law. 262
The dissent also criticized the majority for not adhering to the ten-
ets of Federalism announced in Erie.263 To the extent Chambers was
punished for his breach of contract, the award is one of punitive dam-
ages for the breach, which is prohibited by Louisiana.2 16 Thus, the dis-
sent concluded that since Louisiana law prohibits such an award, had
NASCO brought suit in state court, it would not have received the
excess damages for the so-called bad faith breach.265
V. CRITIQUE AND IMPLICATIONS
The Chambers decision represents an expansion of the bad faith
exception to embrace bad faith inherent in the cause of action itself,
something which the Supreme Court has never clearly sanctioned. 26
The majority's affirmance of sanctioning Chambers' pre-litigation con-
duct, which was related to the enforcement of NASCO's contract
rights, is in essence a fee award against Chambers for his bad faith in
abuse of the discovery abuses; under Rule 56(g) attorney's fees could be awarded for
filing affidavits in bad faith in the motion for summary judgment; and 18 U.S.C. sec-
tion 401 (1988) could have been used to punish Chambers for his contempt of the court
and disobedience of its process. Id. at 2147.
260. Id. The majority made reference to "Chambers' arbitrary and arrogant re-
fusal to honor and perform this perfectly legal and enforceable contract." NASCO, Inc.
v. Calcasieu, 124 F.R.D. 120, 136 (W.D. La. 1989); see also id, at 143 (Chambers
refused to perform without any legal cause, forcing NASCO to bring its suit for spe-
cific performance).
261. Chambers, Il1 S. Ct. at 2148 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
262. Id.; see Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 35 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
263. Chambers, I11 S. Ct. at 2148 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 2147-48.
265. Id.
266. See Fleischmann Distilling, v. Maier Brewing Corp, 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
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provoking the original dispute.2 67 In its understandable desire to
achieve the appellate court's ordered relief, the Court may have sent a
misleading signal to the federal courts not based on precedent.
While the Chambers Court presented a convincing analysis that
the sanctioning scheme of the federal rules does not displace the inher-
ent power of a court to impose sanctions, its expansion on that analysis
may have well defeated Congress' purpose in enacting the federal rules
- uniformity among the federal courts.268 The majority's reasoning is
persuasive in that the federal rules and statutes do not displace the
inherent powers to sanction a litigant for their bad faith conduct.269
Furthermore, the inherent power does serve an extremely important
function where the conduct at issue is not covered by one of the con-
gressionally created sanctioning provisions. 70 In this respect, the inher-
ent power is "both broader and narrower" than these other sanctioning
provisions, and this power must be used to fill in the gaps which the
federal rules and statutes simply do not cover.27 1 However, by permit-
ting a federal court to employ its inherent authority to sanction bad
faith conduct when that conduct is equally sanctionable under the fed-
eral sanctioning scheme, the Court commits several errors.
The first difficulty is with due process requirements. The Court
simply stated that when invoking the inherent powers, federal courts
must exercise caution in complying with the mandates of due process in
determining that the requisite bad faith exists. 272 Due process requires
that everyone is entitled to be informed "as to what the state com-
mands or forbids."27 However, upon a finding of bad faith, since
courts may resort to their inherent powers to impose sanctions, 27' par-
ties who litigate before tribunals have no notice as to the standards
which are required for them to avoid sanctions, until the litigation pro-
ceedings are complete. Imposing sanctions under this rudimentary stan-
dard thwarts the requirements of due process since the courts do not
require any notice or limiting provisions, as do congressionally created
267. See MALLOR, supra note 97, at 634-36. This is essentially a punishment for
Chambers' role in the substance of the dispute; in other words, bad faith inherent in
the cause of action itself. Id.
268. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
269. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2134 (1991).
270. Id. at 2135.
271. Id. at 2134.
272. Id. at 2136.
273, Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
274. Chambers, I1I S. Ct. at 2135.
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powers.2 75 The difficulty is that reasonable federal judges may differ as
to what amounts to bad faith conduct. Consequently, a litigant might
never know when to curtail vigorous litigation, and one federal court
may regard certain conduct as bad faith while another may not.
Aside from due process concerns, the Court failed to adhere to the
limits which the inherent power imposes on itself. The authority to ap-
ply inherent powers as a sanction for bad faith litigation practices can
only be exercised when necessary to preserve the court's authority.276
However, the majority simply did not address this limitation. Nonethe-
less, the dissent aptly pointed out that invoking the inherent power is
not necessary when congressional rules and statutes exist to sanction
the same conduct.277 Furthermore, the American Rule itself accepts
Congress' role in defining the procedural and remedial powers of the
federal courts, 278 as Congress has provided the federal courts with an
abundance of rules and statutes to protect and preserve its authority.279
However, by allowing federal courts to ignore such rules and statutes,
275. For example, FED. R. Civ. P. II stipulates that the signature of an attorney
or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading,
motion or other paper; that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after a reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and warranted by existing
law. . .and if such a document is signed in violation of the rule, the court may assess
attorney's fees. Id. This rule puts the signer on notice of the standards which are ex-
pected in filing such documents, and the types of sanctions which can be imposed.
However, by allowing the standardless exercise of inherent powers, a court can impose
sanctions upon a litigant who is unaware that his specific conduct is sanctionable until
after he has committed such acts.
276. Chambers, 11l S. Ct. at 2132 (citing Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626,
630-31 (1962) for the proposition that inherent powers are those "necessarily vested in
courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly, expeditious disposition
of cases"); see Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (inherent
powers "are those which are necessary to the exercise of all others"); Young v. United
States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(inherent powers are those which are necessary to allow the courts to function); United
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (inherent powers are those "neces-
sary to the exercise of all others").
277. Chambers, Ill S. Ct. at 2143 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
278. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 2, 9-10 (1941).
279. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988) (allows a federal court to punish contempt of
its authority and abuse of process); 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988) (requires a federal court
to award attorney's fees against an attorney who multiplies proceedings vexatiously);
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f) (allows a court to impose sanctions against a party for failure to
follow pretrial orders); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (allows a court to impose sanctions on a
party or attorney for filling groundless pleadings, motions, and other papers); FED. R.
App. P. 38 (grants a federal court power to award costs for a frivolous appeal).
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and to permit the exercise of inherent powers "even if procedural rules
exist which sanction the same conduct," 80 inconsistencies are inevita-
ble. With such an amorphus and broad concept as the inherent power,
this self imposed limitation must be defined if these inconsistencies in
the federal system are to be avoided.
Another problem with the Chambers opinion"'1 is that, implicitly,
it represents an expansion of the bad faith exception to sanction a liti-
gant for pre-litigation conduct.128 The majority's application of the bad
faith exception to the American Rule is, for the most part, correct. The
Supreme Court has held that a court may assess attorney's when a
party has " 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive
reasons.' "283 However, the language of this standard has been strictly
applied to instances where fraud has been practiced upon the Court,28 4
and when litigation practices have delayed or disrupted the judicial
process.28 5 Along these lines, the majority's application of this standard
to Chambers' filing of false and frivolous pleadings, and his tactics of
delay, oppression and harassment are right on point. Nevertheless, the
Court's affirmance of the district court's opinion, and its broad analysis
of the inherent authority implies that the bad faith exception has been
extended beyond litigation tactics and now can explicitly reach a liti-
gant's pre-litigation conduct.218
The district court's opinion reveals that Chambers was partly
sanctioned for his arbitrary and arrogant refusal to honor and perform
the contract, 2 7 and for his role in the breach of contract.288 A fee
280. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2133.
281. Id. at 2131.
282. Id. at 2141.
283. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59
(quoting F.D. Rich Co. Inc. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Co. Inc., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974)); see also Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Newman v. Piggie Park Enter.,
Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, n.4 (1968) (per curiam).
284. Universal Oil Prod. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946).
285. Hutto v. Finney 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1978).
286. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2147 (Kennedy J., dissenting). As the dissent
points out, the majority insists that the lower court did not sanction Chambers for his
role in the breach of contract, but for the fraud and abuse of process practiced on the
district. Id. at 2138 nn.16-17.
287. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 136 ("Chambers arbitrarily and without legal
cause refused to perform forcing NASCO to bring this suit.").
288. Id. at 143 ("There is absolutely no reason why Chambers should not reim-
burse in full all attorney's fees and expenses that NASCO, by Chambers' actions, was
forced to pay.") (emphasis added). The lower court's opinion is full of statements
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award in this respect is essentially a punishment for Chambers' role in
the substance of the dispute and his bad faith in the cause of action
itself. 89 Consequently, any award of attorney's fees on this ground is
actually a substantive remedy and state law should have been applied.
Under this line of thought, an award of attorney's fees would have been
inconsistent with and undermined those principles espoused in Erie and
its progeny.
These principles are embedded in the American Rule as it bars
federal courts from engaging in fee shifting as part of the merits of the
award, but allows fee shifting to the extent necessary to protect the
judicial process. 90 By expanding the bad faith exception to a party's
role in substance of the dispute, several other concerns immediately
surface.
First, although an award on this basis arguably is within the
court's equitable authority, a potentially confusing overlap with the law
of punitive damages is presented291 as punitive damages are imposed
for a broad range of conduct, ranging from oppression, fraud, or malice
on one end to mere caprice on the other. 92 Second, an award of attor-
ney's fees on this basis will run counter to the underlying policy of the
American Rule. The American Rule protects a litigant's right in court
by vindicating his substantive rights.2 93 Since litigation is never clear,
no one should be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a law-
suit.294 Awarding fees based on a party's bad faith pre-litigation con-
duct disrupts the American Rule's balance between free access to the
federal system and penalties for abuses of it. If substantive fee shifting
is permitted, anyone with a novel, disputed, or uncertain claim involv-
which sanction Chambers for his role in the breach of the contract. Id. at 125. The
district court noted Chambers' "unjustified and arbitrary refusal to file" the FCC ap-
plication pursuant to the Purchase Agreement was in absolute bad faith. Id. The court
also stated that the attorney's fees and expenses charged to NASCO was a direct re-
sult and flowed directly from the suit for specific performance. Id. at 142 (emphasis
added).
289. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2148 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Awarding damages
for violation of binding contract, is a matter of substantive law. Marek v. Chesny, 473
U.S. 1, 35 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
290. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2148 (Kennedy J., dissenting).
291. See Oakes, supra note 136, at 175.
292. John D. Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L.
REV, 870, 881 (1976).
293. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2148 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (construing the ma-
jority's application of the bad faith exception to Chambers' pre-litigation conduct).
294. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v Maier Brewing Corp, 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
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ing a substantial possibility of an adverse judgment will be deterred
from bringing suit because of the possibility that he could be taxed
with his opponent's fees. Finally, a fee award based on a litigants bad
faith pre-litigation conduct, where a state does not recognize the bad
faith exception, destroys the notions of federalism, as it is in essence a
substantive and not procedural remedy. Erie and its successors guaran-
tee that if a litigant takes his state law cause of action to federal court,
and follows the rules of that court, the result in his case will be same as
if he had brought it in state court. 295 To the extent that the Court
affirmed the imposition of sanctions which was based on Chambers'
bad faith pre-litigation conduct, the decision to file suit in federal,
rather than state court, expanded the scope of NASCO's remedy. 296
VI. CONCLUSION
If uniformity in the federal court system is our goal, courts must
exercise great care when invoking their inherent power. The Chambers
decision exemplifies the present confusion in the application of the fed-
eral bad faith exception to the American Rule. The Supreme Court
reached a fair result for the wrong reasons. When conduct is not cov-
ered by federal rules or statutes, a federal court should use its inherent
powers. However, the Court's notion that inherent powers can be in-
voked to sanction a litigant even when federal rules and statutes exist,
which cover the same conduct, is misplaced. The American Rule recog-
nizes that Congress, not the judiciary, controls costs and sanctions.
Further, the Court's superficial discussion of the necessity limitation is
a contributing factor in its reluctance to adhere to te.xt-based authority.
The award of attorney's fees because Chambers acted in "bad faith,"
rather than his violations of Congressionally mandated rules sends a
misleading signal to the federal courts. Likewise, imposing sanctions
which are in part based on a litigants pre-litigation conduct represents
for the first time, the Supreme Court's explicit expansion of the bad
faith exception, which subverts the American Rule and impinges on the
notions of Federalism. If the federal courts are willing to utilize their
inherent power as a means to impose sanctions, they must have some
guidance as to the circumstances that this undefined and ambiguous
295. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
296. Chambers, III S. Ct. at 2149 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
1992] 1565
552
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 18
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss3/18
1566 Nova Law Review [Vol. 16
power can be employed. Perhaps a better solution would be for a legis-




et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Hernandez v. New York: Applying Batson to
Peremptory Strikes of Bilinguals-Should Language
Ability be a Surrogate for Race?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................... 1567
II. THE HISTORY OF HERNANDEZ V. NEW YORK ..... 1572
A . Facts of the Case ......................... 1572
B. Procedural H istory ........................ 1573
C. Analysis of the New York Court of Appeals
D ecision ................................. 1574
1. The M ajority Opinion ................. 1574
2. The Concurring Opinion: A Discussion of
the Peremptory Challenge System in Light
of B atson ........................... 1577
3. The Dissenting Opinion ............... 1579
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS .................. 1583
A. The M ajority Opinion ..................... 1585
B. The Concurring Opinion ................... 1593
C. The Dissenting Opinion .................... 1594
IV. CONCLUSION ...................................... 1600
1. INTRODUCTION
Justice White's prophetic statement in Batson v. Kentucky' that
"[m]uch litigation will be required to spell out the contours of the
Court's equal protection holding today ... ." has been realized.
Since the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Bat-
son, 3 which prohibited the state's use of peremptory challenges to ex-
clude members of the defendant's race from the jury on account of
their race, hundreds of cases have come before appellate courts in an
effort to clarify the nuances of that holding and obtain answers to sev-
I. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2. Id. at 102 (White, J., concurring).
3. 476 U.S. 79.
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eral important questions left open by Batson." For example, in Her-
nandez v. New York, 5 one of the more recent Batson cases to come
before the United States Supreme Court,6 the Court considered how
4. Brief for Respondent at 46, Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991)
(No. 89-7645) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]; see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2096 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Judging by the number of
Batson claims that have made their way even as far as this Court . . . it is a certainty
that the amount of judges' and lawyers' time devoted to implementing today's newly
discovered Law of the Land will be enormous."); see also Bonnie L. Mayfield, Batson
and Groups Other than Blacks: A Strict Scrutiny Analysis, 11 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
377 (1988); Steven W. Fisher, Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A "Batson
Update", N.Y. L.J., July 17, 1990, at 1, col. 1. For one of the most recent comments on
the deluge of Batson cases, see David 0. Stewart, Whither Peremptories?, A.B.A. J.,
July 1991, at 38, 42 ("[W]ith many more [Batson cases] working their way through
the lower courts, one state-court judge calls the possibilities for Batson claims 'abso-
lutely limitless' . . . . [T]he notable feature of Batson is just how many additional
issues it keeps spawning.").
The issues on those Batson cases working their way through the courts have been
varied. See, e.g., Mayfield, supra at 379-80 & n.24; see also Connecticut v. Gonzalez,
538 A.2d 210 (Conn. 1988); New York v. Jenkins, 554 N.E.2d 47 (N.Y. 1990) (stat-
ing what factors would be considered in determining whether a prima facie case of
discrimination had been made); Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609 (Ala. 1987); Slappy
v. Florida, 503 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 522 So. 2d 18, cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988) (what would constitute an acceptable race-neutral expla-
nation sufficient to rebut the inference of purposeful discrimination); United States v.
De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990); New York v. Blunt, 561 N.Y.S.2d 90 (App.
Div. 1990) (whether Batson should be extended beyond racial discrimination to bar
gender discrimination); Powers v. Ohio, Ill S. Ct. 1364 (1991); De Gross, 913 F.2d at
1425; Blunt, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 92 (whether a defendant has third party standing to
object to a race based peremptory challenge if the defendant is not of the same race as
the challenged juror).
Edmonson, decided by the Supreme Court on June 3, 1991, presented the issue of
whether Batson would prohibit parties in a civil case from exercising peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2079. It also
triggered, indirectly, the question of whether Batson would prohibit the defense as well
as the prosecution from using peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of
race. Id. at 2096 (Scalia, J., predicting in his dissenting opinion that the effect of Ed-
monson will be to prevent defendants from using race-based peremptory strikes, a con-
clusion already reached by the New York Court of Appeals in New York v. Kern, 554
N.E.2d 1235, 1236 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990)). See generally James 0.
Pearson, Annotation, Use of Peremptory Challenge to Exclude from Jury Persons Be-
longing to a Class or Race, 79 A.L.R.3d 14 (Supp. 1990).
5. 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991), affg 552 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 1990), affg 528
N.Y.S.2d 625 (App. Div. 1988).
6. In the six month period from January to June 1991, three Batson cases have
been heard by the Supreme Court: Powers, 11l S. Ct. at 1364; Hernandez, Ill S. Ct.
1568 [Vol. 16
555
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Savar
broadly the concept of race should be defined for equal protection pur-
poses.7 The defendant, Hernandez, argued that the court should treat
proficiency in Spanish as a surrogate for race, 8 in analyzing the ques-
tion of "[w]hether a prosecutor's proffered explanation that prospective
Latino jurors were struck from the venire because he suspected they
might not abide by official translations of Spanish language testimony
constitutes an acceptable "race neutral" explanation under Batson v.
Kentucky?"9 A secondary issue raised by Hernandez is the degree of
deference owed by reviewing courts to a trial court's acceptance of the
prosecutor's race neutral explanation.'0
Justice Kennedy, speaking for the majority in Hernandez, held
that the prosecutor offered a race-neutral basis for his peremptory
strikes, because the prosecutor's stated reason did not include an intent
to exclude Latino or bilingual jurors." Furthermore, the prosecutor's
stated reason for excluding the jurors was not based on stereotypical
assumptions about Latinos or bilinguals. 12 Giving great deference to
the factual findings of the trial court, the majority held that the trial
court did not commit clear error in finding a lack of intent to discrimi-
nate and in accepting the prosecutor's explanation.'" However, Justice
Kennedy, in an attempt to limit the Court's holding to its facts, cau-
tioned that the Court's decision "does not imply that exclusion of bil-
inguals from jury service is wise, or even that it is constitutional in all
cases," 4 and that a prosecutor who strikes all potential jurors who
speak a given language, in the absence of any trial related circum-
stances or individual responses of the jurors, may be found to be in
violation of the equal protection clause under Batson."3 In a strongly
worded dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and Mar-
at 1859; and Edmonson, I1I S. Ct. 2077.
7. Hernandez, 11I S. Ct. at 1872 (Justice Kennedy stating that this decision did
not "resolve the more difficult question of the breadth with which the concept of race
should be defined for equal protection purposes.").
8. Id. at 1866.
9. Brief for Petitioner at i, Hernandez v. New York, Il1 S. Ct. 1859 (1991)
(No. 89-7645) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]; see also Brief for Respondent, supra
note 4, at i.
10. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at i; Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, ati.
11. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1867.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1869-71.
14. Id. at 1872.
15. Id. at 1873.
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shall, set forth three reasons for the view that the prosecutor's explana-
tion was insufficient to rebut the prima facie case of intentional dis-
crimination: first, the disparate impact was evidence of discriminatory
intent, rendering the prosecutor's explanation a pretext; second, less
drastic means than excluding the bilingual jurors were available to ac-
commodate the prosecutor's stated concern; and third, if the prosecu-
tor's concern was legitimate and capable of being documented, a chal-
lenge for cause would have been warranted. 16 The impact on the public
was immediately addressed as newspapers around the nation carried
the day after the Supreme Court's ruling in Hernandez. Headlines in
three major newspapers read: "Justices see no bias in trial barring bi-
lingual jurors,"' 7 "Supreme Court broadens exclusion of bilingual ju-
rors," 18 and "High court cites basis to reject bilingual jurors."' 9 In all
communities the Hernandez ruling has great impact, because a bilin-
gual juror with proficiency in the language of the non-English speaking
witness or defendant could be excluded on the basis of the explanation
that he or she might not accept the official interpretation. But in heav-
ily bilingual communities, such as South Florida, the impact is even
greater because the jury pools in bilingual communities are more apt to
be heavily bilingual, thus increasing the number of prospective jurors
that could be excluded. Also, the probability is greater that a trial will
involve one or more individuals who do not speak English and will re-
16. Hernandez, Ill S. Ct. at 1877 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. BOSTON GLOBE, May 29, 1991, (Nat'l/Foreign), at 10 (city ed.). Although
the article as a whole was very objective, the initial impact on readers was the impres-
sion that the high court had given its approval to the barring of bilingual jurors. Id.
18. SEATTLE TIMES, May 29, 1991, at A2 (final ed.). The article characterized
the 6-3 ruling as one which will give prosecutors greater power to "keep bilingual mi-
norities off juries in criminal trials." Id.
19. MIAMI HERALD, May 29, 1991, at Al, col. 4 [hereinafter High Court Cites
Basis]. The article began, "[in a ruling that could make it easier to bar bilingual
people from juries, the Supreme Court Tuesday upheld a prosecutor's exclusion of His-
panics on grounds that they might not accept official English translations of testimony
in Spanish." Id. Both the headline and the text carried the message that the increas-
ingly conservative Court had found a legal basis to back its decision to deliver yet
another blow to equal protection. Id. The article included an excerpt from the official
trial transcript of United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1981), which the
Hernandez majority had cited as representing what can go wrong when a juror does
not accept the interpreter's official translation. High Court Cites Basis, supra, at Al,
col. 5. In heavily Latino South Florida, where racial and ethnic tensions already run
high, this message was viewed with alarm by some, see infra note 20, and with ap-
proval by others, e.g., The Language of Justice, MIAMI HERALD, May 30, 1991, at
A 18, col. I (Broward ed.) (staff editorial declaring "'Latino' Ruling is Right.").
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quire an interpreter. A ruling which makes it easier to strike those pro-
spective jurors would greatly alter the composition of the resulting
20jury. 2
This comment examines the reasoning employed in deciding the
Hernandez issue. Section II summarizes the facts of the case and the
procedural history from the trial court to the New York Appellate Di-
vision, to the New York Court of Appeals. This section also discusses
the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions of the New York
Court of Appeals. Section III focuses on the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States, analyzing the majority, concurring and dis-
senting opinions, including those inquiries and policy considerations
which the court did not address. Section IV concludes that the Court
failed to recognize that the prosecutor's explanation was language-
based,2 but that this view was logically necessary to arrive at the
Court's ultimate decision-that the prosecutor's explanation did not
constitute a per se violation of the equal protection clause.22 Also, de-
spite the Court's initial error, its ultimate decision was justified for two
reasons. First, to have declared the explanation a per se violation would
have extended the concept of race to a level which would be overly
broad. Second, the decision does not bar a trial court from finding a
violation of the equal protection clause on the ground that a prosecu-
tor's explanation was pretextual. 21 Regarding the secondary issue of the
degree of deference to be accorded a trial court's finding, Part III con-
cludes that the Hernandez decision to accord great deference,24 even to
trial court findings made in the absence of any mandated guidelines,
was a failure to recognize the potential for abuse in exercising peremp-
tory challenges against bilingual Latinos.
20. See High Court Cites Basis, supra note 19, at Al, col. 4. "Miami defense
lawyer Fred Schwartz called the ruling 'a terrible deprivation of a defendant's civil
rights. I think that's terrible, particularly in our district, where half our population is
Hispanic, and most of our jury pools are one-third or one-half bilingual.'" Id. Further-
more, "Il]awyers for Hispanic groups said the ruling could lead to abuses. 'Prosecutors
could readily rely on the reason this prosecutor gave to exclude Latinos from many,
many juries around the country,' said Kenneth Kimerling, a lawyer for the Puerto Ri-
can Legal Defense and Education Fund in New York City." Id.
21. Hernandez v. New York, Ill S. Ct. 1859, 1868 (1991).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1872-73.
24. Id. at 1869.
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II. THE HISTORY OF HERNANDEZ V. NEw YORK
A. Facts of the Case
In December, 1985, on a Brooklyn street, the defendant, Dionisio
Hernandez, fired several shots at his girlfriend25 and her mother as
they left a restaurant.26 His girlfriend suffered two serious wounds, but
the shots missed the mother, hitting instead two men in a nearby res-
taurant. All the victims survived the shooting. The defendant was crim-
inally charged by the State of New York with two counts of attempted
murder in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the
second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third
degree.27
During jury selection, defense counsel objected to the prosecution's
exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude all four potential Latino
jurors.28 The defendant dropped his claim regarding two of the jurors
after it was explained that they were excluded because each of them
had a brother who had been convicted of a crime. Without waiting for
a ruling by the court on whether the defendant had established a prima
facie case of racial discrimination regarding the other two jurors, the
prosecutor volunteered his explanation. The prosecutor stated that
when the potential jurors were asked if they could disregard the Span-
ish language testimony of witnesses and accept only the interpreter's
official English translation, they looked away from the prosecutor and
hesitantly said that they would try to follow the interpreter.29 The pros-
ecutor continued that even though the jurors' final answers were that
they could accept the interpreter's official translation, he "just felt from
the hesitancy in their answers and their lack of eye contact that they
would not be able to do it."' 0 His concern was that if they could not
accept the official interpretation, they "would have an undue impact on
25. The woman was alternately referred to as defendant's fiancee, see Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 9, at 7, and "young woman friend," see New York v. Hernandez,
552 N.E.2d 621, 622 (N.Y. 1990).
26. New York v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 622 (N.Y. 1990); Hernandez v.
New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1864 (1991).
27. Hernandez, 11 S. Ct. at 1864; Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 2, 3;
see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 7.
28. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 622; Hernandez, III S. Ct. at 1864.
29. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 622; Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1864.
30. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1865 n.1.
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the jury." I He also explained that no motive existed for him to exclude
Latinos from the jury, since all of the parties-defendant, victims, and
witnesses-were Latino. After stating that it was just as likely that a
bilingual Latino juror would sympathize with the victim as with the
defendant, thereby negating a motive for excluding Latinos from the
jury, the trial judge denied defense counsel's motion for a mistrial.32
The case was tried with no Latinos on the jury, and the defendant was
convicted on two counts of attempted murder and two counts of crimi-
nal possession of a weapon.33
B. Procedural History
On appeal, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
ruled that the defendant had made out a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation under Batson, since the prosecutor had challenged the only pro-
spective jurors with Hispanic surnames.3" However, the court ruled
that the prosecutor had satisfied his burden of coming forward with a
race neutral explanation sufficient to rebut the inference of intentional
discrimination, and therefore unanimously affirmed the trial court's
judgment.35 The appellate division, although given factfinding power
under New York statutes, 36 appeared to have simply accepted the ex-
planation given by the prosecutor as being reasonable in light of the
record, noting that it was not necessary for the explanation to rise to
the level needed to justify a challenge for cause.37
In a four-to-two decision, the judgment of the lower courts was
31. Id. at 1865; Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 622.
32. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1865 n.2.
33. Id. at 1864.
34. New York v. Hernandez, 528 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (App. Div. 1988).
35. Id.
36. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 7-8, 41 n.20 (citing N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 470.15 (McKinney, 1983)).
37. Hernandez, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 626. A challenge for cause must be supported
by documentation which indicates that a juror holds a particular bias which may pre-
vent him or her from impartially deciding the case, see New York v. Hernandez, 552
N.E.2d 621, 622 (N.Y. 1990), or that the juror is unable to follow the court's instruc-
tions regarding the law and the evidence to be considered, see Brief for Respondent,
supra note 4, at 19. A peremptory challenge, on the other hand, does not require sup-
porting documentation, but can be exercised if the prosecutor merely suspects that the
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affirmed by New York's high court.3" The court of appeals held that
the prosecutor's explanation for challenging the jurors was facially race
neutral.3 9 The court of appeals then deferred to the lower courts' fac-
tual findings4" that the prosecutor's facially neutral explanation was not
pretextual"I and was therefore acceptable.42
C. Analysis of the New York Court of Appeals Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
The majority reached its conclusion by applying the three-part test
set forth in Batson v. Kentucky"' to determine if the prosecutor had
used his peremptory challenges to discriminate against the defendant's
ethnic group.44 The first part of the test, requiring the defendant to
make a prima facie showing that peremptory challenges were used to
discriminate on the basis of race,4 5 was readily handled, since the pros-
ecution did not dispute that a prima facie case of discrimination had
been made out by the peremptory strikes of all Latino members of the
venire."I The second part provides that once a prima facie case of dis-
crimination has been established, the burden shifts to the prosecution
to rebut the inference of discrimination by offering a race-neutral ex-
planation for excluding the jurors in question. 47 In the only previous
New York Court of Appeals opinion on point, New York v. Scott,48 the
court reversed without having to reach the issue of what constitutes a
neutral explanation under Batson, because the state had never offered
an explanation to rebut the defendant's prima facie case of purposeful
38. New York v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 625 (N.Y. 1990).
39. Id. at 623.
40. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 41 n.20 (explaining that the New
York Constitution and statutes grant jurisdiction to the court of appeals only over ques-
tions of law in most criminal cases, and allow the court to review facts only in death
penalty cases). This was not a death penalty case and, therefore, the court of appeals
was precluded from reviewing the facts as a matter of law. Id.
41. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 624.
42. Id.
43. 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986).
44. New York v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 623 (N.Y. 1990).
45. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.
46. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 623.
47. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98 (construed in New York v. Hernandez, 552
N.E.2d 621, 623 (N.Y. 1990)).
48. 516 N.E.2d 1208 (N.Y. 1987).
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discrimination.49 Thus, this issue in Hernandez was a case of first im-
pression for the court. 50
Batson offers little guidance as to what constitutes a neutral expla-
nation, other than to state that:
[Tihe prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of
discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the
defendant's race on the assumption-or his intuitive judge-
ment-that they would be partial to the defendant because of their
shared race . . . Nor may the prosecutor rebut the defendant's
case merely by denying that he had a discriminatory motive or 'af-
firm[ing] [his] good faith in making individual selections.'51
Based on this loosely-stated guideline, the conclusion sought by the
defendant-that the prosecutor's explanation was not neutral and,
therefore, constituted a per se violation-would necessarily require two
findings by the court. The court would first have to find that the chal-
lenge made by the prosecutor was, in fact, based on Spanish language
ability, and would also have to find that Spanish language ability and
Latino origin are so closely related that a challenge based on Spanish
language ability is tantamount to a challenge based on ethnic
49. Id. at 1211; see also Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 623, 626. When Scott was
decided Batson had not yet been decided. Scott, 516 N.E.2d at 1209. The law gov-
erning peremptory challenges for discriminatory purposes at that time was Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). Swain put the burden on the defendant to overcome
the presumption that the prosecutor was not peremptorily striking jurors in a discrimi-
natory manner. Scott, 516 N.E.2d at 1209-10. The defendant could carry this burden
only by establishing that the prosecutor had routinely excluded jurors on the basis of
race over a period of time. Id. at 1210. Since the defendant in Scott was not able to
establish a pattern of discrimination over several cases, but could only point to his own
case, the presumption carried that the prosecutor did not use his peremptory strikes to
discriminate on the basis of race. Id. at 1211. Thus, the prosecutor never had to re-
spond to the defendant's objections. While Scott was on appeal, Batson was decided.
Id. at 1210. The new judge-made law, which required a showing of discrimination
solely in the defendant's case in order to make out a prima facie case, overruled
Swain's evidentiary burden, and was applied retroactively to Scott. Id. at 1211. It was
held that the defendant had indeed established a prima facie case of discrimination. Id.
Since the trial judge was no longer in the county and it was impossible to reconstruct a
record because of the length of time that had elapsed, the court of appeals simply
reversed Scott's conviction without the state ever coming forward with a statement to
rebut the prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 1211-12.
50. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 626.
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grounds.52 The majority did not deny the language-ethnic connection,
but did not accept the proposition that the challenge was made on the
basis on language ability.58 While the court acknowledged that "[tjhese
jurors . . . were challenged because they indicated their knowledge of
the Spanish language might interfere with their sworn responsibility as
jurors to accept the official translation of the Spanish-proffered testi-
mony," 5  the majority ultimately elected to decide the case on the basis
that "the essence of this case [is] really about a prosecutor's court-
accepted explanation concerning the ability of these jurors-or any
sworn jurors no matter their race or ethnic similarities-to decide a
case on the official evidence before them . . . ."51 Having made the
decision that the reasons were not grounded in Spanish language abil-
ity, the connection to ethnicity or race was moot, and the majority was
thus able to conclude that the reasons offered by the prosecutor consti-
tuted a race-neutral explanation under Batson.56 Therefore, a per se
violation of the equal protection clause did not exist.
If part two of the Batson test indicates that the state carried its
burden in coming forward with an explanation which was facially race-
neutral, then the evaluation must proceed to the third part of the test,
which involves a determination by the trial court whether or not the
defendant has carried the ultimate burden of proving purposeful dis-
crimination . 7 Essentially in part three, the trial court chooses whether
or not to believe the facially race-neutral explanation given by the pros-
ecutor based on the court's determination as to whether the prosecu-
tor's explanation was a pretext, or was real and supported by the total-
ity of factors surrounding the voir dire.5 8 The majority gave great
deference to the factual finding by the trial court that the prosecutor's
explanation was not pretextual and was, therefore, acceptable as a le-
gitimate ground for peremptorily striking the two jurors.5 9 Relying on
both federal60 and state sources6' as authority for deferring to the find-
52. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 623.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986).
58. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 623.
59. Id. at 623-24.
60. In Batson, the Court reiterated that
,a finding of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact' entitled to ap-
propriate deference by a reviewing court. Since the trial judge's findings in
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ings of fact of the lower courts, the majority noted that the United
States Supreme Court adheres to the view that resolution of issues
hinging on credibility is best made by trial courts that are in the best
position to observe the parties and judge all the circumstances; appel-
late courts are best served by deferring to the credibility findings of
those courts.62 The court was careful to point out, however, that its
ruling should not be taken to mean that all facially race-neutral expla-
nations will be accepted.63 Those that are clearly pretextual will, as a
matter of law, be rejected as insufficient to overcome a defendant's
claim of purposeful discrimination.64
The majority, having applied the three-part Batson test, thus con-
cluded that the trial court did not err in its finding that the prosecutor's
peremptory strikes of two bilingual Latino jurors was not an equal pro-
tection violation.65
2. The Concurring Opinion: A Discussion of the Peremptory
Challenge System in Light of Batson
The question presented in Hernandez afforded Judge Titone the
opportunity to discuss his "strongly held beliefs" regarding peremptory
challenges in light of Batson.66 The subject of "post-Batson peremptory
challenges" '67 has been, and will continue to be, debated in an effort to
find a balance between the peremptory challenge system and the anti-
discrimination policy of the equal protection clause.68 A challenge is
the context under consideration here largely will turn on evaluation of
credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great
deference.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573,
575-76 (1985)) (citations omitted).
61. See supra note 40, which explains why the majority stated: "[W]e have no
basis in law . . . to conclude that those courts erred in these essentially factual deter-
minations." Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 624.
62. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 623-24.
63. Id. at 624.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 625.
66. New York v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 625 (N.Y. 1990) (Titone, J.,
concurring).
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-08 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (commenting on the "pernicious nature of the racially discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges, and the repugnancy of such discrimination to the Equal Pro-
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either for cause, requiring an explanation, or is peremptory, requiring
no explanation. 9 Conceptually, it is difficult to comprehend how a pe-
remptory challenge can be "somewhat" explained. 70 It "either has to be
explained or it does not . . . . [T]o permit inquiry into the basis for a
peremptory challenge would force 'the peremptory challenge [to] col-
lapse into the challenge for cause.' "71 On the other hand, the solution
is not to return to a system which permits suspiciously discriminatory
peremptory challenges to go unexplained. 2
The concurring justice recommended that finding a balance be-
tween Batson and the peremptory challenge system is a task for the
courts or the legislatures. 73 Since efforts by the courts to find such a
balance will necessarily yield even more "layers of inquiry and complex
tests," Judge Titone calls for the legislatures to review and perhaps
tection Clause .... The decision today will not end the racial discrimination that
peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That goal can be accomplished only
by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely."); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
244 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) ("Were it necessary to make an absolute choice
between the right of a defendant to have a jury chosen in conformity with the require-
ments of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to challenge peretnptorily, the Con-
stitution compels a choice of the former."); see also Brian J. Serr and Mark Maney,
Racism, Peremptory Challenges and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a
Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 7-18 (1988); Brent J. Gurney,
The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 227, 244 (1986). For very recent comments made in light of the deluge of
Batson cases, see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2096 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he States and Congress may simply abolish peremptory
challenges, which would cause justice to suffer in a different fashion."), and Stewart,
supra note 4, at 38 ("Many have begun to question whether Batson sounded the death
knell for peremptory challenges in the American courts."). See also Marcia Coyle, Not
the Last Word on Juries (Not the Court's Final Judgment on Peremptories), NAT'L
L.J., June 17, 1991, at 1, col. 4, & 28, col. 4 (discussing the effect of the recent deci-
sions in Batson cases, and noting that "the high court's [sic) new law in this area also
affects the long-term viability of peremptory challenges themselves").
69. Batson, 476 U.S. at 127 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id.(quoting United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984)).
72. Id. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting "[tihe inherent potential of pe-
remptory challenges to distort the jury process by permitting the exclusion of jurors on
racial grounds .... ").
73. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 625 (Titone, J., concurring). But cf. Stewart,
supra note 4, at 42 (discussing the views of Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr., of the Mary-
land Court of Special Appeals that "[i]nevitably, whether it takes five years or 15
years, Batson has to bring down the peremptory challenge as we know it," and noting
that Justice Marshall had made that prediction in Batson).
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revamp the existing peremptory system.74
3. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent focused on the third stage of the Batson inquiry-the
determination by the trial court of whether or not the prosecutor's ex-
planation should be accepted as sufficient to rebut the defendant's
claim of purposeful discrimination.78 Whereas the majority had de-
ferred to the lower courts' judgment, the dissent felt that in order to
protect the constitutional rights of defendants, the role of the court of
appeals should be to articulate the standard by which the trial court
makes its finding regarding purposeful discrimination, and then deter-
mine, as a matter of law, whether the state has satisfied that stan-
dard.71 To simply defer to the findings of the lower court without an
evaluation of whether those findings were made in the context of a
clearly defined standard reduces the role of the court of appeals to a
"'rubber stamping' " function. 7 Although the dissent made the lan-
guage-ethnic connection and went on to classify the prosecutor's chal-
lenge as language-based, 78 it failed to accept the defendant's argument
that since an ethnic-based challenge would have been a per se violation,
therefore the language-based challenge must also constitute a per se
violation of Batson.79 The dissent did conclude, however, that because
of the intimate link between Spanish language and Latino ethnicity,
the prosecutor's language-based challenge had a disparate impact on
Latinos, even though it appeared facially race-neutral. 80 This disparate
74. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 626 (Titone, J., concurring).
75. New York v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 626 (N.Y. 1990) (Kaye, J.,
dissenting).
76. Id. at 627.
77. Id. Interestingly, a report issued subsequent to the New York Court of Ap-
peals' review of Hernandez strengthened the dissent's opinion of what the role of the
court of appeals ought to be. See N.Y. Courts 'Racist', NAT'L L.J., June 17, 1991, at 6,
col. 2 (quoting from the report issued by the New York State Judicial Commission on
Minorities). The seventeen members of the New York State Judicial Commission on
Minorities, appointed in 1988 by New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Sol Wach-
tier, found the state's court system to be "infested with racism" and granting "base-
ment justice" to minorities. Id. The recently issued report stated that there are "two
justice systems at work in the courts of New York State, one for whites, and a very
different one for minorities and the poor." Id.
78. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 628 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 627-28.
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impact rendered the prosecutor's neutral explanation "inherently sus-
pect" and as such, the dissent would require that the trial court ex-
amine the explanation under a standard of enhanced scrutiny.81 Under
this standard, a reason which appears to be based on an intuitive feel-
ing, rather than on facts discovered during voir dire, should be rejected
by the court.82
The dissent, referring to the record as quoted in the majority opin-
ion,8 3 concluded that the prosecutor's explanation was based on his in-
tuitive feeling that the two jurors could not follow the court's instruc-
tion to accept only the interpreter's official English translation of
Spanish language testimony. 84 Since the record reflected that ulti-
mately both jurors did satisfy the court that they would accept the offi-
cial court translation, the dissent could discern no factual basis for the
prosecutor's stated reason.8
In addition, under the dissent's enhanced level of scrutiny, the trial
court would have found other inconsistencies in the prosecutor's expla-
nation. For example, the prosecutor's concern that the jurors decide the
case on the basis of the same evidence could have been addressed by an
instruction from the court that Spanish-speaking jurors are to accept
only the English interpretation, and are to discreetly bring any discrep-
ancies to the court's attention, but not to the attention of their fellow
jurors.86 Not only would this have been permissible, but it would have
more rationally furthered the prosecutor's concern, for the state's inter-
est would be better served by having all the jurors decide the case on
the basis of not only the same evidence, but on the basis of the same,
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. The record reflects the following:
Assistant District Attorney: Your Honor, my reason for rejecting . ..
these two is I feel very uncertain that they would be able to listen and
follow the interpreter . . . . I didn't feel, when I asked them whether or
not they could accept the interpreter's translation of it, I didn't feel that
they could . ...
The Court: [Hie [Assistant District Attorney] said the reason that he did
in fact remove these jurors is because even though they said they could
listen to what the interpreter said and not let their own evaluation of what
the witness says be the answer that they would utilize, he said [he had]
grave doubts . . ..
Id. at 622 (some emphasis appears in the opinion, other emphasis added).
84. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 628 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 629.
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non-erroneous evidence."7 The dissent noted that other state courts, in
construing their respective state constitutions, have held that a trial
court cannot simply accept at face value the explanation offered by the
prosecutor, but instead has a duty to examine certain types of evidence
when making its determination as to whether or not a prosecutor's
facially race-neutral explanation is pretextual or insufficient.88 Had the
87. Id. at 628-29.
88. Id. at 627. The dissent specifically cites Florida v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 22
(Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988). Other state courts with set guidelines have
also reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 624 (Ala.
1987); California v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 760-62, 765 (Cal. 1978); New Jersey v.
Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1166 (N.J. 1986). In Florida v. Slappy, the Florida Supreme
Court decreed that
the presence of one or more of these factors [from the nonexclusive list of
five factors] will tend to show that the state's reasons are not actually sup-
ported by the record or are an impermissible pretext: (1) alleged group
bias not shown to be shared by the juror in question, (2) failure to examine
the juror or perfunctory examination, assuming neither the trial court nor
opposing counsel had questioned the juror, (3) singling the juror out for
special questioning designed to evoke a certain response, (4) the prosecu-
tor's reason is unrelated to the facts of the case, and (5) a challenge based
on reasons equally applicable to juror [sic] who were not challenged.
Slappy, 522 So. 2d at 22.
Had the trial court in Hernandez applied the Slappy test, two of the factors would
have indicated that the prosecutor's reasons were not supported by the record or were a
pretext. Factor number three has significance because it might be expected that if a
Latino is asked whether he or she can disregard what is heard in Spanish and accept
only the English interpretation, the response will be a slight hesitation. Hernandez v.
New York, Ill S. Ct. 1859, 1867 (1991). In addition, factor number five is applicable
because the record does not show whether the prosecutor questioned non-Latino mem-
bers of the venire regarding their Spanish language ability. New York v. Hernandez,
552 N.E.2d 621, 628 (N.Y. 1990). It is entirely possible that one or more of those
individuals was indeed bilingual and therefore no less likely than the excluded jurors to
have difficulty in following the court's instruction to disregard the Spanish language
testimony. Similarly, in California v. Wheeler, the California Supreme Court held that
the prosecutor's explanation for excluding a juror would be acceptable only if he could
"satisfy the court that he exercised such peremptories ... for reasons of specific bias
. .. " California v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 765 (Cal. 1978). The trial court in Her-
nandez viewed the lack of specific bias as favorable to the state's position, reasoning
that if the defendant, the victim and the witness were each Latino, then the jurors were
just as likely to sympathize with the victims as with the defendant, and hence the
prosecutor had no motive to exclude the jurors. Hernandez, Ill S. Ct. at 1865 & n.2.
But the same set of facts, if analyzed under Wheeler, would have been viewed as unfa-
vorable to the state's position, since the prosecutor would have no justification for pe-
remptorily challenging a juror who has no specific bias. Brief for Petitioner, supra note
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dissent prevailed in this case, New York would be added to the list of
states which set specific guidelines for trial courts to follow when mak-
ing findings of fact relating to a prosecutor's use of peremptory chal-
lenges. 89 When such guidelines are established, appellate courts have a
basis upon which to rule, as a matter of law, whether or not the trial
courts clearly erred in making their findings of fact.90
Although the dissent did not discuss whether the appellate division
erred by failing to apply the proper review power-legal sufficiency and
weight of the evidence 9'-this area of inquiry would have provided yet
another basis for the dissent to conclude that the court of appeals
should have reversed the holding of the appellate division as a matter
of law. 92 Since the appellate division's opinion in Hernandez manifested
only an application of the legal sufficiency standard of review, 93 the
New York Court of Appeals would have been justified in reversing and
remitting the case to the appellate division for reconsideration of the
case, including a weight of the evidence review. 4
9, at 24-25; see also Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 765; Gilmore, 511 A.2d at 1166.
89. Florida, Alabama, California and New Jersey are among those states which
have set guidelines. See supra note 88.
90. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 626 (Kaye, J., dissenting) ("[T]he citizens of this
State [sic] would be well served by the development of an authoritative body of State
[sic] law instead of being held in suspense, case-by-case, over the next decade of litiga-
tion . ... ").
91. See People v. Bleakley, 508 N.E.2d 672, 673 (N.Y. 1987); infra note 92.
92. Bleakley, 508 N.E.2d at 673 (court held it reversible error when appellate
division "avoids its exclusive statutory authority to review the weight of the evidence in
criminal cases"). Under New York law, defendants are entitled to two standards of
intermediate appellate review: legal sufficiency, which requires only a determination of
whether it was reasonable, based on the record, for the trier of fact to have reached the
conclusion at issue, id. at 674-75, and weight of the evidence, which requires that
where, based on the record, a different finding would not have been unreasonable, the
appellate division must weigh the evidence by performing a factual analysis and must
make a determination whether the trier of fact accorded the proper weight to the evi-
dence. Id. at 675. However, the appellate division must give great weight to the trial
court's findings of fact when those findings turned on credibility. Id.
93. People v. Hernandez, 528 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (App. Div. 1988).
94. Bleakley, 508 N.E.2d at 675. Had the appellate division been required to
apply a weight of the evidence review, a different finding-that the prosecutor's expla-
nation was insufficient to rebut the defendant's prima facie case of intentional discrimi-
nation-might have been reached.
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IlI. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
In its brief to the Supreme Court of the United States, defense
counsel contended that the real issue in Hernandez is whether bilingual
Latinos can ever be jurors in criminal cases in which there may be
testimony in Spanish.95 But the argument can be extended to whether
bilinguals of any ethnic group can ever be jurors in criminal cases in
which there may be testimony in the non-English language of that
group."6 It is logical to conclude that the greater the ethnic population
of a given community, the greater the number of persons in that com-
munity for whom English is not the language generally spoken. There-
fore, the greater the ethnic population of a given community, the
greater the probability that a trial involving a member of that popula-
tion will require the use of an interpreter. 97
Defense counsel argued that if prosecutors are allowed to peremp-
95. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 10.
96. Hernandez v. New York, Ill S. Ct. 1859, 1872 (1991).
97. As of 1975, 42% of all Latinos claimed Spanish as the language they usually
speak. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 10 n.2 (citing Leobardo F. Estrada, The
Extent of Spanish/English Bilingualism in the United States, 15 AZTLAN, INT'L J.
CHICANO STUD. REs. at 381 (1984)); see also Brief for the Mexican American Legal
Defense and Educational Fund and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of
Puerto Rican Community Affairs in the United States, as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, app. D at 5, Hernandez v. New York, Ill S. Ct. 1859 (1991) (No. 89-
7645) [hereinafter Brief for Amici Curiae](citing Estrada, supra, as its source). De-
fense counsel construed this data to mean that, in cases involving Latinos, there is a
42% probability (nationwide) that an interpreter will be used. Brief for Petitioner,
supra note 9, at 10 n.2.
This is not necessarily a logical conclusion. For example, statewide in Florida,
Spanish is the first language of 83 % of all Latinos and the language of over 93 % of all
Cubans. See Brief for Amici Curiae, supra app. C at 4 (source: U.S. Bureau of the
Census (1980, 1983)). This, however, does not necessarily mean that these individuals
do not also speak their second language, English, well enough to testify at trial without
an interpreter. For example, only 16% of all Latinos living in Florida (and 20% of all
Cubans) reported they did not speak or understand English, while 18% of all Latinos
(20% of' all Cubans) described their ability to speak or understand English as "not
well." Brief for Amici Curiae, supra app. A at 2 (source: U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1980, 1983)). Thus, it is not 83% of Latinos and 93% of Cubans that would require
an interpreter, but only 34% of Latinos and 40% of Cubans living in Florida that
would require an interpreter if they were to give testimony. A full 66% of all Latinos,
and 60% of all Cubans, would not require an interpreter. But the 83% and 93%
figures do impact on juror status, since it is logical to conclude that many, who claim
Spanish as their first language, are also part of the 66% and 60% who do not require
an interpreter, and are therefore bilingual and at risk of exclusion from the jury.
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torily challenge bilingual members of an ethnic group because of their
ability to understand the testimony expected to be given in the lan-
guage of their ethnic group, then very few juries will include bilingual
ethnic jurors. 98 The impact on communities with large ethnic, bilingual
populations with resulting jury pools that are significantly bilingual
would be to exclude a large portion of the community from the jury,
based on a prosecutor's concern that those jurors might not be able to
disregard what they hear firsthand from the testimony.9" It was defense
counsel's strategy to integrally link the ability to speak a foreign lan-
guage, Spanish, with ethnic background, Latino, so that to challenge
for the former would be the equivalent of a challenge for the latter, and
thus a per se violation of the equal protection clause, as interpreted in
Batson.1"' For the defendant to prevail on this "per se" basis, it was
98. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 10-11.
99. Id.
100. Hernandez, 11l S. Ct. at 1866. In its reply brief, defense counsel conceded
that there is one situation in which it would be proper and race-neutral to peremptorily
challenge bilingual jurors on the basis of their Spanish language ability: when the sub-
stantive issue of the trial concerns conflicting translations of out-of-court statements
and the jury's determination must turn on testimony from expert witnesses in the field
of Spanish language. See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 15-16, Hernandez v. New York,
Ill S. Ct. 1859 (1991) (No. 89-7645)[hereinafter Petitioner's Reply Brief]. In such a
case, a juror's expertise in the Spanish language might cause him or her to have an
undue influence on the jury in persuading its members as to the "correct translation" of
the disputed statement. Id. But where there is no issue in which Spanish language
expertise plays a role, in other words, where knowledge of Spanish language and all its
nuances and dialects is not the substantive issue in the case, then a bilingual juror
would not have an undue influence on the jury. Id.
The state's argument, conceded by the defense as applicable only in the previously
mentioned situation, was that just as a doctor might be peremptorily struck from serv-
ing as a juror on a medical malpractice case, or a psychiatrist might be peremptorily
struck from serving as a juror on a criminal case involving an insanity defense, so
might a bilingual juror be struck from serving as a juror on a case involving Spanish
language interpretation, because in all cases the juror's special expertise would enable
him or her to unduly influence the jury. Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 18. In
support of its argument, the state cited New Jersey v. Pemberthy, 540 A.2d 227 (N.J.
Super Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 546 A.2d 547 (1988). In Pemberthy, which involved
the disputed translation of out-of-court audio-taped conversations in Spanish, all jurors
who spoke Spanish were peremptorily challenged. Id. at 232. The court found that
because the substantive issue involved Spanish language translation, the state's expla-
nation, which on its face intended to discriminate based on Spanish language, was
race-neutral. Id. at 233-34. In contrast, defense counsel distinguished Hernandez from
Pemberthy by noting that Hernandez contained no issue which required Spanish lan-
guage expertise. Petitioner's Reply Brief, supra at 16.
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critical for the Court to conclude that the prosecutor intentionally dis-
criminated on the basis of language, a conclusion the majority did not
reach.""l Having failed to reach that threshold conclusion, it did not
then matter whether or not the Court accepted the second premise that
language and ethnicity were one and the same, although there were
indications during oral arguments that the Court would not have made
that connection.1"2 At this point, the defendant's legal argument in sup-
port of a per se Batson violation was doomed, for if the prosecutor's
challenge was not made on the basis of language, it did not matter
whether language and ethnicity were one and the same, and therefore,
the prosecutor's statement, at least on its face, was neutral.
A. The Majority Opinion
The Court rejected the defendant's argument that the jurors had
been excluded not because of uniquely individual responses, but be-
cause of responses characteristic of all bilingual Latinos, in other
words, because of a Latino trait-Spanish language ability.1"3 Defense
counsel reasoned that the jurors had been asked if they could block out
and disregard what they would hear in Spanish and accept only the
official English from the interpreter. 04 Because of the difficulty, if not
the impossibility, of performing such a task'05 all bilingual Latinos
101. Hernandez, I11 S. Ct. at 1867. See infra Part 11, Section B, "The Majority
Opinion," for the majority's rationale in reaching its conclusion.
102. During oral argument before the Court, Justice Souter questioned whether
the correlation between bilingualism and national origin was as strong as had been
suggested. See Arguments Before the Court, 59 U.S.L.W. 3591, 3592 (U.S. Mar. 5,
1991) (Supreme Court Proceedings).
103. Hernandez v. New York, 11l S. Ct. 1859, 1867 (1991).
104. Id.
105. Two major reasons exist for the difficulty. The first relates to a phenomenon
known as code-switching, which is the alternating use of two languages by Hispanic
bilinguals. Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 100, at 11. Often the switch from one
language to another is not made consciously. Id. at 12. Recent studies show "that when
asked to recall the language in which certain information was received, bilinguals have
no memory of the input language. They appear to have retained only the information
itself. They have not tagged this information in memory according to the language in
which it was obtained." Id. (citing Magiste, The Competing Language Systems of the
Multilingual: A Developmental Study of Decoding and Encoding Processes, 18 J.
VERBAL LEARNING BEHAVIOR, 79, 79-89 (1979)). "There is no evidence that bilingual
individuals of any type have the ability to switch off one of their language systems." Id.
at 13 (citing M. ALBERT & L. OBLER. THE BILINGUAL BRAIN (1975); Grosjean, The
Bilingual as a Competent but Specific Speaker-Hearer, 6 J. MULTILINGUAL MUL-
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would reflexively hesitate when asked what these jurors had been
asked, even though they were willing to comply.106 Thus, defense coun-
sel contended that the prosecutor's doubts about the jurors' ability to
comply with the court's instructions would have applied to the entire
class of bilingual Latinos as a function of its Spanish language ability,
since the hesitancy which prompted the prosecutor's doubts was a re-
flex which all bilingual Latinos would have exhibited.1"7 This conten-
tion is logical only if one accepts the premise that the prosecutor's
question will always be phrased to place bilingual jurors in the impossi-
ble position of having to respond that they can block out and disregard
what they will hear in Spanish. It is true that if the prosecutor phrases
the question in a "yes or no" manner, most bilingual Latinos would
reflexively hesitate before answering that they could, in fact, comply
with the court's instruction to disregard the Spanish language testi-
mony, while some would hesitate before answering that they could not
comply (and would therefore be excused for cause). But there might be
some, who would immediately, and without hesitation, respond that
they could comply with the court's instruction. Further, one does not
have to accept defense counsel's premise that the prosecutor will pose
the question in a manner which is designed to evoke a hesitant re-
sponse. It is entirely possible that the prosecutor could ask a prospec-
tive juror if he or she will listen to the interpreter and accept the offi-
cial translation, and further ask that should a discrepancy in the
translation be noted, if he or she will discreetly bring it to the court's
attention so as not to make the other jurors aware of the problem until
it can be resolved by the court. If the question were phrased in this
way, then very few, if any, bilingual Latinos would hesitate before an-
swering that, "yes," they could comply. Thus, the responses of the ju-
rors are a function of the way that the question is phrased. Even if
TICULTURAL DEV., 467, 467-77 (1985)).
The second reason relates to the difficulty all jurors face when asked to follow
instructions which require them to disregard evidence they have already heard. See,
e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 132-33 (1968) (quoting excerpts from
Judge Learned Hand's opinions: "[Instructing the jury to disregard evidence is a] rec-
ommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers,
but anybody's else." Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932); "[l]t is
indeed very hard to believe that a jury will, or for that matter can, in practice observe
the admonition." United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956) (subse-
quent history omitted)).
106. Hernandez, Ill S. Ct. at 1867.
107. Id. at 1868.
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phrased in the manner most likely to evoke a hesitant response, there
might still be some who will not hesitate. Therefore, it is conclusory to
state that all bilinguals would react to the prosecutor's question in the
same way. Based on defense counsel's contention, however, the defend-
ant sought to have the Court conclude that the prosecutor's explanation
for challenging the jurors was not a legitimate, neutral explanation
based on difficulty in following the court's instructions, but was instead
an explanation which clearly was language/ethnicity based.'08 By elect-
ing to accept the state's argument that the prosecutor's reason was
based on considerations regarding ability to follow the court's instruc-
tions, the Court did not have to reach the question of whether language
ability and Latino ethnicity were to be considered as interchangeable
for purposes of equal protection, analysis.109 As Justice Kennedy
explained,
A neutral explanation . . . here means an explanation based on
something other than the race of the juror. At this step of the in-
quiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation.
Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's expla-
nation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral." 0
Having found nothing in the prosecutor's statement that indicated an
intent to discriminate on the basis of language ability or Latino ethnic-
ity, the majority concluded that, under step two of the Batson analysis,
the reason offered was race neutral."' Thus the majority found no per
se violation of the equal protection clause." 2
For the Court to have declared the prosecutor's statement a per se
violation, it would necessarily have had to expand the concept of race
to include language ability, so that every challenge based on language
would be an "automatic" per se equal protection violation. Such a step
would have expanded the concept of race too broadly for any sort of
equal protection analysis. The Court did not declare the challenge to be
a per se violation because the Court's initial premise, upon which its
conclusion was based, was incorrect. The Court failed to recognize that
the prosecutor's speculation regarding the bilingual jurors' inability to
accept only the official interpretation of Spanish language testimony
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1866-67.
110. Id. at 1866.
Ill. Hernandez, III S. Ct. at 1866-67.
112. Id. at 1867.
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was, in reality, a language-based reason. The Court did not acknowl-
edge that the prosecutor simply felt uncomfortable with the jurors'
Spanish language ability, despite their stated willingness to comply
with the court's instructions. Having committed to this incorrect pre-
mise, the Court then had no choice but to conclude that if the explana-
tion was not based on language, it could not be a per se violation.113
Had the Court recognized that, in this case, the challenge was lan-
guage based, and logically gone on to hold that the challenge was a per
se violation, the concept of race would have been expanded too broadly
for any future equal protection analysis to be meaningful. It would
have meant, for example, that if a prosecutor peremptorily challenged
a bilingual non-Latino on the basis of his or her language skills, the
court would deem the challenge to be language, and hence, race-based,
and would declare the challenge a per se equal protection violation,
even though the juror may not have been a member of any "cognizable
racial group"'1 4 ordinarily thought to require protection under the
equal protection clause. Foreseeing this possibility, perhaps the Court
intentionally did not reach the first premise-that the prosecutor's ex-
planation was language-based-in order to avoid reaching the conclu-
sion that the explanation was a per se violation of the equal protection
clause. Although language and ethnicity are closely intertwined, it
would be overinclusive to declare every language-based challenge to be
a race-based challenge. With many school districts mandating Spanish
language instruction for English-speaking students, it is not uncommon
to find bilingual individuals who are not members of an ethnic minority
group. Therefore, the Court's ruling was a prudent one.
The Court's decision not to declare the challenge a per se violation
is not harsh because it leaves open the possibility that, in part three of
the Batson analysis, the challenge could still be found unconstitutional
on grounds of pretext or insufficiency, in light of "the particular cir-
cumstances of the trial or the individual responses of the jurors
Under Batson, the analysis must continue to part three even if
113. For the Court to declare the explanation a per se violation, it would have
had to conclude first, that the explanation was language-based, and second, that lan-
guage was a proxy for race/ethnicity. Having failed to reach the first conclusion, it was
logically impossible to reach the ultimate conclusion that the explanation was a per se
violation.
114. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
115. Hernandez, I1l S. Ct. at 1873.
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part two yields a finding that no per se violation had occurred."' 0 How-
ever, unlike part two, where the only consideration is the facial validity
of the prosecutor's explanation, in part three of the Batson analysis, all
factors concerning the voir dire and the proceedings are to be consid-
ered by the trial court when determining if the explanation, though
facially neutral, is really a pretext for purposeful discrimination.1 ' For
example, the disparate impact of the prosecutor's criterion on Latinos,
though not proof of discriminatory intent, may be used by the court as
evidence of such intent.118 Similarly, the trial court could consider as
evidence of discriminatory intent the fact that the prosecutor chose to
exclude all bilingual jurors even after a method far less drastic was
suggested to him." 9 It was the opinion of the majority that since the
trial court had ample opportunity to explore these and other possibili-
ties, and since the trial court was in the best position to observe the
parties and make findings regarding their credibility,12 0 then on appeal,
great deference should be accorded to the trial judge's finding of fact
that the prosecutor's explanation was non-pretextual and to be be-
lieved. 21 Furthermore, the majority flatly rejected defense counsel's
contention that, because a Batson claim involves a racial/ethnic classi-
fication, review of a trial court's decision in such a case should receive
independent appellate review.1"2 The Court rested its decision on prece-
dent holding that, unless "exceptional circumstances" existed, the
Court would defer to factual findings of state courts, and even if those
findings related to a constitutional issue it would not alter the Court's
position based on deference. 23 Thus, a reversal of the trial court's find-
ing of fact on the issue of discriminatory intent would be possible only
if the Supreme Court was "convinced that the trial court's determina-
tion was clearly erroneous."124
116. Id. at 1868.
117. Id.
118. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
119. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1868. Interestingly, the majority noted that intent
to discriminate would only be imputed to the prosecutor if defense counsel had first
suggested the less burdensome means. Id. Thus, the burden was on the defendant to
make such a suggestion.
120. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985).
121. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1871.
122. Id. In support of its position, the Court reiterated the explanation it had
given in Batson. See supra note 60.
123. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1868-69.
124. Id. at 1871. "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evi-
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"[W]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous."' 25 Here,
there was sufficient evidence-the fact that the prosecutor had no mo-
tive to discriminate, since the victims, the defendant and the prosecu-
tion witnesses were all Latino' 2 6-6for the trial judge to have believed
the prosecutor's explanation.1" Thus the judge's view, albeit not the
only view that could have been taken, was permissible. Being a permis-
sible view of the evidence, the majority found no clear error in the trial
court's determination that the prosecutor did not intentionally discrimi-
nate on the basis of the jurors' ethnicity.128
In considering the degree of deference to be accorded a trial
court's judgment on appeal, the majority seemed at a loss to under-
stand the "nature of the review petitioner would have us conduct. 129
Defendant had stated that plenary federal review is required whenever
"critical constitutional values are at stake that extend beyond the rights
of the immediate parties involved .. "..,o In essence, because the
constitutional rights of all bilingual Latinos were at stake, defense
counsel sought some type of heightened scrutiny from the Court.'
The use of the term "scrutiny" was unfortunate,3 2 for if height-
ened (strict) scrutiny was sought, it was not applicable in this case.
Normally, when a state actor, such as the prosecutor, makes a classifi-
cation based on race or ethnicity, an equal protection analysis employ-
ing strict scrutiny will be performed. 13 Under such an analysis, the
classification will be permitted only if the state demonstrates a compel-
ling interest and if the scheme is narrowly tailored and necessary to
achieve that compelling state interest." But under Batson, this type of
equal protection analysis is impossible because the peremptory strike
dence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 365 (1948).
125. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).
126. Hernandez, III S. Ct. at 1872, 1865 n.2.
127. Id. at 1872.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1870.
130. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 34.
131. Id. at 41-42.
132. See infra note 144.
133. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986).
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based on race or ethnicity is never allowed to stand, even if the state's
interest is extremely compelling. 35 It cannot be conceded on the one
hand that the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to exclude a ju-
ror based on race or ethnicity, and then be claimed on the other that
the peremptory strike withstands strict scrutiny under the equal protec-
tion clause because the state had a compelling interest and the means
chosen--excluding the juror-were narrowly tailored to achieve that
goal. 1 36
Additionally, strict scrutiny was not applicable because the prereq-
uisite to this level of scrutiny is the establishment of invidious, inten-
tional discrimination, in other words, the establishment that the classi-
fication was made with the intent to discriminate based on race.3 7 But
in Batson type cases, this prerequisite cannot be satisfied prior to the
inquiry because the establishment of intentional discrimination is pre-
cisely the issue to be decided at the third level of inquiry."8' Further-
more, under Batson, in order to progress to the third level of in-
quiry-whether the stated reason for the peremptory challenge was a
pretext for intentional discrimination-it must have already been es-
tablished at the second level that, at least facially, the defendant's
prima facie case of invidious discrimination had been rebutted. 139 Thus,
the most that could exist at the third stage of inquiry was a "suspicion"
of intentional discrimination. A mere suspicion of intentional discrimi-
nation is insufficient to satisfy the prerequisite establishment of inten-
tional discrimination which is necessary to mandate an inquiry on ap-
peal under strict scrutiny.' 40
135. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-99.
136. Id.
137. Washington, 426 U.S. at 242.
138. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
139. Id. at 97. The inquiry would never proceed to the third level if a per se
violation of the equal protection clause had been found at the second level.
140. Washington, 426 U.S. at 242. The term "scrutiny," as used in constitutional
law, is often associated with an equal protection means-ends analysis. If state action is
analyzed tinder strict [a form of heightened] scrutiny, the action will be held violative
of the equal protection clause, and therefore unconstitutional, unless the means chosen
by the state are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest or objective.
See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
It appears that despite the use of the phrase "heightened [strict] scrutiny" in Peti-
tioner's Brief, Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 42, defense counsel was not refer-
ring to a means-ends analysis, i.e., level of scrutiny, at all, but was referring to the level
of factual analysis that he thought should be employed by the appellate courts. Id. at
42-46. In order to determine if the trial court's finding of no intentional discrimination
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However, if what the defendant sought was independent, de novo
factual review, that type of review is not only reasonable when constitu-
tional issues are involved, but is also reconcilable with the majority's
view regarding deference to the trial court's factual findings that turn
on credibility.' If the appellate court determined, after weighing the
facts and taking into consideration the deference to be accorded the
was clearly erroneous, an appellate court's review of how that finding was made can
range from a de novo factual analysis all the way to extreme deference. Id. at 29.
When performing a de novo factual analysis to review for clear error, the appellate
court will analyze the method by which the trial court arrived at its decision and ascer-
tain that the facts in the record are sufficient to support that finding. Id. at 32. But if,
after weighing the evidence, the appellate court disagrees with the finding of the trial
court, it will overturn the trial court's finding, Id. Under a less stringent level of factual
analysis, if the appellate court is satisfied with the method used and the sufficiency of
the record, then even if it disagrees with the trial court's factual finding, it will con-
clude that the trial court reasonably could have found as it did and, therefore, that the
finding was not clearly erroneous. See People v. Bleakley, 508 N.E.2d 672, 674-75
(N.Y. 1987). However, at the other extreme, the appellate court will not make any
inquiry into the method used by the trial court, but will instead simply defer to the trial
court's finding, provided there is some shred of support in the record. Brief for Peti-
tioner, supra note 9, at 36.
In the present case, defense counsel sought to have the lower court's finding of
non-discrimination reviewed under a stringent, de novo factual analysis, whereby the
trial court's finding of non-discrimination would be held clearly erroneous unless firmly
supported by the record both as to weight and sufficiency. Id. at 36-39. In fact, though,
the trial record was incomplete, containing neither a voir dire record nor specific fac-
tual findings, see id. at 47, and thus, could not have supported the trial court's finding
under a de novo review for clear error. Therefore, the appellate court would have had
to discern clear error.
141. In satisfying both the defendant's request for de novo factual review and the
majority's insistence on deference to the trial court, the appellate court would first
examine the record to ascertain that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial
court's finding. This would be accomplished if a determination was made that it was
reasonable, based on the record, for the trial court judge to have made the finding at
issue. See Bleakley, 508 N.E.2d at 674-75. But then the appellate court would be re-
quired to go one step further in performing a weight of the evidence review. See supra
note 92.
In performing this appellate review, the court would determine if a different factual
finding would not have been unreasonable, and then, by a de novo factual analysis,
would weigh the facts to determine whether the trial court judge had correctly weighed
the facts. Bleakley, 508 N.E.2d at 675. However, in weighing the facts, the appellate
court must assign great weight to the trial court's findings if those findings turned on
credibility. Id.
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trial court, that the finding could not be supported by the weight of the
evidence-even after giving great weight to the trial court-then the
appellate court must conclude that the trial court's finding was clearly
erroneous. Thus, the defendant's request for independent plenary re-
view is entirely consistent with deference to a trial court's findings of
fact.
Of course, had the Court formulated specific guidelines by which
trial courts are to make findings of intentional discrimination in Batson
type cases, then the appellate review might be limited to a determina-
tion, as a matter of law, whether the trial court had reached its finding
by applying those guidelines.
B. The Concurring Opinion
The concurring justices viewed the defendant's case as an argu-
ment for establishing intentional discrimination on the basis of dispa-
rate impact,142 clearly an argument which the Court has never ac-
cepted. 4 In the view of the concurrence, all that Batson requires to
dispel the defendant's prima facie case of purposeful discrimination is
an explanation other than race."' Since the prosecutor's explanation
did not make any mention of race, it succeeded in rebutting any infer-
ence of purposeful discrimination, and thus the peremptory strike was
not a violation of the equal protection clause. ' "
In reaching this conclusion, the concurring justices interpreted
Batson in a purist light. According to the concurrence, the peremptory
strikes "may have acted like strikes based on race, but they were not
based on race. No matter how closely tied or significantly correlated to
race the explanation for a peremptory strike may be, the strike does not
implicate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is based on race. "16
Under this reasoning, a prosecutor can avoid a per se equal protection
violation if he or she is careful to word the explanation in a manner
which does not mention race. 1 7 An analysis of the purist approach
142. Hernandez v. New York, Ill S. Ct. 1859, 1873 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
143. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976); see also Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977); Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973).
144. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1873 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 1874.
146. Id.
147. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring)
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leads one to conclude that it is overly simplistic and invites deception
by encouraging prosecutors to play the game so that the "race words"
are never mentioned. "[A]ny prosecutor's office could develop a list of
10 or 15 standard reasons for striking a juror; the juror was 'inatten-
tive' or dressed poorly and thus 'did not seem to respect the system of
justice.' "148 Surely, when Batson was decided the majority could not
have intended that the requirement of a facially race-neutral explana-
tion to rebut a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination be fulfilled
by the meaningless recitation of empty words.
The concurrence did state, however, that the trial court retained
the right to disbelieve the prosecutor if the court considered dispropor-
tionate effect as evidence of intentional discrimination." 9 But if the
trial court chooses to believe the explanation, "and that finding is not
clearly erroneous, that is the end of the matter."150 Thus, even though
the trial court's findings of fact might have been arbitrary, made with-
out benefit of any clear set of guidelines, the concurrence, like the ma-
jority, would have those findings of fact reviewed on appeal for clear
error under a standard of extreme deference."'
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion in which Justice Mar-
shall joined, and Justice Blackmun joined in part. The thrust of their
opinion centered on the insufficiency of the prosecutor's explanation to
rebut the prima facie case of invidious discrimination.1 52 In the dis-
sent's view, the prima facie case made by the defendant could not have
been established without a preliminary showing of invidious, purposeful
intent to discriminate.153 Once this is shown, the burden then shifts to
the prosecutor to offer an explanation sufficient to rebut that prima
facie case, and does not mean that any facially neutral explanation
("Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial
courts are ill equipped to second-guess those reasons.").
148. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 42 (quoting David 0. Stewart, Court
Rules Against Jury Selection Based on Race, A.B.A. J., July 1986, at 68, 70.
149. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1874-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 1875.
151. Id.
152. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1875-77 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
153. Id. at 1875-76; see supra note 49.
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which is not pretextual is sufficient."" It is entirely possible that an
explanation which is facially race-neutral and not pretextual could sim-
ply be insufficient to dispel the defendant's prima facie case of invidi-
ous discrimination. 55 In that event, the defendant would have carried
his burden of proving that the state peremptorily challenged a juror in
a manner which violated the equal protection clause.1 56 The dissent
felt, therefore, that the majority had erred "in focusing the entire in-
quiry on the subjective state of mind of the prosecutor" rather than on
objective evidence,' 57 since discriminatory purpose may exist even if a
prosecutor believes his motive to be pure.158
In this case, the justification given by the prosecutor, though
facially race-neutral, would nonetheless result in the disproportionate
exclusion of bilingual Latinos from the jury.159 Since such disparate
impact is evidence of discriminatory purpose,' 60 it was the opinion of
the dissent that an explanation which leads to evidence of discrimina-
tory purpose would be insufficient to rebut the prima facie case.' 6 ' The
dissent would reject the prosecutor's explanation, calling it "a proxy for
a discriminatory practice."' 62
The prosecutor's explanation could also be rejected based on pre-
cedent indicating that the state cannot use discriminatory means to ac-
commodate its concern when a nondiscriminatory alternative exists.' 63
154. Id. at 1876.
155. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 159-164, 188-190.
156. Hernandez, Ill S. Ct. at 1876 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. Id.
158. It is important to note that the defendant and his counsel did not accuse the
prosecutor of being racially motivated or intending to exclude Latinos because of their
national origin. Their only contention was that he intended to exclude bilinguals. The
prosecutor believed his motive to be pure, race-neutral and based on the case at bar.
Defense counsel never doubted the prosecutor's good faith, but merely made the point
that an intent to discriminate on the basis of language, even though seemingly neutral,
is tantamount to an intent to discriminate on the basis of ethnic origin. Brief for Peti-
tioner, supra note 9, at 20-22.
159. Hernandez, I1l S. Ct. at 1877 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. Washington, 426 U.S. at 242.
161. Hernandez, 11l S. Ct. at 1876 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 1877.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) ("In deter-
mining whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate, we look to several factors,
including the ...efficacy of alternative remedies ....") (construed in Richmond v.
J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989), to stand for the proposition that the state
cannot make distinctions on the basis of race if there are nondiscriminatory alternatives
which are just as effective).
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In the present case, if the prosecutor was concerned that the bilingual
jurors might hear different evidence than the other jurors and might
then have an undue influence upon the other jurors, the problem might
easily have been resolved by an instruction to the jury that the official
translation, and not the firsthand testimony, shall be evidence. 16  It is
interesting that in support of this proposition, the dissent cited United
States v. Perez,'65 the same case cited by the majority as an "[illustra-
tion of] the sort of problems that may arise where a juror fails to ac-
cept the official translation of foreign-language testimony."'06 In Perez,
the juror interrupted the proceedings to dispute the interpreter's trans-
lation of a word.' 67 The judge advised the juror it was improper for her
to question the interpreter directly in the presence of the other jurors,
declaring that if she had a question she must phrase it privately to the
judge. When the juror persisted, the interpreter responded by defend-
ing her qualifications as an interpreter. To this, the juror responded,
"it's an idiom, '"108 which was incorrectly recorded by the court reporter
as "you're an idiot. '169 It was only after this public interchange that
the judge instructed the jurors, apparently for the first time, that they
were to rely only upon the official English translation, and that should
they have questions they were to bring those questions discreetly to the
attention of the judge. 7 ' The judge then had the interpreter question
the witness as to the juror's doubts, and it was established that the
interpreter's translation had, after all, been what the witness intended,
and not what the juror claimed.' 7 ' But based on the juror's behavior,
the judge concluded the juror was angry and opinionated, and the
The majority opinion indicated that had the defendant suggested such an alterna-
tive to the prosecutor, and the prosecutor then refused the alternative, the trial court
could have considered the refusal to be evidence of intent to discriminate. Hernandez,
111 S. Ct. at 1868. The dissent, however, makes no such requirement that the prosecu-
tor first be apprised by the defendant of such an alternative. Id. at 1876 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The fact that the alternative exists and is one of which the prosecutor
should be aware, without the urging of the defendant, is sufficient. Id.
164. Hernandez, 11l S. Ct. at 1877 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. 658 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1981).
166. Hernandez, Ill S. Ct. at 1867 n.3. Excerpts from Perez appeared on the
front page of The Miami Herald on May 29, 1991, to emphasize the basis for the
Court's ruling in Hernandez. See supra note 19.
167. Perez, 658 F.2d at 662.
168. Id. at 663.
169. Id. at 662, 663.
170. Id. at 662-63.
171. Id. at 663.
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judge feared that the juror's attitude might infect the jury.1 72 As a re-
sult, the judge dismissed her from the jury.173
By citing Perez as support for their proposal, the dissent in Her-
nandez apparently did not view Perez as standing for the proposition
which the majority had suggested.17 ' The problem in Perez was not the
juror's failure or inability to accept the translation, but rather the fail-
ure of the court to instruct the jury before the Spanish language testi-
mony had begun. 175 As the dissent suggests, proper instructions given
to the jury prior to the commencement of any Spanish language testi-
mony would avoid any problem relating to how a juror should resolve a
translation discrepancy, and the level of confidentiality he or she must
maintain with respect to the other jurors. 17 1
Not only would this procedure be a non-discriminatory alternative
to the practice of excluding all bilingual Latinos, but logic dictates that
it would also further the state's interest in promoting fair trials.1 1 7 As
the dissenting opinion in the New York Court of Appeals noted,
"[s]urely, the majority does not intend to suggest . . . that if the trans-
lator is rendering a witness' testimony inaccurately into English, the
State has a valid interest in permitting the errors to go unnoticed. 17 8
To the, contrary, the state's interest should be to ensure that jurors do
not make decisions based on erroneous evidence, a proposition exempli-
fied in Santana v. New York City Transit Authority.79 Santana illus-
trates that justice is best served when bilinguals are seated as jurors in
cases involving Spanish language testimony and are permitted to dis-
creetly question the interpreter through the judge. 8 ' In this case, a
juror who spoke Spanish believed that the plaintiff's testimony had not
172. Perez, 658 F.2d at 663.
173. Id. During the pre-dismissal meeting, the juror admitted to the judge that
she had always had a problem "keeping [her] mouth shut." Id.
174. Cf. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1877 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Perez as
a good example of non-discriminatory means which the prosecutor could have taken)
with Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1867 n.3 (citing Perez as an illustration of the harm
that can result when a bilingual juror has a problem with the official interpretation.)
175. Perez, 658 F.2d at 662-63. In addition, the difficulties that arose were at-
tributable to the individual juror's self-admitted emotional problem. Id. at 663.
176. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1877 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. See New York v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 628-29 (N.Y. 1990) (Kaye,
J., dissenting).
178. Id.
179). 505 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
180. Id. at 777-78.
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been correctly translated by the interpreter.'81 He passed a note to the
court officer requesting permission to confer with the judge during a
recess. The judge first determined that since no other jurors had been
apprised of the matter, the juror would not have an undue influence on
the jury.' 82 The court then instructed counsel to re-call the witness to
the. stand, and upon further questioning, it was established that the ju-
ror, and not the interpreter, had been correct. 183 Thus, the jurors had
the benefit of deliberating and making their determination on the basis
of correct evidence.184
Ideally, such a discrepancy between jurors and interpreters should
not exist, for "[iJf the interpreters employed by our criminal courts are
as accurate as they should be, given that the defendant's liberty may
depend upon the translator's words, then there should be no disagree-
ment between the translator and jurors fluent in Spanish."' 5 The fact
that this proposition may be only an ideal was recently pointed out by
Florida's Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission, appointed in 1989
by the Florida Supreme Court. 86 The commission's findings, which
were scheduled to be formally disclosed in December 1991, in a report
to the Florida Supreme Court, indicate that "trained and certified in-
terpreters are rare, and many judicial circuits have no standards ....
It's often left to individual judges and court administrators to find ca-
pable translators."'1 87 Given the lack of qualified interpreters in Florida,
it would not serve the state's interest in promoting fair trials to exclude
bilingual jurors, nor would it serve the state's interest to seat bilingual
jurors with a proviso that they totally disregard the witness' testimony
in Spanish in favor of the interpreter's translation. Particularly where
there is concern over the quality of the interpreters, it is essential to
seat bilingual jurors, who will listen to both the witness' testimony and
the interpreter's translation, so that discrepancies can be brought to the
court's attention in an effort to serve justice by having the jury decide
181. Id. at 777.
182. Id. at 778.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 779 ("Inevitably, due to the spontanaeity [sic] of an interpreter's
translation or the lack of an exact translation of a word, it is possible that the inter-
preter may not choose the best word possible, thus causing a deviation in the intended
communication to the jury.").
185. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 628 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
186. See Study: Race Bias Pervades Courts, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 14, 1991, at
A l, col. 5.
187. Id. at A25, col. 1.
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on the basis of non-erroneous evidence.
The dissent in Hernandez also noted a third reason why the prose-
cutor's statement was insufficient to rebut the prima facie case: if the
prosecutor's concern regarding the jurors' ability to follow the court's
instructions was valid, a challenge for cause could have been made. 188
The dissent reasoned that since the prosecutor did not make such a
challenge, he must have been unable to document his concern.' 89 The
dissent further reasoned that if the prosecutor's concern could not be
documented by the record, it amounted to a "frivolous or illegitimate
[justification which] should not suffice to overcome the prima facie
case."
9 0
The dissent conceded that each reason, considered separately,
might not be grounds for rejecting the prosecutor's facially race-neutral
explanation as being insufficient.' 9 ' The concession, however, was not
due to the lack of strength or validity of each reason, but rather to the
dissent's acknowledgement that the positions advanced by its opinion
were not acceptable to the majority. For example, on the issue of dispa-
rate impact on Latinos, the dissent focused on the objective result, the
disparate impact, to conclude that the prosecutor's facially race-neutral
explanation was simply "a proxy for a discriminatory practice,"' 92
therefore, insufficient to rebut the prima facie case of purposeful dis-
crimination.' 93 Although a valid argument, the dissent recognized that
the majority would not accept its reasoning, based on the Court's long-
standing position that disparate impact alone is insufficient to establish
a violation of the equal protection clause. 94 Thus, the dissent's first
reason, by itself, would not be grounds for rejecting the state's
explanation.
Similarly, the dissent conceded its second argument, regarding
nondiscriminatory alternatives, because the Court has continued to
hold that the availability of nondiscriminatory means is but one factor
to be taken into account when determining whether or not the state
intended to discriminate. 195 The third argument, that if the prosecutor's
reason was valid it could have supported a challenge for cause, is gain-
188. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1877 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1876-77.
191. Id. at 1877.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
195. See supra note 163.
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ing strength in the movement to do away with peremptory challenges in
the wake of Batson.19 It is a powerful argument, and perhaps in the
final analysis, it will be the solution to the "Batson dilemma," for de-
spite the oft-quoted phrase from Batson that "the prosecutor's explana-
tion need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for
cause," 197 most judges and lawyers are still struggling to understand
Batson's requirement of a quasi explanation. But for now, as long as
the peremptory system still exists, the dissent's third reason cannot pre-
vail, because it directly contradicts the lighter requirements set forth in
Batson to examine the prosecutor's statement. 19
Although each of the reasons advanced by the dissent might not,
on its own, be grounds for rejecting the prosecutor's explanation, the
dissent concluded that the combined weight of the reasons supports a
rejection as a matter of law. 199
IV. CONCLUSION
Using the Batson analysis, there are two ways in which a peremp-
tory challenge could be declared a violation of the equal protection
clause: either the challenge is a per se violation, i.e., on its face the
prosecutor's explanation is that he or she intended to discriminate
based on the juror's race or national origin, or it is a violation because
it fails, by way of pretext or insufficiency, to overcome a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination. 00 The ruling on the per se issue was
a thoughtful, sensitive one, which attempted to find a middle ground
between equating race with language on one extreme for purposes of
equal protection analysis, and on the other extreme, signalling that the
Court would condone discrimination based on language.
However, its decision on whether the trial court erred in determin-
ing that the explanation was not pretextual, nor insufficient, and was
thus not a violation of the equal protection clause under part three of
the Batson analysis, was questionable. This decision involved a ruling
on the other issue in the case-the amount of deference to be accorded
the trial court in deciding whether or not it erred in accepting the pros-
ecutor's explanation. The Court's ruling on this issue was not as astute
196. See supra notes 68, 72, and 73.
197. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
198. See supra text accompanying note 197.
199. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1877.
200. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986).
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as its per se ruling. When the Court ruled that a trial court's finding of
fact on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent should be ac-
corded great deference on appeal,"' it failed to recognize the potential
for abuse in exercising peremptory challenges against bilingual Latinos.
Had the Court decided this case on the basis of whether or not the trial
court took into account all relevant factors, it might have arrived at the
conclusion reached by the dissent.
However, the import of this decision is for future cases. Until the
United States Supreme Court sets guidelines similar to those set by
some states,2"2 cases tried in federal district courts and in state courts
not having such guidelines will be reviewed on appeal under the clearly
erroneous standard, but with very little analysis regarding the trial
court's finding of fact as to discrimination in the use of peremptory
challenges. The effect will be rulings which are inconsistent because
each was a "rubber stamp" given in deference to a trial court which
was not obliged to make its findings under any consistent set of guide-
lines. 'Worse, by simply deferring, rather than analyzing for clear error
according to an authoritative body of law, the Supreme Court or state
appellate courts could be setting legal precedent which has no basis in
fact or in law.
Fortunately, cases arising in Florida are governed by Florida v.
Slappy ,203 which gives direction to the trial court and gives the appel-
late courts a basis upon which to review for clear error. In addition,
Justice Kennedy's warning that, in some cases, language proficiency
will be treated as a surrogate for race,204 should serve as notice that the
Court by no means gave blanket approval to peremptory challenges of
bilinguals in cases involving testimony given through an interpreter. °5
201. Hernandez v. New York, Ill S. Ct. 1859, 1869 (1991).
202. See, e.g., Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 624 (Ala. 1987); Florida v.
Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988).
203. 522 So. 2d at 22.
204. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1872-73; see infra note 205.
205. The Court went to great lengths to emphasize that its holding was limited
to the facts of the Hernandez case, stating explicitly that each case must be reviewed
on its own merits based on all the circumstances of that case. Hernandez, Ill S. Ct. at
1873. Justice Kennedy was referring to this case-by-case method when he stated,
[olur decision today does not imply that exclusion of bilinguals from jury
service is wise, or even that it is constitutional in all cases . . . .It may
well be, for certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that profi-
ciency in a particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a sur-
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Thus, there are sufficient safeguards in Florida, at least, so that the
abuses feared by defense attorneys and Latino groups in the wake of
the Hernandez decision, will not come to pass.
Ronnie R. Savar
Thus, the ultimate message of the Court was that race would not be expanded to
include language proficiency as a general rule, but that if the circumstances of a partic-
ular case indicated, for that case, that language should be treated as a surrogate for
race, then the exclusion of a bilingual juror for a language-based reason would be un-
constitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause.
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